Global warming, climate change, all these things are just a dream come true for politicians. I deal with evidence and not with frightening computer models because the seeker after truth does not put his faith in any consensus. The road to the truth is long and hard, but this is the road we must follow. People who describe the unprecedented comfort and ease of modern life as a climate disaster, in my opinion have no idea what a real problem is.
For decades, the climate crisis narrative has rested on a single, emotionally powerful claim:
As the planet warms, extreme weather will become more frequent and more intense.
After 25 years of claimed record heat, extreme weather refuses to cooperate
For decades, the climate crisis narrative has rested on a single, emotionally powerful claim:
As the planet warms, extreme weather will become more frequent and more intense.
This idea didn’t emerge from nowhere. It has been repeated, often verbatim, by governments, international institutions, scientific bodies, and major media outlets. It became the mechanism by which modest warming was transformed into an existential emergency.
Extreme weather wasn’t a side effect. It was the proof.
Which is why the figure below matters so much.
The dataset climate alarmists used… until it stopped cooperating
“Any future warming will increase the occurrence of extreme weather events… The frequency and intensity of extreme events will considerably increase with warming.”
“Climate change has led to an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.”
This is not subtle language. This is not hedged or cautious. This is the backbone of climate crisis messaging.
Now compare those claims to the data.
What the observational data show instead
Over the last 25 years… the same 25 years in which:
Atmospheric CO₂ reached its highest levels in human history
Global temperatures rose to claimed record highs
Climate policies expanded dramatically
Global climate-related disaster counts have not increased.
They are flat.
And in 2025, the year following the highest CO₂ concentrations and some of the warmest global temperatures on record, total disaster counts are lower than at any point in the past quarter-century.
Yes, the 2025 data are provisional. EM-DAT has a modest reporting lag, particularly for events late in the calendar year. Minor upward revisions are possible.
But no realistic revision transforms 2025 into a record year for disasters. The signal is not subtle. The trend does not reverse.
If warming were driving an explosion of extreme weather, this is precisely where it should appear.
It doesn’t.
The most revealing detail: extreme temperature events
One detail in the 2025 data deserves special attention.
In the entire world, EM-DAT recorded only one extreme temperature disaster in 2025.
One.
This is remarkable given how often we are told that heat waves are becoming ubiquitous, unprecedented, and increasingly deadly everywhere at once.
EM-DAT does not count warm days or uncomfortable summers. It counts documented disaster events that meet thresholds for impact, displacement, or mortality.
If heat extremes were spiraling out of control, this category should be surging.
It isn’t.
Why temperature was never the real problem
Almost no one ever argued that a slightly warmer planet than 1850 was inherently dangerous.
The mid-19th century was an exceptionally cold, unstable, and unhealthy period for humanity… marked by reduced agricultural productivity, widespread disease, and geopolitical turmoil. Returning to 1850 temperatures would not improve human welfare.
What made warming “dangerous,” we were told, were the positive feedbacks:
More frequent storms
More intense floods
Worsening droughts
Escalating wildfires
Expanding heat catastrophes
Extreme weather was the mechanism by which warming became a crisis.
Because once a narrative becomes institutionalized, it no longer depends on observational confirmation. It depends on repetition, authority, and moral framing.
When EM-DAT appeared to support alarmism, it was cited constantly. Now that it doesn’t, it’s quietly ignored.
This is not how healthy science behaves.
The smoking gun problem
After 25 years of rising emissions and record heat, the disaster surge that was supposed to justify a global emergency never materialized.
That doesn’t mean weather doesn’t happen. It doesn’t mean adaptation isn’t necessary. And it doesn’t mean the climate stops changing.
It means the crisis narrative is failing its own empirical test.
And that should force a reassessment… not a doubling down.
Closing thought
If extreme weather is not increasing, then the justification for permanent emergency politics collapses.
Fear was always the fuel. Disasters were always the proof.
Without them, the climate crisis loses its foundation.
Here we show a period of nearly 2500 years when the conjunction periods of Jupiter and Mars sum to an exact number of Earth years. Using this result, and referring to previous Talkshop findings, we determine how Jupiter, Mars and Earth are related to each other in terms of orbits and conjunctions (joint alignments to the Sun).
Here we show a period of nearly 2500 years when the conjunction periods of Jupiter and Mars sum to an exact number of Earth years. Using this result, and referring to previous Talkshop findings, we determine how Jupiter, Mars and Earth are related to each other in terms of orbits and conjunctions (joint alignments to the Sun). We note that Mars has a more eccentric orbit than (for example) Earth, at least partly due to its far larger ‘neighbour’, Jupiter. This can lead to slight variability in its conjunctions with both Jupiter and Earth (and other planets), typically +/- a few days or maybe a few weeks. However over long enough periods these variations can balance out, so we’re able to find some consistency in its orbit patterns.
Turning to the NASA planetary factsheet for Mars we find: Sidereal orbit period (days) 686.980 Tropical orbit period (days) 686.973
The timings we’re talking about are all verifiable, or at least testable, using Arnholm’s solar simulator where we find (see graphic below) this:
Elapsed time between the two screenshots = 2470 tropical years [TY] = 2660 minus 194, same calendar date. (Note: the simulator is limited to years 0-3000). Conjunctions of Jupiter-Mars in 2470 TY = 1105 (17*65). Mean conjunction period = 2470/1105 = 2.2352941 TY. 17 J-Mars = 2470/65 = 38 TY exactly. 38 TY = 2*19 TY = 2 Metonic cycles. (Note: in the Talkshop link we say why we think the Metonic cycle is exactly 19 tropical years, whereas most sources say it’s ~2 hours ‘short’. It depends on what exactly is being measured).
We can calculate a Mars orbit period (J orbits + no. of J-Mars = Mars orbits) from the simulator graphic: 2470/J = 208.31326 J orbits. J-Mars occurs 1105 times, therefore: Mars orbits = 208.31326 + 1105 = 1313.3132 2470/1313.3132 = 1.8807395 TY (mean value). 1.8807395 TY in days = 686.9254 (NASA says 686.973).
For the conjunctions with Earth we just use the Metonic cycle and Jupiter. 19/1.8807395 = 10.102409 Mars orbits In this post we showed Jupiter has 14 orbits per 166 TY in the tropical reference frame (as used by the solar simulator). 10.102409 Mars * 166 = 1677 orbits in 1577 TY (= 83 Metonic). Since 17 J-Mars is 2 Metonic cycles not 1, we make the full period 2*1577 = 3154 TY = 166*19 or 83*38 TY. Check: 3154/1677 = 1.8807395 TY = Mars orbit period (as calculated earlier). The Jupiter-Earth conjunction occurs 3154 – 266(J) = 2888 times in the full period.
The full number chart for the planetary data is on the right. The Metonic cycle (not shown) occurs 166 times in the period.
The tropical timings posts so far have shown these planets align with the 83 TY (166/2) cycle, and therefore with Jupiter and Earth, thus: Jupiter: 1 cycle (7 J) Venus: 12 cycles (1619 V) Mercury: 13 cycles (4480 Me.) Mars: 19 cycles (1677 Ma.) Neptune: 144 cycles (73 N) Uranus: 335 cycles (332 U)
Green activists who sabotaged the Berlin grid last week may not have convinced anyone that carbon dioxide was a threat, but they have raised awareness that Germany needs more diesel generators, and thermal power plants.
Green activists who sabotaged the Berlin grid last week may not have convinced anyone that carbon dioxide was a threat, but they have raised awareness that Germany needs more diesel generators, and thermal power plants.
On January 3rd, left-wing extremists caused the longest blackout in Berlin since World War II, leaving 100,000 people without heating or electricity for up to five days in midwinter. Suddenly local utilities have realized how vulnerable Germany is and are calling for a “national crisis reserve of mobile generators and heating systems.” And they want several hundred megawatts of it.
The association of local utilities (VKU) put out a press release calling for this new emergency reserve to be set up and spread around the country so it can restore power within 24 hours. They also ask for someone to clear away the bureaucratic red tape that slowed down the helpers, specifically mentioning the odd thing that must have delayed the response this time — like “responsibility, permits, liability, costs, labor rules, and insurance.”
They paid homage to the “decentralized energy supply base on renewables” which could have (but didn’t) mitigate the damage. They probably had to write that. They also want to add in “grid meshing” or more interconnectors –presumably to make it harder for vandals to knock out one key line. But it will be “expensive” they say (isn’t it always). It’s just another bucket of money needed to be added to the renewable’s bills.
Germany’s municipal utilities are calling for a national crisis reserve of mobile generators and heating systems. These should be dispatched in an emergency to restore the electricity supply within 24 hours, argued industry lobby group VKU.
The VKU said the emergency reserve would enable the creation of temporary “island electricity grids” independent from the main supply system. These could be run by emergency power generators, which mostly run on diesel, combined heat and power plants, and gas turbines that could be activated with “a single phone call.” The association stated that this emergency reserve should have a combined capacity of several hundred megawatts.
In other lessons from Germany, Prof Vahrenholt points out that converting everyone on gas or petrol to electricity only makes a blackout so much worse and the nation more vulnerable.
Frontier Economics estimates the total cost of the energy transition until 2045 at an unaffordable 4,800 to 5,400 billion euros.
But now, the attack in Berlin demonstrates to us that such an energy system, based solely on electricity, is highly vulnerable. We are learning that when the power fails, the heat supply also fails — at least when it is supposed to be generated by heat pumps. And to make matters worse, we are learning that in freezing temperatures, heat pumps face total loss due to bursting pipes. This particular “warning label” was certainly not included in the “Habeck heating law,” which the CDU-SPD federal government intends to continue seamlessly. The content of the law will remain the same, but to ensure citizens don’t quite realize it, the name of the law is to be changed.
We are also learning that during a large-scale power outage, electric vehicles can only help if they happened to be charged before the “bang.” Otherwise, this utility also fails.
Home batteries and electric cars won’t be much use if the terrorists attack just before they get recharged.
ADDENDUM: Let’s not forget their manifesto for grid sabotage:
“In the greed for energy, the earth is being depleted, sucked dry, burned, ravaged, burned down, raped, destroyed,” the group, which is listed by Berlin’s intelligence services as a left-wing extremist organization, said in the letter.
“The aim of the action is to cause significant damage to the gas industry and the greed for energy,” its authors wrote. The group has used similar means to communicate in the past, and Berlin police believed the letter to be genuine.
A posh pressure group that threw custard at the crown jewels is planning mass thefts from Waitrose.
Arthur Clifton is the privately educated son of a mega yacht insurance executive.
A posh pressure group that threw custard at the crown jewels is planning mass thefts from Waitrose. The Telegraphhas more.
Take Back Power (TBP), viewed as the successor to Just Stop Oil (JSO), has vowed to shoplift from the high-end supermarket in the coming months.
The group suggested it would redistribute the stolen food to the needy, in a protest at economic inequality.
However, Chris Philp, the shadow home secretary, said TBP was “trying to dress up criminality with some kind of moral purpose”.
The newly formed activist group, which describes itself as a non-violent civil resistance group, announced itself with two stunts in December.
Four people smeared crumble and custard on a case containing the State Crown at the Tower of London before unveiling a sign reading: “Democracy has crumbled – tax the rich.” [Do they mean their parents?]
Members of TBP also emptied bags of manure under a 25ft indoor Christmas tree at the Ritz Hotel in central London in protest at wealth inequality.
At the group’s formal launch at Limehouse Town Hall, east London, on Saturday, founder members set out a three-pronged strategy for further disruption this spring. Reporters from the Telegraph attended the meeting.
Arthur Clifton [Latymer Upper], co-founder of TBP and a former prominent JSO activist, said the first approach would be a series of “take-backs”.
He told an audience of around 200: “We have seen that food is locked behind skyrocketing prices. Less and less people can afford less and less food.
“So what we do is actually pretty obvious – we go in there, we take it out and we redistribute it to the local community. This is what we are going to be doing in March.”
He added: “We’ll be coming down to London in April for a week of action – a massive take-back with 50 to 100 people just going in and clearing out a Waitrose.”
Mr Clifton, originally from Chiswick, West London, said the group was also planning “takeovers” of high-end stores in areas such as Oxford Circus.
“This is standard, bread-and-butter civil resistance occupation of high-end stores… the places that are getting more and more expensive on the same streets that people are starving,” he said.
The former English literature student at Exeter University said the group would also carry on performing eye-catching “stunts” such as its Ritz and Crown Jewels interventions.
He compared the group to the Suffragettes and led the crowd in a chant of “revolution”.
Mr Clifton was previously found guilty of causing criminal damage after spraying orange paint onto a building at University College London.
The group has set a target of mobilising 10,000 people to the streets in the year of the 2029 election.
The dramatic arrest of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro sent shock waves around the world. Yet nowhere was the reaction more negative – and more baffling – than in the European Union, where outrage swept through public discourse, a stark contrast to the generally positive reaction in the U.S. and elsewhere.
The dramatic arrest of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro sent shock waves around the world. Yet nowhere was the reaction more negative – and more baffling – than in the European Union, where outrage swept through public discourse, a stark contrast to the generally positive reaction in the U.S. and elsewhere.
Much of this anger was aimed at Donald Trump and, more pointedly, at the U.S. oil industry, which once again has become the convenient scapegoat for complex geopolitical realities.
Until his arrest, Maduro was universally condemned across the European Union as a dictator responsible for his people’s suffering and for widespread international drug trafficking – and as an unelected, illegitimate president.
But after his arrest by U.S. authorities, the EU media rapidly changed their tune. Suddenly, Maduro was portrayed as a victim – a martyr in the ongoing battle between American imperialism and the so-called defenders of sovereignty. This shift is hardly surprising. Most EU journalists lean left politically, and given Maduro’s communist background, they now seek to cast him in a heroic light. Comparisons to Nelson Mandela have even surfaced.
The European Union finds itself in an awkward position. Just weeks ago, it acknowledged Maduro’s authoritarian rule. Now, perhaps fearing public backlash, it hesitates to endorse the legitimacy of U.S. actions and instead allows the narrative to be dominated by accusations of American overreach.
As a professor of energy policy, I am deeply frustrated by the European Union’s persistent hostility toward the oil industry. The EU press frames the U.S. operation in Venezuela almost exclusively through the prism of oil, with foreign producers portrayed as “predators.” Headlines scream about “grabbing Venezuela’s oil,” “looting Venezuelan resources,” and “stealing the country’s wealth.” Nuance is lost, and the complex realities of the oil business are ignored.
For example, the EU media don’t consider the technical challenges involved – such as the poor quality of the Venezuelan crude, which requires blending with naphtha or other lighter hydrocarbons to be fluid enough for processing. Nor do they acknowledge that refineries in the Gulf of America are uniquely equipped and best suited to handle Venezuelan crude.
This lack of understanding reveals a deep ignorance of technical complexities that shape the oil industry and the geopolitics of energy. The EU media often ignore that Citgo, originally a Venezuelan-owned company based in the U.S., remains a crucial economic lifeline for Venezuela. It provides essential revenue and access to refined petroleum products amid an ongoing legal dispute over its ownership, yet this important context rarely is covered.
Also infrequently explained is that oil always legally belongs to the country where it is found. Even during the early 20th-century oil boom, producing nations retained ownership of their resources, granting only minimal royalties to foreign companies. The myth that foreigners simply “take” oil solely for their enrichment persists, and many journalists prefer to keep this false narrative alive.
As Paolo Scaroni, CEO of Italy’s state oil company, once said, “I am not here to argue with oil-producing countries. It is their oil.” Yet this fundamental truth goes unrecognized by EU media, and therefore by the public.
I have repeatedly tried to explain that oil production is a risky business requiring enormous upfront investment and years – sometimes decades – before returns are realized. Moreover, EU audiences and media seem to forget that Venezuela is one of the most unstable countries for foreign investment. Companies like Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil had assets expropriated by Maduro’s predecessor, the late Hugo Chávez, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in losses. Despite international arbitration that ordered compensation, Venezuela has not paid.
Most concerning to me is the deeply entrenched negative image of the oil industry in the European Union. “They didn’t like us, they don’t like us, and they never will,” one oil lobbyist told me. “We don’t care; we just keep doing our job.” The sentiment is commendable, but the lack of public understanding is unhelpful.
While EU citizens are quick to criticize, they readily consume oil products, which still account for over 90% of transportation energy use despite a half century of searching for alternatives.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has said that fossil fuels are obsolete – a statement that ignores the harsh realities of current energy demands and infrastructure. Such rhetoric risks alienating the very industries and technologies critical to Europe’s security during this long – if not endless – energy transition.
With leaders like von der Leyen exhibiting such ignorance of facts, is it any wonder the EU media are hostile to U.S. oil companies? This lack of understanding deserves honest, courageous discussion.
Originally published in Daily Calleron January 16, 2026.
Dr. Samuele Furfariis a professor of energy geopolitics in Brussels and London, a former senior official with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy and a member of the CO2Coalition. He is author of the paper, “Energy Addition, Not Transition,” and 18 books, including “Energy Insecurity: The organised destruction of the EU’s competitiveness.”
Government hails step towards clean power in Great Britain by 2030 – but the auction shows trade-offs are now needed.
…
The government has defied gloomy price expectations for its latest auction for offshore wind capacity. …
Cue some forgivable crowing from Ed Miliband, the energy secretary. “A monumental step towards clean power by 2030,” he declared. …
But let’s not get carried away. Yes, this auction was Europe’s “biggest ever” in commissioning 8.4GW of capacity in one go – and it again proved the virtue of competitive tension in the bidding process. But it also demonstrated two hard truths about offshore wind and the wider push towards clean power.
…
First, the days when offshore wind got cheaper every year are over. …
The second point flows from the first: the rollout of offshore wind at these prices will not knock squillions off the price of electricity. Any downward pressure on bills cannot be enormous when we’re talking about the difference between £91 and a theoretically neutral price of £94. …
…
Instead, the most pressing questions in energy-land are different. Is it possible to take a chunk out of the towering £80bn bill for rewiring the electricity grid? If 90% low-carbon is deemed enough, possibly, as retail energy suppliers have argued. Will new transmission cables arrive before the new windfarms are built? That is critical to keep a lid on “constraint” payments that run on to billions of pounds.
And what is the government’s plan for gas? It barely talks about the backup system for cold, windless winter days that will be retained. That is despite the scariest report out of the energy department in recent months being the one that warned of an “emerging risk” of running out of gas supplies by 2030 if an important piece of kit, such as a pipeline from Norway or an LNG terminal, were out of action.
It’s getting pretty rough when even The Guardian is pointing out the flaws in your ambitious renewable energy plan.
But maybe The Guardian group is thinking ahead. When Britain’s electricity grid inevitably falls in a heap, a possibility which is becoming more likely with each passing year, a track record of pointing out the problems might give The Guardian maneuvering room to claim the failure was because of flaws in Mad Miliband’s energy plans, not the fault of renewable energy.
The leaders of Europe have put their people in jeopardy with their insane climate policies. They remain heavily dependent on Russia for natural gas. The Russian winter is turning punishing, as I feared it would when I wrote about its possible impact on the war back in August. Natural gas storage is at 52% of capacity. There is no reason for such a low level except for the nonsensical climate policies these leaders have pursued.
The leaders of Europe have put their people in jeopardy with their insane climate policies. They remain heavily dependent on Russia for natural gas. The Russian winter is turning punishing, as I feared it would when I wrote about its possible impact on the war back in August. Natural gas storage is at 52% of capacity. There is no reason for such a low level except for the nonsensical climate policies these leaders have pursued. You may think they have a suicide pact with their other policies, but it’s nothing compared to what could happen in the coming weeks.
The leaders of Europe — first and foremost enabled by the people who elect them — have driven energy prices through the roof in their pursuit of net zero, which will do nothing provable to impact the climate. They are effectively paying Russia for energy, thereby enabling Russia to fund a war that these same leaders claim to be opposing. This is truly lunatic-fringe stuff — as crazy in its own way as some of the missteps that led to past world wars. These are stupid decisions made by people who think they are smart, even though their actions prove otherwise. They have placed themselves — and their people — at the mercy of their antagonist.
Now the coup de grâce. In the face of the coldest air mass in decades spreading eastward out of Russia (they are exporting more than just natural gas) and arriving at the coldest time of the winter, European leaders are making a big deal about defending Greenland against the U.S.
Do they have any idea what 3 weeks of this could do to them?
They are at 52% of capacity now (as of this writing, Jan. 16 at 1 pm). And the winter so far has only looked like this, overall normal:
It’s the last 20 days that have turned cold, but nothing compared to what I am showing you is coming.
It’s insane that this is happening. What is it with Europe and their leaders? World War I and World War II were driven by extremes of stupidity that led them into catastrophe. Apparently, that wasn’t enough for them, so now let’s once again examine what they’ve set up here — a situation from which only by the grace of God (an odd phrase, given the decline in belief over there) they might escape.
1) The use of energy from Russia, which helps Russia fight a war, that the NATO alliance is trying to stop.
2) Somehow, it’s okay to use fossil fuel from your enemy because it mysteriously does not count as a negative in your war against climate. Sort of like taking drug money to fund a city park, I guess.
3) Their insane net-zero policies have left you wide open to this vulnerability, which, because of your ignorant understanding of climate and weather, you had no idea could ever happen.
4) So you have put your people at risk of running out of energy — especially since energy demands in Russia are going to be extraordinarily high this winter. A disgruntled population there, unhappy with the way things are going, may lead to unrest. Putin can shut off the gas anytime he wants to the West.
You know, at least the situations in Europe that previously led to disasters were actually man-made. Apparently, that wasn’t good enough — they had to fight each other (although obviously that remains a concern). I have to wonder if their populations understand just how close they are to having this situation spin completely out of control because of insane climate policies. And you are paying your enemy to fight a war that you are opposing. How does that make any sense?
But not to worry. While you import gas from Russia, which could be turned off, you are making sure you are ready to defend Greenland.
Their climate policies are indefensible given the risk that is being revealed by your phony climate war. The real war is on the people of Europe by their leaders.
Net zero policies are slowing the global economy, Andrew Bailey has warned.
Both climate change and initiatives to tackle it are among the main factors dragging down growth, the Governor of the Bank of England said in a speech.
Governor says climate change and initiatives to tackle it risk damaging the economy
Net zero policies are slowing the global economy, Andrew Bailey has warned.
Both climate change and initiatives to tackle it are among the main factors dragging down growth, the Governor of the Bank of England said in a speech. The Telegraph has the story.
Mr Bailey said “headwinds” facing the world economy included “climate-related economic shocks and the consequences of the policies chosen to tackle these shocks”.
The cost of switching to electricity and levies on fossil fuels have been blamed for the UK’s extraordinarily high energy prices and the shutdown of heavy industry.
Mr Bailey’s comments are likely to fuel debate about the speed and cost of reaching net zero, as Labour races to decarbonise Britain’s electricity network by 2030. Critics say the artificial deadline is creating unnecessary costs for the households and businesses, calling for slower reforms.
The Climate Change Commission estimates reaching net zero by 2050 will involve a net cost of £4bn per year – around £100bn in total.
Mr Bailey has acknowledged some of these costs previously. In 2021, he said shifting from coal to less polluting fuels may result in “permanent higher level of prices”.
But the Governor has also argued that the costs of failing to act on the climate may be even larger than net zero.
In 2020, he said climate change is “even bigger and more complex” than the Covid pandemic or the financial crisis, and the following year he argued that “ignoring [the effects of climate change] is not an answer. Indeed, the longer we wait, the greater the costs of adjustment”.
In his speech this week, the Governor said net zero and climate change were one of several factors dragging on global growth.
There was a time when publication in Nature signaled restraint. Not correctness, not consensus, but seriousness: an awareness of uncertainty, an allergy to grand prescriptions, and a reluctance to turn provisional findings into marching orders. That version of Nature treated science as a method, not a ministry.
There was a time when publication in Nature signaled restraint. Not correctness, not consensus, but seriousness: an awareness of uncertainty, an allergy to grand prescriptions, and a reluctance to turn provisional findings into marching orders. That version of Nature treated science as a method, not a ministry.
The version now publishing climate-policy optimization exercises like “Large carbon dioxide emissions avoidance potential in improved commercial air transport efficiency” operates very differently. It does not merely describe the world. It scolds it. It does not explore trade-offs. It resolves them in advance. It does not ask whether its preferred objectives are justified. It assumes they are, and then works backward to discipline behavior accordingly.
This is not an aviation paper in any meaningful sense. Aviation is the prop. The real subject is moral instruction — how people ought to travel, how airlines ought to behave, and how policy ought to coerce them when they fail to comply.
The collapse of Nature from scientific journal to nagging preacher is not subtle anymore. This paper is a clean, almost didactic example.
The authors begin with the now-ritual framing: aviation emissions are growing, technological progress is insufficient, and therefore “efficiency gains will be an important pillar of any decarbonisation strategy”. Notice what is absent already. There is no serious interrogation of whether the scale of the problem warrants the scale of intervention implied. There is no cost-benefit framing in any human sense. The premise is treated as settled.
From that point on, the paper becomes an exercise in moralized accounting. A single metric — grams of CO2 per revenue passenger kilometer — is elevated to supreme status. Everything that does not optimize this metric is reclassified as inefficiency, regardless of why it exists.
Comfort becomes inefficiency. Choice becomes inefficiency. Redundancy becomes inefficiency. Even economic viability is treated as a secondary consideration, mentioned only as a constraint to be overcome.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the discussion of seating configurations. The authors write, approvingly:
“Business and first class seats are up to 5 times more CO₂-intense than economy class seats… An all-economy class configuration would consequently reduce emissions.”
This is presented not as a descriptive observation, but as a normative indictment. The existence of premium seating is framed as a moral failure of the system. The fact that passengers willingly pay for space, privacy, or flexibility is not treated as data. It is treated as pathology.
The market signal — perhaps the cleanest empirical signal in economics — is ignored. Instead, the authors propose that emissions could be reduced by forcing aircraft into maximum seating density, increasing passenger numbers by as much as 57%, with only a “small fuel penalty” .
This is where the paper’s tone quietly shifts from analysis to instruction. It is no longer asking how aviation operates. It is telling aviation how it should operate, under the assumption that emissions minimization overrides all other values.
The same logic appears in the fixation on load factors. We are told that average load factors of 78.9% are insufficient, and that a hypothetical 95% load factor would reduce emissions by another 16.1% . What is glossed over is what such load factors actually imply: fewer flights, less slack in the system, tighter scheduling, diminished resilience to disruptions, and a travel experience increasingly indistinguishable from livestock transport.
The authors briefly acknowledge that achieving this would require “considerably reduced capacity” and policy intervention, but this is treated as an implementation detail, not a fundamental trade-off. The possibility that resilience, redundancy, and flexibility have value is never seriously entertained.
This is moral preening masquerading as efficiency. The message is not that emissions can be reduced. The message is that passengers should expect less — less comfort, less choice, less accommodation — and that resistance to this outcome is a problem to be managed.
The paper is explicit about that. In its conclusions, it states:
“New policies and policy corrections are needed to accelerate efficiency gains in aviation.”
Resistance, we are told, “must be expected,” because airlines operate under economic constraints and expectations of growth. That sentence alone reveals the posture. Economic constraints are not signals; they are obstacles. Expectations of growth are not preferences; they are moral failings.
This is sermonizing with equations.
What makes this particularly striking is the paper’s technocratic confidence in its own ability to redesign a complex adaptive system. Aviation is treated as a mechanical assembly of levers: aircraft type, seating layout, load factor. Adjust the levers, and the system obediently optimizes.
Absent from the discussion is any serious treatment of failure modes. There is no exploration of how hub-and-spoke networks respond to reduced slack. No discussion of how safety margins interact with density. No accounting for how airlines hedge risk through fleet diversity and differentiated products. These are not minor omissions. They are the substance of how real systems survive.
Instead, we are offered cap models, intensity thresholds, and regulatory analogies to washing machine energy labels. The authors suggest CO2intensity caps as a governance tool, explicitly drawing parallels to appliance standards and insurance bonus-malus schemes .
This analogy alone should disqualify the argument from a serious journal. A commercial aviation network is not a refrigerator. It is a globally interdependent system operating under safety constraints that tolerate very little error. Treating it as a consumer appliance awaiting regulation is not just naïve; it is dangerous.
Yet Nature publishes this without blinking.
Perhaps the most revealing irony in the paper appears when the authors briefly admit that one of the flagship climate policies — sustainable aviation fuel mandates — may actually worsen outcomes:
“Paradoxically, this legislation could lead to an increase in overall warming, even if quotas are successfully met, if total fuel use increases faster than the share replaced with SAF.”
In an older scientific culture, this would have been a red flag. A moment for pause. Evidence that the system does not respond linearly to intervention.
Here, it is treated as a footnote on the way to recommending more policy. The conclusion is not that policy may be the wrong tool, but that different policies — efficiency caps, penalties, ratings, and fees — must be layered on.
This is the circular logic that now dominates climate policy discourse. Policy fails. The failure is not evidence against intervention. It is evidence that intervention was insufficiently ambitious.
Science, properly understood, is supposed to break such loops. Nature once did that work. Now it legitimizes the loop.
The deeper problem is institutional. Publication in Nature confers authority. It signals to policymakers, journalists, and regulators that “this is what the science says.” But this paper does not say what the science says. It says what the authors want society to value.
CO2 per RPK, (Revenue Passenger Kilometre), is not a law of nature. It is a chosen metric. Choosing it as supreme is a value judgment. Deciding that comfort, choice, and resilience must yield to it is a moral decision. None of this is acknowledged as such.
Instead, normative claims are laundered through technical language until they appear inevitable. Once that laundering is complete, dissent becomes ignorance, and skepticism becomes obstruction.
That is how journals become preachers.
The rot does not stop with Nature itself. If the flagship journal has become preachy, its specialist offspring—most notably Nature Climate Change—have become something worse: a containment zone for arguments that are too nakedly normative, too speculative, or too politically eager to survive scrutiny in the parent journal. What does not quite pass as “general science” is rerouted into a venue where the audience is narrower, the priors are aligned, and the conclusions are rarely surprising. There, the moral framing is no longer implicit. It is the point. Papers routinely blur the boundary between analysis and exhortation, between describing risks and prescribing social reorganization, all under the protective branding of Nature.
Even more troubling is the illusion of rigor. While Nature Climate Change carries the prestige of the brand, it does not consistently carry the same level of adversarial peer review that once defined it. Reviewers are often drawn from the same tight epistemic community, steeped in the same assumptions, rewarded for the same conclusions. The result is not fraud or fabrication, but something more insidious: a soft consensus factory, where weak models, speculative impacts, and policy-forward narratives receive far less resistance than readers are led to believe. The journal functions less as a filter than as an amplifier. What emerges is not settled science, but settled attitude — and that attitude then flows upstream, cited, echoed, and laundered into inevitability by policymakers and journalists alike.
In that sense, Nature Climate Change increasingly functions as an institutional pressure valve. It absorbs the most overtly prescriptive, least self-critical material, allowing the flagship journal to preserve a veneer of restraint while the broader Nature ecosystem advances a far more aggressive normative agenda. The brand continuity does the rest. To policymakers and journalists, a paper in Nature Climate Change is still “a Nature paper,” carrying an implied authority few will interrogate. This division of labor is convenient: advocacy is outsourced, credibility is retained, and the boundary between science and sermon is blurred without ever being formally crossed. What emerges is a publishing architecture that shields ideology behind prestige, while quietly lowering the epistemic bar where it matters most.
When scientific journals create specialty outlets to house certainty they can no longer defend under adversarial review, the problem is no longer bias. It is institutional self-preservation.
At this point, the specific aviation paper almost no longer matters. It has served its purpose. What remains in view is a publishing culture that no longer treats skepticism as a virtue, restraint as a discipline, or uncertainty as an obligation. The problem is not that Nature and its satellites publish flawed papers — that has always been true of science — but that they now publish them with moral confidence,institutional protection, and an unmistakable sense of righteousness. When journals cease to ask where the limits of their knowledge lie, and instead focus on where compliance must be extracted, they stop functioning as scientific institutions at all. They become instruments of persuasion, dressed in equations, animated by a conviction that being on the “right side” of history absolves them from the harder work of being careful.
The tragedy is not that Nature publishes climate papers. It is that it no longer seems capable of publishing skepticism — not denial, but skepticism in its proper sense: disciplined uncertainty, careful boundary-drawing, and resistance to moral certainty.
When a journal trades those virtues for advocacy, it does not become more relevant. It becomes louder. And like all nagging preachers, it eventually discovers that scolding people into submission works far less well than understanding them in the first place.
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