Ancient Maya Engineers Mastered Water in a World of Droughts—Until the Climate Turned Against Them

Ancient Maya water management systems, particularly at cities like Tikal, represent sophisticated engineering that enabled large populations to thrive in a seasonally dry tropical environment with limited permanent surface water.

Maya filtration techniques centered on a sophisticated zeolite- and- quartz system at Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, the oldest known zeolite- based water purification method in the world and the earliest documented example in the Western Hemisphere.

Maya filtration techniques centered on a sophisticated zeolite-and-quartz system at Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, the oldest known zeolite-based water purification method in the world and the earliest documented example in the Western Hemisphere.

A scenic view of ancient pyramids surrounded by lush greenery and cascading waterfalls under a dramatic cloudy sky.
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Ancient Maya water management systems, particularly at cities like Tikal, represent sophisticated engineering that enabled large populations to thrive in a seasonally dry tropical environment with limited permanent surface water.

By the Classic Period (roughly 250- 900 CE), Tikal in present- day Guatemala supported an estimated 60,000- 100,000 people in its urban core (with broader regional estimates often cited around 60,000- 80,000 or higher depending on the source and method), sustained by intensive water capture, storage, filtration, and distribution amid porous karst limestone terrain and a pronounced dry season lasting several months.

Environmental Challenges and Core Solutions

The Maya Lowlands receive substantial annual rainfall (often ~1,500 mm), concentrated in a wet season, but much of it rapidly percolates through the limestone bedrock into inaccessible aquifers. Surface water is scarce, and natural springs or permanent lakes and rivers were limited or distant from major inland centers like Tikal. Early settlement at Tikal was attracted to natural springs in a ravine; over time, these were modified as population and monumental construction grew.

Key adaptations included:

Catchment surfaces from architecture: Plastered plazas, courtyards, and pavements around temples and palaces were deliberately graded (slightly canted) to seal the porous ground and direct runoff into reservoirs. Central precinct catchments alone could potentially collect hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of water annually.

Reservoirs (aguadas and engineered tanks): Natural depressions and ravines were enlarged, lined with clay, plaster, or stones, and dammed. At Tikal, central reservoirs (e.g., Temple, Palace, and Hidden) formed a descending chain. The Palace Reservoir was among the largest, with capacity estimates around 74,000 m³; overall central and related systems could store 100,000- 250,000 and more m³ (with broader estimates for the site exceeding 900,000 m³ of potential collection under full rainfall). Bajo-margin (wetland- edge) and residential reservoirs supplemented these.

Dams, canals, and control features: The Palace Dam (also functioning as a causeway) is the largest known in the Maya area, roughly 80 m long, up to 10 m high, built of cut stone, rubble, and earth, holding tens of millions of gallons. Other features included cofferdams for dredging/maintenance, rock- cut canals (some of the deepest in the Maya Lowlands), sluice gates or spillways under causeways for controlled release, switching stations for seasonal flow diversion, and berms.

Advanced Filtration and Maintenance

Archaeological evidence reveals intentional water purification. At the Corriental reservoir, researchers identified imported quartz sand and zeolite (a crystalline mineral acting as a natural molecular sieve), transported from tens of kilometers away. These materials filtered microbes, heavy metals (including mercury), nitrogen compounds, and toxins, making this one of the earliest known sophisticated filtration systems in the Western Hemisphere, predating comparable European techniques by about two millennia. Reservoirs required ongoing maintenance: dredging sediments, repairing liners, and managing algal growth or contamination risks from nearby activities.

Water infrastructure was inseparable from monumental architecture and political power. Rulers’ construction projects simultaneously created catchment surfaces and storage, reinforcing authority through control of a critical resource during dry seasons. Some reservoirs supported irrigation of nearby fields (e.g., periodic flooding below certain tanks for crops), while others prioritized potable water. The systems proved resilient for centuries, adapting to population growth and environmental pressures, though later droughts, sedimentation, contamination (e.g., from cyanobacteria or mercury in some cores), and possible overexploitation contributed to challenges in the Terminal Classic.

Similar principles appear at other Maya centers (reservoirs, canals, wetland modifications), but Tikal’s convex micro-watershed design, turning the landscape into engineered catchments centered on elevated precincts, stands out for its scale and documentation through mapping, excavation, sediment coring, and radiocarbon dating.

These systems demonstrate practical hydraulic engineering attuned to local hydrology, long- term landscape modification, and social organization. They allowed dense urban living far from permanent rivers and offer insights relevant to modern sustainable water management in seasonal tropics. Research continues through interdisciplinary work combining archaeology, geoarchaeology, paleoecology, and remote sensing.

Aerial view of ancient Mayan ruins with a prominent pyramid structure surrounded by lush greenery and archaeological artifacts.
The ancient Maya city of Tikal flourished between the fifth and ninth centuries before the city eventually was abandoned. Credit: Jimmy Baum/Wikimedia Commons Ancient Maya built sophisticated water filters

Maya filtration techniques centered on a sophisticated zeolite- and- quartz system at Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, the oldest known zeolite- based water purification method in the world and the earliest documented example in the Western Hemisphere.

This system operated from roughly the Late Preclassic into the Late Classic periods (approximately 2185- 965 calibrated years before present or starting around the 2nd century BCE and continuing for over a millennium). It purified drinking water for one of Tikal’s major reservoirs in a tropical environment prone to seasonal droughts, heavy rains, cyclones, and contamination risks.

Diagram illustrating a filtration system featuring zeolite and crystalline quartz sand, with labeled components including a stream channel, woven petate, and a limestone filter wall.
The Tikal filtration system used quartz and zeolite to remove both heavy metals and biological contaminants. Kenneth Barnett Tankersley / University of Cincinnati

Key Materials and How They Worked

The filter combined two non- local minerals deliberately transported about 30 km (roughly 18 miles) northeast of Tikal from volcanic tuff deposits around the Bajo de Azúcar:

Zeolite (primarily clinoptilolite and mordenite): A porous, crystalline hydrated aluminosilicate formed from volcanic ash reacting with alkaline water. Its three- dimensional microcrystalline pore structure (about 3- 4 Å) acts as a natural molecular sieve. It adsorbs and ion- exchanges harmful microbes, nitrogen- rich compounds, heavy metals (including mercury), and other soluble and insoluble toxins. Zeolites remain widely used in modern water treatment for the same reasons.

Coarse, sand- sized crystalline (euhedral) quartz: Provided mechanical clarification by trapping fine particulates, sediments, and organic debris. Alone it would clarify water visually but would not remove microbes or chemical toxins; zeolite supplied the critical purification.

Together they created an effective dual-action filter. Researchers identified these minerals via X- ray diffraction (XRD) analysis of reservoir sediments, with multiple radiocarbon dates confirming the timeline. The materials matched the distant source closely, and the source area itself produced naturally clear, sweet- tasting water that modern workers still preferred.

Detailed geological profile showing sediment layers and their depths in centimeters. The profile includes radiocarbon dating results indicating ages in years B.P. for various deposits.
From: Zeolite water purification at Tikal, an ancient Maya city in Guatemala

Proposed Design and Operation

No intact filter structure survives, so the reconstruction is based on sediment layers, stratigraphy, mineral distribution, and hydraulic logic. The system was likely positioned at the upstream inlets (ingresses) of the Corriental reservoir:

  • Dry-l aid stone walls or permeable limestone barriers held the filter media.
  • Zeolite and quartz sand were constrained by woven petate (reed or palm- fiber matting) or similar perishable porous material.
  • Incoming stormwater and runoff passed through these layers before entering the main reservoir body.
  • Four distinct layers of the quartz- zeolite mixture in the sediments suggest the filter was periodically washed out by flash floods or tropical cyclones and then rebuilt.

This setup would have handled large volumes of water while reducing contamination. Notably, Corriental sediments show no traces of mercury (likely from cinnabar pigment used in elite architecture, art, and burials that washed into other reservoirs) or toxin- producing cyanobacteria found elsewhere at Tikal. Pottery evidence suggests Corriental water was specifically used for drinking.

Broader Context and Significance

The Maya developed this in a karst landscape where rain rapidly disappears underground and surface water was scarce for much of the year. Reservoirs collected runoff from plastered plazas and architecture, but still-water storage risked stagnation, algal blooms, and pollution from urban activities (including latrines and gardens). Filtration addressed quality as well as quantity.

While other ancient cultures (e.g., in Egypt, South Asia, and Greece) used boiling, cloth strainers, porous ceramics, or simple sand sieves earlier or contemporaneously, the Maya zeolite system was more advanced at removing invisible chemical and microbial contaminants. It predates documented European zeolite applications by nearly two millennia.

Evidence is currently unique to Corriental among investigated Maya reservoirs (fewer than 50 of thousands have been excavated or cored in detail). Other sites used sand filtration more generally, and broader water management included clay and plaster liners, dams, canals, and settling features, but the zeolite innovation stands out for its specificity and effectiveness. It reflects empirical observation- recognizing clean water associated with certain deposits, and organized labor to transport materials without draft animals.

This technique highlights Maya ingenuity in resource management and remains relevant: the same minerals are still effective in contemporary filters. Ongoing research continues to test other reservoirs for similar evidence.

Ruins of ancient Mayan structures set amidst lush greenery, showcasing stone stairways and buildings with thatched roofs under a moody sky.
The Maya built the Corriental reservoir filtration system as early as 2,185 years ago. szeke via Flickr under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Ancient Maya water management systems were sophisticated adaptations to a seasonally dry tropical climate, enabling large populations to thrive for centuries, but they faced severe challenges from multiyear droughts and reduced rainfall predictability that contributed to the Terminal Classic decline (roughly 800-950 CE).

The Maya Lowlands experience a pronounced wet season (roughly late June to January) and a 4- 5- month dry season, with high interannual variability, tropical storms, and occasional hurricanes. Much of the region sits on porous karst limestone, so rainwater quickly infiltrates and permanent surface water is scarce away from rivers, lakes, or cenotes. Major inland cities like Tikal depended almost entirely on rainfall capture.

Core Water Management Strategies

Maya systems focused on collecting, storing, purifying, and distributing rainwater while also managing excess during wet periods and supporting agriculture:

Reservoirs (aguadas) and dams: Natural depressions and ravines were enlarged, lined (with clay, plaster, or stone), and dammed. At Tikal, central precinct reservoirs (e.g., Temple, Palace, Hidden) formed interconnected systems fed by graded plastered plazas and architecture that acted as catchments. Capacities reached hundreds of thousands of cubic meters; broader estimates for the site exceed 900,000 m³ under average rainfall. Bajo- margin and residential reservoirs supplemented these.

Canals, channels, sluices, and switching stations: These controlled flow, diverted excess to prevent flooding/erosion, and released stored water in the dry season. Some features doubled as causeways.

Filtration and quality control: At Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, imported zeolite and quartz sand created a molecular sieve that removed microbes, heavy metals (including mercury), and toxins, the oldest known zeolite filtration system. Other practices included aquatic plants and settling features. Some reservoirs may have functioned similarly to modern constructed wetlands.

Agricultural integration: Raised fields, canals in wetlands, terracing, irrigation from reservoirs, and drought- resistant crops (e.g., manioc/cassava) spread risk. Household cisterns (chultunes) were common in drier northern areas like the Puuc.

Political and social dimensions: Large centralized systems often linked to elite control and ritual authority, providing dry- season water and reinforcing power.

These systems proved resilient for over a millennium, supporting peak populations (tens of thousands at major centers) through annual dry seasons and earlier climate fluctuations. Construction of major features often intensified during drier intervals (e.g., Late Preclassic to Terminal Preclassic drying).

Climate Impacts and Stressors

Paleoclimate proxies (stalagmites, lake sediments, plant waxes, speleothems) document significant hydroclimate variability:

Earlier drying: Substantial drying occurred in the southern lowlands ~200- 500 CE (Terminal Preclassic/Early Classic), coinciding with agricultural intensification (shift toward more water- conserving maize practices) and the growth of reservoir systems. Societies adapted successfully in many areas.

Terminal Classic droughts: Multiple severe multiyear droughts (at least eight lasting 3- 18 years between ~800- 930 CE) struck the region. Precipitation dropped 36- 56% in some reconstructions. Recent high-resolution stalagmite data from the Yucatán show eight wet-season droughts of at least three years between 871-1021 CE, including one extreme 13- year megadrought, the longest in the region in ~2,000 years. Reduced seasonal predictability (year- to- year rainfall variability) between ~700- 800 CE further destabilized systems. Natural internal climate oscillations (multi- centennial to interannual) may have produced or amplified these events without needing external triggers.

Compounding factors: Droughts reduced reservoir recharge. Lower water levels concentrated pollutants (e.g., mercury from cinnabar pigments in elite contexts, phosphates leading to toxic cyanobacteria blooms in some Tikal reservoirs). Deforestation and intensive land use may have locally exacerbated drying by reducing humidity and rainfall recycling. Floods or intense storms could damage infrastructure.

Differential Impacts and Responses

Water systems buffered short-term scarcity effectively, but prolonged droughts exceeded thresholds:

Southern lowlands (e.g., Tikal): More intense drying and heavier reliance on rain-fed reservoirs correlated with earlier and more persistent decline. At Tikal, systems operating near carrying capacity failed under 9th- century droughts; the last dated monument is from 869 CE. Centralized reservoirs became political liabilities when water quality/quantity declined, eroding elite authority.

Northern lowlands (e.g., Puuc, Chichén Itzá): Drier baseline but different timing of impacts. Sites used extensive chultunes and aguadas. Political activity and monument construction paused at different times relative to specific droughts; some recovery occurred during wetter intervals.

Resilience examples: Sites with access to permanent water (e.g., Lamanai near a lagoon) or diversified wetland agriculture showed greater continuity. Farmers adapted via crop diversification (drought- resistant plants), migration, and less hierarchical organization; “divine kings” and large urban centers were more vulnerable. Overall population decline and abandonment of many southern centers occurred, but Maya societies persisted and reorganized.

Models suggest even modest rainfall reductions, interacting with high population density and crop sensitivity, could cause large population drops; reservoirs reduced drought frequency but amplified impacts if they ran dry.

Lessons and Nuance

Climate stress was a major contributor, not the sole cause, of Terminal Classic changes. It interacted with overexploitation of resources, warfare, political dynamics, and demographic pressures. Water management demonstrates both remarkable ingenuity and the limits of highly engineered, rainfall- dependent systems under extreme, prolonged, or unpredictable climate stress.

These cases remain relevant for modern tropical regions facing similar seasonal variability and anthropogenic climate change, underscoring the value of diversified storage, quality management, and adaptive agricultural strategies. Research continues to refine the precise timing, severity, and human responses through integrated paleoclimate and archaeological data.

EVs: Just a Government Play

“Currently, in many car markets, an electric car is more expensive to purchase upfront than a comparable gasoline- or diesel-powered model, which tends to be the biggest consideration for most consumers.” (New York Times, August 18, 2026, below)

A theatrical depiction criticizing government involvement in electric vehicles (EVs), featuring a puppet-like illustration of a government official controlling an EV with strings. Surrounding text highlights skepticism about EV affordability, charging infrastructure, and consumer benefits, while emphasizing themes of government mandates and financial implications.

From Master Resource

By Robert Bradley Jr.

“Currently, in many car markets, an electric car is more expensive to purchase upfront than a comparable gasoline- or diesel-powered model, which tends to be the biggest consideration for most consumers.” (New York Times, August 18, 2026, below)

The statistic of increasing global sales of electric vehicles (EVs) is often cited as if consumers in an open, free market prefer EVs to internal combustion engines. A careful reading of a recent New York Times article, “The Gulf Oil Shock Is Pushing E.V. Sales to New Heights Globally” (August 18, 2026), supports the counter-thesis that EV sales are driven by special government favor. Here-today-gone-tomorrow EV subsidies (as in the U.S.) raise the question of sustainability. From a government-neutral, consumer-first perspective, EVs are not sustainable.

“Electric car sales are on track to hit record highs this year,” begin Mira Rojanasakul and Brad Plumer, “with 29 percent of all new cars purchased around the world expected to be either purely battery-powered models or plug-in hybrids,” versus four percent in 2020. Continuing:

What makes the surge in electric car sales especially striking is that E.V. purchases have actually declined this year in both China and the United States, the world’s two largest automobile markets. In China, which accounts for roughly half of all E.V. sales worldwide, a weakening economy and reduction in government subsidies led to a drop in overall purchases this year…. China still has roughly as many electric vehicles on the road as the rest of the world combined, a trend that has noticeably curtailed the nation’s oil use.”

China is losing money on its “green” buildout, solar and EVs, the authors could have added. Continuing:

The United States also saw a dip in sales this spring after Republicans in Congress phased out a $7,500 tax credit for electric cars last year. The Biden administration had pushed to expand the credit to help fight climate change, since electric vehicles produce fewer emissions than their gasoline- or diesel-powered counterparts.”

Yes, like the rooftop solar industry, the domestic EV industry has all but crashed with the reduction of special government favor. Expect the same if the ITC and PTC tax credits expire as they are set to do at the end of next year.

The “good news” of EVs is government subsidies and mandates in other countries of the world. The authors state:

More than a dozen governments have also announced new policies to encourage electric vehicle adoption since the conflict began, as countries have sought to curb their imports of expensive oil. Ireland and the Netherlands introduced programs to encourage drivers to trade in their older combustion-engine vehicles for electric models. Chile provided incentives for buses and taxis to go electric. Spain extended electric vehicle tax credits for consumers. China has set new goals to electrify its trucks.

Back to reality:

Currently, in many car markets, an electric car is more expensive to purchase upfront than a comparable gasoline- or diesel-powered model, which tends to be the biggest consideration for most consumers.

California EVs a Government Play

An unsigned editorial in the Wall Street Journal last year, “Newsom Tells a Tesla Truth,” made the same point for California. “Speaking at a Clinton Global Initiative event last week,” the editorial began,

Mr. Newsom boasted that “there is no Elon Musk, there’s no Tesla without California’s regulatory framework, period, full stop. It wouldn’t exist.” …. Newsom is right that California’s EV mandate and subsidies gave Tesla a financial spark. Sacramento dangled thousands of state dollars in subsidies for the affluent to buy Teslas. The state also awarded Tesla a sales-tax exemption worth hundreds of millions of dollars in return for making cars in the state.

More valuable have been the regulatory credits that Tesla has received and sold to other auto makers to comply with the state’s EV mandate. Tesla didn’t turn an annual profit until 2020—17 years after its launch and sales of regulatory credits gave it cash to expand. Last year Tesla made $2.8 billion from credit sales, accounting for more than a third of its profit.

The editorial continued:

California’s EV mandate is effectively an income transfer from auto makers that produce mostly gas-powered cars to Tesla, which accounted for roughly half of the state’s sales last year. If Mr. Newsom is angry that state regulation has padded Tesla’s profits, he could let the $1.4 trillion company sink or swim on its own without mandates or subsidies.

Conclusion

Consumers support electric transport with golf carts and, increasingly, bikes. Electrification in place of oil-firing is also increasingly prevalent with lawn mowers, leaf blowers, and other micro-applications. But not for cars (outside of subsidies), and more so for trucks, ships, trains, and planes.

With government neutral, “deep decarbonization” dies on the vine. The major retreat of U.S. automakers after losses estimated at $50 billion, led by Stellantis (Chrysler, Dodge, Ram, et al.) and Ford, was a monumental mistake. So much for Net Zero on the transportation front.

China’s Ancient “Venice of the Stone Age” Collapsed Under Extreme Monsoon Floods 4,300 Years Ago

The Liangzhu culture (Chinese: 良渚文化; c. 3300- 2300 BCE) was a late Neolithic society in the Yangtze River Delta of eastern China (primarily modern Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai provinces). It is widely regarded as one of East Asia’s earliest complexes, state- level societies and a key contributor to the origins of Chinese civilization.
The climate was generally warm and humid, with average annual temperatures around 15- 16°C and precipitation of roughly 1,000- 1,400 mm, concentrated in summer. The landscape consisted of freshwater wetlands, river networks, and coastal plains that were highly susceptible to seasonal flooding, typhoons, and changes in sea level or river discharge.

A dramatic scene of ancient ruins submerged in floodwaters, with figures struggling against the powerful waves and stormy sky filled with lightning.
AI generated by Grok

The Liangzhu culture (Chinese: 良渚文化; c. 3300- 2300 BCE) was a late Neolithic society in the Yangtze River Delta of eastern China (primarily modern Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai provinces). It is widely regarded as one of East Asia’s earliest complexes, state- level societies and a key contributor to the origins of Chinese civilization.

Key Features

Urban center: The main site, Liangzhu Ancient City (near present- day Hangzhou), was a large, planned settlement covering roughly 290- 300 hectares within city walls (with outer areas expanding further). It featured a massive artificial earthen platform (Mojiaoshan, about 30 hectares) that supported palace complexes, residential zones, workshops, and cemeteries. Most transport was by boat through canals.

Advanced water management: One of the world’s earliest large- scale hydraulic systems included numerous earthen dams, levees, and reservoirs (high- dam and low- dam systems) for flood control, irrigation, and water storage. These controlled vast areas and supported intensive wet- rice agriculture.

Social complexity and jade culture: Highly stratified society. Elite tombs (e.g., at Fanshan and Yaoshan) contained elaborate jade artifacts, iconic cong tubes (square outer form with circular inner hole), bi discs, axes (yue), and other ritual objects with deity/animal motifs,while commoner burials had simpler pottery. Jade production, silk, lacquer, and ivory indicate specialized craftsmanship and a unified belief system.

Economy and influence: Based on rice farming with surplus storage, supplemented by other resources. Its cultural influence extended widely across the region.

The Archaeological Ruins of Liangzhu City were inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2019 for representing an early regional state with rice agriculture, social differentiation, urban planning, and a sophisticated belief system expressed through jade.

Decline and Climate Connection

The culture flourished around 2500 BCE but largely disappeared from the Taihu Lake area after about 2300 BCE. Recent research (including speleothem records) indicates the ancient city was abandoned during a short, anomalously wet period of intense flooding and inundation between roughly 4345- 4324 years ago. This followed earlier drier conditions (including a possible megadrought phase). The broader hydroclimatic instability around 4300- 3000 years ago has been linked to changes in the East Asian monsoon and increased ENSO variability.

Some scholars connect this timing to the wider 4.2 ka event (the aridification episode around 2200 BCE that affected multiple Old World civilizations), though evidence for Liangzhu specifically emphasizes flooding after drought phases rather than pure aridification. Later Neolithic cultures in the region were less complex.

In short, Liangzhu stands out as a sophisticated prehistoric urban civilization with impressive engineering and artistry that thrived for about a millennium before climate- driven environmental crises led to its rapid decline.

Aerial view of a lush green landscape featuring fields, a small pond, and a rural settlement amidst mountains in the background.
Archaeological Ruins of Liangzhu City Liangzhu Ruins: China’s 5000-Year-Old UNESCO Heritage

The Liangzhu culture (c. 3300- 2300 BCE) developed in the low- lying Yangtze River Delta and Taihu Lake plain of eastern China, a subtropical region strongly influenced by the East Asian summer monsoon. The climate was generally warm and humid, with average annual temperatures around 15- 16°C and precipitation of roughly 1,000- 1,400 mm, concentrated in summer. The landscape consisted of freshwater wetlands, river networks, and coastal plains that were highly susceptible to seasonal flooding, typhoons, and changes in sea level or river discharge.

Environmental Setting and Human Adaptation

During the culture’s rise, the area shifted from more brackish/tidal conditions to stable freshwater wetlands as post- glacial sea- level rise slowed and coastal progradation advanced. This created favorable conditions for intensive wet- rice agriculture.

Liangzhu society responded with one of the world’s earliest large- scale hydraulic engineering systems. Beginning around 5300- 4700 years ago, people built extensive earthen dams, levees, and reservoirs (both high-dam systems in the hills and low- dam systems on the plain). These controlled water flow across thousands of hectares for flood mitigation, irrigation, and storage, supporting large-scale rice farming, urban construction (including the walled Liangzhu Ancient City with its massive earthen platforms), and population growth. The infrastructure allowed the culture to thrive despite strong seasonal rainfall variability and the risks of a low- lying delta environment.

Climate Change and Collapse

Paleoclimate records (especially high- resolution speleothem data from nearby caves) show that the culture’s emergence coincided with a relatively drier interval. Dam construction appears to have paused or ended around a megadrought phase near 4420 years ago- the driest period in the culture’s history.

The decisive crisis came later: between approximately 4345 and 4324 years ago (± about 30 years), an anomalously intense wet period of heavy monsoon rains caused large- scale flooding and inundation.

Even the sophisticated dams and canals could not handle the volume of water from the Yangtze and its tributaries. This led to the rapid abandonment of Liangzhu Ancient City and the collapse of the culture around 4300 years ago. Some studies also point to relative sea- level rise and marine transgression contributing to coastal flooding, salinization, and the deposition of distinctive yellowish silty sediments over cultural layers.

These hydroclimatic shifts (drier phases alternating with extreme wet pulses) have been linked to increasing El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) frequency against a background of weakening Northern Hemisphere summer insolation.

After the Liangzhu collapse, successor cultures in the region were less complex, and a subsequent extended arid period beginning around 4000 years ago further disrupted remaining Neolithic societies in the Yangtze Delta.

In summary, Liangzhu represents a remarkable adaptation to a dynamic, monsoon- dominated wetland environment through advanced water management. Ultimately, extreme climate variability, particularly catastrophic flooding after drier intervals, overwhelmed these systems and contributed decisively to the culture’s end, illustrating both the ingenuity and vulnerability of early complex societies in coastal delta settings.

Aerial view of an ancient fortified city surrounded by rivers and mountains, featuring structures within defensive walls and lush green landscape.
An illustration of Liangzhu City in the Yangtze Delta region existed about 5,000 years ago Liangzhu Culture 5,000 Years Ago – All Things Chinese

The Liangzhu culture (c. 3300- 2300 BCE) in China’s Yangtze River Delta collapsed around 4300 years ago, and researchers have frequently discussed this timing in relation to the 4.2 ka event (the global aridification and megadrought episode centered near 4200 years before present, or roughly 2200 BCE).

Timing and Proposed Link

The 4.2 ka event is defined primarily by prolonged drought and cooling in many Northern Hemisphere and Asian regions. It has been hypothesized as a contributing factor in the decline of several societies, including the Akkadian Empire, Egypt’s Old Kingdom, and the Liangzhu culture in the lower Yangtze area.

For Liangzhu specifically:

High- resolution speleothem records show a relatively drier interval during much of the culture’s later phase, including a notable megadrought around 4420 years ago (the driest period in its history). Dam construction appears to have slowed or stopped around this time.

The decisive collapse of the main city and culture occurred slightly earlier than the classic 4.2 ka peak, during a short but extreme wet pulse of heavy monsoon rains between approximately 4345 and 4324 years ago (± ~30 years). This caused catastrophic flooding and inundation that overwhelmed the sophisticated system of dams, canals, and reservoirs, forcing abandonment.

After the collapse, an extended period of aridity began around 4000 years ago, which further disrupted successor Neolithic cultures in the Yangtze Delta.

Scientific Interpretation

The connection is therefore indirect but meaningful within a broader pattern of hydroclimatic instability. Researchers attribute the major changes between ~4300 and 3000 years ago to increased frequency of El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events combined with a long- term weakening of Northern Hemisphere summer insolation, which disrupted the East Asian summer monsoon. These shifts produced alternating droughts and extreme floods in the low-lying, monsoon- sensitive Yangtze Delta, conditions that the Liangzhu hydraulic infrastructure ultimately could not fully withstand.

Some studies place Liangzhu’s end within the wider climatic upheavals associated with the 4.2 ka event (or its regional expression), while others emphasize that the immediate cause was flooding rather than pure aridification. Evidence of marine transgression or relative sea- level rise in the delta around the same period is also cited as a contributing factor in some research.

In short, while the classic 4.2 ka signal is one of drought, the Liangzhu case illustrates how the same era of global climatic reorganization manifested regionally as extreme monsoon variability, first drier phases that stressed the system, then catastrophic flooding that precipitated the rapid abandonment of East Asia’s earliest known large urban complex and state-level society.

A detailed diorama depicting ancient workers constructing structures using logs and tools, with a painted background showing a landscape of hills, rivers, and additional workers in the distance.
Liangzhu – Chapter Three: A Jade… – China Travelogue | Vakantio

Wrong, Guardian, If Humanity Can No Longer ‘Flourish,’ Someone Forgot to Tell Humanity

The Guardian claims in ‘Planetary boundaries’ necessary for flourishing of life have been massively breached, scientists warn, that seven of nine supposed “planetary boundaries” necessary for life to flourish have been breached, leaving Earth outside a “safe operating space” as “climate disaster looms.” This is grossly misleading.

The first problem is that planetary boundaries are not physical tripwires beyond which humans suddenly cannot flourish. The framework was created to define a precautionary “safe operating space” based on selected Earth-system processes.

An illustration depicting a contrast between pessimism and optimism about humanity's progress. A stressed man reads a newspaper with gloomy headlines, while a diverse group of people smiles and engages in productive activities like farming, technology, and community building. Various positive statistics about humanity's improvement are included, promoting the message of flourishing despite challenges.

From ClimateRealism

By Anthony Watts

The Guardian claims in ‘Planetary boundaries’ necessary for flourishing of life have been massively breached, scientists warn, that seven of nine supposed “planetary boundaries” necessary for life to flourish have been breached, leaving Earth outside a “safe operating space” as “climate disaster looms.” This is grossly misleading. Real-world measures of human and ecological welfare show a planet on which human population, life expectancy, agricultural production, protection from natural disasters, and even global vegetation have increased dramatically during the very period in which The Guardian says conditions for flourishing have been collapsing.

There are legitimate environmental problems involving pollution, habitat destruction, species loss, and land use. Those deserve serious discussion. But The Guardian does something quite different. It bundles a collection of environmental indicators into a conceptual framework called “planetary boundaries,” labels seven of them breached, and leaps from that to rhetoric about deteriorating “planetary life support systems” and the world “standing on the edge of the abyss.”

The first problem is that planetary boundaries are not physical tripwires beyond which humans suddenly cannot flourish. The framework was created to define a precautionary “safe operating space” based on selected Earth-system processes. Even the scientific literature describes it as a framework based on an evolving understanding of Earth-system resilience, not a set of experimentally demonstrated points beyond which human civilization ceases to prosper.

If seven of nine conditions necessary for human flourishing have been “massively breached,” as The Guardian’s headline announces, an obvious question follows: Where is the corresponding collapse in human flourishing?

Let’s start with food.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization reports that global cereal production increased 27 percent from 2010 to 2024, reaching 3.1 billion tons, with the increase driven primarily by improved yields. Oil crop production increased 50 percent during the same period. Climate Realism has repeatedly documented the same inconvenient trend: yields for major crops such as corn, wheat, soybeans, and rice have risen substantially during the period of modern warming.

That is a strange-looking collapse of Earth’s “life support systems.”

Then there is something The Guardian has repeatedly been reluctant to give its proper weight: carbon dioxide is plant food. Satellite observations show substantial global greening. NASA reported that between one-quarter and one-half of Earth’s vegetated land experienced significant greening from 1982 to 2015, with CO₂ fertilization identified as the dominant driver in the associated study. Climate at a Glance summarizes the extensive evidence for this global greening as well.

Apparently, nobody informed the plants that Earth’s life support system is failing.

Human beings seem equally reluctant to follow The Guardian’s script.

According to the Federal Reserve, global life expectancy rose from about 51 years in 1960 to more than 73 years in 2024. The United Nations estimated the world’s population at approximately 8.2 billion people in 2024, after decades of enormous population growth. Population growth certainly creates environmental challenges of its own, but it is difficult to reconcile longer lives supporting billions more people with the breathless suggestion that Earth’s ability to support human flourishing is disintegrating before our eyes.

Extreme weather mortality tells an even more embarrassing story.

Climate at a Glance reports that deaths from weather-related disasters have fallen by more than 99 percent during the past century, based on international disaster data. Humanity has become vastly better at protecting itself through forecasting, infrastructure, communications, transportation, medicine, air conditioning, heating, irrigation, engineering, and abundant energy.

The temperature mortality evidence is particularly awkward for the climate catastrophe narrative. A massive 2021 study in The Lancet Planetary Health, using data from 750 locations in 43 countries, estimated that cold-related mortality vastly exceeded heat-related mortality. From 2000 to 2019, declining cold mortality more than offset increasing heat mortality, producing a net reduction in the overall temperature-related mortality ratio.  Climate Realism has repeatedly pointed out this inconvenient fact when media outlets portray warming as an unambiguous mortality catastrophe.

Line graph comparing cold-related deaths (blue) and heat-related deaths (red) from 1999 to 2015, illustrating that cold-related deaths are generally higher than heat-related deaths.

The Guardian’s treatment of extreme weather is equally revealing. It points to recent floods, European wildfires, U.S. summer temperatures, and the Tibet-Nepal flood as evidence that the planet is “out of balance.”

That is not a climate trend analysis. It is a collection of frightening anecdotes.

Climate Realism and Climate at a Glance have repeatedly examined claims involving hurricanes, floods, drought, wildfires, heat waves, and other extremes. The observational records do not support treating every destructive weather event as evidence that the planet has crossed some generalized threshold into catastrophe.

The Guardian even resurrects the familiar Amazon tipping-point scenario, warning that there is a “chance” the rainforest could transform into savanna, with severe worldwide consequences. Notice the language: there could be a tipping point that could produce disastrous consequences. This is speculation about a possible future outcome being placed alongside actual present-day disasters to create the impression that the feared future has already arrived.

This is the fundamental problem with the article. The Guardian substitutes an abstract index of environmental pressures for actual measurements of human welfare, then treats the former as more meaningful than the latter.

If humanity were truly losing the environmental conditions necessary to flourish, one might reasonably expect human flourishing to be deteriorating. Instead, the broad historical direction has been longer lives, vastly greater food production, sharply lower vulnerability to weather disasters, and the capacity to sustain billions more people.

None of that proves environmental problems do not exist. It does demonstrate how absurd it is to wave away enormous improvements in observable human welfare while declaring that Earth’s ability to support human civilization has been “massively breached.”

The Guardian is no longer merely reporting environmental risks here. It is peddling fear. Phrases such as “climate disaster looms,” “worst levels ever recorded,” and “standing on the edge of the abyss” are the vocabulary of catastrophe marketing, not sober scientific journalism.

A newspaper genuinely interested in whether humanity is flourishing would examine how humans are actually doing. The Guardian largely avoids that evidence because it wrecks the story it wants to tell.

The planet faces environmental challenges. Humanity should address genuine problems with evidence, technology, adaptation, conservation, and sound policy. But declaring the planetary life support system to be approaching the abyss while people are living longer, producing more food, surviving natural disasters at vastly higher rates, and inhabiting a demonstrably greener planet is not serious analysis.

It is apocalypse journalism, and The Guardian has once again confused frightening its readers with informing them.

Ancient Peru’s Pyramid City Survived a Global Megadrought 4,200 Years Ago — Without War

The Sacred City of Caral- Supe (also linked to the broader Caral- Supe or Norte Chico civilization) in Peru’s Supe Valley features monumental platform pyramids and other architecture dating to roughly 2600 B.C. (with the wider culture spanning approximately 3000- 1800 B.C.), making it contemporaneous with, and in some assessments as old as or older than, the earliest Egyptian pyramid, the Step Pyramid of Djoser at Saqqara (around 2630 B.C.).

The Sacred City of Caral- Supe sits in an extremely arid desert environment on a dry terrace overlooking the green Supe River valley in north- central coastal Peru (about 125- 200 km north of Lima and roughly 20 km inland from the Pacific).

A panoramic view of ancient pyramids and structures in a desert landscape at sunset, with a winding river and lush greenery visible in the background.
AI generated by Grok

The Sacred City of Caral- Supe (also linked to the broader Caral- Supe or Norte Chico civilization) in Peru’s Supe Valley features monumental platform pyramids and other architecture dating to roughly 2600 B.C. (with the wider culture spanning approximately 3000- 1800 B.C.), making it contemporaneous with, and in some assessments as old as or older than, the earliest Egyptian pyramid, the Step Pyramid of Djoser at Saqqara (around 2630 B.C.).

Caral is widely recognized as the oldest known urban center and complex civilization in the Americas (and one of the earliest independent centers of civilization worldwide). Key points include:

Scale and features: The main site covers hundreds of hectares (often cited around 150- 626 hectares depending on measurement) and includes six major pyramidal platform mounds, sunken circular plazas, residential areas, and staircases. The largest, the Pirámide Mayor (Great Pyramid), has a base roughly the size of several football fields and rises tens of feet (estimates vary around 60- 100 feet or 18- 30 m depending on the measurement and remaining height).

Dating: Radiocarbon dates from organic materials (such as reed bags used in construction, known as shicra) confirm construction and occupation in the late 3rd millennium B.C., with some activity earlier. The civilization developed without ceramics, metal tools, or clear evidence of writing in the conventional sense, yet produced sophisticated monumental architecture, irrigation agriculture, textile technology, and possible early record- keeping systems.

Context: It arose independently in the arid coastal valleys north of Lima, relying on a mix of irrigated farming (notably cotton) and marine resources. Unlike many later Andean societies, evidence points to relatively peaceful organization focused on ceremony, trade, and communal labor rather than fortifications or widespread weaponry. The site and related settlements influenced later Andean cultural traditions.

Recognition: Excavations led by Peruvian archaeologist Ruth Shady Solís (starting in the 1990s) established its antiquity through radiocarbon dating published around 2001. It became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2009 as an exceptionally well- preserved example of Late Archaic architecture and urban planning in the Americas.

This challenges older assumptions that complex societies in the Americas developed much later. The Caral- Supe culture declined around 1800 B.C., possibly linked to environmental changes such as drought or shifts in coastal resources, though related settlements continued in adapted forms.

Aerial view of ancient ruins in a desolate landscape, featuring building structures and circular formations surrounded by sandy terrain.
Archaeology and Ancient Origins

The Sacred City of Caral- Supe sits in an extremely arid desert environment on a dry terrace overlooking the green Supe River valley in north- central coastal Peru (about 125- 200 km north of Lima and roughly 20 km inland from the Pacific).

Local Climate and Environment

The region experiences very low rainfall, typically just a few centimeters per year, due to dual rain shadows created by the Andes Mountains to the east and Pacific trade winds. Strong daily winds, intense year- round sunshine, and dry conditions dominate. The Supe River is seasonal (mainly flowing November- April from Andean snowmelt and runoff), so surface water is limited.

Despite the aridity, the valley floor is fertile when irrigated. The site’s elevated desert terrace provided geological stability (helpful against earthquakes common in the region) and protection from river flooding while preserving riverside vegetation as a natural buffer.

How the Caral- Supe People Adapted

The civilization thrived for over a millennium (roughly 3000- 1800 BCE) through sophisticated water management and a mixed economy:

  • Irrigation canals drew from the Supe River and groundwater springs (linked to highland amuna systems and aquifers) to support agriculture on valley bottoms, terraces, and some plateau areas.
  • Key crops included cotton (important for textiles and trade), squash, beans, sweet potato, chili peppers, fruits (such as guava and pacay), and limited other foods.
  • Protein came almost entirely from the sea, especially anchovies and shellfish, gathered along the nearby coast and dried and salted using sun and wind for preservation and trade.
  • They managed the entire Supe basin as a unit and selected the “capital zone” for its aquifer, sunshine, low rainfall, moderate winds, and strategic position linking coast, highlands, and even distant trade networks.

These adaptations supported monumental construction (platform pyramids, sunken plazas) without ceramics or metal tools in a challenging desert setting. The dry climate also helped preserve the ruins exceptionally well after abandonment.

Climate Challenges and Responses

The society faced significant environmental stresses from El Niño- Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events, including flooding, sediment deposition that formed beach ridges, sand dune encroachment on farmland, rising groundwater turning fields into marshes, and disruptions to coastal fisheries.

A particularly severe prolonged drought around 4,200 years ago (≈2200 BCE), linked by researchers to the global “4.2 ka” megadrought event that also affected Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, and other regions, caused crop failure, famine, and the abandonment of Caral’s urban centers. Some accounts describe it lasting on the order of a century.

Rather than collapsing through violence, populations adapted by relocating to nearby sites such as Vichama (closer to the coast, emphasizing fishing and the Huaura Valley) and Peñico (further inland in the Supe Valley). They carried forward architectural styles (pyramids and plazas), ceremonial practices, and social organization. At Vichama, temple friezes depict emaciated famine victims alongside symbols of renewal, pregnant women, large fish, dancers, and a lightning- struck toad (associated with water and rain), interpreted as a deliberate record and warning about the climate crisis for future generations.

In short, Caral- Supe demonstrates both remarkable resilience in an arid coastal desert through irrigation, marine resources, and water management, and a non- violent adaptive response to major climate shifts that ultimately led to the relocation of its main centers.

Aerial view of a large pyramid structure set against a mountainous backdrop, surrounded by arid lands and visible pathways, with small figures near its base.
Caral Peru Travel Information: Ancient City Guide

The “4.2 ka” (or 4.2- kiloyear) event refers to a major aridification (long-term drought) episode centered around 4,200 years before present, roughly 2200 BCE. It is considered one of the most severe climate shifts of the Holocene epoch and marks the formal start of the current Meghalayan Age in the geological timescale.

It most strongly affected parts of the Northern Hemisphere, North Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent, and areas of East Asia. Proposed impacts include contributing to the collapse or major disruption of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia, Egypt’s Old Kingdom, and the Liangzhu culture in China, among others. Proxy records (speleothems, lake sediments, ice cores, dust layers) show prolonged drying lasting decades to a few centuries in these regions. Causes are still debated and may involve a slowdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), shifts in the Intertropical Convergence Zone, changes in monsoon systems, and possible links to El Niño- Southern Oscillation (ENSO) variability.

It’s truly global character remains contested. While some researchers argue for widespread effects reaching the Americas (including western South America), many paleoclimatologists find the evidence outside the Mediterranean- West Asia- South Asia core region weaker or inconsistent, with some areas experiencing wetter rather than drier conditions.

Connection to the Sacred City of Caral- Supe

Archaeological work led by Peruvian researcher Ruth Shady links a severe local drought around 2200 BCE at Caral- Supe (and the broader Norte Chico/Caral- Supe civilization) to this timeframe. The drought disrupted irrigation- dependent agriculture in the arid Supe Valley, leading to crop failure, famine, and the abandonment of the main urban center.

Rather than a total societal collapse, populations appear to have adapted by relocating:

  • To Vichama (closer to the Pacific coast, emphasizing marine resources and the Huaura Valley).
  • To Peñico (further inland in the Supe Valley).

These new settlements retained key Caral architectural features (platform mounds/pyramids and sunken plazas) and ceremonial practices. At Vichama, temple friezes depict emaciated famine victims alongside symbols of renewal, pregnant women, large fish, dancers, and a lightning- struck toad (associated with water/rain), interpreted as a deliberate visual record and warning about the climate crisis.

In summary, the Sacred City of Caral- Supe provides a well- documented New World case in which a severe drought near 2200 BCE, potentially part of the wider 4.2 ka event, prompted urban abandonment and adaptive relocation while cultural continuity was maintained.

Aerial view of ancient ruins with stone structures and an amphitheater, surrounded by mountains and green fields.
Caral, a great civilization in the north of Peru

Environmental activists show their true color is red, not green

On August 9, Save Long Beach Island (LBI), an organization based in New Jersey and founded in 2021 for purpose of fighting offshore wind, announced its intention to file a lawsuit against U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC).

NOAA denied the petition on July 22 after Save LBI filed suit to compel the agency to follow the Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) 90-day review standard for acting on petitions. ‘The new legal notification from Save LBI is modest in scope in that it simply asks NOAA to reconsider its prior decision to turn down the petition.

The NRDC and Sierra Club, along with many other environmental activist groups, have a history of opposing military exercises they view as harmful to whales and other marine life. But as Save LBI points out, both groups support offshore wind despite a growing body of evidence that shows the projects harm whales.

A wind turbine stands against a colorful sunset over the ocean, with a whale partially visible in the foreground.

From CFACT

By Kevin Mooney

The clock is ticking on a decision to join litigation that would ban offshore wind to save the whales.

In a strange twist, the largest, most well-funded environmental advocacy groups have thus far declined to join a growing effort to protect an endangered whale species. This has left grassroots conservationists flummoxed. There is still time for the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Sierra Club, and others to jump in, but the clock is ticking on pending litigation.

On August 9, Save Long Beach Island (LBI), an organization based in New Jersey and founded in 2021 for purpose of fighting offshore wind, announced its intention to file a lawsuit against U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). Save LBI is calling on the department to have its National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) revisit a 16-month-old petition to designate a critical habitat along the East Coast for the benefit of the North Atlantic right whale. The petition also asks NOAA to exclude wind complexes from the migratory critical habitat Save LBI seeks to establish.

Wind or Whales?

NOAA denied the petition on July 22 after Save LBI filed suit to compel the agency to follow the Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) 90-day review standard for acting on petitions. ‘The new legal notification from Save LBI is modest in scope in that it simply asks NOAA to reconsider its prior decision to turn down the petition. However, it does come with a sense of urgency since NOAA figures show the whale species is down to a sparse population of about 380 with just an estimated 70 females that are reproductively active.

As part of its petition, Save LBI also asked the Department of Interior to conduct an analysis of underwater noise from offshore wind to determine what kind of impact those projects might have on the whales’ migration.

Bob Stern, the president of Save LBI, has followed up on previous correspondence addressed to the NRDC, Sierra Club, and more than a dozen other groups in July 2025.

Neither the NRDC nor the Sierra Club have responded to any of Save LBI’s correspondence. Stern told Restoration News that Save LBI received “very little response” from other long established environmental outfits with one notable exception. Stern says the Center for Biological Diversity, an environmental advocacy group based in Arizona, did provide Save LBI with a favorable response indicating it would support the petition.

Abandoning Their Pro-Whale History

The NRDC and Sierra Club, along with many other environmental activist groups, have a history of opposing military exercises they view as harmful to whales and other marine life. But as Save LBI points out, both groups support offshore wind despite a growing body of evidence that shows the projects harm whales. Save LBI has released detailed studies that showthe construction and potential implementation of offshore wind have already caused whale fatalities migrating up and down the East Coast.

Stern explained to Restoration News why time is a factor for the NRDC and the Sierra Club if they want to protect whales from offshore wind.

“Regarding our lawsuit on the NARW [North Atlantic right whale] migration corridor petition, the filing of our intent to sue starts a 60-day clock by which NOAA has to either agree to reconsider the petition or continue to deny it,” Stern said. “If they continue to deny it, which is the likely course, then we will go back to the Court to ask a judge to compel them to consider it, how long that will take I cannot tell. If they agree to consider then they have a year to do a rule-making and based on that make a decision.”

Restoration News sent media inquiries to NRDC and the Sierra Club asking their media representatives if the advocacy groups would join in the litigation to protect the right whale, and whether they would make a decision on Save LBI’s litigation during the 60-day time frame Stern referenced. Neither group responded.

Save LBI has about 10,000 core members and 100,000 online supporters including homeowners, business owners, and other residents who have united in opposing offshore wind, which they view as harmful to whales and other marine life. The most recent tax filings show Save LBI has just over a million dollars in assets. By comparison, the NRDC sits on almost $660 million in assets and more than 3 million members, while the Sierra Club has $152 million in assets and more than 3.8 million members.

In his latest letter to the NRDC, Sierra Club, and others, Stern makes the point that Save LBI’s efforts to protect whales is consistent with the stated missions of the largest environmental advocacy groups.

Stern wrote:

If your organization has already considered this issue and determined that participation would not be appropriate, we would appreciate understanding your reasoning. Your organization has consistently articulated a mission of defending whales and their habitats; silence on this issue, which goes to the heart of that mission as we understand it, is puzzling to us.

Suspected Foreign Agents Sue U.S. Navy 

The NRDC was involved in a high-profile lawsuit against the U.S. Navy that went to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2008. In Winter v NRDC, the environmental activist group argued that naval sonar exercises were harmful to whales and other marine mammals. But the high court in a 5-4 decision ruled against the NRDC and said that the plaintiffs needed to demonstrate an irreparable harm to marine life was likely and not just possible. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts determined that Navy’s need to conduct realistic training with active sonar far outweighed the specious concerns raised by the NRDC. That’s because, as the chief justice explained, the Navy must have the ability to respond to the growing threat of enemy submarines.

Despite setbacks in court, the largest environmental groups remain united in opposition to certain military exercises for the ostensible purpose of protecting sea life. For instance, the Sierra Club, says on its website that “some forms of ocean military testing produce powerful noises capable of harming and killing marine mammals and adversely disrupting behavior.” In April, the Sierra Club joined with other green groups in litigation against the Trump administration to restore ESA protections for the Rice’s Whale and other species in the Gulf of Mexico. The administration says an exemption to the ESA was needed to allow oil and gas drilling to proceed in the region for national security reasons. But the Sierra Club and its co-litigants are making the case that the national security concerns are not valid and that the oil and gas activities could harm Rice’s Whale along with other species.

So why are the NRDC and the Sierra Club running silent when it comes to protecting whales up and down the East Coast? As I argue in my book Climate Porn: How and Why Anti-Population Zealots Fabricate Science, while Targeting American Capitalism, Freedom, and Independence the largest, most well-funded environmental groups have been usurped by the climate movement, which often supports measures that are harmful to the environment.

This would help explain why groups like the NRDC and Sierra Club prioritize offshore wind over vulnerable whale populations. Both groups have also been the focus of congressional probes into potential violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The restrictions green groups seek to impose on U.S. military testing could redound to benefit of Russia and China and raise questions about the sincerity of their environmental efforts.

Stern, an engineer who previously managed environmental reviews for the U.S Department of Energy, wants the NRDC, the Sierra Club, and others to produce evidence (if they have it) showing that the long-term climate benefits of offshore wind “outweigh and justify” near-term risks to the right whale. He also makes the point that Save LBI’s own assessments show the climate benefits of offshore wind would be “minute” and accrue over the span of several centuries. At the same time, the conservation group’s offshore wind studies show the damage to the environment and the whales would be immediate and severe. Even so, Save LBI invites the NRDC and Sierra Club to produce competing evidence.

Stern wrote:

If you have scientific evidence, modeling, or peer-reviewed analyses that demonstrate that operation noise from full-scale wind complexes will not pose a significant behavioral or physiological risk to North Atlantic right whales, we would welcome the opportunity to see it. Conversely, if our concerns are valid and these complexes are built and operating at scale, any resulting harm to this critically endangered species may be irreversible. Given the right whale’s precarious status, we believe we are at a pivotal juncture: decisions made now could determine whether these species survive.

Save LBI’s conservation efforts on behalf of whales may be for all the marbles. Environmental advocacy groups that have been in operation for decades now appear poised to advance offshore wind projects that put whales not just in danger put on a path to extinction.

Beyond Hypocrisy

Bonner Cohen, a senior fellow with the National Center for Public Policy Research, told Restoration News that he expects the big green groups to drop the mask and show their true colors.

The deafening silence from NRDC and the Sierra Club on the threat to endangered Atlantic right whales posed by offshore wind turbines reflects these organizations’ real commitment to protecting wildlife. Their sympathies clearly lie with propping up what we hope are the remnants of America’s misbegotten transition to green energy, and not with the ocean-borne creatures getting in the way. The word ‘hypocrisy’ doesn’t begin to capture what’s going on here. There are funds to be raised from deep-pocketed anti-fossil-fuel interests—foreign and domestic. Keeping the climate narrative alive—no matter the cost to marine life or to ocean-front communities—is what this game is all about.

If NOAA decides once again to reject Save LBI’s petition, the New Jersey conservationists will most certainly file suit to reverse that decision. They may have also have an ace in the hole in the form of President Donald Trump. In the press release announcing its intention to sue the Commerce Department, Stern says his group is “perplexed” by the department’s position because the petition to ban offshore wind is in line with Trump’s own stated objectives.

Save LBI has written to the president asking him to intervene. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick may want to call his office.

This article originally appeared at Restoration News