Day: October 11, 2026

Missing Magmatic Arc Unearthed: Geologists Reveal Hidden Late Cretaceous Volcanic Belt in Northwestern Iran

Geologists from an international team led by Istanbul Technical University (ITU) have identified evidence of a previously unrecognized Late Cretaceous continental magmatic arc in northwestern Iran, named the Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc.

The discovery of the previously unrecognized Late Cretaceous Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc in northwestern Iran is significant because it fills a major gap in the tectonic and magmatic history of the Arabia- Eurasia collision zone and revises models of Neo- Tethyan subduction.

An illustrated geological map depicting the Hidden Cretaceous Magmatic Arc in northwestern Iran, showcasing ancient volcanic activity, basaltic outcrops, and the effects of tectonic movement on the landscape.
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Geologists from an international team led by Istanbul Technical University (ITU) have identified evidence of a previously unrecognized Late Cretaceous continental magmatic arc in northwestern Iran, named the Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc.

This arc was active roughly 101- 97 million years ago during Neo-Tethyan subduction. It had been largely obscured by later tectonic overprinting, erosion, and basin burial.

The findings, published in Geoscience Frontiers (open access), come from integrating new zircon U- Pb geochronology, Lu- Hf isotopic data, and whole- rock geochemistry on volcanic and plutonic rocks from the Misho, Sufian, Moro, Amand, Vanyar, and Iskandar regions.

Key results

  • Ages of ~101- 97 Ma for gabbros and granodiorites.
  • εHf(t) values ranging from +9.8 to −7.2, indicating mixed mantle and crustal sources.
  • Arc- like geochemical signatures (LREE enrichment and subduction- related anomalies).
  • Magmatic evolution from juvenile tholeiitic to enriched shoshonitic compositions, linked to increasing crustal assimilation and slab rollback.
  • Structural alignment along the Siah Cheshmeh- Khoy- Misho- Tabriz Fault (SKMT), interpreted as a possible concealed suture related to arc migration and back-arc basin development.

The system is distinct from the better- known Sanandaj- Sirjan and Urumieh- Dokhtar magmatic belts and was later overprinted by Eocene Urumieh- Dokhtar magmatism. Corresponding author Dr. Ali Mohammadi (ITU) noted that the magmatic history of northwestern Iran is more complex than previously recognized.

Authors include Ali Mohammadi, Hadi Shafaii Moghadam, Amaneh Kaveh- Firouz, Anna Lechmann, Fulong Cai, and Lin Ding (affiliations involving ITU, Damghan University, ETH Zurich, and others). Supplementary data (zircon images, geochemical tables, etc.) are available via Mendeley Data.

This discovery fills a gap in the tectonic evolution of the Arabia- Eurasia collision zone and highlights how continental arcs can be cryptically preserved despite later deformation. Note that separate recent work has addressed a broader “missing” Late Cretaceous arc in Iran (e.g., via detrital zircons in the Makran), proposing removal by subduction erosion or strike- slip displacement; the ITU- led study specifically documents preserved remnants in the northwest.

A landscape view featuring Miocene sandstone and basalt formations, with labeled geological features.
Field photographs of sampled outcrops: (a) Sufian Late Cretaceous basalt; (b) Moro Late Cretaceous gabbro; (c) Amand Late Cretaceous gabbro and Late Devonian granite; (d) Vanyar Late Cretaceous basalt; (e) Iskandar Late Cretaceous granodiorite. Credit: Geoscience Frontiers (2026). DOI: 10.1016/j.gsf.2025.102205

The discovery of the previously unrecognized Late Cretaceous Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc in northwestern Iran is significant because it fills a major gap in the tectonic and magmatic history of the Arabia- Eurasia collision zone and revises models of Neo- Tethyan subduction.

Key aspects of its importance

Completes the magmatic record: Iran’s well-documented magmatic belts have long focused on the Jurassic- Cretaceous Sanandaj- Sirjan Magmatic Arc and the Cenozoic Urumieh- Dokhtar Magmatic Arc. This work shows that northwestern Iran also preserves remnants of a distinct, short- lived continental arc active ~101- 97 million years ago. It demonstrates that the region’s magmatic evolution was more complex and continuous than previously recognized.

Evidence of a “missing” or cryptic arc: The arc was largely obscured by later deformation, erosion, and burial. Identifying it through zircon U- Pb ages, Hf isotopes, and geochemistry highlights how continental arcs can leave only cryptic traces yet still record critical phases of subduction. This has broader implications for reconstructing ancient convergent margins worldwide where similar overprinting may hide important geological events.

Constraints on Neo- Tethyan subduction dynamics: The rocks record a transient flare-up during Neo-Tethys Ocean subduction beneath the Iranian margin. Magmatism evolved from juvenile tholeiitic (mantle-dominated) to enriched shoshonitic compositions, tracking increasing crustal assimilation and slab rollback. Structural links to the Siah Cheshmeh- Khoy- Misho- Tabriz Fault (SKMT) suggest this fault marks a concealed suture that accommodated arc migration and back- arc basin development.

Refines regional tectonic models: The findings link Late Cretaceous arc activity to later Eocene overprinting by the Urumieh- Dokhtar system. They improve understanding of crustal growth, arc migration, and the transition from subduction to collision in the Arabia- Eurasia zone- one of the world’s major active collision belts.

In short, the discovery provides direct geological evidence for a missing piece of Iran’s subduction history, improves reconstructions of Neo- Tethyan plate interactions, and underscores that even heavily overprinted regions can preserve critical records of Earth’s tectonic evolution when examined with modern geochronological and isotopic tools.

Diagram illustrating geological changes in the Sanandaj-Sirjan Zone and Neo-Tethys Ocean from the Late Jurassic to the Eocene, including oceanic rifting, subduction, and magmatic arc development.
1-s2.0-S1674987125002105-ga1_lrg.jpg (2081×886)
The missing late Cretaceous magmatic arc in the Arabia-Eurasia collision zone (NW Iran): constraints from zircon geochronology, Hf isotopes, and geochemistry – ScienceDirect

The missing late Cretaceous magmatic arc in the Arabia-Eurasia collision zone (NW Iran): constraints from zircon geochronology, Hf isotopes, and geochemistry

It is published under a Creative Commons license (open access).

Core findings (from the abstract and highlights)

The study documents a previously unrecognized Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc in northwestern Iran that was active ~101- 97 million years ago. This Late Cretaceous continental arc is distinct from the better-known Sanandaj- Sirjan and Urumieh- Dokhtar belts. It was largely hidden by later tectonic overprinting, erosion, and burial, then partly overprinted by Eocene Urumieh- Dokhtar magmatism.

Key evidence comes from volcanic and plutonic rocks in the Misho, Sufian, Moro, Amand, Vanyar, and Iskandar regions:

  • Zircon U-Pb ages of ~101- 97 Ma for gabbros and granodiorites.
  • εHf(t) values ranging from +9.8 to -7.2 (mixed juvenile mantle and crustal sources).
  • Arc- like geochemical signatures (LREE enrichment, subduction- related anomalies).
  • Magmatic evolution from juvenile tholeiitic to enriched shoshonitic compositions, linked to crustal assimilation and slab rollback.
  • Spatial association with the Siah Cheshmeh- Khoy- Misho- Tabriz Fault (SKMT), interpreted as a possible concealed suture that accommodated arc migration and back- arc basin development.

Significance (as stated in the paper)

The results fill a gap in the Neo-Tethyan subduction history of the Arabia- Eurasia collision zone. They demonstrate cryptic preservation of continental arcs and refine models of arc migration, crustal growth, and the transition between major magmatic belts in NW Iran.

Supplementary data (zircon CL images, geochemical tables, isotopic data, sample locations, etc.) are available with the paper.

Title: The missing late Cretaceous magmatic arc in the Arabia-Eurasia collision zone (NW Iran): constraints from zircon geochronology, Hf isotopes, and geochemistry

Journal: Geoscience Frontiers, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2026, Article 102205

DOI: 10.1016/j.gsf.2025.102205

Provided: Istanbul Technical University

Authors: Ali Mohammadi (corresponding), Hadi Shafaii Moghadam, Amaneh Kaveh-Firouz, Anna Lechmann, Fulong Cai, Lin Ding

Abstract

The Late Cretaceous magmatic evolution of northwestern (NW) Iran reveals a previously unrecognized continental arc system, the Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc, herein termed the Azerbaijan Continental Magmatic Arc, which is largely obscured by subsequent tectonic overprinting, erosion, and basin burial. Integration of new zircon U-Pb ages, Lu-Hf isotopic data, and whole-rock geochemical compositions from volcanic and plutonic rocks in the Misho, Sufian, Moro, Amand, Vanyar, and Iskandar regions identifies a subduction-related arc system distinct from the Sanandaj–Sirjan and Urumieh–Dokhtar magmatic belts. The ∼ 101–97 Ma gabbros and granodiorites record εHf(t) values from + 9.8 to −7.2, reflecting variable mantle and crustal inputs. Arc-like trace-element patterns, including LREE enrichment and subduction-related anomalies, together with structural alignments along the Siah Cheshmeh–Khoy–Misho–Tabriz Fault (SKMT), indicate arc magmatism contemporaneous with transpressional deformation. The magmatic series evolved from juvenile tholeiitic to enriched shoshonitic compositions, tracking increasing crustal assimilation and slab rollback. This flare-up event represents a transient phase of Neo-Tethyan subduction, later overprinted by Eocene intrusions of the Urumieh–Dokhtar Magmatic Arc. Collectively, these results highlight the cryptic preservation of continental arcs and propose that the SKMT Fault marks a concealed suture accommodating Late Cretaceous arc migration and back-arc basin development in NW Iran.

Polar Oceans Lock Away Carbon — But Climate Policy Still Can’t Count It

Polar oceans (Arctic and Antarctic) store and transport carbon via “polar blue carbon”, but current science and policy frameworks are not yet ready to fully recognize or count it in climate strategies.

Polar carbon storage (often called polar blue carbon) is quantified by measuring carbon stocks (how much is stored) and sequestration and accumulation rates (how fast it is buried and locked away long- term) in marine ecosystems of the Arctic and Antarctic.

A serene Arctic landscape featuring icebergs and snow-capped mountains, with the glow of the northern lights in the sky. Below the surface, ice sheets appear to contain transparent charts and graphs, surrounded by bubbles rising from the ocean floor.
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Polar oceans (Arctic and Antarctic) store and transport carbon via “polar blue carbon”, but current science and policy frameworks are not yet ready to fully recognize or count it in climate strategies.

A new review published in Global Change Biology (around 9 October 2026) by an international team from the Horizon Europe project POMP (Polar Ocean Mitigation Potential), led by researchers at Aarhus University (including lead author Nadescha Zwerschke and coordinator Mikael Sejr), assesses what is known about carbon captured, stored, or transported by polar marine ecosystems.

Key points from the review

  • Polar marine ecosystems can lock carbon into sediments and living tissue for decades, centuries, or longer. Habitats of interest include certain coastal and shelf systems; less is known about phytoplankton, ice- associated algae, microphytobenthos, and carbon in fjord, shelf, and deep- sea sediments.⁠
  • These systems are changing rapidly due to warming, ice loss, erosion, and rising human pressure. Some may gain importance as carbon stores while others weaken.
  • Traditional “blue carbon” frameworks (developed mainly for tropical and temperate coastal wetlands such as mangroves, salt marshes, and seagrasses) do not readily apply. Polar areas are largely absent from national greenhouse- gas inventories, carbon- market methodologies, and related policies, despite the Arctic and Southern Ocean together covering roughly one- fifth of the global ocean and warming especially fast.

Why policy is not ready

Major uncertainties remain around measurement standards, additionality, permanence (threatened by rapid environmental change), and governance (fragmented or contested jurisdictions, especially in Antarctica under the Antarctic Treaty System/CCAMLR and parts of the Arctic). Treating polar blue carbon as a conventional carbon- offset mechanism would therefore be premature.⁠

The authors stress that it is not a substitute for cutting fossil- fuel emissions. Protecting carbon- rich ecosystems can still support broader climate and biodiversity goals.

Recommended actions

The review calls for four coordinated steps:

  1. Greater investment in polar blue- carbon research.
  2. Precautionary protection of known carbon- rich and vulnerable habitats (polar regions remain among the least protected oceans).
  3. Management approaches that consider carbon storage alongside biodiversity.
  4. Clearer policy pathways for recognizing substantial natural carbon stores in polar marine ecosystems.⁠

In short, polar oceans contribute to carbon storage, but better science, standardized methods, and adapted policy are needed before they can be reliably “counted”. The priority remains emission reductions, with habitat protection as a complementary measure. The full paper is titled roughly “Status of Polar Blue Carbon: Toward Recognition and Integration in Marine Policy.”

Map of Antarctica and the Arctic showing the Antarctic Treaty area in teal and the polar region outline in orange.
Relevant geographic boundaries of the Antarctic and Arctic region as defined by the IPCC (2019).
Global Change Biology | Environmental Change Journal | Wiley Online Library

Polar carbon storage (often called polar blue carbon) is quantified by measuring carbon stocks (how much is stored) and sequestration and accumulation rates (how fast it is buried and locked away long- term) in marine ecosystems of the Arctic and Antarctic.

These systems differ from classic tropical and temperate blue carbon (mangroves, salt marshes, seagrasses). Polar storage occurs mainly in sediments (fjords, shelves, deep sea), benthic communities (including on hard substrata), macroalgae and kelp, phytoplankton, ice- associated algae, and related pathways. Measurement is challenging due to remoteness, ice cover, seasonal darkness, and limited standardization.

1. Carbon stocks in sediments (the largest long-term reservoir)

  • Collect sediment cores (using gravity cores, multicorers, or box corers; SCUBA or ROVs in shallow areas).
  • Determine dry bulk density (mass per volume after drying).
  • Measure organic carbon (OC) content, typically via elemental analysis (after acid treatment to remove inorganic carbonates) or loss- on-ignition (LOI) calibrated against elemental analysis.
  • Calculate stock as: OC fraction × bulk density × sediment depth and thickness, then scale by area.
  • Account for total organic carbon (TOC), sometimes distinguishing autochthonous (local biological) vs. allochthonous sources using biomarkers, C:N ratios, or stable isotopes (δ¹³C, δ¹⁵N).

2. Accumulation and burial rates (sequestration)

  • Date cores with radioisotopes, primarily ²¹⁰Pb (half-life ~22 years, for recent decades- centuries) and sometimes ¹⁴C for longer timescales. Correct for porosity, compaction, and the surface mixed layer (bioturbation).
  • Multiply the mass accumulation rate by the buried OC concentration (below the mixed layer).
  • Optionally correct for the fraction of local (e.g., algal) carbon using biomarkers and for any inorganic carbon effects.⁠

Example results from Arctic fjords show OC burial rates on the order of several to tens of g C m⁻² yr⁻¹, varying strongly by location.

3. Living biomass and standing stocks

  • Direct sampling of benthic fauna, macroalgae and kelp, or ice algae (SCUBA, trawls, grabs, or ice cores).
  • Measure wet and dry weight and convert to carbon content (typically ~10- 50% of dry mass depending on tissue).
  • Indirect methods: underwater imagery and photography (photo- quadrats or video), acoustics, or remote sensing for habitat extent and density.

Shallow Antarctic Peninsula studies have estimated hundreds of tonnes of C km⁻² in rocky vs. soft-substratum communities.

4. Fluxes, primary production, and pathways

  • Primary production: incubations, ¹⁴C uptake, oxygen sensors, or satellite- derived chlorophyll and models.
  • Export and biological carbon pumps: sediment traps, particle imaging, or models of vertical flux.
  • Other metrics (prioritized for standardization in high- latitude work): particulate organic carbon (POC), functional groups (phytoplankton, microbes, benthos, macroalgae), habitat mapping, and export/migration processes. A recent review identified 23 key metrics for polar and sub- polar biological carbon pathways and recommended standardization plus modeling for scaling.

5. Scaling up and remote sensing

  • Combine field data with satellite, airborne, or UAV imagery, acoustic surveys, and ecosystem models to estimate extent and total stocks over large, inaccessible areas.
  • Machine learning and geospatial models help map hotspots (e.g., certain Arctic shelf seas).

Key challenges and current limitations

  • Methods for traditional coastal blue carbon are better standardized (e.g., Blue Carbon Initiative manuals), but polar adaptations are still developing, measurement, additionality, permanence, and governance remain uncertain.
  • Ice, logistics, and high spatial variability limit data density.
  • Stocks alone do not equal permanent sequestration; burial efficiency, remineralization, and future climate impacts (warming, ice loss, erosion) must be considered.
  • Experts emphasize greater investment in research, precautionary habitat protection, and clearer policy pathways before polar blue carbon can be reliably “counted” in climate frameworks.

Status of Polar Blue Carbon: Toward Recognition and Integration in Marine Policy

This is the full open- access perspective paper “Status of Polar Blue Carbon: Toward Recognition and Integration in Marine Policy” by Nadescha Zwerschke and co-authors (including many from Aarhus University and the POMP project), published in Global Change Biology (2026; 32:e71098).

Core message

Polar (Arctic and Antarctic) marine ecosystems store significant carbon and are becoming more important as CO₂ uptake shifts poleward under climate change. However, current science and policy frameworks are not yet ready to fully recognize or “count” polar blue carbon in climate strategies. The authors call for better research, precautionary protection, and clearer policy pathways, while stressing that this is not a substitute for cutting fossil- fuel emissions.

Key habitats reviewed (Table 1)

The paper distinguishes actionable (*) systems (already somewhat recognized, e.g., seagrass and saltmarsh) from emerging (°) systems that are less studied but potentially important:

  • Saltmarsh & seagrass (Arctic mainly; limited Antarctic data): Relatively low carbon accumulation rates (CAR) compared with tropical systems, but still relevant; facing coastal infrastructure, pollution, etc.
  • Macroalgae and kelp: Large potential area in the Arctic (~340,000 km²); expanding with ice loss; CAR largely unknown.
  • Microphytobenthos, phytoplankton, ice-associated algae: Substantial production; export and long-term burial poorly quantified.
  • Sediments (fjord, shelf, glacial troughs, deep sea): Often the main long-term store. Fjord sediments can show high CAR (e.g., tens to hundreds of g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ in some Arctic and West Antarctic Peninsula sites). Shelf and deep-sea rates are lower but the areas are vast.

Many extents, growth and or decline trends, and CAR values remain poorly constrained, especially in the Antarctic.

Knowledge gaps (Table 2)

Major gaps include:

  • Accurate extent and standing stocks.
  • Carbon accumulation rates (CAR) and greenhouse- gas fluxes across most habitats.
  • Responses to multiple climate drivers (light, nutrients, warming, ice loss, terrestrial carbon delivery).
  • Remineralization rates, carbon sources (marine vs. terrestrial), and long- term sequestration efficiency.
  • Effects of human pressures (seafloor disturbance, pollution, resource extraction) as polar regions become more accessible.

Policy and management recommendations

  • Polar regions are among the least protected oceans (~4–5% managed/no-take).
  • Apply the precautionary principle: protect known carbon-rich and vulnerable habitats now, even before all uncertainties are resolved.
  • Adopt holistic, ecosystem- based management that considers carbon storage alongside biodiversity, from source (e.g., kelp or phytoplankton) to sink (sediments).
  • Strengthen science- policy links so polar blue carbon can eventually enter NDCs, carbon accounting, and frameworks such as the Kunming- Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and High Seas Treaty.
  • Avoid treating polar blue carbon as conventional carbon- offset credits at present, measurement standards, additionality, permanence, and governance remain inadequate.

Relevance to measuring polar carbon storage

The paper underscores that reliable measurement is still limited. It relies on the same core approaches discussed earlier (sediment cores, bulk density, organic -carbon analysis and radioisotope dating for accumulation rates; biomass sampling; remote sensing and models for scaling) but highlights large data gaps and the need for standardization and more observations, especially under changing climate conditions.

The full PDF is freely available via repositories such as the NERC Open Research Archive (direct link typically ends in /GCB-32-e71098.pdf). Let me know if you’d like a deeper dive into any specific section, table, habitat, or measurement aspect.

Journal: Global Change Biology (2026; 32:e71098)

DOI: 10.1111/gcb.71098

Provided: Aarhus University

Authors: Nadescha Zwerschke, Dorte Krause-Jensen, David K. A. Barnes, Paul E. Renaud, William E. N. Austin, Mathieu Ardyna, Karl Attard, Bodil A. Bluhm, Steeve Comeau, Jean-Pierre Gattuso, Judith Hauck, Eva Leu, Marie Maar, Laurent Oziel, Amanda E. Poste, Vibe Schourup-Kristensen, Camilla Svensen, Jakob Thyrring, Mikael Sejr

First published: 21 September 2026

Climate Alliance’s anti-affordability platform raises big election issues

Eighteen of the 23 Climate Alliance Governorships are up for grabs in November so the Alliance’s anti-affordability platform is especially important. There are also thousands of State Legislator races. Nor does it end with this election.

Here the worst anti-affordability case is net-zero which is impossibly expensive. The Alliance says 16 of its member states already have “net-zero GHG goals” and more are wanted. In addition, 20 members have “economy-wide GHG goals” and all have “State climate action plans.”

A coastal landscape featuring multiple wind turbines standing tall against a colorful sky during twilight.
wind turbines on the coastal mud flat in sunset

From CFACT

By David Wojick

Eighteen of the 23 Climate Alliance Governorships are up for grabs in November, so the Alliance’s anti-affordability platform is especially important. There are also thousands of State Legislator races. Nor does it end with this election.

Energy affordability is a central issue nationwide and the Democrats say they are all for it, but the Alliance platform says otherwise. The Democrats need to be called out on their hypocrisy so here is a quick overview of what they have signed up for in joining the Alliance.

The platform is here.

Listed below are the Alliance’s ten State-level “Policy Priorities” with some of the more anti-affordability features pointed out, to be used for questioning candidates.

Here is how the Alliance puts it: “Together, Alliance members are advancing a series of bold, high-impact actions across 10 key policy areas.”

Unfortunately, the high- impact is often a hard hit on energy affordability. This anti-affordability needs to be called out, candidate by candidate.

The Climate Alliance’s ten policy priorities:

GHG Targets & Governance

Here the worst anti-affordability case is net-zero which is impossibly expensive. The Alliance says 16 of its member states already have “net- zero GHG goals” and more are wanted. In addition, 20 members have “economy-wide GHG goals” and all have “State climate action plans.”

Buildings

They have a specific and incredibly expensive net-zero goal for buildings:

“Alliance members are committed to decarbonizing the buildings sector, including collectively achieving zero-emission new construction as soon as practicable, accelerating efforts to eliminate emissions from existing buildings, and collectively quadrupling heat pump installations across the coalition by 2030.”

Climate Finance

It is all about net-zero which is incredibly expensive:

“Alliance members are deploying a wide range of financial policies and programs, leveraging diverse funding sources, and partnering across the public and private sectors to finance the net-zero transition.”

The adverse impact on affordability is simply ignored.

Electricity

The policy is single minded — decarbonize the grid:

“Alliance members are developing policy pathways and programs to decarbonize the electricity grid, including establishing interim targets and identifying opportunities to better align planning and procurement processes for generation, distribution, and transmission resources with our collective climate goals.”

They say that 19 member states already have “100% clean electricity goals” with more needed. That this dramatically drives up the cost of electricity is not considered.

Industry

Net-zero for all GHGs from the entire supply chain, not just industry:

“Alliance members are establishing innovative policy frameworks for eliminating GHG emissions from the industrial sector and its supply chains while fostering the growth of a strong, domestic clean manufacturing economy.”

This is impossibly expensive.

Just Transition & Equity

Complex and costly social policies:

“Alliance members are partnering with frontline communities to develop climate and clean energy solutions, directing significant expenditures to create environmental and economic benefits for vulnerable and overburdened populations, and accelerating the development of a climate-ready workforce, including by collectively supporting 1 million new workers in completing Registered Apprenticeship programs across the coalition by 2035.”

Natural & Working Lands

Vague but potentially disruptive and expensive sequestration:

“Alliance members are scaling best practices for land management, restoration, and conservation to contribute to emission reductions and carbon sequestration at the scale needed for deep decarbonization and, where appropriate, integrating natural and working lands into state mitigation and resilience plans with ambitious goals that center equity and prioritize actions that deliver multiple benefits.”

Pricing Carbon & Valuing Damages

Carbon taxes and rationing plus the bogus social cost of carbon:

“Alliance members are incentivizing cost-effective emissions reductions by setting prices or caps on carbon pollution while also considering societal and environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, including the social cost of greenhouse gases, across relevant policy-making and decision-making processes.”

Resilience

Nonsensical climate change impacts:

“Alliance members are integrating physical climate risk and prioritizing climate adaptation and equity in state planning and decision making to help communities prevent, reduce, withstand, and recover from climate-related impacts and disasters. States, which have varying needs and capacity, will utilize and share best practices to bolster resilience and tailor effective solutions.”

Transportation

The policy is “….to decarbonize the transportation sector by reducing vehicle miles traveled and significantly increasing access to and the affordability of zero-emission vehicles, clean fuels, and multi-modal options.”

So, in addition to pushing expensive EVs, which drives up the need for costly new electricity supply, they want to curtail travel.

Every candidate who says they want affordability should be questioned hard on these outrageously anti-affordability policies.

When Europe’s Thermometers Plunged 30 Degrees in a Day: The 1978/79 Air-Mass Boundary That Triggered a Century Winter

The winter of 1978/1979 (often called the “Jahrhundertwinter” or “Schneekatastrophe”) was one of the most severe and memorable cold and snow events in modern German and European history, especially in northern and eastern Germany.

When the cold air advanced southward, temperatures plunged 20- 30 °C within about 24 hours in many places. This triggered intense snowfall, freezing rain and glaze ice, and strong northeasterly winds that created metre- high (sometimes 5- 7 m) snow drifts.

The winter of 1978/79 had widespread effects across much of Europe, beyond the severe impacts in Germany (West and East). It initiated a prolonged cold, snowy period for large parts of the continent, with major disruptions from blizzards, extreme cold, freezing rain, power outages, and transport chaos, especially in northern and western Europe.

A split image depicting two contrasting weather scenes: one side shows a city street in Bonn, Germany, with a temperature sign reading +10°C and people walking under umbrellas, while the other side illustrates a snowy, blizzard-covered landscape in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, with a temperature sign indicating -20°C and people struggling through deep snow.
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The winter of 1978/1979 (often called the “Jahrhundertwinter” or “Schneekatastrophe”) was one of the most severe and memorable cold and snow events in modern German and European history, especially in northern and eastern Germany.

What happened

Around Christmas 1978 the weather was mild (temperatures around +10 °C in parts of Germany). On 28-30 December a sharp air- mass boundary formed over the Baltic Sea and northern Germany, separating mild, moist Atlantic air in the south from Arctic polar air (temperatures locally under -40 °C farther north).

When the cold air advanced southward, temperatures plunged 20- 30 °C within about 24 hours in many places. This triggered intense snowfall, freezing rain and glaze ice, and strong northeasterly winds that created metre- high (sometimes 5- 7 m) snow drifts.

Northern Germany (especially Schleswig-Holstein), parts of the then- GDR (e.g., Rügen), Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and other areas were hit hardest. The storm front eventually reached southern Germany (including the Lake Constance area) by New Year’s Eve.

A second major snowstorm struck northern Germany around 13- 18 February 1979, adding further heavy snow (locally 60- 80 cm or more) on top of the existing cover.

Impacts in Germany

  • Closed snow cover lasted 67 days in large parts of northern Germany (28 December 1978 to 4 March 1979), comparable only to the post- war “Hungerwinter” of 1946/47.⁠
  • Roads, railways, and airports were blocked; dozens to hundreds of villages and islands (e.g., ~80 villages in Schleswig- Holstein, Rügen for about a week) were cut off. Power and telephone lines failed; people and livestock were stranded; helicopters and the Bundeswehr helped with supply and rescue.⁠
  • Casualties: at least 17 deaths in West Germany and at least 5 (officially) in the GDR; some later estimates suggest higher numbers in the East. Large numbers of farm animals died. Economic damage exceeded 140 million Deutschmarks in the West alone; the GDR suffered severe industrial and supply disruptions.

Broader European picture

The same weather pattern brought a long, cold, snowy winter across much of northern and central Europe (Denmark, Poland, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Scandinavia).

Temperatures in parts of Norway fell to around -50 °C. The event is regarded as one of the hard winters of the 20th century in the region, alongside 1928/29, 1962/63, 1984/85, and 1986/87.⁠

In short, the turn of the year 1978/79 marked the abrupt start of an exceptionally snowy and disruptive winter that paralysed northern Germany for weeks and affected large parts of Europe.

A snow-covered highway with numerous cars and trucks stuck in heavy snow drifts, with people walking alongside the vehicles.
AI generated by Meta

The winter of 1978/79 had widespread effects across much of Europe, beyond the severe impacts in Germany (West and East). It initiated a prolonged cold, snowy period for large parts of the continent, with major disruptions from blizzards, extreme cold, freezing rain, power outages, and transport chaos, especially in northern and western Europe.

Key effects by region

  • Netherlands and Belgium: One of the colder winters of the 20th century in the Netherlands (average -0.8 °C; Hellmann cold index ~206). Two major snowstorms (late December 1978 and mid- February 1979, the latter among the strongest of the century). Rapid temperature drops, heavy ice glaze, and prolonged snow cover caused widespread disruption.⁠
  • Denmark: A multi- day snowstorm from 28 December onward, strongest in the south, with significant snowfall and high winds. Major transport and infrastructure problems.⁠
  • United Kingdom and Ireland: Severe snowstorms and blizzards in late December, particularly affecting northern Britain, Scotland, and parts of southern England. Large snowdrifts cut off some areas; Heathrow Airport closed. In Ireland, notable snow depths (e.g., up to 26 cm near Dublin) followed by unusually severe frosts. The continental cold also drove an influx of birds (e.g., smew, harriers, owls) fleeing to Britain.⁠
  • France: The cold wave arrived 30- 31 December with snow and abundant freezing rain. (Separately, France experienced its largest power outage to date on 19 December 1978, affecting about three-quarters of the country for hours, though this preceded the main Arctic outbreak.)
  • Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden): Extreme cold, with temperatures in parts of Norway dropping to around −50 °C. Contributed to the broader northern European cold wave.⁠
  • Poland: Known locally in some accounts as a “Winter of the Century”. Heavy snow (e.g., 70 and more cm in Warsaw and Łódź areas), transport collapse, economic damage (livestock losses, supply failures, industrial shortfalls), and infrastructure problems (including a major gas explosion in Warsaw linked to frost- damaged pipes). The hardships highlighted systemic issues and had political repercussions.⁠
  • Poland and nearby areas: Sharp temperature plunge (e.g., from near +10 °C to −18/−20 °C), up to 60 cm of snow in the north, road blockages, power -line failures under ice and snow, and temporary isolation of communities.

Broader continental impacts

The late- December weather pattern (sharp air- mass boundary and polar outbreak) triggered a long, cold, snow- rich winter across northern and central Europe. Persistent snow cover helped sustain further cold waves into February. Common effects included:

  • Transport paralysis (roads, rails, airports).
  • Power and communication failures from ice- laden lines and snow weight.
  • Supply shortages and livestock deaths.
  • Economic costs from disrupted industry, agriculture, and infrastructure.
  • Some flooding in coastal or thaw- related areas earlier in the period.

Overall, the event is remembered as one of the notable hard winters of the 20th century in Europe (alongside others like 1962/63), with the strongest human and economic impacts concentrated in northern Germany, the Low Countries, Denmark, Poland, and parts of the British Isles.

Three figures dressed in winter clothing navigating through deep snow in a frigid landscape, with a thermometer showing -50°C nearby. Snow-covered wooden cabins and icy waters are visible in the background under a dark sky.
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The rapid 20- 30 °C temperature plunge occurred because a sharp, quasi-stationary air- mass boundary (Luftmassengrenze) finally shifted southward, allowing extremely cold Arctic polar air to flood over regions that had been under mild Atlantic air.

Meteorological setup

Around 28 December 1978, a strong high- pressure system (anticyclone) over Scandinavia and northern Russia held very cold, dry Arctic air (locally under -40 °C, and even colder farther east). At the same time, low pressure over the Rhineland and western Europe fed mild, moist subtropical and Atlantic air northward into central Europe (temperatures often +5 to +15 °C).⁠

These two contrasting air masses met along a sharp frontal boundary that stalled for several days roughly over the Baltic Sea and northern Germany. The temperature contrast across this narrow zone was extreme, sometimes 20 °C or more over short distances (e.g., mild “beer-garden” weather in southern Germany while freezing conditions and heavy snow existed only ~100 km farther north).

Why the sudden drop

  • For a few days the boundary held nearly stationary while secondary low- pressure systems tracked eastward along it, producing prolonged heavy precipitation (snow on the cold side, rain or freezing rain on the warm side).
  • When the last of these systems passed and the pressure pattern allowed it (around 30- 31 December), the denser cold polar air advanced southward as a cold front and surge.
  • Locations that had been in the mild air experienced the front’s passage: the mild air was displaced (often undercut or lifted), and surface temperatures crashed 20- 30 °C within roughly 24 hours (examples include drops of ~28 °C in places such as Hof and Weiden).

In short, the plunge was not gradual cooling but the abrupt replacement of one air mass by a radically different one once the boundary moved. This is a classic (though unusually intense) example of a cold- air outbreak behind a strong frontal system.