Pangeaโ€™s Megamonsoon: The Supercontinentโ€™s Extreme Wet-Dry Climate Engine

Pangea produced extreme continentality, strong monsoonal circulation, widespread aridity in the interior, altered atmospheric and ocean circulation, and influenced long- term COโ‚‚ and temperature trends, often creating highly seasonal, harsh conditions unlike todayโ€™s more fragmented continents.

During the lifespan of Pangea, atmospheric COโ‚‚ and global temperatures showed a clear long- term shift from icehouse conditions in the late Paleozoic to greenhouse conditions in the early Mesozoic.

Illustration depicting Pangea's megamonsoon phenomenon, showcasing extreme heat haze, cross-equatorial atmospheric circulation, intense rainfall along coastlines, and surrounding oceans.
AI generated by Grok

Pangea (roughly 335- 175 million years ago) produced extreme continentality, strong monsoonal circulation, widespread aridity in the interior, altered atmospheric and ocean circulation, and influenced long- term COโ‚‚ and temperature trends, often creating highly seasonal, harsh conditions unlike todayโ€™s more fragmented continents.

With nearly all landmasses joined into one vast continent (stretching from near the South Pole to the North Pole and surrounded by the Panthalassa ocean, plus the warmer Tethys Sea to the east), large areas of the interior lay far from oceanic moisture sources.

This led to:

  • Very hot summers and cold winters in the continental interior.
  • Strong diurnal temperature swings (hot days, cold nights) in arid zones.
  • Limited moderating influence from oceans over much of the land.

Climate models and geologic evidence (evaporites, red beds, coals) indicate the interior was often inhospitable, with temperatures potentially exceeding 40- 50 ยฐC in places during peak warmth, especially in the Triassic โ€œhothouseโ€ phase.

Pangea supported an intense, hemisphere- spanning โ€œmegamonsoonโ€ driven by large land- sea temperature contrasts and the geometry of the landmass flanking the Tethys Sea.

Key features included:

  • Strong seasonal wind reversals and extreme wet- dry seasonality.
  • Heavy rainfall concentrated along eastern and some coastal margins (especially near Tethys), with models suggesting coastal daily totals that could greatly exceed modern monsoons in intensity in places.
  • Very dry conditions in the central and western interior, where moisture was diverted away.

The megamonsoon was particularly well developed in the Late Triassic when the supercontinent reached maximum extent. Precipitation was highly seasonal rather than year- round tropical. Later continental breakup progressively altered the global monsoon system toward more modern patterns.

Drylands covered a large fraction of Pangeaโ€™s land surface (simulations suggest ~50% and more during peak configuration, higher than in the more fragmented Cretaceous).

An extensive arid to hyperarid belt often spanned the equatorial and subtropical interior, unlike todayโ€™s wet equatorial tropics, because of the merged subtropical high- pressure cells, distance from moisture, and monsoonal diversion of rainfall. Evaporite deposits and other proxies record persistent dry conditions across much of the central continent.

Coastal zones and higher latitudes were generally wetter or more seasonal.

Simulations of the Pangea- era climate (e.g., around 250 Ma) show a weaker and wider Hadley circulation compared with the pre- industrial modern climate (annual -mean cells ~20- 45% weaker, poleward edges shifted outward by ~2ยฐ).

Ascending branches of the winter cells shifted more poleward, linked to the supercontinentโ€™s geography and higher static stability in a warmer world. Global mean surface temperature in one hothouse simulation reached ~26 ยฐC (roughly 13 ยฐC warmer than a pre- industrial control).

Pangeaโ€™s configuration disrupted zonal (east- west) circulation patterns and limited the mixing of cold high-latitude waters into equatorial Panthalassa in some reconstructions.

The warm Tethys Sea supplied humid air and rainfall to adjacent coasts. Changes in ocean gateways and currents with assembly and later breakup also affected heat transport and polar temperatures.

Supercontinent assembly and breakup influence atmospheric COโ‚‚ via volcanism, sea level, and silicate weathering:

  • Assembly is often linked to relatively lower sea levels, enhanced weathering of collision- related mountains, and cooling tendencies (Pangeaโ€™s early phase coincided with late Paleozoic icehouse conditions and Gondwanan glaciation).
  • The assembled supercontinentโ€™s aridity reduced runoff and weathering efficiency in the interior, which models suggest helped maintain higher COโ‚‚ and warmer continental temperatures (especially Middle- Late- Triassic).
  • Breakup increased continental runoff and silicate weathering in many simulations, drawing down COโ‚‚ (from high Triassic values toward lower Cretaceous levels) while also involving changes in volcanic outgassing; the overall Mesozoic trend after breakup included greenhouse conditions.

These effects interact with large igneous province eruptions (e.g., end- Permian Siberian Traps) that drove major warming, ocean anoxia, and the largest mass extinction.

In summary, Pangeaโ€™s climate was characterized by strong geographic control: extreme seasonal and spatial contrasts, a dominant megamonsoon, vast interior deserts, modified Hadley cells, and feedback on the global carbon cycle that contributed to both icehouse and greenhouse intervals.

Geologic proxies (sediments, fossils, isotopes) and climate model experiments consistently support these patterns, though exact temperatures and precipitation amounts vary with assumed COโ‚‚, topography, and solar luminosity.

The later breakup of Pangea shifted Earth toward wetter, more fragmented continental climates and different monsoon regimes.

During the lifespan of Pangea (roughly 335- 175 million years ago), atmospheric COโ‚‚ and global temperatures showed a clear long- term shift from icehouse conditions in the late Paleozoic to greenhouse conditions in the early Mesozoic.

Values varied significantly, with large uncertainties in proxies, but the overall pattern is well- established.

Atmospheric COโ‚‚ Levels (ppm)

Proxy data (paleosols, stomata, isotopes, etc.) and carbon-cycle models (e.g., GEOCARBSULF) indicate:

PeriodApproximate COโ‚‚ Range (ppm)Notes
Late Carboniferous- Early/Mid Permian (~335- 260 Ma)~300- 500 (often near or below ~350- 400)Low levels during Late Paleozoic Ice Age (LPIA); comparable to or slightly above pre- industrial (~280 ppm)
Latest Permian- Early Triassic (~260- 245 Ma)Sharp rise: from ~400 to 1,000-2,600 and more (peaks often 1,200- 2,000 or more)Driven by Siberian Traps volcanism; some proxies show 4 times increase
Middle- Late Triassic (~245- 201 Ma)Highly variable: ~500- 2,000 and more (many estimates 800- 1,500)Elevated greenhouse levels; some records show spikes near Triassic- Jurassic boundary
Early- Middle Jurassic (~201-175 Ma, early breakup)Generally, 500-1,300 (often 500-1,100)Still elevated relative to today but lower than peak Triassic in many reconstructions

Overall trend: Low COโ‚‚ during Pangea assembly (icehouse), followed by a major rise across the Permian-Triassic boundary and sustained higher levels (typically several times pre- industrial) through the Triassic and into the Jurassic.

Modern comparison: Pre- industrial โ‰ˆ 280 ppm; current โ‰ˆ 420 and more ppm.

Global Mean Surface Temperature (ยฐC)

Estimates of global average temperature (GAT/GMST) relative to modern (~14โ€“15 ยฐC pre-industrial):

PeriodApproximate GMST (ยฐC)Warming vs. Pre-industrialNotes
Late Carboniferous- Early Permian (icehouse peak)~12- 15 ยฐC (sometimes as low as ~11- 14 ยฐC)Near modern or slightly coolerPolar ice sheets present (especially Gondwana)
Latest Permian- Early TriassicSharp rise; peaks up to ~25- 33 ยฐC in extreme estimates+10 to +18 ยฐC or moreExtreme hothouse after end-Permian extinction; tropical land temperatures often >40 ยฐC
Middle- Late TriassicCommonly ~20- 26 ยฐC (some simulations ~25- 26 ยฐC)+6 to +12 ยฐCWarm greenhouse world; one 250 Ma simulation shows ~25.8 ยฐC
Early- Middle Jurassic (early breakup)Often ~19- 24 ยฐC+5 to +10 ยฐCStill warm, with some cooling relative to peak Triassic in certain models

Overall trend: Cool icehouse during early Pangea โ†’ extreme warming across the Permian- Triassic โ†’ sustained warm greenhouse conditions through the Triassic and into the Jurassic.

Tropical sea- surface temperatures were frequently >30- 32 ยฐC, and continental interiors experienced even greater extremes due to continentality.

Key Comparison and Drivers

  • Early Pangea (Carboniferous- Permian): Low COโ‚‚ (~300- 500 ppm) and cooler temperatures (near modern or cooler) โ†’ icehouse with widespread southern glaciation.
  • Late Pangea / early breakup (Triassic- Early Jurassic): Higher COโ‚‚ (often 800- 2,000 or more ppm) and much warmer temperatures (+6 to +15 ยฐC or more globally) โ†’ greenhouse climate with no permanent polar ice and extreme seasonal contrasts (megamonsoon).

The major transition occurred around the end- Permian (~252 Ma), strongly linked to massive volcanic COโ‚‚ release from the Siberian Traps.

Supercontinent- related factors (aridity reducing weathering efficiency, changes in sea level and volcanism) also influenced the carbon cycle.

Proxy uncertainties remain large (especially for exact peak values), but the directional shift from low- COโ‚‚ icehouse to high- COโ‚‚ greenhouse is robust across models and data.

The Pangean megamonsoon was a vast, seasonally reversing atmospheric circulation system driven primarily by the extreme land- sea thermal contrasts of the assembled supercontinent Pangea (peak intensity in the Triassic, ~250- 200 Ma).

It produced strong wet- dry seasonality, heavy coastal rainfall in alternating hemispheres, and widespread interior aridity, with dynamics distinct from modern monsoons due to Pangeaโ€™s size, north- south span, and the warm Paleo-Tethys Sea.

The core driver was the enormous seasonal heating contrast between the vast landmass and surrounding oceans (Panthalassa and especially the warm Paleo-Tethys).

In Northern Hemisphere (boreal) summer, intense heating over Laurasia created a broad, deep thermal low-pressure system. High pressure developed over the cooler Gondwana. The resulting strong pressure gradient drove cross- equatorial flow from the south, drawing moist air across the Tethys toward eastern and northern Pangea.

In Southern Hemisphere (austral) summer, the pattern reversed: low pressure over Gondwana and high pressure over Laurasia drove northward- to- southward flow, bringing moisture to southern coasts.

This interhemispheric thermal contrast was amplified by Pangeaโ€™s C- or bipolar shape (large landmasses in both hemispheres flanking the equatorial Tethys), which maximized the seasonal pressure differential. Some models indicate seasonal pressure changes over the continent of ~25 mb (comparable in scale, though not identical, to modern Asian monsoon variations of ~36 mb).

Additional factors:

Paleo- Tethys warm pool: Elevated sea- surface temperatures supplied abundant moisture and, in some simulations, acted as a primary forcing for the location and intensity of monsoonal precipitation, sometimes outweighing pure land- sea temperature gradients alone.

Topography: The Central Pangean Mountains (formed by continental collisions) enhanced orographic uplift and rainfall on windward sides while contributing to rain shadows and stronger overall circulation (analogous to the Tibetan Plateauโ€™s role today). Without them, models show a substantially weaker monsoon.

Disruption of zonal flow: The supercontinentโ€™s size broke typical east- west trade- wind patterns, enabling strong meridional (north- south) and even temporary westerly flows on western coasts during peak intensity.

Sensible heating over land was the dominant process; latent heating from condensation further intensified rising motion and lowered central pressures, reinforcing the gradient.

Circulation and Precipitation Dynamics

Seasonal wind reversal: Surface winds shifted dramatically between seasons. Moist easterlies or cross-equatorial flows dominated the summer hemisphereโ€™s eastern margins, while divergence under high pressure produced clear, dry conditions in the winter hemisphereโ€™s interior.

Precipitation patterns: Heavy seasonal rains concentrated along eastern Tethyan coasts and some western tropical margins. Model estimates include coastal rates of several mm/day (up to ~5- 8 mm/day in peak rainy seasons in various simulations) and annual totals exceeding 1,000 mm in favored coastal zones. Interiors received little moisture year- round or only brief seasonal rains, creating vast arid to hyperarid belts (often spanning equatorial regions, unlike modern wet tropics).

Global averages: Roughly ~1,000 mm/year in some idealized simulations, but with extreme spatial gradients.

Non- zonal character: Unlike more latitudinally symmetric modern monsoons, the Pangean system featured strong hemispheric alternation and could reverse portions of the normal easterly equatorial flow.

Recent energetics analyses emphasize that continental area (especially tropical), latitudinal position, and degree of fragmentation control land- monsoon extent and intensity over tectonic timescales.

The Pangea configuration produced a spatially extensive land- monsoon domain (broad coverage) but with relatively modest average precipitation intensity compared with more fragmented Cretaceous continents (smaller area but heavier local rains). Global mean temperature/COโ‚‚ changes had only minor effects on these metrics compared with paleogeography.

Seminal work by Kutzbach & Gallimore (1989) used an atmospheric GCM with idealized Pangea geography and showed extreme continentality, hot summers and cold winters, and large- scale monsoon circulations under various assumptions of elevation, snow cover, COโ‚‚, and solar luminosity. Later higher-resolution models (e.g., HadCM3, CESM) and multi- million- year ensembles confirm the megamonsoon and its evolution.

On shorter timescales, orbital forcing (especially precession modulated by eccentricity) drove substantial variability in monsoon strength and rainfall (20- 50% in some Late Triassic simulations), with ~20 kyr, 100 kyr, and longer (~405 kyr, ~3.3 Myr) cycles recorded in sedimentary proxies.

Proxies supporting the dynamics include:

  • Widespread red beds, evaporites (arid interiors), and seasonal indicators.
  • Coals and humid sediments concentrated in coastal/seasonal zones.
  • Eolian sandstones and wind-direction indicators showing meridional/cross- equatorial and occasional westerly flows.
  • Loess and other dust deposits consistent with seasonal wind shifts.
  • Lacustrine and basin records (e.g., Ordos Basin, Colorado Plateau Chinle Formation) showing strong seasonality and orbital cyclicity aligned with model predictions.

Note that some regional records (e.g., parts of East Asia) show diachronous humidification that has been used to debate the universality or exact timing of a single โ€œmegaโ€ system versus more zonal patterns in certain intervals.

The system strengthened from the late Carboniferous/Permian as continents assembled, peaked in the Triassic with maximum land area, and weakened as Pangea began breaking up after ~180 Ma.

Fragmentation reduced the extreme interhemispheric contrast, shifted continents poleward in places, and led to more regional, intense monsoons over smaller tropical landmasses (Cretaceous stage) before a broader, weaker configuration returned in the Cenozoic with continental reassembly.

In essence, the Pangean megamonsoon was a geography- dominated phenomenon: the supercontinentโ€™s size and configuration created an amplified, hemispherically alternating monsoon that controlled rainfall seasonality across much of the land surface, leaving the vast interior chronically dry while delivering intense seasonal deluges to coasts.

Modern understanding integrates classic GCM results with high- resolution paleogeography, energetics analysis, and proxy records, confirming paleogeography as the primary long- term control.

Prince William is Wrong, the Independent, Sweeping Climate Action Will Only Harm People

In a recent article in the Independent, โ€œPrince William warns โ€˜inch-by-inchโ€™ action is not enough to stop climate change,โ€ Prince William points at recent forest fires in the UK as evidence that climate change is devastating the globe and that the worldโ€™s peoples must make rapid, sweeping economic and social changes and sacrifices changes to prevent catastrophe. This is nonsense.

A speaker at a podium emphasizes the need for climate action, surrounded by concerned citizens reacting to rising energy costs and questions about who will bear the financial burden. The backdrop features renewable energy sources, while newspaper headlines highlight the urgency of the situation.

From ClimateRealism

By Linnea Lueken

Headline about Prince William warning that minor actions are insufficient to combat climate change, with a statement emphasizing the urgency for more effective measures.

In a recent article in the Independent, โ€œPrince William warns โ€˜inch-by-inchโ€™ action is not enough to stop climate change,โ€ Prince William points at recent forest fires in the UK as evidence that climate change is devastating the globe and that the worldโ€™s peoples must make rapid, sweeping economic and social changes and sacrifices changes to prevent catastrophe. This is nonsense. The kind of civilizational overhaul Prince William insists on would be unacceptably authoritarian and would produce far more harm and death than it would prevent. Also, this yearโ€™s wildfires are a bad example to point toward as evidence of climate change since they were neither unprecedented nor part of a long-term trend.

The Prince of Wales is reported to have made a series of comments hyping an alarmist perspective of climate change, albeit an optimistic oneโ€ฆ with a deadline of course.

The Independent writes:

Current measures are proceeding at a snailโ€™s pace โ€œinch by inchโ€ and are nowhere near enough to address the problem, he said.

โ€ฆ

He said action must be stepped up in what is left of this decade, effectively setting a deadline of 2030, less than four years from now.

He referenced this summerโ€™s wildfires in the UK as an example of the troubling evidence that climate change is causing dangerous weather.

The problem for Prince William is that data debunks his wildfire assertions. Data from the collaborative project between NASA and the European Space Agency, Copernicus, covering the 2002 to 2023 time period demonstrate that over the past two decades there has been no trend towards worsening wildfires in the UK. (See figure below)

Bar graph showing yearly burned area in hectares versus yearly number of fires from 2002 to 2023, with a red area for burned land and a blue line for fire counts.
Figure 1: Chart from Copernicus, accessed September 15, 2026, from https://gwis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/apps/country.profile/charts/ba

If anything, the recent trend is downward.

This summerโ€™s wildfires burned about 23,000 ha of land in the UK, which is certainly high, but not unprecedented, and is clearly not part of a long-term trend according to this dataset. Global satellite data on wildfires likewise show that they are not becoming worse or more common, but the opposite. (See figure below)

Line graph showing global burned area in million kmยฒ per year from 1901 to 2018, with a decline in area burned over time, highlighting data from historical reconstruction and satellite estimates.
Figure 2. Historical and Satellite data on wildfire acreage burned. Blue curve, global wildfire area burned reconstruction. Orange curve, global wildfire area burned measured by satellites. Graph plotted by Bjorn Lomborg, Ph.D.

The set of solutions that Prince William suggests to prevent supposedly dangerous climate change are nebulous, nothing specific is ever promoted in the article itself. The closest we get are those promoted by his Earthshot Prize competition, which thus far have primarily focused on environmental issues like cleaning up water resources and waste management. It is unclear what exact solutions he advocates for when it comes to, as Earthshot says, โ€œfixing the climate,โ€ but the Prince of Wales said his favored plans โ€œrequires people willing to fund them.โ€

He does deserve some credit for insisting at the same time that โ€œcompetition, invention, and optimism are the best means of overcoming the multiple environmental challenges facing the world.โ€ This is true, much better than top-down government intervention. But if, as he says, the world is moving too slowly and must โ€œtake actionโ€ to stop climate change, the solutions he has in mind almost have to be authoritarian and burdensome in nature.

Unfortunately for him, but fortunately for everyone else, the most stringent net-zero policies are also the most unpopular among even climate-concerned UK and European residents. As covered at Climate Realism three years ago, a YouGov poll showed that most Europeans believe that climate change is a problem, but few are willing to agree to changes like limiting the number of children they have or stopping consuming meat in order to reach net-zero carbon dioxide.

Meanwhile, net zero policies are preventing people from obtaining life-saving technology like air conditioning and the plentiful, reliable energy needed to power it.

Prince William is behind the curve when it comes to climate change, which seems to be collapsing as a popular cause even among true believers. He is also very misinformed, most likely by the biased media, about the history of European and global wildfire occurrences. Setting yet another deadline for climate action, like the dozens of deadlines that have gone by before with no ill consequences, will not make people believe more urgently that a climate cataclysm is in the offing or that radical changes in their lifestyles are justified.

UN Tries to Insert itself into Calls for AI Regulation

United Nations: Countries must increase AI regulation to avoid โ€˜existential risksโ€™.

Make the AI more powerful, and it suffers out of control hallucinations โ€“ AI schizophrenia.

Imagine somewhere out there is a brilliant data scientist with a novel theory of how to overcome this theoretical intelligence barrier.

A meeting room with various officials discussing AI regulation and the climate crisis. A large book titled 'CLIMATE CRISIS' is featured prominently, while a holographic representation of AI is being projected. Characters express concern and urgency, with one character animatedly reminding others about the climate.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrall

Iโ€™m now even more convinced of my AI drawbridge theory โ€“ incumbents using red tape to raise the drawbridge and block entry for new competitors.

From the United Nations;

Countries must increase AI regulation to avoid โ€˜existential risksโ€™: Tรผrk

Byย Isaiah Steinberg 14 September 2026

Human Rights

Voluntary self-regulation by companies developing frontier artificial intelligence (AI) is โ€œnowhere near sufficientโ€ to address existing harms and prevent advanced autonomous AI models from circumventing human safeguards, UN human rights chief Volker Tรผrk wrote on Monday.

โ€œThe current race towards ever more powerful AI is a step change towards greater existential risks to every aspect of our lives,โ€ he wrote in an open letter.

The High Commissionerโ€™s message comes six days after a former researcher at Anthropic โ€“ the company behind the chatbot Claude โ€“ resigned from his position while warning that โ€œthe people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade.โ€

โ€ฆ

People over profit

Mr. Tรผrk rejected the industry argument that AI safety protections slow down innovation, arguing that nobody should be forced to give up their human rights to enable progress.

As it stands, he said the rights to life, food, privacy, health and security are all threatened by unchecked AI development.

Whether AI continues to enable disinformation and unequal automation or tackles the climate crisis and cures diseases depends on how companies and governments choose to respond to the current โ€œwatershed moment,โ€ according to Mr. Tรผrk.

โ€œThe generation now entering adulthood will inherit the consequences of the decisions being taken on this issue without having a say in them,โ€ Mr. Tรผrk wrote. โ€œWe owe it to them to ensure those decisions are made openly, with their rights in view, and with the humility that the scale of this undertaking demands.โ€

Read more: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/09/1168326

Dario Amodei

We Must Pace the Frontier

September 2026

I have worked on AI for the last twelve years because I believe it could dramatically raise the quality of human life. Iโ€™ve written often about these incredible benefits: I believe that AI could cure most major diseases in the next 5โ€“10 years, greatly accelerate economic growth rates, create a world of abundance and empowerment, and usher in a renaissance of democracy and freedom. I feel the urgency personally. My own father died of a disease that was cured just a few years after his death, and I myself survived an early-stage cancer that would not have been treatable even fifty years ago. Carefully wielded, AI can be the latest in a long line of technological miracles that have uplifted and ennobled humanity.

But like many technologies before it, AI brings risks, and because it is such a powerful technology, these risks are serious. Iโ€™ve writtena lot about them too. They include the risk of losing control of AI systems, misuse of AI for cyberattacks and bioterrorism, and serious economic disruption. A race to the bottom, spurred by commercial incentives, can make these risks more acute.

โ€ฆ

My first concern is that, since roughly this summer, AI has been advancing drastically faster, driven primarily by AIโ€™s growing ability to build the next generation of AI. This dynamic is called recursive self-improvement, and it is starting to happen across the industry, including at Anthropic, as we and others have described. Left unchecked, it could outrun our ability to understand and control these systems, and so must be pursued very carefully, if at all.

โ€ฆ

Iโ€™m therefore proposing a three-step plan with the goal of pacing the frontier: building AI at a balanced rate that aims to ensure its safety while still achieving its benefits and grappling with important geopolitical dilemmas. To be clear, pacing does not mean halting model training or technical progress, but ensuring companies take adequate time to align and safeguard their models, and for third party evaluators to confirm this. Our pacing framework is an attempt to further strengthen our commitment to safety and encourage a race to the top. The first step is something Anthropic is unilaterally committing to (and calls on governments to require other frontier companies to match). The second step requires industry-wide coordination.1The third step requires global coordination. The steps do not need to be taken strictly in order, and some of them may be much harder to achieve than others, but Iโ€™ve found them to be a useful framework in thinking about what needs to be accomplished. The steps are:

Embedded Evaluators. Each frontier AI company commits to giving ongoing, employee-like access to a team of embedded third-party evaluators (such as METR), whose role is to verify adherence to safety practices and commitments, report incidents, and help assess the alignment of not just completed AI models but training pipelines and processes. This is the key step for verifiability of any pacing commitments, and has precedent in the banking industry, which sometimes involves regulatory โ€œsupervisorsโ€ embedded along with employees. Anthropic is unilaterally committing to this step now. We intend this to be part of a broader push to redouble efforts on our safety and alignment work.

Democratic Coordination. Frontier AI companies within democratic countries coordinate to establish common safety standards as well as limits on the rate of unchecked AI progress. Some forms of coordination that would be impactful for pacing are legally challenging, and will require government support.

Global Coordination. The US and other democratic governments attempt to coordinate with authoritarian governments, to the extent this is possible, while taking seriously the challenges of verifying compliance.

โ€ฆRead more: https://darioamodei.com/post/we-must-pace-the-frontier

Can you imagine the compliance costs of the bureaucratic nightmare Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei is proposing? The model the UN is gearing up to back?

A multi-billion dollar company with an entire floor of lawyers can afford such costs. A small startup with a good idea, not so much.

So why are AI companies so relaxed about slowing down, about โ€œpacingโ€? Obviously only AI leaders know what is going through their own heads, but there is a problem with Artificial Intelligence the Anthropic CEO forgot to mention. For all their claims of progress, AI companies like Anthropic have hit a problem, a theoretical barrier. They may not have a choice about whether to slow down.

Make the AI more powerful, and it suffers out of control hallucinations โ€“ AI schizophrenia.

The AI Hallucination Paradox: The Smarter AI becomes, the More it Hallucinates

Youngwhan Nick Lee
8 min read
May 29, 2025

Introduction

It might seem intuitive that a more intelligent, larger language model (LLM) would make fewer factual mistakes. However, recent research reveals a paradox: as AI models become more powerful, their tendency to hallucinateโ€” i.e., produce confident but false or unfounded information โ€” can persist and even increase in certain ways (Xu et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025). In other words, simply scaling up model size or training data does not straightforwardly eliminate hallucinations; in some cases, it worsens them. This paradox has critical implications: despite dramatic improvements in language fluency and reasoning, even state-of-the-art LLMs remain prone to fabricating details. In this article, we summarize two theoretical perspectives explaining why hallucinations are fundamentally unavoidable and how greater computational power can exacerbate them. We then illustrate the issue with an example of Anthropicโ€™s advanced Claude model and discuss a proposed solution: a multi-agent architecture with a dedicated โ€œhallucination monitorโ€ agent to curb the spread of false outputs. We conclude by contrasting these findings with the mainstream assumption that more compute yields safer, more reliable models.

โ€ฆRead more: https://medium.com/@youngwhannicklee/the-hallucination-paradox-the-smarter-ai-becomes-the-more-it-hallucinates-b82fc2a3df9d

Keep the AI as is, and progress grinds to a halt, or requires crazy amounts of additional processing capacity for modest gains in capability.

There must be a way to overcome the artificial intelligence wall. Evolution solved the problem โ€“ our brains donโ€™t experience this barrier to nearly the same extent as artificial intelligence systems.

Likely when the solution is discovered it will turn out to be really simple, an architectural principle nature stumbled across through incremental natural selection, which can easily be replicated once we know what to do.

Imagine somewhere out there is a brilliant data scientist with a novel theory of how to overcome this theoretical intelligence barrier.

If that scientist launches their own startup, all the big players, Anthropic, OpenAI and XAi, their models will be superseded junk. Their businesses will be toast.

BUT if there are massive bureaucratic hurdles and compliance costs to launching a new startup, that brilliant scientist will have no choice but to share their invention, to get a leg up from the incumbents.

As for the UN, in my opinion itโ€™s just UN opportunism. Never let an opportunity go to waste.

President Trumpโ€™s take on the situation;

Trump Says AI Doesnโ€™t Need More Guardrails and Calls Safety Fears a Hoax

President alleges that a conspiracy is undermining support for AI and data centers as industry leaders raise alarms about the technologyโ€™s risks

By Brian Schwartz and Philip Wegmann
Updated Sept. 14, 2026 at 5:16 pm ET

President Trump pushed back on the need for tighter federal regulations on artificial intelligence and dismissed safety concerns as a hoax that would leave the industry in financial ruin and hand China a competitive edge. 

The presidentโ€™s forceful messaging on AI comes as industry leaders sound increasingly urgent warnings about the need for regulation to guard against potential dangers from their own technology, while public backlash builds to the construction of the data centers needed to power it.

โ€œThe only control or โ€˜guardrailsโ€™ that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!โ€ Trump wrote on Truth Social on Monday. โ€œThere is a SICK conspiracy going on against AI and Data Centers, and the only one that is happy about it is China.โ€ 

โ€ฆRead more: https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/trump-says-ai-doesnt-need-more-guardrails-despite-industry-warnings-b94263fa

In my opinion President Trump has seen straight through the fog as he frequently does. Industry calls for AI regulation in my opinion are disguised self serving protectionism for incumbents, an attempt to create an AI industry cartel.

If adopted the kinds of heavy handed regulations being pushed would stifle US freedom to innovate.


Update (EW): h/t R Taylor โ€“ Nvidia boss Jensen Huang has stood with President Trump, opposing calls for A.I. regulation. Iโ€™m sorry for including you in the original group photo Jensen.

Ancient Wall in Morocco Rewrites North African History: 5,000-Year-Old Farming Hub Linked to Mediterranean Trade and Climate Resilience

History is being rewritten at an archaeological site in Morocco: Discovery of an ancient wall at Oued Beht.

Oued Beht and climate impacts center on how the siteโ€™s location in northwestern Morocco buffered it against broader North African aridification during the later Holocene, enabling a major Final Neolithic farming complex (c. 3400- 2900 BC) while much of the Sahara and other regions dried out.

A panoramic view of rolling hills and fields at sunset, with a river winding through the landscape and the sea visible in the distance.
AI generated by Grok

History is being rewritten at an archaeological site in Morocco: Discovery of an ancient wall at Oued Beht.

Researchers working at the Oued Beht site in northwestern Morocco have uncovered what they describe as the earliest known large- scale construction of a probably defensive nature in North Africa outside the Nile Valley. The multiphase ditch, rampart, and wall system dates to roughly 4,000- 3,500 years ago (equivalent to the Bronze Age in the western Mediterranean).

The structure cuts across a narrow section of the ridge between the river and a ravine, protecting the southern tip of the site (an รฉperon barrรฉ or barred spur). Earlier notes of earthworks and walls go back to the 1930s, but new 2023 excavations and radiocarbon dating have clarified its age and nature.

Building it required significant planning, coordination, and labor, pointing to more complex and organized societies in the Maghreb than previously assumed. It may relate to competition over land, resources, or control of movement rather than external invaders.

This builds on earlier work at the same site, which revealed a large Final Neolithic agricultural complex (around 5,400- 4,900 years ago), likely the earliest and largest of its kind in Africa outside the Nile Valley. That phase included farming (barley, wheat, livestock), craft production (thousands of polished stone axes, decorated pottery), and activity across at least 10 hectares.

The ridge saw renewed use in the medieval period (11th-13th centuries AD), with the defensive structure rebuilt, a nearby hamlet or farm, and a cemetery.

The discoveries challenge the long-held view that the later prehistory of the Maghreb was poorly understood or relatively isolated. Evidence suggests northwestern African communities were connected to wider Mediterranean networks (including southern Iberia) and participated in processes of social transformation, settlement shifts toward more defensible locations, and possibly more formalized leadership.

The findings come from a 2023 study published in Libyan Studies by researchers including Giulio Lucarini, Cyprian Broodbank, and Toby C. Wilkinson (reposted via The Conversation on phys.org, dated September 15, 2026). Ongoing work at the site continues to fill gaps in North African prehistory.

Bronze Age Maghreb trade involved exchange networks linking northwest Africa (primarily Morocco, with less evidence from Algeria and Tunisia) to the western Mediterranean, especially southern Iberia, from roughly the late 3rd millennium BC through the 2nd- early 1st millennium BC. These connections predate intensive Phoenician activity (from c. 800 BC) and challenge older views of the Maghreb as isolated or sparsely occupied before later historical periods.

Recent excavations at sites such as Oued Beht and Kach Kouch in northwest Morocco have been key to rewriting this picture. Trade appears to have been bidirectional, involving raw materials, finished goods, pottery styles, technologies, and possibly livestock or people, facilitated by the short crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar and coastal/maritime routes.

Key Evidence and Goods

African ivory and ostrich eggshell: A major export from the Maghreb to Iberia. North African elephant ivory use intensified in the Maghreb from around 4000 BC (linked to Saharan population movements and the end of the African Humid Period). Exchange networks with the Iberian Peninsula remained active at least until the end of the Early Bronze Age. Ostrich eggshell also appears in Iberian Copper Age and Bronze Age contexts. These materials indicate Maghreb communities supplied high-value exotic goods that supported social differentiation on both sides.

Pottery and material culture parallels: Painted pottery traditions at Oued Beht (Final Neolithic, c. 3400-2900 BC, with later activity) show similarities to southern Iberian styles. Bell Beaker- related ceramics (including Maritime styles) and other forms appear in Moroccan sites such as Kehf el Baroud. At Kach Kouch, handmade pottery includes forms with clear Iberian resemblances, pointing to shared stylistic and possibly technological exchange.

Metals: Local metallurgy evidence is limited in the Maghreb during much of the Bronze Age. A tin- bronze fragment from Kach Kouch (radiocarbon-dated c. 1110- 920 BC, with ~9.4% tin) is among the earliest known in North Africa west of Egypt; its chemical signature raises the possibility of imported tin (potentially European) or finished metal, as no clear local production infrastructure has been identified at the site. Other metal objects include copper items and later iron. Flat axes resembling Early Argaric (southern Iberian) types further suggest exchange. Iberia itself had copper and tin resources that fed broader Mediterranean networks.

Other indicators: Possible African cattle genetic influence (mtDNA haplotype T1) in Iberian Bronze Age remains supports livestock or population movement. Modeling of least- cost paths for ivory transport highlight a strong southwestern Iberia- Morocco corridor and additional links along Mediterranean North African shores. Defensive architecture at Oued Beht (c. 4,000- 3,500 years ago) and settlement shifts may reflect intensifying competition or control over resources and routes amid these interactions.

Major Sites

Oued Beht (Khรฉmisset Province, Morocco): Large Final Neolithic agricultural complex (c. 3400- 2900 BC; earliest and largest of its kind in Africa outside the Nile Valley) with later Bronze Age activity, including the earliest confirmed large- scale (likely defensive) wall/ditch/rampart system in North Africa outside Egypt. It functioned as a production hub (polished stone axes, pottery) with clear western Mediterranean ties.

Kach Kouch (near Oued Laou, northwest Morocco): Earliest known Bronze Age settlement in the Maghreb (outside Egypt). Occupation phases include sparse early evidence (c. 2200- 2000 BC, contemporary with the Iberian Copper/Bronze transition), a stable farming village (c. 1300- 900 BC) with wattle- and- daub houses, silos, and mixed agriculture/livestock, and a later phase (c. 800- 600 BC) showing local continuity alongside Phoenician- influenced innovations (wheel-thrown pottery, iron, hybrid architecture). Pottery and the early bronze object highlight pre- Phoenician Mediterranean links.

Nature and Scale of Networks

Exchange was likely community-based or small-scale rather than highly centralized long- distance commerce of the later eastern Mediterranean type. The Maghreb participated in processes paralleling those in southern Iberia (e.g., Argaric societies with fortified hilltop settlements, metallurgy, and hierarchies, c. 2200-1550 BC). Connections extended into Atlantic and broader western Mediterranean circuits involving metals, amber, and other goods, though Maghreb evidence remains sparser due to historically limited research.

By the Late Bronze/Early Iron Age transition, networks intensified, setting the stage for Phoenician integration without simple replacement of local communities. Overall, these findings show northwest Africa as an active agent in western Mediterranean dynamics rather than a peripheral zone. Ongoing excavations continue to refine the picture, with many gaps remaining especially outside Morocco.

Neolithic agriculture in the Sahara developed within the context of the African Humid Period (roughly 14,800- 5,500 years ago, or ~12,800- 3,500 BCE), when the region was a โ€œGreen Saharaโ€ of grasslands, savannas, lakes, and rivers supporting diverse flora, fauna, and human populations. Unlike the Near Eastern Neolithic model of sedentary village farming with domesticated cereals and animals, the Saharan pathway emphasized mobile pastoralism combined with intensive gathering and limited cultivation of wild plants, with full plant domestication emerging later and mainly along the southern margins (Sahel).

The Green Sahara enabled early Holocene hunter- gatherer- fisher communities (with pottery appearing by ~8,000- 7,000 BCE in places) to expand widely. A mid- Holocene arid event (~8.2 ka) and progressive drying after ~5,500- 5,000 years ago drove adaptations: increased mobility, reliance on livestock, and eventual southward migrations into the Sahel as the desert expanded. Pastoralism may even have temporarily delayed full desertification in some models by altering vegetation and fire regimes.

Domestic cattle, sheep, and goats appeared by the early to mid- 7th millennium BP (around 6,000- 5,000 BCE or earlier in some eastern/central sites).

  • Early evidence comes from the Tadrart Acacus (Libya; Takarkori and Uan Muhuggiag, ~8,300- 8,000 cal BP), Nabta Playa (Egypt), and other central/eastern sites.
  • Dairying is chemically confirmed by the 5th millennium BCE in the central Sahara (lipid residues on pottery).
  • A distinctive โ€œcattle cultโ€ is visible in rock art, cattle burials/tumuli, and ceremonial sites.

This multi- resource pastoralism (herding plus hunting, fishing, and plant gathering) became the dominant strategy across much of the Sahara by the mid- Holocene, contrasting with Near Eastern sedentary farming. Populations peaked with pastoral expansion before collapsing with aridification.

True domesticated cereal agriculture was not central to most Saharan Neolithic economies. Wild grasses (sorghum, millets such as Pennisetum, Panicum, Echinochloa, Brachiaria, etc.) were intensively gathered and processed (evidenced by abundant grinding stones and pottery).

Key findings include:

Wild cereal use and possible pre- domestication cultivation: At Nabta Playa (Egyptian Western Desert), carbonized wild sorghum and millets date to ~8,000 BP. At Takarkori rockshelter (Acacus, Libya), long sequences show gathering of wild sorghum and millets from the Early Holocene, with morphological changes suggesting cultivation without full domestication over millennia (especially after ~4,800 BCE for some small millets). Hundreds of thousands of wild cereal seeds indicate managed stands selected for โ€œweedinessโ€ traits useful in fluctuating environments.

Domestication of African crops: Pearl millet (Pennisetum glaucum / Cenchrus americanus) shows a western Sahara/Sahel origin, with domestication processes underway by the 5th- 4th millennium BCE in northern Mali/Mauritania areas and fully domesticated forms spreading by the 3rd- 2nd millennium BCE. Sorghum (Sorghum bicolor) domestication evidence appears in eastern Sudan (Butana Group pottery impressions, 4th millennium BCE), with wild exploitation earlier across the Sahara and Sahel. These were suited to mobile pastoralists due to low water needs.

Near Eastern cereals: Emmer wheat and barley (of Southwest Asian origin) appear earlier than previously thought in Nubian/Sudanese Neolithic contexts (~7,000 years ago at sites like R12 and Ghaba cemeteries via phytoliths and dental calculus starch), and in the Fayum/Merimde by ~5,000 BCE, but these are more tied to Nile Valley developments than core Saharan ones.

Near Eastern cereals: Emmer wheat and barley (of Southwest Asian origin) appear earlier than previously thought in Nubian/Sudanese Neolithic contexts (~7,000 years ago at sites like R12 and Ghaba cemeteries via phytoliths and dental calculus starch), and in the Fayum/Merimde by ~5,000 BCE, but these are more tied to Nile Valley developments than core Saharan ones.

Other early plant evidence includes possible early watermelon (Citrullus lanatus) domestication signals in the Acacus (~5,500 BP).

Key Sites

  • Nabta Playa (Egypt): Multi- phase settlements with hearths, dwellings, cattle remain, wild sorghum/millets, pottery, and later megalithic structures (including a possible calendar circle) and cattle cult features. Early herding from ~8,700- 7,800 BCE phases.
  • Tadrart Acacus / Takarkori (Libya): Exceptional organic preservation showing long- term wild cereal management alongside early pastoralism and dairying.
  • Gobero, Adrar Bous, Tรฉnรฉrรฉ (Niger/central Sahara): Burial grounds and pastoral sites reflecting population dynamics and livestock introduction.
  • Southern margins (e.g., Tilemsi Valley, Mali; Tichitt tradition, Mauritania; Gajiganna, Chad Basin): Where domesticated millet agriculture became established as pastoralists moved south with aridification (from ~3rd- 2nd millennium BCE).

Broader Implications and Transition

The Saharan Neolithic represents an independent African trajectory: pottery- using foragers becoming mobile pastoralists who managed wild plants, rather than a direct shift to village farming.

As the Sahara dried (~5,000- 3,000 BCE), groups migrated southward, contributing livestock, knowledge, and eventually cereal farming to Sahelian and sub- Saharan societies. Oasis agriculture (with techniques like foggaras) developed much later (e.g., Garamantian period, ~1st millennium BCE- AD).

Research continues to refine timelines through archaeobotany, lipid analysis, genetics, and modeling, highlighting human resilience and the role of climate in shaping African food production systems.

The Maghrebโ€™s later Neolithic farming complexes (e.g., Oued Beht) partly reflect interactions and population movements linked to these Saharan dynamics.

Oued Beht and climate impacts center on how the siteโ€™s location in northwestern Morocco buffered it against broader North African aridification during the later Holocene, enabling a major Final Neolithic farming complex (c. 3400- 2900 BC) while much of the Sahara and other regions dried out.

Oued Beht sits on a limestone- marl- conglomerate ridge (170- 210 m above sea level) on the Zemmour plateau, overlooking the perennial Oued Beht river (which flows year- round from the Middle Atlas).

The area today is a semi- arid Mediterranean bioclimatic zone, with average annual rainfall around 481 mm near Khรฉmisset (mostly in winter months) and marked inter-annual variability. It is currently used for cereal farming.

The northwest Maghrebโ€™s position, between Atlantic and Mediterranean weather systems and near the Atlas range, provided more reliable moisture than interior North Africa.

This significantly moderated the aridification that intensified across much of northern Africa from the fourth millennium BC onward (linked to the end of the African Humid Period / Green Sahara). As a result, the region remained viable for agriculture when many Saharan and Sahelian areas saw population declines, increased mobility, or abandonment.

Excavations show a farming community with domesticated barley (notably naked barley), wheat, and peas, plus wild olive and pistachio (xerophytic species adapted to drier conditions). Livestock were kept, and there is evidence of plant processing (grinding stones) and storage (numerous deep pits/silos). Wild plant exploitation and a perennial river water source further supported the economy.

Geoarchaeological observations include:

  • Soil profiles with carbonate accumulation and translocation (from evaporation, root activity, and wetting and drying cycles).
  • Pits left open and episodically infilled by natural processes, such as after heavy rains (sharp boundaries, clay coatings, planar voids).
  • Ridge edges prone to rain- induced erosion, with colluvium and evidence of landscape stability alternating with erosion episodes.

These features indicate a climate with seasonal rainfall variability and occasional intense rains, consistent with a Mediterranean regime that supported intensive agriculture without requiring the more extreme adaptations seen farther south or east.

During the main Final Neolithic phase, activity focused on the larger, more open northern part of the ridge. By the early- to- mid second millennium BC (Bronze Age), focus shifted to the narrower, more defensible southern ridge, marked by the construction of a multiphase ditch, rampart, and wall system (the earliest confirmed large- scale defensive architecture of this type in North Africa outside the Nile Valley). This may reflect social changes, resource competition, or responses to environmental and social pressures, though direct climate causation is not established.

Regionally, Moroccan Neolithic sequences show climate influences: arid signals around 6.3 ka cal BP and the 4.2 ka event are linked to shifts in mobility, Saharan population movements toward more favorable rims (including the Maghreb), and changes in settlement patterns. Oued Behtโ€™s success during the Final Neolithic highlights local climatic advantages that allowed continuity and complexity when broader aridification was underway.

Oued Beht, North Africa, and the 4.2-kiloyear event

The 4.2- kiloyear event (also called the 4.2 ka BP event) was a major Holocene climate episode of widespread aridification and cooling that began around 2200 BCE (approximately 4,200 years ago) and lasted roughly a century or more (often spanning the 22nd century BCE).

It is one of the most severe climate disruptions of the Holocene and marks the formal start of the Meghalayan stage. Proxy records (lake sediments, speleothems, pollen, marine cores, and dust fluxes) show intensified drought across much of North Africa, the Middle East, the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and parts of South Asia, with associated societal stresses.

In North Africa the event is generally recorded as a phase of increased aridity:

  • Reduced monsoon strength and enhanced evaporation.
  • Lower Nile floods in Egypt (around 2150 BCE), which contributed to famine, social disorder, and the collapse of the Old Kingdom.
  • Dry signals in Morocco (e.g., Tigalmamine in the Middle Atlas) and Algeria.
  • Broader evidence of hydrological instability, dust deposition, and vegetation shifts.

The expression was regionally variable.

The expression was regionally variable. Some northwestern sites show cooler/more humid intervals or complex โ€œW-shapedโ€ patterns rather than uniform megadrought, influenced by Saharan dynamics and Mediterranean westerlies.

Overall, the event accelerated the long- term drying trend that followed the end of the African Humid Period.

Oued Behtโ€™s main occupation phases do not coincide directly with the peak of the 4.2 ka event, but the siteโ€™s chronology and regional context are relevant:

Final Neolithic phase (c. 3400โ€“2900 BC / roughly 5,400โ€“4,900 years ago): This is the major farming complex (earliest and largest agricultural site known in Africa outside the Nile Valley). It clearly predates the 4.2 ka event. The northwest Maghrebโ€™s position, between Atlantic and Mediterranean weather systems and near the Atlas Mountains, provided more reliable rainfall and buffered the region against the progressive aridification that affected much of northern Africa from the fourth millennium BC onward. This climatic advantage helped sustain intensive cereal agriculture (barley, wheat, peas) and livestock herding at the site.

Bronze Age phase (defensive wall, ditch, and rampart system dated to roughly 4,000- 3,500 years ago / early-to-mid second millennium BC): This overlaps with or immediately follows the 4.2 ka event. Activity shifted from the open northern ridge to the more defensible southern tip, accompanied by the earliest confirmed large- scale defensive architecture of this type in North Africa outside Egypt. Researchers interpret the constructions as responses to increasing competition over land, resources, or movement corridors rather than external invasion. While publications on Oued Beht do not explicitly attribute the shift to the 4.2 ka event, the timing aligns with broader Mediterranean social transformations (e.g., the rise of fortified Argaric settlements in southern Iberia, c. 2200- 1550 BC) and the climatic stresses of the period.

In short, Oued Beht illustrates resilience in a relatively protected Maghreb microenvironment during the broader aridification of North Africa.

The Final Neolithic farming hub thrived before the 4.2 ka peak, while the later defensive architecture appears during the climatic and social upheavals of the early second millennium BC.

Ongoing research at the site and regional paleoclimate proxies continue to refine these connections.

Noel Cass: More Climate Emotionalism (and vulgarity)

Noel Cass:
I am a researcher focussing on the social and political aspects of energy systems and everyday life. I have researched areas including environmental audits of organisations, tourism and travel, everyday life and travel practices, public engagement with renewable energy technologies, the ethical implications of nuclear power and options for radioactive waste management, the social exclusion implications of transport policies on congestion and climate change, climate change policy in local authorities in the UK, the energy demands of the built environment, later focussing on office building designs, and the implications of changing office work practices.

A cartoon-style illustration contrasting two perspectives on climate change: one side, a frantic 'Climate Emotionalist' with a worried expression, facing a computer with alarming messages and a stack of books. The other side, a calm 'Energy Realist' holding a coffee mug, seated at a desk with a laptop displaying rational data, alongside a checklist for evidence, costs, and reliability.

From Master Resource

By Robert Bradley Jr.

โ€œThe climate profession needs a serious reboot.โ€

The above fronted my repost of Michael Shellenbergerโ€™s article, โ€œCaught Pushing an Apocalyptic Scenario They Knew Couldnโ€™t Occur, Climate Scientists Are Now Claiming Their Policies Prevented It.โ€ His article came with the subtitle, โ€œClique of stealth activists, including the former head of the National Academies of Science, claimed a high-emissions future was possible long after it had been falsified.โ€

Noel Cass

Attracting more than a thousand impressions, my repost led to 50 comments, several belonging to Noel Cass, a research fellow at University of Leeds. Cass describes his work here:

I am a researcher focussing on the social and political aspects of energy systems and everyday life. I have researched areas including environmental audits of organisations, tourism and travel, everyday life and travel practices, public engagement with renewable energy technologies, the ethical implications of nuclear power and options for radioactive waste management, the social exclusion implications of transport policies on congestion and climate change, climate change policy in local authorities in the UK, the energy demands of the built environment, later focussing on office building designs, and the implications of changing office work practices.

Bradley/Cass Exchange

Does Noel Cass question climate alarm and/or UK energy policies that drive up rates while having no effect on global climate? No! Our exchange follows:

Cass: So, when the Montreal Convention stopped ozone destruction, does that make it a โ€˜scamโ€™ to point out that coordinated international cooperation and environmental protection legislation averted catasrophe? If we hadnโ€™t started to rein in emissions from the 90s, things would be a lot worse now. And incidentally, the positive feedback loops we are still facing will likely make climate change runaway and catastrophic anyway.

Bradley: Your analogy fails because CO2 is not a pollutant (criteria pollutants are) and climate mitigation policies are futile, wasteful, and do not affect global or local climate change. Adaptation with energy affordability and reliability is the imperative.

Cass: No, it applies, because climate change also needs coordinated international legislation to ban chemicals from the atmosphere. Mitigation is essential, if we continue fucking the planet up then adaptation will simply get more expensive and imposible. You turn off the taps before mopping the floor. All mitigation policies and behaviour changes and demand reduction strategies โ€“ EVERY SINGLE ONE โ€“ saves GhGs and reduces how fucked our children, grandchildren and descendentsโ€™ lives are, or if they can even exist. Your institute sounds like a waste of energy and oxygen.

Bradley: No, CO2 is not a pollutant. Climate model scenarios showing harm are not demonstrative because such models are causality-deficient and not testable. CO2 Science is real scienceโ€“and indicative to CO2 being a positive externality.

Bradley: Also note the abject failure to regulate CO2 versus the results of the Montreal Convention. Hint, hintโ€ฆ.

Bradley: Also, control your anger and emotions. Stop being vulgar. You sound like Betsy Rosenburg, who I criticize here.

Humility, Please

After my replies, Cass added a โ€˜funnyโ€™ motif without a substantive response. His disappearance is par for many alarmists who cannot refute the criticism and rest on confirmation bias of the intellectual elite and political class. He knows he is right and that the rest of us are wrong and driven by bad intentions. Wrong. His life work is, arguably, misdirected. And if he were to question the governmental energy paradigm, he would probably lose his job. He is emotionally committed, as shown by his vulgarities.

A comment by David Jordan put his own critic (and others like Cass above) on notice.

Your rhetoric is amusing to the majority of people who are astounded at the ego trips of the climate change sector. Just because you believe your cause is just โ€“ does not mean that your opinion is superior to everyone else. Climate science is a grouping โ€“ not a specialist science and climate scientists are not the Kings and Queens of science. You might all want to learn some humility instead of lording over everyone. Science is a contest of ideas and if climate scientists cannot take the heat โ€“ stay out of the kitchen.

What a shame that the UK is ruining its economy and exploiting its citizens for the symbolism of Net Zero. It is (past) time for the victims to stand up to the elites. The emperor has no clothes.


Appendix: Other MasterResource/LinkedIn Posts

Betsy โ€œCode Greenโ€ Rosenberg: Emotional Climatism (September 3, 2026)

Should โ€œDeniersโ€ Participate in Climate Debates? (Manfredi Fiorillo says No) June 1, 2026

Climate/Energy Debate: Tom Trounce Goes Low (June 8, 2023)

Colin Hunt Goes Nuclear (March 14, 2023)

An Exchange with Michael Webber (UT- Austin) on the February 2021 Texas Blackouts (February 15, 2023)

โ€œCognitive Dissonanceโ€ and Climate Change: A Takedown (February 7, 2023)

A Typical Exchange with a Climate Alarmist/Forced Energy Transformationist (October 25, 2022)

An Exchange on Climate Alarmism/Forced Energy Transformation (August 31, 2022)

Fossil Fuel Subsidies Historically Considered (December 8, 2021)

Paul Bryan on Steven Koonin: Cancel Culture at Work (October 6, 2021)

In and Out of LinkedIn Jail (November 17, 2022)