Global warming, climate change, all these things are just a dream come true for politicians. I deal with evidence and not with frightening computer models because the seeker after truth does not put his faith in any consensus. The road to the truth is long and hard, but this is the road we must follow. People who describe the unprecedented comfort and ease of modern life as a climate disaster, in my opinion have no idea what a real problem is.
It would be a near- extinction- level catastrophe for humanity and most complex life, driven primarily by global ash fallout, a severe volcanic winter, acid rain, and collapse of ecosystems and infrastructure, though it is vanishingly unlikely to occur.
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It would be a near- extinction- level catastrophe for humanity and most complex life, driven primarily by global ash fallout, a severe volcanic winter, acid rain, and collapse of ecosystems and infrastructure, though it is vanishingly unlikely to occur.
There are roughly 1,350-1,500 potentially active volcanoes on land worldwide (about 500 have erupted in historical time), concentrated especially along the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, plus many more undersea volcanoes along mid- ocean ridges that are not fully counted. These are driven by localized magma systems, so simultaneous eruption of all of them would require an impossible coincidence of independent processes.
Immediate effects (hours to days)
Explosive eruptions (stratovolcanoes and any supervolcanoes such as Yellowstone) would produce pyroclastic flows, lava bombs, and shock waves that devastate areas near the volcanoes, collapsing buildings, triggering landslides, and generating tsunamis from undersea or coastal activity.
Ash columns would reach the stratosphere in many cases. Ash is dense (roughly five times denser than water in bulk deposits) and would quickly blanket regions, collapsing roofs, clogging engines and filters, contaminating water supplies, and grounding all air travel. Planes already airborne near eruptions would face extreme risk.
Local death tolls near active volcanic zones (parts of Indonesia, Japan, the western Americas, southern Europe, etc.) would be enormous, but these would be dwarfed by later global effects.
Atmospheric and climate impacts (days to years)
Volcanic ash and especially sulfur dioxide (SO₂) injected into the stratosphere would form sulfate aerosols that reflect sunlight.
Even a single large eruption like Tambora in 1815 cooled the Northern Hemisphere by ~0.5°C and caused the “Year Without a Summer”. Scaling to all volcanoes (including multiple VEI 7- 8 events) would produce far thicker global coverage.
Skies would darken dramatically or turn to prolonged twilight/darkness in many regions as ash and aerosols block sunlight.
Global temperatures could drop by several degrees Celsius (estimates for multiple supervolcanoes reach ~15°C temporarily in extreme scenarios), triggering a volcanic winter lasting months to years. Photosynthesis would collapse, killing most plants and crops.
Acid rain from sulfur compounds would poison soils, freshwater, and further destroy remaining vegetation and infrastructure.
Ocean acidification from gases and ash would harm shellfish, corals, and marine food webs.
Agriculture and food systems worldwide would fail rapidly.
Famine, respiratory illness from ash, and infrastructure breakdown (power grids, transport, water treatment) would kill the vast majority of people even far from volcanoes. Experts describe the result as many times worse than a nuclear winter.
Longer- term effects (years to decades and beyond)
Once aerosols settle, the large release of CO₂ could eventually drive significant greenhouse warming, potentially shifting the climate in the opposite direction after the cold phase.
In extreme interpretations involving massive magma outpourings, some speculative accounts raise the possibility of severe long- term heating or even mass imbalances that could slightly alter Earth’s rotation or axial tilt (drawing analogies to ancient events on Mars), though this is far less certain.
Most complex surface and marine life would face mass extinction.
Microbial and extremophile life would likely persist in protected niches.
Human civilization as we know it would end.
Survival of isolated groups in less- affected or underground or other protected locations is theoretically possible but extremely limited by the global environmental collapse.
In short, the planet itself would survive, but the biosphere and human society would be devastated on a scale comparable to or exceeding past mass- extinction events linked to massive volcanism (e.g., flood basalt episodes). Fortunately, volcanoes are independent systems; simultaneous global eruption is not a realistic geological risk.
“… The role they discharge as climate criminals is quite willful. …”
Can you imagine the kind of horror show world someone like the author John Clarke would build, if he and his friends were in charge?
Actually we don’t have to imagine what such a world would be like – events like China’s Cultural Revolution and Cambodia’s Pol Pot have already demonstrated how badly intellectuals are treated by “just” socialist societies.
Actually, we don’t have to imagine what such a world would be like – events like China’s Cultural Revolution and Cambodia’s Pol Pot have already demonstrated how badly intellectuals are treated by “just” socialist societies.
Capitalists have long been aware of the consequences of fossil-fuel use, but the profit system requires them to seek to benefit from it, or escape it as individuals, explains John Clarke
The scale and pace of climate breakdown are now well-established realities of life on this planet, as extreme weather and chronic impacts impose themselves on us to an ever-greater degree.
It is equally well understood that fossil-fuel companies and political leaders are doggedly compounding these catastrophic results by doubling down on oil and gas production, resulting in levels of carbon emissions that will make things even worse.
…
Though the ranks of the ruling establishments include crude climate deniers like Donald Trump, it would be wrong to imagine that the major capitalists and their leading functionaries are unaware of the implications of the course that they are on. The role they discharge as climate criminals is quite willful.
…
It would be useful, however, also to consider how the capitalists themselves, along with their political agents and intellectual enablers, view the question of climate change. We have already seen how they work to stifle a clear understanding of the threat that it poses and try to delay meaningful action to address this dire threat. Nonetheless, the harsh and intensifying reality of the issue can only force itself upon them and they are compelled to consider its implications.
…
Working-class people across this planet have no luxury bunkers to escape into and very limited means of mitigating the impacts of climate breakdown, as they intensify to the point of catastrophe. Our survival hinges on our collective struggles against climate-wrecking capitalism and the creation of a just and sustainable socialist society.
Can you imagine the kind of horror show world someone like the author John Clarke would build, if he and his friends were in charge?
If you disagree with extreme climate claims, you’re not someone with legitimate concerns about the quality of the science, you are an “intellectual enabler”, as much of a criminal as people who build businesses which emit CO2 in order to put food, goods and services at our disposal.
Yet John thinks such a world would be “just”.
Actually, we don’t have to imagine what such a world would be like – events like China’s Cultural Revolution and Cambodia’s Pol Pot have already demonstrated how badly intellectuals are treated by “just” socialist societies. Scientists like Ye Qisun, who trained many famous scientists including a Nobel Prize winner, was brutally persecuted by the Communist regime because – who knows why. But Ye got lucky, if you can call such cruelty luck. Many of his fellow scientists were murdered.
I’m glad the climate alarmists lost, because recent history shows us things could have gotten so much worse. I know places like Britain and Europe and Canada it might not feel like they lost, but they’re on the way out. They will never get the kinds of show trials of capitalist criminals and “intellectual enablers” they appear to want – at least, they’ll need to find a new cause to frighten society into acting like barbarians. Too many people have seen through the fake climate crisis.
The IPCC references global mean temperature increases to the 1850-1900 mean (IPCC, 2021, Ch. 2&4), and radiative forcing increases to 1750 (IPCC, 2021, Ch 7), then uses the two numbers to help them model warming since the pre-industrial period. According to Pages 2K the world warmed 0.1 to 0.2°C (see figure 1) between 1750 and 1850-1990 (Pages2K, 2019). AR6 (p 150) estimates a change of 0.1°C (-0.1 to 0.3°C.
The IPCC references global mean temperature increases to the 1850-1900 mean (IPCC, 2021, Ch. 2&4), and radiative forcing increases to 1750 (IPCC, 2021, Ch 7), then uses the two numbers to help them model warming since the pre-industrial period. According to Pages 2K the world warmed 0.1 to 0.2°C (see figure 1) between 1750 and 1850-1990 (Pages2K, 2019). AR6 (p 150) estimates a change of 0.1°C (-0.1 to 0.3°C):
“This assessed change in temperature before 1850–1900 is not included in the AR6 assessment of global warming to date, to ensure consistency with previous IPCC assessment reports, and because of the lower confidence in the estimate. There was likely a net anthropogenic forcing of 0.0–0.3 W/m2 in 1850–1900 relative to 1750 (medium confidence), with radiative forcing from increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations being partially offset by anthropogenic aerosol emissions and land-use change. Net radiative forcing from solar and volcanic activity is estimated to be smaller than ±0.1 W/m2.” (IPCC, 2021, p. 150)
The key assumption in this AR6 quote, unsupported in my view, is that natural climatic forcing is negligible, or varies randomly over shorter climatic periods than 100 years.
Evidence for Solar Forcing
There is considerable evidence for natural solar driven climate oscillations longer than 100 years (Stefani et al., 2024) & (Scafetta & Bianchini, 2022). Figure 1 shows the Pages 2K temperature reconstruction (Pages2K, 2019) since 1600AD, this is one of the temperature reconstructions cited and used in AR6 (IPCC, 2021, p. 61).
Figure 1. The Pages 2K proxy reconstruction with uncertainty bounds for 1600-2019. The instrumental record is overlain in blue from 1850 to 2017. The Little Ice Age and the Modern Solar Maximum are identified. The blue bracket identifies the period between the AR6 forcing zero (1750) and temperature zero (1850-1900). Anomaly from 1961-1990. Data source: link.
The AR6 “temperature 0” and “radiative forcing 0” are not from the same point in time and both are within, or just after, the Little Ice Age, a period of rapid natural climate change. In this section I will discuss the AR6 assertion that natural solar forcing is negligible.
Problems with tree-ring data
The Pages 2K estimate of the global warming between 1750 and 1850-1900 is possible given the data available, but, as AR6 notes, the data is sparse and of poor quality before 1850. The data is mostly tree-ring data (see figure 4 here), but its accuracy, at least since ~1950 and probably sooner, is affected by increasing CO2 concentrations and possibly other anthropogenic factors (Briffa et al., 1998b). Since tree-ring records are calibrated in the modern era, increasing CO2 creates calibration difficulties. Additional CO2 accelerates tree growth, independently of temperature and precipitation, this is especially true in the colder, dryer regions preferred for tree ring analysis (Briffa et al., 1998b).
Briffa, et al. emphasize that increasing CO2, whether from anthropogenic or natural sources, using standard tree ring paleotemperature techniques, can:
“… result in systematic overestimation of past temperatures, particularly in regions where the loss of low-frequency temperature sensitivity in tree growth is greatest (eastern Siberia and eastern North America).” (Briffa et al., 1998b).
Is TSI an adequate measure of the Sun’s climatic effect?
Another problem is that AR6 only considers TSI (total solar irradiance) when evaluating solar forcing, when it has been shown that other solar changes influence our climate (Lean J. , 2017), (Lean & Rind, 1998), (Haigh J. , 2011), (Hoyt & Schatten, 1997). According to Judith Lean, Earth’s climate system somehow amplifies changes in solar output, because the effects (Earth’s surface temperature changes) are larger than can be accounted for from the changes in TSI forcing alone. Exactly how this works is not fully understood due to “ambiguous observations, dubious correlations, and lack of plausible mechanisms.” (Lean J. , 2017).
One long-term TSI reconstruction is from Steinhilber et al. The data I used for figure 2 is from Steinhilber et al. 2012, but also see Steinhilber et al. 2009. AR6 does not directly use Steinhilber’s reconstructions, they use SATIRE-T and NRLTSI2, but Steinhilber’s reconstruction is similar. I prefer Steinhilber’s cosmogenic isotope reconstruction because it shows more detail in periods of low solar activity. The problem with SATIRE-T and NRLTSI2 is that they rely too much on sunspots and zero sunspots does not equate to zero solar activity.
Figure 2. The Steinhilber et al. TSI reconstruction with uncertainty shading. Data source (Steinhilber et al., 2012).
AR6 does not use Steinhilber’s reconstruction because they require annual resolution and Steinhilber’s reconstruction only produces 22-year averages. The sunspot-based magnetic flux models used in AR6 correlate better with modern satellite TSI measurements, but unfortunately due to problems with the satellite datasets, the correlations are ambiguous and open to interpretation, as discussed in more detail here (see especially figure 5 in the linked post). Some sunspot-based reconstructions show up to 5 W/m2 difference between 1700 and the present day. The satellite record of total solar irradiance is short and fraught with problems (see especially figure 7 in the linked post).
AR6 explicitly ignores:
Solar magnetic field strength doubled from the beginning of the Modern Solar Maximum around 1930 to the peak of solar cycle 19 (~1958), the strongest solar cycle in recorded history. The solar magnetic field then leveled off until about 1990, followed by a slow gradual decline (Lockwood, 2003).
Solar wind became more geoeffective (efficiency of transferring energy into Earth’s magnetic field) during the Modern Solar Maximum. This led to enhanced coupling with Earth’s magnetosphere.
The Heliosphere has become better at reducing cosmic ray flux.
Solar UV variability is much more variable than TSI.
Stratospheric ozone shows a 1-3% increase at solar maximum.
The Modern Solar Maximum (~1930–2000) is the longest in over 600 years.
As Joanna Haigh writes:
“Understanding the role of variability in solar activity is essential for the interpretation of past climate and prediction of the future. In the past, although much had been written on relationships between sunspot numbers and the weather, the topic of solar influences on climate was often disregarded by meteorologists.” (Haigh J. , 2011).
As an example, the temperature changes in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere (~20 km) are three times higher than at the surface. The main point that Joanna Haigh and Judith Lean make is that the IPCC is oversimplifying the impact of solar variability on climate by only considering TSI. AR6’s estimate of solar forcing is not a measure of the total solar influence on the climate, as Judith Lean writes:
“Because solar radiation impinges primarily at low latitudes, the increased radiant energy alters equator-to-pole thermal gradients, initiating dynamical responses that produce regions of both warming and cooling at mid to high latitudes. Because solar energy deposition depends on altitude as a result of height-dependent atmospheric absorption, changing solar radiation establishes vertical thermal gradients that further alter dynamical motions within the Earth system.” (Lean J. , 2017).
As Christopher Scotese has shown, the equator-to-pole temperature gradient is fundamental to average global surface temperature over geological time (Scotese et al., 2021). A steep gradient means a colder planet and a shallow gradient means a warmer one (see Scotese’s figure 7 for more details).
The Little Ice Age
The deepest and most widespread cold period during the Holocene is roughly 1645-1715AD. After this cold period, glaciers reached their greatest Holocene extent in Europe, Iceland, Alaska and New Zealand. The period contains the historically coldest winters in Europe and North America and follows five consecutive solar grand minima, including the longest solar grand minimum of the past 6,000 years.
There were also numerous large volcanic eruptions during the period, Parker (Philippines, 1641), Serua (Indonesia, 1693), Fuji (Japan, 1707), plus three others that have been identified in sediments and ice with unknown locations. In addition to these, there were probably three other eruptions in the western Pacific in 1654 (Japan), 1673 (Indonesia), and 1674 (Indonesia). The Little Ice Age is identified in figure 3 and compared to high-quality temperature proxies from Indonesia, Greenland, Antarctica, and the logarithm of CO2 from the Dome C ice record.
Figure 3. Three high-quality temperature proxies for the Holocene are plotted. Rosenthal’s 500-meter Indonesian proxy (black), Vinther’s Greenland ice proxy, and the Antarctic Dome C proxy (blue), along with the logarithm of the Dome C CO2 proxy in purple. The Little Ice Age, Neoglacial, and Holocene Climatic Optimum periods are identified. Data sources, in the order in the legend: (Jouzel et al., 2007), (Vinther et al., 2009), (Rosenthal et al., 2013), (Bereiter et al., 2015).
The key point of figure 3 is that the Little Ice Age is the coldest period in the entire 12,000-year Holocene Epoch, at least in Greenland, Indonesia, the North Pacific, and in the New Zealand area. It is also cooler in Antarctica, but not as much. For more details on the proxies see here and here. Thus, the AR6 implication that this period (the “pre-industrial”) is somehow preferred to today’s temperature or is some sort of climatic baseline is disingenuous. Further, how can a pre-industrial climatic baseline be composed of a baseline temperature and radiative forcing that are separated by over 100 years and within the climatically unstable Little Ice Age (Parker G. , 2012)?
Antarctic CO2
Figure 3 also shows that the logarithm of atmospheric CO2 concentration in Antarctica does not correlate well with temperature in Greenland or Indonesia, although it does visually correlate reasonably well with the Antarctic Dome C ice core temperature proxy. Regional temperatures naturally capture regional amplification effects, but since CO2 is a well-mixed gas it is supposed to have a global effect. The trends in figure 3 cast considerable doubt on this idea. AR6 relies very heavily on the Dome C CO2 record (Jouzel et al., 2007) & (Lüthi et al., 2008) for their studies, but it only seems to support a CO2-temperature correlation for Antarctica, not a global correlation.
The Little Ice Age Glacial Maximum
It was quite cold between 1809 and 1820, at least partly due to the famous Tambora eruption in 1815. But by 1850 the worst of the cold was gone, and the world began to warm. Thus, it is difficult to compare warming from 1850-1900 and radiative forcing since 1750, the climate (or more accurately global mean surface temperature) was quite variable between 1750 and 1900 as shown in figure 1. Table 1 shows glacier losses since the Little Ice Age glacial maximum (~1750) in 1900 and 2020.
Region
Area Remaining in 1900
Area Remaining in 2000–2020
% Loss by 1900
% Loss by 2000–2020
New Zealand (Southern Alps)
~80 %
~45 %
≈ 20 % loss
≈ 55 % loss
Alaska (Glacier Bay region)
~60 %
~25 %
≈ 40 % loss
≈ 75 % loss
Europe (Alps)
~70 %
~35 %
≈ 30 % loss
≈ 65 % loss
Table 1. Glacier loss by region in 1900 and 2020.
I had Microsoft Copilot generate an illustration of the glacier positions in New Zealand, Alaska, and in the European Alps at important times. It is shown in figure 4.
Figure 4. Images of the glacier retreats in New Zealand, Alaska, and the European Alps since the Little Ice Age maximum glacier extent around 1750. Source: Microsoft Copilot generated image.
Glacier extent is a very sensitive indicator of climate change, in the sense of average surface temperature change, in the glacier’s region (Bray, 1968) & (Zumbühl & Nussbaumer, 2018). It is well understood from historical records and paleo-glacial-moraine data that the maximum glacier extent in the three regions shown in figure 1 occurred between 1700 and 1800, with a maximum reached around 1750. This is just after the historically coldest part of the Little Ice Age, ~1640-~1715 when one-third of the world’s population died (Parker, 2008) & (Parker G. , 2012). There is a delay between the glacial maximum and the cold that caused it due to the time necessary for the snow to compact, form the glacial ice, and move to its ultimate maximum point.
The data sources for the New Zealand illustrations in figure 4 are the NIWA Climate Database (CliFlo) climate snow and ice records (link), the NIWA Snow and Ice Network (SIN) high-elevation glacier/snow monitoring group (link), and the NIWA Glacier Inventory and terminal position update group (Part of the new Climate Present and Past group: link).
The Alaska data is from the USGS (link and link). More details are available in Connor, et al. (Connor et al., 2009), who write:
“Neoglacial climate and landscape dynamism created difficult but endurable environmental conditions for the Huna Tlingit people living there. Choosing to cope with environmental hardship was perhaps preferable to the more severely deteriorating conditions outside of the Bay as well as conflicts with competing groups. The central portion of the outwash plain persisted until it was overridden by ice moving into Icy Strait between AD 1724—1794. This final ice advance was very abrupt after a prolonged still-stand, evicting the Huna Tlingit from their Glacier Bay homeland.” (Connor et al., 2009)
Thus, the maximum ice advance in southern Alaska was around 1750. Additional sources were the NOAA NSIDC data access portal (link) and NCEI (link).
For the European Alps the data are from WGMS (link, link, and link) and swisstopo (link, link, and link). In 1644 the Mer de Glace reached its maximum extent after swallowing three villages in the mountain valley. The terrified and homeless villagers asked Bishop Jean‑Amédée de Milliet to perform an exorcism ritual at Chamonix, France to halt the advancing ice in 1645. The exorcism’s effect was temporary however, in 1821 the glacier reached a second maximum, which was nearly as far down the mountain as the first in 1644. The glacier’s ultimate retreat finally began in the mid-1850s (Zumbühl & Nussbaumer, 2018).
As we can see in table 2, 20-40% of the loss from that maximum occurred by 1900, the end of the temperature baseline period. Thus, it is hard to relate radiative forcing change, as seen in glacial records, since 1750 to temperature changes in 1850-1900. Another complication is that the last of five consecutive grand solar minima was in 1680 and the beginning of the longest grand solar maxima in 600 years was in about 1930 (Usoskin, 2017).
Summary
From this discussion, it should be clear that the Little Ice Age is not a good climatic baseline from the standpoint of humans or human civilization. It was a time of war, famine, drought, plague, and misery in Europe, North America, the Middle East, Japan, China, and probably elsewhere (Parker G. , 2012). The climate of the Little Ice Age is not a climate any sane person would want to return to. This baseline was chosen by the IPCC out of scientific convenience because it had the best available data and not for any meaningful purpose. It is madness to imply that the “pre-industrial” or the Little Ice Age is an ideal climate.
So, what is the optimal global temperature for humankind? This period must be a time when agriculture was productive, civilizations expanded, ecosystems were stable, extreme cold was rare, and glaciers were not advancing into farmland and villages. Historically, when were these times? Refer to figure 3 and here and we see the best times for humans were the Holocene Climatic Optimum (~8000BC to 4200BC), the Medieval Warm Period (~800AD to 1250AD), and the Modern Warm Period (~1905 to present). These were the times that civilizations grew and prospered. Table 2 lists the average temperature in these periods from all three curves in figure 3. The average shown for the Modern Warm Period is mostly from the Pages2K instrumental data after it was moved to the same reference period used for the proxies.
Table 2. Warm Period Anomalies for the Holocene Climatic Optimum (HCO), the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), and the Modern Warm Period using a 1961-1990 and a pre-industrial (1850-1900) reference.
The values in table 2 are the change in temperature, during the Holocene Climatic Optimum (HCO), the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), and the Modern Warm Period relative to a 1961-1990 mean (top table) and the “pre-industrial” (1850-1900). In both tables, the Modern Warm Period falls in between the MWP and the HCO.
The values in table 2 are very rough (perhaps ± 0.2° to 0.3°C or so), but directionally correct. The MWP was probably about the same temperature as the late 20th century, and the HCO was probably warmer than today. This is important because humans and human civilization thrived during these warm periods and suffered during the Little Ice Age or pre-industrial period, see here and here for a discussion and comparison. The best human-centric climate baseline is not the Little Ice Age, it is the climate seen in the HCO, MWP, and today.
The most powerful volcanic eruptions are ranked primarily by the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI), a logarithmic scale (0- 8 or more) based mainly on the volume of ejected material (tephra), plume height, and qualitative descriptors.
Most powerful eruptions in recorded human history are those of VEI 7 (and the largest VEI 6 events). No VEI 8 supereruptions have occurred in the Holocene.
Wah Wah Springs, La Garita (Fish Canyon Tuff), and Toba rank among the largest known single explosive (VEI 8) eruptions by erupted volume in Earth’s geological record.
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The most powerful volcanic eruptions are ranked primarily by the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI), a logarithmic scale (0- 8 or more) based mainly on the volume of ejected material (tephra), plume height, and qualitative descriptors.
Each step up generally represents about a tenfold increase in ejecta volume. VEI 8 events are “mega-colossal” supereruptions (≥1,000 km³ of ejecta).
Power can also be considered by dense- rock equivalent (DRE) volume of magma, energy release, or climate impact (e.g., sulfur dioxide emissions), but VEI is the standard for explosivity. Note that enormous effusive flood- basalt events (such as the Siberian Traps ~252 million years ago) released millions of km³ of lava over long periods and are linked to mass extinctions, but they are not highly explosive and thus score low on the VEI.
Most Powerful in Recorded Human History
No VEI 8 eruptions have occurred in the Holocene (last ~11,700 years). The largest in the historical/written record are VEI 7:
Mount Tambora (Indonesia), 1815: The most powerful eruption in recorded history (VEI 7; ~30- 50 and more km³ DRE / ~100 or more km³ bulk ejecta). It was heard ~1,600- 2,000 km away, killed ~10,000 people directly (and tens of thousands more from famine and disease), and caused the 1816 “Year Without a Summer” with global cooling, crop failures, and widespread hardship.
Other notable large historical or near- historical eruptions include:
Samalas (Rinjani, Indonesia), 1257: VEI 7; major climate impact.
Paektu/Changbaishan (China/North Korea border), ~946 CE: VEI 7.
Santorini/Thera (Greece), ~1600 BCE: VEI 7; heavily impacted Minoan civilization.
Taupo (New Zealand), ~232 CE: VEI 7.
Krakatoa (Indonesia), 1883: VEI 6; extremely loud explosions heard thousands of km away, massive tsunamis, ~36,000 deaths.
Novarupta (Alaska, USA), 1912: VEI 6; largest of the 20th century.
Mount Pinatubo (Philippines), 1991: VEI 6; significant global cooling.
Hunga Tonga- Hunga Haʻapai (Tonga), 2022: Around VEI 5- 6; the most powerful of the 21st century so far, with a massive atmospheric shockwave and tsunami.
VEI 6- 7 events occur on timescales of decades to centuries/millennia and can have regional- to- global climatic effects.
Largest Known Supereruptions (VEI 8) in Earth’s Geological History
These are far larger than anything in human history. Roughly 40- 60 VEI 8 events have been identified in the last ~132 million years (many more are likely lost to erosion and tectonics). Frequency is on the order of once every ~50,000 years or more.
Notable examples (volumes are approximate bulk ejecta and can have significant uncertainty):
Eruption / Caldera
Age
Location
Approx. Volume (km³)
Notes
Wah Wah Springs Tuff
~30 Ma
Utah/Nevada, USA
5,500- 5,900
One of the largest known
La Garita (Fish Canyon Tuff)
~27.8 Ma
Colorado, USA
~5,000
Often cited among the very largest
Youngest Toba Tuff
~74,000 years ago
Sumatra, Indonesia
~2,800 (range 2,000-13,200)
Largest in the last ~1- 2 million years; possible human population bottleneck
Huckleberry Ridge (Yellowstone)
~2.1 Ma
Wyoming/Idaho, USA
~2,450- 2,500
Largest Yellowstone event
Oruanui (Taupō)
~26,500 years ago
New Zealand
~1,170
Most recent VEI 8
Lava Creek (Yellowstone)
~640,000 years ago
Wyoming, USA
~1,000
Formed the present Yellowstone caldera
Other very large events include various Mid-Tertiary ignimbrite flare- up deposits in the western U.S. and several in the Taupō Volcanic Zone.
Key Context
VEI 8 events eject ≥1,000 km³ and can inject vast amounts of material into the stratosphere, potentially causing multi- year volcanic winters and major ecological disruption.
The largest known explosive events (by volume) date back tens of millions of years; evidence becomes scarcer further back due to geological recycling.
Climate and human impacts depend heavily on sulfur content and latitude as well as raw size (Tambora and Toba are classic examples of strong climate forcing).
In short:Tambora 1815 is the standout for recorded history, while Wah Wah Springs, La Garita/Fish Canyon, and Toba rank among the most powerful known explosive eruptions in Earth’s longer geological record.
Most powerful eruptions in recorded human history are those of VEI 7 (and the largest VEI 6 events). No VEI 8 supereruptions have occurred in the Holocene.
Climate impacts arise mainly from sulfur dioxide (SO₂) injected into the stratosphere, which forms sulfate aerosols that reflect sunlight and cause temporary global or hemispheric cooling (a “volcanic winter”), often lasting 1- 3 years, along with disruptions to precipitation and monsoons.
1. Mount Tambora (Indonesia), April 1815: VEI 7
This is the most powerful eruption in recorded history (~30- 50 or more km³ dense- rock equivalent / >100 km³ bulk ejecta; plume up to ~43- 45 km). It released an estimated 10- 120 Tg (million tons) of sulfur (commonly cited around 50- 60 Tg SO₂).
Climate impact:
Global average temperatures dropped by roughly 0.4- 0.7 °C (some regional or Northern Hemisphere estimates higher, up to ~0.8- 1+ °C in places).
1816 became known as the “Year Without a Summer” in the Northern Hemisphere (especially Europe and North America): widespread frosts and snow in June- August, crop failures, livestock deaths, famine, and disease. It contributed to tens of thousands of deaths beyond the immediate local toll (~10,000- 90,000 or more including famine and disease in Indonesia and elsewhere).
Effects persisted for 1- 3 years, with altered weather patterns, reduced precipitation in some regions, and vivid sunsets from aerosols.
Models confirm the eruption greatly increased the likelihood of the extreme cold (and contributed to wetter conditions in parts of Europe).
2. Samalas (Rinjani, Indonesia), 1257: VEI 7
One of the largest sulfur- rich eruptions of the Common Era (possibly larger sulfur release than Tambora; estimates ~100- 160 Tg SO₂ or more). It ranks among the top stratospheric gas injections of the past 2,000 years.
Climate impact:
Produced some of the coldest Northern Hemisphere summers of the past millennium in 1258-1259 (proxy reconstructions show peak cooling of ~0.7- 1.2 °C or more in places; models often simulate stronger cooling, ~1- 2 °C).
Cooling was spatially heterogeneous: strong in Western Europe, Siberia, and Japan; milder or even warmer in parts of North America (possibly modulated by El Niño).
Aggravated existing food shortages and famines in Europe and Japan (though crises began before the eruption in some areas). Effects lasted a few years and may have contributed to broader 13th-century cooling trends.
Other Major Historical Eruptions and Climate Effects
Huaynaputina (Peru), 1600 (VEI 6): Linked to one of the coldest years of the past millennium (1601); strong Northern Hemisphere cooling and crop failures.
Krakatoa (Indonesia), 1883 (VEI 6): Global cooling of ~0.3–1 °C lasting ~1- 2 years; spectacular sunsets; measurable temperature drops and weather anomalies.
Novarupta (Alaska), 1912 (VEI 6): Largest 20th- century eruption; significant but more regional Northern Hemisphere effects.
Mount Pinatubo (Philippines), 1991 (VEI 6): Best- observed modern large eruption. Injected ~15- 20 Tg SO₂; global surface/tropospheric cooling of ~0.4- 0.7 °C peaking in the following 1- 2 years, with stratospheric warming; reduced tropical precipitation. Effects faded within a few years.
Other notable cases: Paektu/Changbaishan (~946 CE, VEI 7), Ilopango (~450 CE or earlier, VEI 6 or more), and the unknown 1809 tropical eruption (preceding Tambora) also produced detectable cooling signals in ice cores and tree rings.
General Patterns of Climate Impact
Tropical eruptions (like Tambora, Samalas, Pinatubo) tend to produce more global effects because aerosols spread efficiently across both hemispheres. High- latitude eruptions can cause stronger regional (especially Northern Hemisphere) cooling relative to their sulfur load. Cooling peaks in the first 1- 2 years and typically lasts 2- 5 years depending on aerosol lifetime. Secondary effects include:
Reduced global and monsoon precipitation in the first summer.
Possible modulation of El Niño- Southern Oscillation or other modes of variability.
Agricultural disruption, famine risk, and societal stress, especially when combined with other factors (e.g., low solar activity during the Little Ice Age).
Proxy records (tree rings, ice cores) and climate models consistently show that the largest VEI 6- 7 events of the past 2,000 years drove some of the most extreme short- term cooling episodes of the Common Era.
Wah Wah Springs, La Garita (Fish Canyon Tuff), and Toba rank among the largest known single explosive (VEI 8) eruptions by erupted volume in Earth’s geological record.
These far exceed anything in human history (e.g., Tambora 1815 was ~30- 50 or more km³ DRE). Volumes are approximate bulk ejecta (or dense-rock equivalent where noted) and carry uncertainties due to erosion, incomplete exposure, and modeling assumptions. All are supereruptions (≥1,000 km³).
Wah Wah Springs (~30.06 million years ago)
Location: Indian Peak- Caliente Caldera Complex, southwestern Utah (near the Utah- Nevada border), USA.
Volume: ~5,500- 5,900 km³ (preferred average often cited as ~5,900 km³) of crystal-rich dacite. This makes it one of the largest single explosive eruptions known.
Details: Part of a major Mid-Tertiary ignimbrite flare-up. The eruption produced extensive pyroclastic flows (some >500 m thick) and ash that reached as far as Nebraska. The structural caldera is roughly 1,000 km². It occurred over a short period (possibly about a week in models). The deposits are now deeply eroded and dissected.
It ranks as the largest known eruption from its caldera complex and among the very top globally by volume.
La Garita / Fish Canyon Tuff (~27.8- 28.2 million years ago)
Location: La Garita Caldera, San Juan volcanic field, southwestern Colorado, USA (near Creede).
Volume: ~5,000 km³ of remarkably uniform, crystal- rich dacite (often described as “monotonous intermediate”).
Details: One of the largest and best- studied Cenozoic eruptions. The Fish Canyon Tuff is highly homogeneous in composition. The caldera is large and elongate (~35 × 75 km in revised estimates). It is part of the same Oligocene ignimbrite flare- up that produced many other large events in the western U.S. Sanidine crystals from the tuff are widely used as a geochronology standard (astronomically calibrated age ~28.175 Ma). The eruption was followed by smaller associated activity over ~100 ka.
It is frequently ranked among the top two or three largest known explosive eruptions of the past 100 million years.
Youngest Toba Tuff (Toba, ~74,000 years ago)
Location: Toba Caldera, northern Sumatra, Indonesia.
Volume: Commonly estimated at ~2,800 km³ bulk (or ~2,000- 2,800 km³ DRE in classic figures); more recent modeling of ash fallout plus proximal deposits raises total estimates to ~5,300 km³ DRE (or bulk volumes up to ~8,600- 13,200 km³ in some calculations). It is the largest known eruption of the Quaternary (last ~2.6 million years).
Details: Formed the present Lake Toba caldera (one of the world’s largest). Ash blanketed the Indian subcontinent (centimeters thick in places) and reached the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and beyond. The eruption column likely reached 30- 40 and more km.
Climate and environmental impact: The most debated of the three because it is relatively recent. Sulfur release estimates vary widely (hundreds of Tg SO₂ in many models). Climate simulations often predict multi- year global cooling of several degrees (peak global means around 3- 5 °C in high- sulfur scenarios, with stronger regional effects), a possible volcanic winter, and disruption of monsoons. Some ice- core and proxy records support cooling lasting years to a decade or more.
However, the severity and duration are contested: certain African and Indian records show limited long-term disruption or even short- term warming/drying in places, and the long- proposed human population bottleneck (near- extinction of early modern humans) remains highly controversial and is not strongly supported by all genetic or archaeological evidence. Regional effects near the source would have been catastrophic.
Comparison and Context
Eruption
Age
Volume (approx.)
Location
Notes
Wah Wah Springs
~30.06 Ma
5,500- 5,900 km³
Utah, USA
Largest of its complex; among the absolute biggest known
La Garita (Fish Canyon)
~27.8- 28.2 Ma
~5,000 km³
Colorado, USA
Extremely uniform composition; major dating standard
Toba (Youngest Tuff)
~74 ka
2,800- 5,300 or more km³ DRE
Sumatra, Indonesia
Largest Quaternary; potential climate & human impacts debated
These three stand out because of their exceptional volumes. Older or less well- preserved candidates (e.g., some Mid-Tertiary or Paleozoic events) exist with potentially comparable or larger estimated sizes, but evidence is more fragmentary. Wah Wah Springs and La Garita belong to a period of intense western North American volcanism; Toba is the most recent of the truly giant ones and the only one with possible direct relevance to modern human populations.
Volcanic ash has limited direct long- term climate impacts compared to sulfate aerosols, but it plays several important short- term and secondary roles.
Primary Distinction: Ash vs. Sulfate Aerosols
The dominant climate effect of large explosive eruptions comes from sulfur dioxide (SO₂), which converts into sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere. These tiny droplets can persist for 1- 3 years, efficiently scatter incoming sunlight back to space, and produce global surface cooling (typically 0.1- 0.5°C or more after major events like Pinatubo 1991).
Volcanic ash (fine particles of rock, glass, and minerals) behaves differently:
Larger ash particles fall out of the atmosphere within days to weeks due to gravity.
Only very fine ash (sub- micron to a few microns) can remain suspended longer.
Even fine ash has a much shorter atmospheric lifetime than sulfate aerosols (weeks to a few months in most cases, though some observations show persistence for months).
As a result, ash contributes mainly to local or regional, short- term effects, while sulfate drives the longer- lasting global cooling.
Direct Radiative Effects of Ash
Fine ash can scatter sunlight and contribute to temporary cooling while airborne.
Observations after some eruptions (e.g., Kelut 2014) showed ash-rich particles dominating the optical properties of the volcanic cloud for the first ~60 days and accounting for 20- 25% of the aerosol optical depth in certain cases.
Ash is generally less efficient at reflecting sunlight than sulfate aerosols on a per- mass basis over long periods.
Some studies indicate that persistent fine ash can enhance short- term cooling beyond what models assuming rapid ash fallout predict.
Indirect and Secondary Effects
Ash influences climate and atmospheric chemistry in other ways:
Heterogeneous chemistry: Ash surfaces can take up SO₂, accelerating its removal from the atmosphere. In some cases this shortens the SO₂ lifetime and reduces the amount of sulfate that forms (one study found ~43% more sulfur removed in 2 months when ash chemistry was included).
Ocean iron fertilization: When ash falls into the ocean, it can supply iron and stimulate phytoplankton growth. This may enhance carbon dioxide uptake from the atmosphere, providing a longer- term (though usually modest) cooling effect via the carbon cycle. This has been observed after events such as the 2008 Kasatochi eruption.
Surface albedo: Thick ash deposits on land (especially continental-scale blankets from supereruptions) can increase surface reflectivity, potentially causing regional or longer- lasting cooling lasting years to decades until the ash is weathered or covered.
Local weather disruption: Ash reduces solar radiation at the surface near the volcano, lowers daytime temperatures, and can affect precipitation and aviation in the short term.
Summary of Climate Relevance
Aspect
Volcanic Ash
Sulfate Aerosols
Atmospheric lifetime
Days to months (fine particles)
1- 3 years
Main climate effect
Short- term local/regional cooling; some optical contribution
Global surface cooling for years
Key mechanism
Scattering, chemistry and ocean fertilization and surface albedo
Scattering of sunlight
Importance for large eruptions
Secondary / short- term
Primary driver
In climate models, ash is often neglected or simplified because of its short lifetime. Recent research shows this may underestimate early post- eruption cooling and chemical interactions. For the largest supereruptions (such as Toba), thick ash blankets could have more significant regional and multi- year surface effects than typically assumed.
Overall, while ash contributes to the initial climate response and has interesting biogeochemical roles, sulfate aerosols remain the main agent responsible for the multi- year global cooling associated with major volcanic eruptions.
And yet, by the time President Joe Biden and his minions had left office in early 2025, such people, operating deep in the administrative state (and with the apparent blessing of a demented President), had managed to impose regulations that, by some time in the 2030s would have, among other things, forced the end of the manufacture and sale of all vehicles except electric vehicles, and forced the closure of all power plants using fossil fuels.
Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump and his people have been actively working to rescind and eliminate this insanity.
Today the EPA took another big step in removing these destructive regulations by finalizing a Rule titled “Partial Repeal of the Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units.”
I will never understand how large numbers of seemingly intelligent people got the idea that they were going to save the world by forcing the closure of all the functional parts of the energy system of the U.S. Nor will I ever understand how enough of those people got themselves into positions of sufficient political power to put their wacko energy ideas into effect. And yet, by the time President Joe Biden and his minions had left office in early 2025, such people, operating deep in the administrative state (and with the apparent blessing of a demented President), had managed to impose regulations that, by some time in the 2030s would have, among other things, forced the end of the manufacture and sale of all vehicles except electric vehicles, and forced the closure of all power plants using fossil fuels.
Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump and his people have been actively working to rescind and eliminate this insanity. I have previously reported on many of these actions, for example here and here. Today the EPA took another big step in removing these destructive regulations by finalizing a Rule titled “Partial Repeal of the Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units.” The final Rule was published today in the Federal Register at 91 F.R. 58,954; it takes effect 60 days from today, that is, November 16, 2026.
Today’s action is ludicrously complex in its efforts to clear away some of the convoluted regulatory thicket erected by the previous administration. (It was 195 pages long in the standard double-spaced typed format issued a few days ago, in advance of the official Federal Register publication.). The complexity of the rescission is a function of the complexity of the prior actions that it seeks to unwind. Today I’ll try to provide a comprehensible summary of the background, and how the latest action fits into the mix.
It was way back in December 2009, during Barack Obama’s first year as President, that EPA adopted what is known as the Endangerment Finding, purporting to determine that carbon dioxide and other “greenhouse gases” constitute a “danger” to human health and welfare. In the same December 2009 regulatory action, EPA also claimed to find that emissions of these gases from “from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contribute to the greenhouse gas pollution that threatens public health and welfare.” That finding then formed the basis for the subsequent regulations that initially imposed fuel economy standards on vehicles, and then further imposed emissions mandates that would ratchet down over time until only fully-electric vehicles could be manufactured and sold.
After the December 2009 action, it remained for further regulations to extend the Endangerment Finding to other emissions sources like industry, aircraft, and power plants. As to power plants, the major initiative of the Obama administration was a regulation informally known as the Clean Power Plan, finally imposed in October 2015, during the second half of Obama’s second term. (The official name of the CPP was “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units.”). The basic structure of the CPP was to set limits on the amounts of CO2 and other GHGs that a power plant could emit, with those limits ratcheting down over the years until, by some point in the late 2030s, it would be impossible for any power plant using fossil fuels to comply. At that point, all fossil fuel power plants would be forced to close.
During President Trump’s first term, EPA attempted to do away with the CPP and replace it with another regulation called the Affordable Clean Energy rule; but that effort got struck down by the D.C. Circuit, thereby seemingly re-instating the CPP pending Supreme Court review. The litigation reached the Supreme Court in 2022, during the Biden presidency, in a case called West Virginia v. EPA. The Supreme Court struck down the CPP as being beyond the authority conferred on EPA by Congress in the Clean Air Act.
But the zealots in the Biden EPA were not going to be deterred by the Supreme Court’s striking down of the CPP, and they looked for another avenue to force the end of electricity generation by fossil fuels. In May 2024 the Biden EPA went final with a Rule with a ridiculously long title but generally referred to as the “Carbon Pollution Standards” for power plants. To avoid the Supreme Court’s West Virginia decision, this regulation took a new approach, which was to declare that the “best system of emissions reduction” (BSER) for a power plant would be to adopt a system of carbon capture and sequestration or storage (CCS), supposedly to capture 90% of the emissions of the power plant.
The problem with CCS is that it is enormously costly and uses up a large fraction of the energy produced by the plant in the effort to capture the emitted CO2. In the limiting case, you can use up all the energy produced by the plant, and still not capture the last bits of the emitted CO2. (I have previously referred to CCS as “a war against the second law of thermodynamics.”)
When the Biden EPA proposed the Carbon Pollution Standards, numerous commenters — including major states like Ohio and West Virginia — pointed out why the standards were technically infeasible. I summarized those comments in this post from August 2023. But EPA went ahead anyway.
EPA’s action today rescinds the Carbon Pollution Standards for existing power plants. In support of its action, EPA basically adopts the infeasibility arguments made in the cited comments of Ohio and West Virginia. Here are some excerpts from the Executive Summary:
The EPA is finalizing the repeal of the emission guidelines for existing fossil fuel-fired steam generating units in their entirety. Specifically, the EPA is finalizing the determination that 90 percent CCS is not the BSER for existing long-term coal-fired steam generating units because 90 percent CCS has not been adequately demonstrated, the costs of 90 percent CCS are not reasonable, and the associated degree of emission limitation is not achievable. In a change from the 2024 CPS, the EPA concludes that previous projects that failed to achieve 90 percent CCS were not a sufficient basis to conclude the technology has been adequately demonstrated. Additionally, the carbon dioxide (CO2) capture, pipeline, and sequestration infrastructure necessary to implement 90 percent CCS for the fleet of existing coal-fired steam generating units does not currently exist and would need to be broadly deployed. Because it is significantly unlikely that the necessary infrastructure for CCS can be deployed by the January 1, 2032 compliance date, the EPA is finalizing the determination that the degree of emission limitation in the 2024 CPS for long-term coal-fired steam generating units is not achievable.
Note that, as with the previous rescission in February 2026 of the Endangerment Finding as to motor vehicle emissions, EPA did not attempt in this rule-making to take on the scientific basis for the claim that human GHG emissions are leading us to some kind of global warming apocalypse. I regard that omission as a lost opportunity. EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding rested on a very shaky foundation, most notably claiming to find ongoing warming in a surface temperature record that lacked almost all data for 40% of the earth’s surface (the Southern Hemisphere oceans). It would be great to point out how comically weak were the bases on which this power-hungry agency purported to imposed trillions of dollars in cost on the American people.
Like the February rescission of the EF, this action will undoubtedly quickly proceed to litigation in the D.C. Circuit. Although I would have liked EPA to base its actions on additional arguments besides the ones it has used, I still think its position is strong. Indeed, I can’t even think of what the environmental groups are going to say to the arguments about infeasibility of CCS. There really is no functional economic demonstration of this technology at scale, even today, and there likely never will be. So have at it!
Thankfully President Trump has issued Executive Order 143000 under which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is undergoing restructuring and is reviewing the use of the Linear No-threshold (LNT) model. The Executive Order stated that the LNT model is flawed, and it instructs reviewers to use science-based measures.
As years went by, the application of the LNT model demanded hugely expensive safety measures be built into nuclear reactors, even though the real risks were negligible.
An interesting illustration was the Fukushima incident. The very old reactor complex was struck by the largest tsunami on record. It also turned out that Fukushima had a number of design faults and management faults as well, and yet the result was that not one single person was killed or injured by nuclear radiation.
Thankfully President Trump has issued Executive Order 143000 under which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is undergoing restructuring and is reviewing the use of the Linear No-threshold (LNT) model. The Executive Order stated that the LNT model is flawed, and it instructs reviewers to use science-based measures. In June 2025 President Trump abruptly dismissed sitting NRC Chairman Chris Hanson. This marked the first time in the agency’s history that a sitting commissioner was removed. Before this happened, I had been told confidentially that the NRC had effectively become an anti-nuclear body, under the influence of the anti-nuclear lobby. Looking at the United States from other countries, it certainly had appeared like that. The NRC of the U.S. had become a major obstacle to the advance of nuclear power. Since mid-2025 a major NRC restructuring has been underway.
How did LNT happen, and what was the result?
What happened was that a scientist, Herman Mueller, discovered in 1927 that X-rays caused genetic mutations in fruit flies. Additional research in the 1920s and 1930s suggested a linear relationship between X-ray dose and fly mutations.
As the 1950s and 1960s of the Cold War era unfolded, the International Commission on Radiological Protection introduced this concept into nuclear radiation protection rules. They knew how much nuclear radiation would kill a person, and how much would seriously harm a person. At that point all was OK. But then people with political agendas extended the argument, (like the ice block story) and what they did was draw a straight line all the way to zero. But this was wrong. It implied that there was no dose under which nuclear radiation was harmless. The result was that huge costs were introduced into nuclear power plant construction, based on unrealistic assumptions of possible danger.
I asked a South African nuclear engineer, Andrew Kenny, to give a talk about this at a conference. Andrew did an excellent job and introduced the Falling Out Of Bed (FOOB) concept, as an amusing illustration of how silly LNT had become.
Andrew assembled real figures for injuries and death to people falling at industrial sites. The data was comprehensive. For example, for workers falling from, say, a four-storey building, death is virtually certain. From a two-storey building; very likely, but not certain, and so on. Andrew pointed out that falling from the height of a table would almost certainly not harm anyone, or at worst, break an arm. However, if you use the LNT nuclear radiation model, and foolishly extend the line all the way to zero, it would tell you that the chance of death was not zero. The law would then kick in, and require safety measures to be put in place to prevent anybody falling off a bar stool, from dying. Andrew took it further, and said that the mathematics would say that there was a chance of dying if a person fell out a bed. In the nuclear LNT scenario the law would then require that no bed could be higher than two bricks height, and that safety barriers would have to be built around the bed. This sounds silly but it is exactly what really happened in the nuclear industry.
Crazy cost escalation
As years went by, the application of the LNT model demanded hugely expensive safety measures be built into nuclear reactors, even though the real risks were negligible. These actions were enthusiastically encouraged by the anti-nuclear lobby who openly stated that they wanted to price nuclear power out of the market.
An interesting illustration was the Fukushima incident. The very old reactor complex was struck by the largest tsunami on record. It also turned out that Fukushima had a number of design faults and management faults as well, and yet the result was that not one single person was killed or injured by nuclear radiation. Additionally, no private property was harmed in any way by nuclear radiation. Fukushima was not a nuclear disaster. It was a conventional industrial incident which was very costly for the owners, and very damaging to the image and pride of the Japanese government. But it was not a nuclear disaster.
Air Disaster?
As a comparison, imagine if three large passenger aircraft were parked in a hangar at an airport, and the hangar catches fire. The hangar is burnt to the ground, and the three aircraft totally destroyed. Would you classify that as a major air disaster, merely because aircraft were involved? Not a chance…
Fukushima should have been hailed as an incredible illustration of just how safe nuclear power was. After all that went wrong, there was actually no nuclear problem. But the result of Fukushima internationally was that extra safety measures were demanded at reactors all over the world. Using the LNT model, ridiculously expensive additional safety measures were put in place, merely adding to the cost of nuclear power. So totally false LNT Index criteria were applied foolishly.
This is like creating a silly; Falling Out Of Bed Index (FOOBI) and applying it all over society to anything of any height, even your bed and barstool, supposedly to save lives on a massive scale.
So, the FOOBI concept shows that you can’t just extrapolate some data without actually checking if the extrapolation is valid.
In the case of LNT, it is not valid. Small doses of nuclear radiation are harmless and there’s no need for any concern. As much as you can safely sleep on a normal bed, you can safely sleep next door to a modern nuclear reactor.
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