Polar Bears Once Roamed Northern Europe – Fossils Confirm Southern Expansion During the Ice Age

Polar bears (Ursus maritimus) were present in parts of Europe during the late Pleistocene (Ice Age) and earliest Holocene, primarily along northern coastal areas where sea ice extended farther south, but there is no confirmed fossil evidence from Germany or most of central/southern continental Europe.

Researchers have found suggestive evidence from Ice Age fossils in Scotlandโ€™s Inchnadamph (Assynt) Bone Caves that some bears may have been polar bears (or a closely related form with a similar ecology), based mainly on diet rather than definitive DNA confirmation of species.

A snowy landscape featuring polar bears and a large animal skull, with icebergs and a cloudy sky in the background. The text overlay discusses polar bears' historical presence in Northern Europe during the Ice Age.
AI generated by Grok

Polar bears (Ursus maritimus) were present in parts of Europe during the late Pleistocene (Ice Age) and earliest Holocene, primarily along northern coastal areas where sea ice extended farther south, but there is no confirmed fossil evidence from Germany or most of central/southern continental Europe.

Fossil records show polar bears reached the southwestern margin of the Scandinavian Ice Sheet during the last deglaciation:

Scandinavia (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) and Iceland: Remains date mainly from about 15,000 to 11,000 years ago (Late Glacial to earliest Holocene). They include finds from the western coasts. A nearly complete skeleton from Finnรธy, Norway (~12,000- 12,400 years old), is among the best- preserved Ice Age examples. A mandible from northern Denmark has been dated to ~11,100 years BP. These indicate a temporary southern Scandinavian population that became regionally extinct by ~11,500 years ago as the climate warmed and sea ice retreated.

Oldest known European (and global) fossil: A jawbone from Svalbard (Norway) dated to ~130,000-115,000 years ago (Eemian interglacial), confirming the species already had polar-bear adaptations by that time.

These southern extralimital finds (farther south than the modern range) align with periods of expanded North Atlantic sea ice, such as the Younger Dryas cold interval.

Possible or Suggestive Evidence Elsewhere in Europe

British Isles (including Scotland): Suggestive but not definitive. Isotope analysis of bear bones from Scotlandโ€™s Inchnadamph Bone Caves (~30,000- 50,000 years old) shows a near- exclusive marine/seafood diet, matching modern polar bears rather than typical brown bears. A skull from the same area has some polar- bear- like traits (though earlier dating has been questioned). DNA analysis is ongoing to confirm species identity (polar bear, specialized brown bear, or hybrid). A fragmentary ulna from Kew Bridge, London (~70,000 years ago, early Weichselian), was proposed as a large polar bear (Ursus maritimus tyrannus) but is disputed and may represent a large brown bear.

Genetic evidence indicates past hybridization between polar and brown bears in northwestern Europe (including areas near Ireland), implying overlapping ranges at times during the Late Pleistocene.

Germany and Other Continental European Countries

There is no confirmed polar bear fossil evidence from Germany or most of central/southern Europe. German Paleolithic sites (e.g., Schรถningen, Bilzingsleben, Salzgitter- Lebenstedt) yield remains of brown bears, cave bears (Ursus spelaeus), and other Ice Age mammals (mammoth, reindeer), but Arctic specialists like polar bears are noted as absent in some faunal lists. Polar bears are strongly tied to sea ice and marine mammal prey, so their presence was limited to coastal zones with suitable ice conditions rather than inland or more southerly continental areas.

Polar bear fossils are rare overall because many individuals die on sea ice (where remains are less likely to be preserved on land). Their range expanded and contracted with Arctic temperatures and sea-ice extent. They survived warmer Holocene periods in high- Arctic refugia (e.g., near the East Siberian Sea, northern Greenland, Canadian Archipelago) and re- expanded during cooler phases.

In summary, polar bears did inhabit parts of northern Europe (especially Scandinavian coasts and possibly the British Isles) during colder phases of the last Ice Age, but they did not range into Germany or deeper continental Europe based on current evidence. Further discoveries or DNA work could refine this picture.

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Researchers have found suggestive evidence from Ice Age fossils in Scotlandโ€™s Inchnadamph (Assynt) Bone Caves that some bears may have been polar bears (or a closely related form with a similar ecology), based mainly on diet rather than definitive DNA confirmation of species.

The Daily Galaxy article (March 2025) reports on re- examination of bones (including material linked to earlier finds) by scientists from National Museums Scotland and the universities of Aberdeen and Edinburgh.

It highlights radiocarbon dating and analysis pointing to a marine/seafood- heavy diet in some specimens, consistent with modern polar bears, in an environment that included glacial conditions in northern Scotland. The caves have long yielded Ice Age remains of brown bears, lynx, reindeer, and other species; a 1927 bear skull had previously been noted for some polar- bear- like traits.

More precise reporting from late 2024 (BBC, The Times, and others) describes the key evidence as stable isotope analysis of three samples dated roughly 30,000- 50,000 years ago. These showed diets composed almost entirely of marine fish or other seafood, very different from the typical terrestrial (meat/plant, occasionally salmon) diet of brown bears, including other prehistoric Scottish bears. This was published in the journal Annales Zoologici Fennici.

Professor Kate Britton (University of Aberdeen) noted the samples โ€œstick out like a sore thumbโ€ relative to expected brown- bear diets.

The findings reopen the possibility of polar bears in Scotland during colder periods of the last Ice Age, when sea ice extended farther south in the North Atlantic, potentially allowing excellent swimmers like polar bears to reach the region.

Researchers emphasize it is not conclusive species identification: it could represent polar bears, a marine- specialized brown- bear subspecies/population, or overlapping ranges (polar and brown bears can interbreed). An older skull previously suggested as a possible polar bear had dating and isotope issues that weakened the case.

In short, the dietary evidence is genuine and interesting, it strengthens the case that polar-bear-like ecology occurred in Ice Age Scotland, but it does not yet constitute definitive proof of Ursus maritimus fossils there. Further DNA work has been discussed as a next step in related coverage. Polar- bear fossils are overall rare because many die on sea ice.

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The Last Ice Age in Europe refers to the most recent major glacial period of the Quaternary, commonly called the Last Glacial Period (LGP) or, regionally, the Weichselian glaciation (northern Europe), Devensian (British Isles), and Wรผrm (Alps).

Timeline

  • Began: Roughly 115,000- 110,000 years ago (end of the previous interglacial, the Eemian).
  • Peak (Last Glacial Maximum, LGM): Approximately 26,500- 19,000 years ago.
  • Ended: Around 11,700 years ago, marking the start of the current Holocene epoch (with a brief cold snap called the Younger Dryas just before the final warming).

Ice Cover and Landscape in Europe during the LGM:

A massive Scandinavian Ice Sheet covered Scandinavia, Finland, the Baltic region, much of northern Germany, Poland, and parts of the British Isles (including Scotland and northern England/Ireland).

Alpine glaciers expanded significantly across the Alps, Pyrenees, and other mountain ranges.

Sea levels dropped by about 120- 130 meters, exposing land bridges (e.g., Doggerland connecting Britain to continental Europe) and extending coastlines.

Much of northern and central Europe was tundra, steppe- tundra, or permafrost- covered; southern Europe had more open grasslands and refugia for forests in milder areas (Iberia, Italy, Balkans).

Ecological and Human Context

Cold- adapted animals thrived, including woolly mammoth, woolly rhinoceros, reindeer, Arctic fox, and (in coastal/northern areas) species with polar- bear- like ecology. Brown bears were widespread; polar bears may have ranged farther south along sea- ice margins in the North Atlantic, as suggested by some Scottish fossil evidence from this period.

Early modern humans (Cro-Magnon) and Neanderthals (earlier in the period) adapted with specialized hunting technologies, clothing, and shelters. Human populations were concentrated in southern and ice-free refugia during the coldest phases.

Rapid warming after ~19,000- 15,000 years ago caused ice retreat, rising sea levels, and the return of forests. The transition included abrupt climate oscillations (e.g., Bรธlling- Allerรธd warming followed by Younger Dryas cooling).

This is the glacial stage most relevant to recent paleontological finds (such as the Scottish Bone Caves remains dated ~30,000- 50,000 years ago).

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Ice Age climate impacts refer primarily to the environmental, ecological, and human consequences of the Last Glacial Period (roughly 115,000- 11,700 years ago), with the most extreme phase being the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) around 26,000- 19,000 years ago.

Global Climate Changes

Cooling: Global average temperatures dropped by about 4- 6ยฐC relative to the pre- industrial Holocene (some estimates range higher locally). High latitudes cooled far more (polar amplification), with winter cooling often stronger than summer.

Ice sheets and sea level: Massive ice sheets covered northern North America (Laurentide), northern Europe (Scandinavian), and parts of Asia. Sea levels fell by ~120- 130 meters, exposing continental shelves, creating land bridges (e.g., Beringia, Doggerland), and extending coastlines.

Drier and dustier conditions: Many regions became more arid. Atmospheric dust levels rose dramatically (up to 20- 25 times modern values) due to reduced vegetation, stronger winds, and less precipitation to clear the air.

Ocean and circulation shifts: Weakened Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) during cold phases reduced heat transport to the North Atlantic, amplifying regional cooling. Storm tracks shifted southward.

These changes were driven by lower greenhouse gases (COโ‚‚ ~180โ€“200 ppm), orbital forcing (Milankovitch cycles), and ice- albedo feedback.

Impacts in Europe

Europe experienced particularly strong effects due to proximity to the Scandinavian Ice Sheet:

  • Temperature and precipitation: Cooling of 10- 14ยฐC in many areas compared to today, with greater winter severity. Western/coastal regions were moderated by the ocean; areas southeast of the Alps saw stronger cooling and drying. Southwestern Europe (Iberia) was relatively wetter in some reconstructions, while Central and Eastern Europe were drier.
  • Vegetation and landscapes: Forests retreated to southern refugia (Iberian, Italian, and Balkan peninsulas). Much of central and northern Europe became open steppe- tundra or permafrost-covered loess landscapes. Solifluction, wind- blown loess deposits, and expanded deserts/arid zones occurred.
  • Abrupt climate swings: Dansgaard-Oeschger (D-O) events brought rapid warmings and coolings on millennial timescales. Heinrich stadials (massive iceberg discharges) caused sharp Atlantic cooling and vegetation crashes, especially near the western margin. The Younger Dryas (~12,900- 11,700 years ago) was a final intense cold snap before the Holocene.

Regional heterogeneity (e.g., Alps as a barrier) influenced local conditions strongly.

Ecological Impacts

  • Ecosystems and biomes: Shift from forests to open grasslands/steppe- tundra favored cold- adapted grazers. Mammoth- steppe habitats expanded across Eurasia. Reduced forest cover and lower COโ‚‚ stressed woody plants.
  • Megafauna: Climate- driven habitat changes (expansion then contraction of open landscapes) caused range shifts and population stresses. Rapid interstadial warmings are linked to genetic turnover and local extinctions in some studies. This interacted with human pressures in the late Quaternary extinctions (e.g., woolly mammoth, woolly rhino). Polar bears expanded southward along sea- ice margins into Scandinavia and possibly the British Isles during colder phases with extended ice.
  • Other fauna and flora: Arctic species (reindeer, Arctic fox) moved south; temperate species contracted. Biodiversity patterns were reshaped by repeated habitat fragmentation and recolonization.

Human Impacts

  • Population declines and genetic bottlenecks occurred during the coldest phases (especially LGM and Late Pleniglacial), with western European groups facing severe reductions or local extinction/replacement.
  • Hunter- gatherers were pushed into southern and ice- free refugia. Cultural developments (e.g., Chรขtelperronian, Uluzzian) show regional divergences possibly linked to climatic heterogeneity.
  • Resource base changed with shifting prey (large herds on steppes) and vegetation.

Landscapes were reshaped by glaciation (moraines, fjords, outwash plains), lower sea levels created migration corridors, and the eventual rapid deglaciation (~19,000โ€“11,700 years ago) caused sea- level rise, forest recolonization, and further ecological turnover. The transition into the Holocene featured the Younger Dryas cooling followed by abrupt warming.

These Ice Age dynamics demonstrate high climate sensitivity and the cascading effects of cooling, ice growth, and circulation changes on every level of the Earth system, from oceans and atmosphere to ecosystems and human societies. Modern paleoclimate research uses pollen, ice cores, marine sediments, and models to refine these reconstructions, highlighting both gradual orbital drivers and abrupt millennial-scale events.

UN Climate Chief: โ€œthe climate crisis is now a continent-wide economic security emergencyโ€

He forgot to add words like โ€œsuperโ€ and โ€œapocalypticโ€.

And it shows both that the climate crisis is now a continent-wide economic security emergency. And that doubling down on Europeโ€™s longstanding climate leadership is entirely in the continentโ€™s best interest.

Globally, over 2 trillion dollars was invested in clean energy last year โ€“ double fossil fuel investment.

A cartoon depicting a continent-wide economic security emergency due to the climate crisis, featuring a United Nations official, rising energy prices, and distressed citizens discussing their high bills.

From Watts Up With That?

By Eric Worrall

He forgot to add words like โ€œsuperโ€ and โ€œapocalypticโ€.

UN Climate Chief: โ€œthe climate crisis is now a continent-wide economic security emergencyโ€

10 September 2026

The following is a transcript of a speech delivered by UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell at the European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety in Brussels, Belgium, on Thursday 10 September 2026.

Thank you for this opportunity.

Climate is sometimes seen as a partisan issue: as territory in culture wars. That is palpably false. And weโ€™ve just seen why: Europeโ€™s summer has been hot as hell. This is the price of global fossil fuel addiction hitting home.

And it shows both that the climate crisis is now a continent-wide economic security emergency. And that doubling-down on Europeโ€™s longstanding climate leadership is entirely in the continentโ€™s best interest.

This summerโ€™s climate-driven extreme heat has killed tens of thousands of people, and hammered Europeโ€™s infrastructure, businesses, and economies.

Weโ€™ve seen mass evacuations. Power stations closed. And trade routes choked. Crops lost. Yields down. And food prices up โ€“ and set to rise further.

Elsewhere, horrifying floods have ripped through the Himalayas. In North Africa, devastating heat has meant lost lives, power outages, water shortages, and economies slowed.

In many places, climate impacts are fueling forced migration โ€“ internally and across national borders โ€“ taking a dire human toll.

And the costs of the climate crisis are spiraling. Disasters are pushing up insurance premiums. Leaving some entirely uninsurable.

One study calculates this summerโ€™s extremes will cost Europe 180 billion euros โ€“ in lost labour productivity, and disruption to food, energy and transport. Thatโ€™s equivalent to carving a full percentage point from European GDP โ€“ the same amount the EU economy is forecast to grow.

No wonder some EU member states are calling for a dedicated climate adaptation fund.

The EUโ€™s summer of hellish heat comes on top of the ongoing fossil fuel cost crisis โ€“ and both are driving up prices for households, businesses and governments, in a deathly double-blow. Dependence on volatile fossil fuel imports has long been an economic Achillesโ€™ heel for Europe.

This year โ€“ again โ€“ households and businesses have been hit with higher bills. Now, another European winter fuel crisis is looming, due to fossil fuel dependency.

Increasingly, to be soft on climate action is to be soft on inflation and the cost of living, soft on sovereignty and security, and soft on economic growth and jobs.

The fossil fuel cost crisis is also pushing up the costs of government borrowing, meaning less fiscal space to deliver vital services that populations need and expect.

Understandably, Europe wants to insulate itself from volatile fossil fuel costs you cannot control.  Understandably, Europe wants affordability, economic stability, energy security, and policy-making autonomy. Clean energy is the surest path to deliver, cheaply and safely.

Thanks to growing investment, renewables now provide around half of Europeโ€™s power. In the first six months of this Middle East conflict, solar alone saved Europe more than 30 billion euros in avoided gas imports.

And you have so much more to gain from accelerating the shift to clean energy โ€“ across this continent and the world.

The clean tech boom is already driving European growth, jobs and living standards: Your companies are at the forefront of some key clean industries. The opportunities will only grow.

And some countries developing national transition plans will reap particularly strong benefits.

Globally, over 2 trillion dollars was invested in clean energy last year โ€“ double fossil fuel investment.

As all countries at COP30 said: the move to clean energy is now irreversible. That means a goldmine of jobs and commercial opportunities.

By standing firm behind your climate policies, going further, and backing clean, resilient growth. You can better position Europe to thrive. Locking-in higher living standards โ€“ now and in the long-term.

Colleagues,

Itโ€™s clear: Climate cuts across the core concerns of voters, whatever their politics: Family health, community safety and economic stability. Affordable food and available water. Jobs, business costs, and household bills.

Itโ€™s entirely in Europeโ€™s interests to stand firm behind climate action โ€“ and to boost it: To build resilience to climate impacts โ€“ protecting global supply chains, on which all economies depend. And to slash global emissions.

If humanity doesnโ€™t cut the fossil fuel pollution baking our planet, this summerโ€™s brutal heat, fires and droughts will seem mild compared to the permanent climate nightmare that will follow.

We have made progress but still not enough.

Without UN-convened climate cooperation, humanity would be heading for unsurvivable global heating well over 4 degrees Celsius. With it, current policies are taking us to a 2.6 degree temperature rise.

Thatโ€™s a long way from the 1.5 degree limit demanded by science to avert the worst climate impacts, and agreed among nations, time and time again.

A recent report from the UN Environment Programme reaffirms that this limit will now be breached. But the report is equally clear: that this can and must be temporary.

Concerted global action can bring the temperature rise back down to 1.5 degrees.

For years, Europe has been a climate leader. And a champion of multilateralism.

You were instrumental in building the international climate system, and the Paris Agreement โ€“ at the 21st UN Climate Conference.

Europeโ€™s continued leadership is essential โ€“ including in supporting vulnerable nations. And itโ€™s entirely in the interests of Europeโ€™s people and economies.

All nations win by avoiding a two-speed global transition.

We need you working in partnership. Forging international alliances that secure supply chains for clean energy and new industries. And continuing to deliver on your current climate finance pledges โ€“ boosting quality and access, building on existing work โ€“ which strengthens trust.

No single COP can solve the climate crisis overnight, but each moves global efforts forward โ€“ building on the last, and looking to the next: From a global agreement in Dubai to transition away from all fossil fuels. To a new climate finance goal in Baku. And steps forward on a just transition in Belem, which ushered in the era of implementation.

I ask the EU to throw itself behind helping COP31 in Tรผrkiye to deliver further progress.

The need now is not to re-open decisions already taken.

Itโ€™s delivering whatโ€™s already been agreed: Countries implementing their plans and targets, and striving to do better, where domestic conditions allow.

By the second global stocktake of climate action in 2028, we must be much closer to meeting the global commitments made at the first. Laying the ground for greater ambition.

This yearโ€™s negotiations can help support implementation: across mitigation, adaptation and finance โ€“ including quality and access to finance.

For example, through developing the just transition mechanism โ€“ to support countries deliver fair transitions that create opportunities for all.

I ask the EU to come to Tรผrkiye prepared to find solutions.

That means spending time considering what you would like the outcomes to include. And what others need from COP31.

It means forging compromises. And developing a clear plan on how to use the spaces weโ€™ve created together.

That includes the Global Climate Action Agenda. Which is key to turning targets into results. Accelerating real economy action. And supporting countries to implement their national adaptation plans and NDCs.

The Turkish COP31 Presidency, working closely with Australia, has set key Action Agenda targets, including 35% of final global energy demand met by electricity by 2035.

The EU is already making gains here. And you have ambitious electrification targets. Around one in four new cars sold in Europe is now electric. And battery deployment is now accelerating.

Itโ€™s in your interests to push forward. And to drive progress in other areas where the impact and urgency are greatest: Methane โ€“ a super pollutant crucial to reducing near-term heating and cutting costs. Food waste and security, as climate-driven droughts hit crops and food prices. And building the resilience of cities to climate extremes.

These topics strike at the heart of everyday concerns of people across the continent.

Colleagues,

We live in a polarized age: But inflation is a common enemy, security is a common cause. Health, jobs, community and prosperity matter to us all. And every one of them demands action on climate.

I thank you.

Source: https://unfccc.int/news/un-climate-chief-the-climate-crisis-is-now-a-continent-wide-economic-security-emergency

In my opinion the claim the climate movement is not a partisan issue is absurd, because the climate movement is rebadged communism. When the Soviet Union fell, the last dictator of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev rallied and restored hope to his bereft Western Soviet communism groupies by launching โ€œGreen Cross Internationalโ€ at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. For a while the green camouflage might have fooled a few conservatives, but Climategate ripped away the disguise, by revealing the intense politicisation of the scientists pushing the crisis narrative, and the dirty tricks employed to try to silence critics and competing narratives.

Simon Stiell mentioned power plant closures. As we recently discussed on WUWT, the power plant closures in most cases were not because of the heat, they were because Europe ran short of water. And the cause of that water shortage disaster was long term chronic underinvestment in water infrastructure, which even the EU admits is a problem. Yes the drought put pressure on the system โ€“ but I would argue failure to invest in resilience was the real problem.

Claiming climate changed caused the Nepal disaster is way premature, and likely untrue. Nepal is well known for unstable geology and mountain collapses. Such events have been happening regularly for millions of years, even before humans raised CO2 levels with industrial output.

Stiell notes Europe is facing a winter gas shortage โ€“ but how much of that is due to climate policy? Europe has trillions of cubic meters of recoverable shale gas, but refused to frack that gas due to climate regulations. People are going to freeze to death because Europeโ€™s leaders have shut down the industry which could have provided resilience against Middle Eastern and Russian supply shocks, in the name of combating climate change.

I note that Europe hasnโ€™t managed to ween itself off fossil fuel despite trillions of dollars of investment. Who can ignore the absurdity of Germany purchasing 4-5% of the worldโ€™s solar panel output, despite Germany being between 47ยบ and 55ยบ North? Even sunny Australia canโ€™t eliminate fossil fuel, weather is simply too unreliable to be the basis of a secure energy supply โ€“ especially for nations as far north as Germany.

Stiell makes the obligatory UN prediction of fiery doomsday if we donโ€™t listen to him โ€“ this summerโ€™s brutal heat, fires and droughts will seem mild compared to the permanent climate nightmare that will follow. But the UN has been issuing doomsday warnings since the late 1980s, and none of them have come true.

Stiell claims Europe has to help vulnerable nations โ€“ but why? Given Europeans are suffering, shouldnโ€™t Europe help its own people first?

To top off the absurdity, Stiell claims Europe needs to double down on climate action to reduce inflation and avoid fiery doomsday, which is obviously wrong. If high fossil fuel prices are causing inflation, the first priority is surely to bring down the price of fossil fuel, either by helping the USA fix the Persian Gulf crisis, or permitting frackers to secure domestic European fuel supplies. To take care of immediate needs, discretionary expenditure like foreign aid could be suspended to buy more gas from whomever can sell it.

Why is something so obvious so difficult for UN officials like Stiell to grasp? Why do people like Stiell appear to find it so difficult to separate fixing todayโ€™s problem โ€“ fuel price inflation โ€“ from fixing tomorrowโ€™s energy problems, with whatever form tomorrowโ€™s energy solutions will take?

I used to wonder how great powers from history like the Roman Empire could fail so completely in such a short time. But weโ€™re seeing the answer to this mystery play out live, right now, in Europe.

Great powers fail because of gross leadership incompetence. Leaders of failing powers ignore genuine crisis, and fritter away precious resources on unimportant trivialities or plans for a future which never happens. They lose focus on what matters.

Europeโ€™s problems could be solved at the stroke of a pen. But Europeโ€™s leaders are so disconnected from reality, so distracted and obsessed with fantasy future issues like the fake climate crisis, they cannot bring themselves to take simple, obvious steps which would alleviate the problems their people are facing right now.

Earthโ€™s Crust Is Unzipping Beneath Italy

Scientists say Earthโ€™s crust is โ€œunzippingโ€ (delaminating) under Italyโ€™s Apennine Mountains, explaining their paradoxical geology of simultaneous extension and compression.

Integrating geodetic, seismic, and geological data, the authors show that lower- crustal delamination is currently the primary geodynamic driver of Apennine tectonics and seismicity.

Illustration explaining the geological process of lower crust delamination and mantle sinking in the Apennines region, showing the unzipping front migrating west to east and depicting crustal changes.
AI generated by Grok

Scientists say Earthโ€™s crust is โ€œunzippingโ€ (delaminating) under Italyโ€™s Apennine Mountains, explaining their paradoxical geology of simultaneous extension and compression.

A study led by Stefano Tavani of the University of Florence, published in Communications Earth & Environment (2026), proposes that dense lower crust and attached lithosphere are peeling away from the upper crust and sinking into the mantle. This is not happening all at once; instead, it advances along a migrating โ€œhingeโ€ or front (like a zipper or peeling tape) that is slowly moving under Italy toward the Adriatic foreland.

The Apennines stretch ~1,200 km along the Italian peninsula. They formed through plate convergence that crumpled and thickened the crust. Later, slab rollback stretched the crust behind the range, helping open the Tyrrhenian Sea. This produced simultaneous contraction at the outer (eastern) edge and extension farther west, an apparent paradox that has puzzled researchers for years.

Earlier explanations centered on slab rollback. After ~2 million years ago, major Tyrrhenian extension largely ended and frontal shortening slowed, yet the contradictory deformation continued, pointing to another driver.

Researchers combined decades of earthquake data, GPS measurements, satellite radar observations, and maps of the Moho (the crust- mantle boundary). Key findings include:

A zone spanning more than 500 km where the Tyrrhenian- side Moho overlaps the Adriatic- side Moho, interpreted as the peeling front (doubled crust where lower layers detach).

Earthquakes cluster around this hinge: mechanisms indicate extension behind/above it and compression ahead of it.

GPS data show ~4 mm/year of extension across the mountain belt, partially offset by ~2 mm/year of contraction toward the outer edge, an โ€œaccordion- likeโ€ pattern.

Ahead of the hinge, the lower crust and lithospheric mantle stay attached to the sinking slab, pulling the crust downward (causing compression and subsidence). Once the hinge passes and denser material peels away, the remaining buoyant crust can rebound and extend.

The team argues this ongoing lower- crust delamination is now the main geodynamic driver of tectonics and seismicity in the Apennines, providing real- time evidence of a laterally migrating delamination hinge. The model is simplified, and fuller understanding of the underlying slab will need more detailed work.

This process helps account for why parts of the range rise while others sink, and why extension and contraction occur together today. The original ScienceAlert article (by Michelle Starr, 11 September 2026) summarizes the findings based on the peer- reviewed paper.

Geological map depicting the Northern, Central, and Southern transects of the Tyrrhenian Sea region, highlighting sedimentary layers and tectonic features from the Miocene to Quaternary periods.
Cross-sections through the northern, central, and southern Apennines show the overlapping Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Moho and the delaminated lower crust beneath the mountain range. (Tavani et al., Commun. Earth Environ. 2026)

The Moho (short for the Mohoroviฤiฤ‡ discontinuity) is the boundary that separates Earthโ€™s crust from the underlying mantle.

It was identified in 1909 by Croatian seismologist Andrija Mohoroviฤiฤ‡. While analyzing seismic waves from an earthquake in Croatia, he noticed a sudden increase in the speed of P- waves (primary seismic waves) at a certain depth. This marked a sharp change in rock properties.

Above the Moho (crust): Rocks are less dense and richer in silica (granitic to basaltic composition). Seismic P- wave velocities are typically ~6- 7 km/s.

Below the Moho (uppermost mantle): Rocks are denser peridotite (olivine- and pyroxene- rich). P- wave velocities jump to ~8 km/s or higher.

This velocity discontinuity defines the Moho.

Depth and variations

  • Under continents: usually 30- 50 km deep (can exceed 70 km under major mountain belts such as the Himalayas or Andes).
  • Under oceans: much shallower, typically 5- 10 km.
  • It is not a perfectly smooth surface; it can undulate, step, or even double in complex tectonic settings.

The Moho is primarily mapped using:

  • Seismic refraction and reflection surveys
  • Receiver- function analysis from distant earthquakes
  • Tomography

Gravity and other geophysical data also help constrain its depth.

In the recent studies of Italyโ€™s Apennines, maps of the Moho were crucial evidence. Researchers identified a >500 km- long zone where the shallower Tyrrhenian- side Moho overlaps the deeper Adriatic- side Moho.

This โ€œdoubledโ€ Moho marks the migrating hinge where denser lower crust and lithospheric mantle are peeling away (delaminating) from the upper crust and sinking into the mantle, the process described as the crust โ€œunzipping.โ€

In short, the Moho is the fundamental compositional and rheological boundary between crust and mantle. Its geometry and depth variations provide key insights into tectonic processes such as subduction, collision, extension, and delamination.

Diagram of Earth's interior layers, including crust, mantle, outer core, and inner core, with labeled depth measurements.
The Moho: Image of Earth’s internal structure by USGS – Mohorovicic Discontinuity (red line) added by Geology.com. Mohorovicic Discontinuity – The Moho

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Lower-crustal unzipping drives active orogenic deformation

The Apennines- Tyrrhenian Sea system records seismotectonics in a coupled thrust-belt and back- arc setting driven by subduction retreat, continental collision, and crustal delamination. Since the late Miocene, active extension has migrated forelandward (in tandem with contraction) away from the Tyrrhenian back-arc basin (inactive since ~2 Ma) and is now localized tens of kilometers from the active thrust front.

Integrating geodetic, seismic, and geological data, the authors show that lower- crustal delamination is currently the primary geodynamic driver of Apennine tectonics and seismicity. This delamination propagates via a continuous hinge; an elastic flexural framework anchors crustal extension, contraction, and short- term vertical movements around the migrating hinge.

The results offer a template for other mature retreating subduction systems: the onset of delamination and later waning of back- arc opening do not stop deformation but transfer its locus to a migrating zone of intra-lithospheric decoupling that sustains active deformation and seismicity.

Core findings and interpretation

  • A continuous >500 km- long zone of Moho overlap (Tyrrhenian Moho overlying Adriatic Moho) defines the deep- seated โ€œunzipping front,โ€ the locus of ongoing lower- crustal delamination.
  • Seismicity and active deformation concentrate above this front: extension dominates behind/above it (SW side), compression ahead of it (NE side / thrust front).
  • GNSS and InSAR data show ~4 mm/yr internal extension across the belt, partially balanced by ~2 mm/yr frontal shortening in northern and central sectors (creating an โ€œaccordion-likeโ€ pattern). Far-field NE- SW divergence is only ~2 mm/yr.
  • Vertical motions include relative uplift on the southwestern flank of the extensional domain and subsidence ahead of the hinge.
  • Delamination began ~10 Ma (coeval with Tyrrhenian opening). After Tyrrhenian extension largely ceased (~2- 1 Ma), deformation continued and became focused around the migrating lower- crustal hinge.

The authors use a deliberately simple elastic flexural model constrained by modern strain rates to argue that the unzipping front is the first-order control on the spatiotemporal evolution of the orogen, rather than a passive response. This isolates the contribution of delamination from far- field Africa- Eurasia plate motion (which is oblique to the main NE- SW shortening direction in large sectors of the belt).

The paper is open- access under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 license. A PDF version and transparent peer- review file are available on the Nature site. This is the primary scientific source underlying the ScienceAlert summary.

Title: Lower-crustal unzipping drives active orogenic deformation

Journal: Communications Earth & Environment (Nature Portfolio)

Published: 07 September 2026 (early access / Article in Press)

DOI: 10.1038/s43247-026-04021-w

Authors: Stefano Tavani,
Lorenzo Petracchini,
Andrea Billi,
Eugenio Carminati,
Giancarlo Molli,
Mimmo Palano,
Laura Scognamiglio,
Jason P. Morgan &
Paola Vannucchi 

Stefano Tavani, Lorenzo Petracchini, Andrea Billi, Eugenio Carminati, Giancarlo Molli, Mimmo Palano, Laura Scognamiglio, Jason P. Morgan, and Paola Vannucchi (affiliations include University of Florence, CNR- GEO, Sapienza University of Rome, University of Pisa, University of Palermo, INGV, and ICM- CSIC Barcelona).

Abstract

The Apennines-Tyrrhenian Sea system allows us to investigate seismotectonics in coupled thrust belt and back-arc realms driven by subduction retreat, continental collision, and crustal delamination. Since the late Miocene, active extension has progressively migrated forelandward, in tandem with contraction, away from the Tyrrhenian back-arc basin, inactive since ~2โ€‰Ma, to become localized tens of kilometers from the active thrust front. Integrating geodetic, seismic, and geological data, here we show that lower-crustal delamination is presently the primary geodynamic driver of Apennine tectonics and seismicity. This delamination propagates via a continuous hinge; an elastic flexural framework anchors crustal extension, contraction, and short-term vertical movements around the migrating hinge. Our results provide a template for other mature retreating subduction systems, where the onset of delamination and later waning of back-arc opening do not arrest deformation, but instead transfer its locus to a migrating zone of intra-lithospheric decoupling that sustains active deformation and seismicity.

RGGI Auction Clearing Price Results

Today RGGI announced that the Auction 73 price did indeed exceed $35 closing $2.65 higher at $37.65.

The eleven participating states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the nationโ€™s first market-based regulatory effort to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution, today announced the results of their 73rd auction of carbon dioxide (CO2) allowances. 28,537,847 CO2 allowances were sold at the auction at a clearing price of $37.65.

Illustration depicting the RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) auction process and its financial implications, highlighting increasing carbon allowance prices, electric bill breakdown, and contrasting promises versus realities of the program.

From Watts Up With That?

Roger Caiazza

Last week I gave an update on RGGI and posed the question whether the Auction 73 clearing price would exceed the Auction 72 price of $35.  Today RGGI announced that the Auction 73 price did indeed exceed $35 closing $2.65 higher at $37.65.  This post summarizes the impact of the auction.

The RGGI press release stated:

NEW YORK โ€” The eleven participating states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the nationโ€™s first market-based regulatory effort to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution, today announced the results of their 73rd auction of carbon dioxide (CO2) allowances. 28,537,847 CO2 allowances were sold at the auction at a clearing price of $37.65. This includes an initial offering of 27,389,847 allowances and 1,148,000 CCR allowances. The allowance offering included a supply of 5,740,000 allowances from Virginia, which resumed RGGI participation on July 1, 2026. Bids for the CO2 allowances ranged from $2.69 to $190 per allowance. Additional details are available in the Market Monitor Report for Auction 73, which is appended.

A quick summary of what I have documented since July

In my last post I summarized four things that happened in quick succession this summer.  Two of them are relevant to this result.

In Hochul and RGGI Affordability I quantified the wholesale-market effect of RGGI allowance costs and showed that it contradicts Governor Hochulโ€™s affordability messaging. New Yorkโ€™s electricity market pays every accepted generator the market-clearing price for a given interval. When an emitting generator sets that price, its RGGI allowance cost is embedded in the bid and gets paid to every resource dispatched in that interval โ€” including non-emitting and imported resources that bear little or none of the underlying RGGI cost., I showed the RGGI allowance price has risen from $9.30 per ton in the first full auction of Hochulโ€™s tenure to $35.00 at Auction 72 โ€” a 276% increase.   At the Auction 73 cost of $37.65 the increase is 296%.  For a typical residential customer, the RGGI-attributable share of the bill was around 4.2% in 2024 but at $37.65 the share is 7.8%.

I also described the report by RGGIโ€™s market monitor Potomac Economics.   On August 21, 2026, RGGI, Inc. released an unprecedented special report โ€” the Report on the Supply and Demand for RGGI CO2 Allowances: Second Quarter 2026 โ€” timed roughly eleven weeks after the record $35 auction. I covered this in RGGIโ€™s Market Monitor Confirms the Scarcity Iโ€™ve Been Tracking.  I believe the intent of the release of the report was to calm the market.  However, the report confirms 2026โ€™s CCR allowances are fully exhausted, confirms compliance entities and investors are increasingly hoarding rather than selling allowances as the compliance deadline approaches, confirms Virginiaโ€™s return adds less new supply than the demand it brings, and โ€” most importantly โ€” declines to say anything about whether the steep post-2027 cap trajectory is sustainable, because that question was โ€œbeyond the scopeโ€ of the report.  Given that the auction price still went up  this attempt to keep prices stable failed.

Costs are not hypothetical

Put together, these my work tells a consistent story. RGGIโ€™s own cost-containment mechanism โ€” the CCR, which releases additional allowances once prices cross a trigger โ€” was exhausted as soon as the allowances were available in 2026, months before the compliance deadline. The regional cap is scheduled to tighten by more than 10% of the 2025 budget each year from 2027 through 2033, a pace never sustained historically. Virginiaโ€™s re-entry adds demand faster than supply. And New York adopted its conforming rule in August without grappling with any of this, relying on cost-impact modeling that predates the price spike and a ratepayer-benefit claim that ignores the wholesale market cost adder.

None of this is abstract for consumers. My estimates put the total New York consumer impact of RGGI โ€” direct allowance costs plus the wholesale market cost adder โ€” at $1.1 to $3.4 billion annually at a sustained $37.65 allowance price, more than double the direct-allowance-cost figure that state messaging emphasizes. Scaled across all eleven RGGI states, the same mechanism plausibly adds several billion dollars more. That is the real price of a program whose defenders describe rising auction revenue as a โ€œbig opportunityโ€ for new spending rather than a cost signal ratepayers are already absorbing.

Auction 73 results

When I posed the question whether the costs would exceed $35 I noted that several signals pointed toward continued upward pressure on the clearing price rather than relief. Secondary-market allowances have been trading well above the $35 auction price throughout August, with Argus Media reporting 2026-vintage RGGI allowances in the high-$30s to around $40 per short ton in mid-to-late August (Argus Carbon), with December 2026 futures trading even higher. The market monitorโ€™s own Q2 2026 report shows the share of the allowance surplus held by compliance entities โ€” as opposed to investors with no obligation to sell โ€” has fallen, and that investors holding 68% of the surplus have little incentive to release allowances for anything less than what the market has already shown it will pay. The 2026 CCR is gone. Virginia is a net new claim on the bank, not a source of relief. The larger Auction 73 offering did not absorb that pressure.  Instead, it simply confirmed how much latent demand exists because the price exceeded $35 despite the bigger offering.

Prior to the auction I said I would not be surprised it the price exceeded $35 a ton.  I noted that if it did it would  be real-time confirmation that the price trajectory regulators have not acknowledged is one more sign that the statesโ€™ own cost-containment tools โ€” the mechanism they cite as evidence that consumer costs will be manageable โ€” can no longer do the job they were designed to do.  Given these cost impacts it is past time to pause RGGI.


Roger Caiazza blogs on New York energy and environmental issues at Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York. Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program. He has been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and has no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program. This represents his opinion and not the opinion of any of his previous employers or any other company with which he has been associated.

Was 2026 really the โ€œhottest summer on recordโ€ in the United States?

By now Iโ€™m sure that you have seen the headlines claiming that the U.S. just had its โ€œhottest summer on record.โ€ It is front-page news this week from CBS News and CNN to USA Today. Andrew Freedman and CNN meteorologist Brandon Miller report that we have โ€œbeat the Dust Bowl eraโ€

โ€œThe Dust Bowl summer of 1936 has been long been regarded as the benchmark of hottest summers in the U.S. but has now been equaled or eclipsed twice in the past five years thanks to the influence of human-caused climate change.โ€

An infographic titled 'Hottest Summer Ever!' featuring cartoon characters discussing climate statistics.

From CFACT

By Chris Martz

By now Iโ€™m sure that you have seen the headlines claiming that the U.S. just had its โ€œhottest summer on record.โ€ It is front-page news this week from CBS News and CNN to USA Today. Andrew Freedman and CNN meteorologist Brandon Miller report that we have โ€œbeat the Dust Bowl eraโ€ (Fig. 1).

CNN article headline announcing the US experienced its hottest summer on record, surpassing the Dust Bowl era.
Fig. 1. CNNโ€™s headline from September 9, 2026: โ€œThe U.S. just had its hottest summer on record, beating the Dust Bowl era.โ€

There is no shortage of news coverage about this. After all, itโ€™s a pretty big story, as such a topic should be. But for simplicity, and to not bore you to death (and also because all of these articles read the same), Iโ€™m just going to focus on CNNโ€™s reporting. Freedman writes,

โ€œThe Dust Bowl summer of 1936 has been long been regarded as the benchmark of hottest summers in the U.S. but has now been equaled or eclipsed twice in the past five years thanks to the influence of human-caused climate change.โ€

That first part is definitely true. Not only was Juneโ€“August 1936 incredibly hot, but 15 U.S. states set or tied their โ€œall-timeโ€ high temperature records in 1936 alone (Fig. 2), the most in any calendar year. Manitoba, Canada, also set theirs that summer. The second part about the 1936 record being equaled in 2021 and broken this year is also true at face value, but there is one reason Iโ€™ll detail later on as to why that statistic might not actually be correct.

Map of U.S. statewide high temperature records, displaying the highest recorded temperatures and their corresponding years for each state, with color coding for different decades.
Fig. 2. U.S. statewide โ€œall-timeโ€ high temperature records. Data: NOAA NCEI and GHCNd network. Year displayed represents the year the record was first set in as some have been tied since. The colors group the years by decade for visual purposes.

Freedman continues, stating that the average temperature โ€” which, for the laymen reading, is just the sum of a locationโ€™s daily high temperature (Tmax) and low temperature (Tmin) divided by two โ€” was the highest on record since 1895, and that Juneโ€“August 2026 beat 1936โ€™s record by 0.4ยฐF (~0.2ยฐC). One could even ask whether that difference is even measurable, but I digress. Freedman states,

โ€œSummer featured widespread above-average temperatures across the Lower 48 states, with well-above-normal nighttime low temperatures throughout the country โ€” largely driven by a series of powerful heat domes that affected nearly every state besides Alaska and Hawaii.

The average [temperature] for meteorological summer โ€” from June through August โ€” was 74.4 degrees, which was 3 degrees above average.

Record-breaking heat was especially present across the Southwest, with Arizona, New Mexico, Utah and Colorado each setting records for their warmest summer.โ€

This is also true (although as a scientist, I absolutely despise the use of the term โ€œheat dome,โ€ but thatโ€™s a different can of worms to open and I donโ€™t feel like upsetting the terminally online weather community hall monitors). And therein lies the devil in the details; this โ€œrecordโ€ was driven primarily by record high overnight Tmin values and repeated transient bursts of record-breaking heat in the Desert Southwest/Four Corners region. NOAA NCEIโ€™s mean temperature percentiles map shown in Fig. 3 below showcases this very well.

Map showing mean temperature percentiles across the United States from June to August 2026, with color gradients indicating temperature categories from coldest to warmest.
Fig. 3. Juneโ€“August 2026 U.S. mean temperature percentiles map. Source: NOAA NCEI.

However, just because summer 2026 may have had the highest average temperature on record nationwide does not mean that it was the โ€œhottest summer on record,โ€ as widely reported by legacy media. It also does not tell the full story in terms of the conditions that the vast majority of people actually felt.

Reporting that it was the โ€œhottest summer on recordโ€ implies that average Tmax was highest on record, not the average Tmin or overall Tavg. By Tmax, 2026 ranks fourth behind 1936, 1934, and 2012, respectively. Some of my readers may argue โ€œtomayto, tomahtoโ€ and say that terminology is trivial. But it absolutely matters. Case in point, NOAA refrains from describing this past summer as having been the โ€œhottest on recordโ€ in the CONUS. They explicitly state in their press release that meteorological summer 2026 was โ€œwarmest for the CONUS in the 132-year recordโ€ (Fig. 4). The adjective โ€œhottestโ€ appears ZERO times in the press release.

Aerial view of a canyon with red rock formations and a river, illustrating the warm summer record for the contiguous U.S.
Fig. 4. NOAA NCEI press release for summer 2026 weather/climate information.

Above I stated that this statistic โ€œdoes not tell the full story.โ€ And that is abundantly clear from a spatial standpoint.

I used the University of Iowaโ€™s Iowa Environmental Mesonet (IEM) page to generate the maps below showing temperature rankings for all 344 districts used in NOAAโ€™s U.S. Climate Divisions database. Notice that there were very few districts in the U.S. that observed their warmest summer on record (marked by No. 1 labels) this year (Fig. 5a). In fact, only SEVEN of the 344 were record-breaking. Thatโ€™s a little over 2%. And all seven No. 1s (and most top 5s) were confined to the southwest. Now compare that to the summer of 1936 (Fig. 5b) where a whopping 51 (~15% of) districts recorded their warmest summer on record. Make of that what you will.

Map showing average temperature rankings by climate district in the United States from 31 May 2026 to 31 Aug 2026, indicating temperature extremes with a color gradient.
Fig. 5. Meteorological summer (Juneโ€“August) temperature rankings for the CONUS land area (344 climate districts). Rankings are based on data since 1895. (a) 2026 and (b) 1936.

Thereโ€™s one more important thing to consider here and that is that the data NOAA NCEI use above are โ€œhomogenized.โ€ That is, the aggregate of station data used for these temperature analyses has been adjusted from the raw data that is handwritten on the original paper observation forms submitted to the federal government by volunteer station observers. These adjustments are not a government conspiracy; they are part of a process known as โ€œquality control.โ€ The problem, however, is that the magnitude of these adjustments may be questionable.

A long-running weather station is rarely, if ever, perfectly consistent for 100+ years. During its operation history, it may be relocated, observe a change in observation time, and instrumentation most certainly changed from mercury-/liquid-in-glass thermometers to electronic Maximum Minimum Temperature Systems (MMTSs). Also, the landscape around a rural station may become developed over time, leading to an artificial warming trend. There is also the issue of missing daily observations; these values are marked with an โ€œMโ€ or โ€œ-9999โ€ in digitized data files.

NOAA (and other government agencies) are well aware of these potential issues (e.g., Menne et al., 2009), and so they apply correction factors to the monthly (and annual) data. Daily values are never adjusted unless there are transcription errors brought to NOAA NCEIโ€™s attention (and as I have found in my own research, there are a lot of them that have gone undetected). The largest of these correction factors in terms of its overall magnitude is the time of observation bias (TOB) adjustment.

For some background, prior to the mid-to-late 19th century, weather station observers generally took temperature measurements three times a day: first at 7:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m., and finally at 9:00 p.m. This, of course, was a very tedious task. And while this technique provided a fairly decent estimate of the temperature variation throughout the day, more often than not, we know that Tmax occurs around or a little after 3:00 p.m. locally while Tmin occurs shortly after sunrise (the time of which varies throughout the course of the year). Therefore, a locationโ€™s true Tmax and Tmin on any given day were likely under and overestimated, respectively, for much of the 19th century.

By the 1870s, the U.S. Weather Bureau (now National Weather Service) began to use min-max thermometers at stations in major cities (e.g., Washington, D.C., New York City, Richmond), which log both the true Tmin and Tmax over a 24-hour observation period. Traditional versions used a liquid column that pushes small markers as the temperature rises or falls; one marker remains at the warmest point and the other at the coldest point until the thermometer is manually reset, even after liquid contracts or expands upon reaching their daily extrema. An observer then read those values and reset the markers, allowing the thermometer to begin recording the next dayโ€™s Tmin and Tmax, respectively. By the 1880s, rural observation sites began employing the min-max thermometers, and by October 1890 when the Cooperative Observer Network (COOP) was launched, essentially all observing stations were using them. The COOP data are integrated into NOAAโ€™s Global and U.S. Historical Climatology Networks (GHCN / USHCN).

However, different COOP stations had different observation times. That is, some station observers reset their min-max thermometers in the morning while others reset theirs in the afternoon or evening. Afternoon schedules can produce warm bias in the monthly means, particularly for Tmax, while morning schedules can produce the opposite effect, particularly for Tmin. Starting in the early 1980s, there was a shift from afternoon to morning stations, which some scientists have argued induced an artificial cooling trend into the unadjusted (raw) CONUS Tavg time series.

It has been argued by the likes of Drs. Zeke Hausfather and Texas A&Mโ€™s Andrew Dessler that afternoon resets resulted in a โ€œdouble countingโ€ of hot days in the past, which means that the raw Tmax observations cannot be trusted at face value and thus that charts showing robust declines in hot summer afternoons are misleading. The justification for this rests on the idea that afternoon resets carried over the high temperature from โ€œday oneโ€ into the following day.

To illustrate this better, suppose that a COOP station observer resets his max thermometer once per day at 3:00 p.m. local time. Letโ€™s also suppose that on the afternoon of July 1st, it reaches 104ยฐF (40ยฐC) at 3:00 p.m. The observer goes out at 3:00 p.m., reads the marker, jots the value down on a log sheet, and finally resets the thermometer for the next 24-hour observation period. Now, letโ€™s say a cold front plowed through that evening and the next day, the high temperature was only 86ยฐF (30ยฐC). Well, when the observer goes out to read the max thermometer, it will show the high as being 104ยฐF (40ยฐC) again. However, this does not mean every day of a heat wave is counted twice like Hausfather and Dessler claim. It only potentially adds ONE artificial hot day at the trailing edge of a heatwave event when sharply falling temperatures follow a hot afternoon observation, which was discussed in Christy (2026). According to Dr. John Christyโ€™s paper, hot afternoons in the raw temperature data are only overestimated by ~4% in the โ€œearly part of the record compared with the present.โ€

When the TOB adjustments are applied (each station data file contains metadata with their observation times), they are applied to the monthly means, ultimately inducing a significant cooling tendency that is arguably not entirely real. As a result, NOAAโ€™s TOB adjustment adds ~0.2โ€“0.4ยฐC (0.4โ€“0.7ยฐF) of warming to the unadjusted U.S. temperature record. The upper bound of the TOB adjustment is larger than the margin by which the U.S. supposedly broke the previous 1936 and 2021 Juneโ€“August Tavg record. TOB adjustments, while arguably necessary, should only be applied to the handful (at most) of specific calendar days on which an erroneous reading was logged and only to COOP stations that have switched from afternoon to morning observation times. Instead, the adjustment is applied to monthly averages, which effectively erases both legitimately hot afternoons as well as erroneous observations. It may be an overcorrection.

There is another significant adjustment made to the raw station data that attempts to correct for spurious trends. These are false statistical patterns where data over time appear(s) to show a statistically significant upward or downward trend, but the movement is actually caused by some third external factor as opposed to being an indication of change in the physical quantity that is being measured. In the case of temperature data, this is typically caused by station movement over time, instrumentation changes, and perhaps most importantly, long-term urbanization around the observation site. NOAA (and other groups like Berkeley Earth) use whatโ€™s called the โ€œpairwise homogenization algorithmโ€ (PHA) to achieve this.

The PHA compares a stationโ€™s monthly series with numerous neighboring stations. Weather-related fluctuations such as a regional heat wave should appear at many neighboring stations. Simply put, a sudden change found primarily at one station is more likely non-climatic in origin and thus must be corrected for. PHA is designed to detect breakpoints (discontinuities) associated with station siting and instrumentation changes. The previous urban correction factor used in USHCN Version 1 (which contains the COOP data) was eliminated, and NOAA argues that PHA indirectly corrects for urban sprawl in Version 2.5. But PHA, being a breakpoint detector, is poorly suited to that gradual urban heat island (UHI) effect signal. In fact, PHA may actually blend urban warming into rural data, something that Dr. Roy Spencer has written about and documented extensively on his blog.

Urban blending happens with PHA because if a rural station sits next to growing towns or airports that have weather stations to โ€œpairโ€ it to, those neighbors already carry a slowly positive UHI slope. Because that slope is shared across the neighboring stations, it does not manifest as a sharp breakpoint in the time series. So, the algorithm does not remove it. Instead, PHA adjustments can pull the rural time series toward the urban ones. Fig. 6 below, from Dr. Roy Spencer, shows this well. Stations that had no urban-related warming trend in the raw data now have a warming trend after PHA adjustments are applied.

Scatter plot showing Raw and Adjusted GHCN Station Trends versus UHI Trends for CONUS from 1895 to 2023, with red and blue data points representing different trends, and annotations for slope, intercept, explained variance, and degrees of freedom.
Fig. 6. Raw vs. adjusted GHCNm station mean temperature trends vs. UHI-related temperature trends. Plot by Dr. Roy Spencer.

Another problem with the PHA is that there are breakpoints the algorithm inserts into station time series that donโ€™t have a documented cause (e.g., location or instrumentation change) in their metadata. The algorithm does not require a station move, instrument change, or time of observation note. It only needs a statistically unusual jump in a difference series. Oโ€™Neill et al. (2022) found that only 19% of GHCNm Version 4 breakpoints (18% in Version 3) landed within a year of a documented event such as a move or instrument change. While that does not prove that the adjustments were unnecessary, it most certainly calls them into question.

While summer 2026 was indeed the โ€œwarmest on recordโ€ in the CONUS since 1895 using NOAAโ€™s homogenized data product, it was not the โ€œhottestโ€ (i.e., by the average Tmax). While the goal of homogenized data NOAA NCEI publishes is to ensure quality control, there are legitimate concerns that the adjustments applied to raw data may overcorrect for certain biases (e.g., time of observation) and/or not completely remove others (e.g., urban warming), which in aggregate act to artificially cool the early and mid-20th century (potentially meaning that 2026โ€™s reported โ€œrecordโ€ isnโ€™t actually a record) while artificially warming more recent years with urban blending.

You can discuss amongst yourselves in the comments.

This article originally appeared at ChrisMartzweather.com