Day: February 21, 2026

Astroturf Alert: $2 Billion in Foreign Cash Behind America’s “Grassroots” Climate Movement?

Well, well, well.
For years, climate skeptics have been told they are nothing more than the paid mouthpieces of “Big Oil.” The accusation has been repeated so often that it has hardened into something resembling doctrine. Any challenge to prevailing climate narratives is brushed aside with a knowing smirk and the word “funded.” The implication is clear: dissent is artificial. Manufactured. Astroturf.

From Watts Up With That?

By Charles Rotter

Well, well, well.

For years, climate skeptics have been told they are nothing more than the paid mouthpieces of “Big Oil.” The accusation has been repeated so often that it has hardened into something resembling doctrine. Any challenge to prevailing climate narratives is brushed aside with a knowing smirk and the word “funded.” The implication is clear: dissent is artificial. Manufactured. Astroturf.

And yet, the latest development out of Montana suggests that the truly industrial-scale astroturf operation may be sitting on the other side of the political aisle.

Montana Attorney General Austin Knudsen, joined by 18 other state attorneys general, has formally urged the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate more than 150 U.S.-based climate organizations for potential violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The request follows a report detailing nearly $2 billion in funding from five foreign climate foundations flowing into American activist networks over roughly the past decade.

0,2026-02-12-AGs-Letter-to-DOJ-re-APT-ReportHerunterladen

The foundations named include the Oak Foundation (Switzerland), the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (United Kingdom), the Quadrature Climate Foundation (United Kingdom), the KR Foundation (Denmark), and the Laudes Foundation (Switzerland). According to the report cited by the attorneys general, these entities have collectively poured extraordinary sums into U.S. groups engaged in litigation, regulatory advocacy, public relations campaigns, and organized pressure efforts aimed at reshaping American energy policy.

FARA exists for a reason. It requires individuals or entities acting “for or in the interest of” foreign principals in a political capacity to disclose that relationship. Transparency is not optional under the statute. If organizations are advancing policy goals aligned with foreign funders, the public has a right to know.

The letter from the AGs does not assert guilt. It requests investigation. That distinction matters. Skepticism demands suspension of judgment pending evidence. But the scale of the funding alone raises legitimate questions.

Nearly $2 billion.

If a comparable sum had flowed from domestic oil companies into policy think tanks questioning renewable mandates, it would dominate headlines for months. Congressional hearings would be scheduled before the ink dried. Editorial pages would thunder about corruption and capture.

Instead, much of this foreign-sourced funding has operated under the halo of philanthropy.

That halo deserves examination.

Climate activism is frequently portrayed as spontaneous, grassroots energy — citizens rising organically in defense of the planet. The term “grassroots” is invoked almost reflexively. But when movements depend on coordinated, cross-border financial pipelines worth billions, the word begins to look misplaced.

Astroturf, by definition, is artificial grassroots — a synthetic surface designed to resemble the real thing. When funding networks spanning London, Zurich, and Copenhagen supply massive financial backing to U.S. advocacy groups working to constrain domestic fossil fuel production, shut down pipelines, and litigate energy infrastructure into paralysis, observers are entitled to ask whether what appears organic is, in fact, carefully cultivated.

This is not a claim that every activist is aware of funding sources. Nor does foreign funding automatically invalidate a policy position. Ideas stand or fall on their merits. But financial influence does shape priorities, messaging, and strategy. It is how political ecosystems function.

One particularly notable element in the reporting concerns the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, which has reportedly directed hundreds of millions of dollars into U.S. climate advocacy. CIFF has connections to Energy Foundation China, an organization operating within the strategic environment of the Chinese Communist Party. Even if all transactions are technically legal, it is reasonable to question whether foreign strategic interests benefit when U.S. domestic energy production is constrained.

Energy is not merely an environmental matter. It is an economic foundation and a national security pillar. When American production declines while geopolitical competitors expand theirs, the balance shifts.

The irony here is difficult to ignore. Climate activists have long argued that fossil fuel companies distort democracy with money. Yet if foreign-based foundations are channeling vast sums into American policy fights — including litigation designed to halt specific projects — the concern about distortion does not evaporate simply because the cause is labeled “climate action.”

It becomes a bipartisan issue of transparency.

There is also a broader pattern worth noting. Climate policy debates increasingly operate within a framework of moral urgency. Opponents are framed not as participants in a complex policy disagreement, but as obstacles to planetary survival. That rhetorical posture is used to suppress scrutiny. If the cause is existential, the funding questions become secondary.

That is precisely when scrutiny is most necessary.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act was enacted in 1938 to address covert foreign influence operations. Its purpose is disclosure, not prohibition. The public can decide for itself how much weight to assign to advocacy that originates abroad. But that decision requires information.

If the DOJ investigation proceeds, it will need to establish whether these organizations meet FARA’s threshold for registration. That analysis will hinge on legal definitions of agency, direction, and political activity. It may conclude that no violations occurred. Or it may reveal structural arrangements that warrant registration.

Either way, sunlight is appropriate.

Climate policy involves extraordinary economic stakes. Net-zero frameworks, emissions mandates, restrictions on leasing and permitting, and electrification initiatives carry trillions of dollars in implications. The cost-benefit calculations behind them rest on climate models that project decades into the future, models that themselves contain acknowledged uncertainties. In such an environment, foreign financial leverage layered atop domestic activism adds another variable to an already complex equation.

This episode should also prompt a reassessment of rhetorical habits. Accusations of “Big Oil money” have functioned as a conversation-ending device for years. If foreign capital has been underwriting substantial segments of climate advocacy, perhaps the funding conversation should expand in scope and tone.

The public deserves to know who funds whom. It deserves to know whether coordinated international funding networks are influencing domestic regulatory fights. And it deserves to weigh those facts without being told that asking questions constitutes disloyalty to the planet.

Transparency should apply evenly.

Astroturf accusations lose their force when they are deployed selectively. If artificial amplification is objectionable when it supports skepticism, it remains objectionable when it supports aggressive decarbonization policies.

Skepticism does not assume guilt. It suspends judgment and demands evidence. An investigation into foreign funding of climate activism is a straightforward application of disclosure law to a policy domain that has become economically and strategically central.

The irony lingers, though.

After years of hearing that skepticism was purchased, it now appears that large segments of climate politics may have been financed from abroad — by foundations whose strategic interests do not necessarily align with American energy security, or American interests in general.

Well, well, well.

Climate Change is Not Going to Cost Colorado Billions, Colorado Sun

A recent Colorado Sun article claims that climate change could cost the state up to $37 billion due to high temperature extremes and drought. This is false, built almost entirely on speculative claims about future weather and ignores the fact that reductions in extreme cold will positively influence health related costs.

From The Climate Realism

By Linnea Lueken

A recent Colorado Sun article claims that climate change could cost the state up to $37 billion due to high temperature extremes and drought. This is false, built almost entirely on speculative claims about future weather and ignores the fact that reductions in extreme cold will positively influence health related costs.

The Colorado Sun’s (TCS) post, titled “What will climate change cost Coloradans? Up to $37 billion, a new study says,” discusses a study put out by a group called the Colorado Fiscal Institute (CFI), “which uses research to promote equitable economic policies.” In other words, this is a left-wing activist, advocacy group, not a firm that performs straightforward economic analysis.

TCS says that the study “largely avoids scare scenarios about climate vortexes and unlivable homelands,” which is a refreshing change from studies that rely heavily on model scenarios like RCP8.5 and other extremely unlikely scenarios. However, the study still focuses on “predictable costs of higher heat and more frequent drought from now to 2050.”

The $37 billion figure is called a “conservative estimate of real costs” for the state. It primarily comes from the costs due to projected increases in extreme heat, from needing to build out cooling infrastructure, wildfire related costs, and human deaths, which CFI says will increase due to extreme heat over the next 25 years.

Colorado is one of the few states where the number of very hot days (days with temperatures over 95°F) has increased in recent years; however, it’s no worse than it was during the 1930s and 1940s, according to data on Colorado’s weather history from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (See figure below)

Fig. 1: Number of “very hot” days in Colorado, graphic from NOAA https://statesummaries.ncics.org/chapter/co/

Nowhere in the article is extreme cold mentioned, which is notable, because deaths due to extreme cold are declining as the planet has slightly warmed over the past hundred-plus years. In fact, data on heat-and-cold related mortality show that the number of deaths due to extreme cold have declined at a faster rate than deaths due to heat have increased over the same time period. Estimates say that as many as 20 times more people die of cold than heat. This means that global warming has actually been a net life saver, rather than killer. And indeed, extreme cold instances have declined in Colorado over the years even more consistently than highs have increased. (See figure below)

Fig. 2: Number of “very cold” nights in Colorado, graphic from NOAA https://statesummaries.ncics.org/chapter/co/

Regarding TCS’s claims about drought, there is little to no evidence that rainfall related drought is striking Colorado more frequently than usual in recent years, or that recent droughts have been more severe than in the past. Data show no consistent decline in precipitation over time. (See figure below)

Fig. 3: Annual precipitation, graphic from NOAA https://statesummaries.ncics.org/chapter/co/

What is true is that what water exists is under more pressure than in the past, as population growth and agricultural development come with rising water demands in an otherwise fairly arid part of the country.

Climate Realism has covered the fact that Colorado’s water problems are not a function of changes in rainfall patterns or amounts but rather increased development and demand, here, here, and here, for example. This also brings us to the wildfire question: is climate change making wildfires more intense or widespread in Colorado?

Again, the answer is no.

Data from the National Interagency Fire Center show that the acreage burned from wildfires in recent years is actually much less than what fires burned in the early 1900s. As discussed in the first of the Climate Realism posts linked above, much of the Western United States’ woes, when it comes to fire, has to do with poor forest management and an increase in the number of people moving into areas historically prone to wildfires. Not to mention the decline of the timber industry, which has led to less clearing of fuel for fires, and fewer maintained forest access roads that used to serve as fire breaks and critical paths for firefighters to reach isolated fires before they destroyed developed areas.

The study referenced by TCS is yet another in a long line of fearmongering economic studies on climate impacts, which rely heavily on fallible climate models while eschewing real world data that would otherwise show that there is no looming emergency. Trying to appeal to the public’s pocketbook probably doesn’t mean as much as the study authors would like, when enacted climate policies like restrictions on energy use and sources are always so expensive themselves. TCS should stick to the facts and not promote speculative scare stories uninformed by real world data.

Germany’s “Energy Transition” Hits the Ice: LNG Crisis Exposes the Costs of Shunning Nuclear and Baseload Power

Germany’s week-by-week battle to keep its LNG imports flowing isn’t just a story about weather and stuck ships. It’s a tale about energy policy choices made over decades — choices that sidelined reliable baseload power sources like nuclear and coal in favor of intermittent renewables and imported fuels. The recent incident in which “Germany’s largest LNG terminal … ran out of gas because the tanker got stuck, and the icebreaker broke down” is an apt metaphor for a system that was designed more for political signaling than for robust, weather-proof reliability.

From Watts Up With That?

By Charles Rotter

Germany’s week-by-week battle to keep its LNG imports flowing isn’t just a story about weather and stuck ships. It’s a tale about energy policy choices made over decades — choices that sidelined reliable baseload power sources like nuclear and coal in favor of intermittent renewables and imported fuels. The recent incident in which “Germany’s largest LNG terminal … ran out of gas because the tanker got stuck, and the icebreaker broke down” is an apt metaphor for a system that was designed more for political signaling than for robust, weather-proof reliability.

https://www.sott.net/article/504686-Germanys-largest-LNG-terminal-running-out-of-gas-The-tanker-got-stuck-the-icebreaker-broke-down

The SOTT piece notes that Germany’s largest LNG regasification hub at Mukran on the Baltic Island of Rügen “stopped shipping gas to the country’s gas transportation system since early February,” because a tanker became immobilized by ice and the icebreaker sent to free it “broke down.” With LNG imports cut sharply and German underground gas storage at historically low levels, the situation is not a trivial inconvenience but a systemic weak point.

But this vulnerability didn’t arise in a vacuum. It was engineered over time by policy decisions that eliminated some of the most reliable sources of domestic power generation and replaced them with inherently intermittent ones and imported fuels that require long logistics chains.

Until April 15, 2023, Germany maintained a fleet of nuclear reactors that once provided a significant percentage of its electricity. Those reactors were dismantled in accordance with the long-standing Atomausstieg (nuclear phase-out) policy, which had been enshrined in law well before the current crisis. Germany did not pause permanently when other countries doubled down on nuclear as a way to balance grids dominated by renewables. Instead, it completed its nuclear exit — even though nuclear plants had historically contributed roughly a quarter of German electricity and provided steady, dispatchable baseload power. (agora-energiewende.org)

Critics have long argued that removing these zero-carbon, continuous output plants from the grid would leave Germany exposed when weather-driven sources like wind and solar falter, and when imported fuels become constrained or expensive. It’s obvious that maintaining nuclear operations would have reduced gas-fired generation and lowered electricity prices during the recent energy crunch. For example, postponing the nuclear shutdown as was briefly done during the 2022 energy crisis reduced gas generation and held down power prices by an estimated €9/MWh before the reactors were finally taken offline.

Germany’s phase-out of coal is also underway. After decades of reliance on lignite and hard coal for consistent, high-volume power generation, the plan is to shut coal plants down by 2038. Coal historically provided a large share of dispatchable electricity, and even recent years saw the temporary restart of coal plants to conserve gas when supplies were tight.

What remains in Germany’s energy mix today is heavily skewed toward intermittent renewables, a growing share of imports, and fuels like LNG that must clear logistical bottlenecks before they enter the grid. Renewables are a major part of the production mix — but they cannot on their own supply the steady baseload that economies depend on day in, day out. Nuclear and coal both do supply baseload; wind and solar do not, by design. That’s why systems that rely on them either need dispatchable alternatives, massive storage, or extensive interconnections — and Germany’s grid and storage infrastructure has struggled to keep pace with the rapid pivot.

The current LNG fiasco brings these deficiencies into sharp relief:

  • The LNG import system’s vulnerability to ice and mechanical failure highlights the fragility of relying on long, weather-dependent supply chains for critical fuels.
  • The absence of on-demand domestic baseload power — nuclear reactors that could have been kept online, or coal plants maintained until firm replacements were in place — forces Germany to lean heavily on imported gas when renewables underperform.
  • Renewables’ intermittency remains a core challenge. Without dispatchable sources operating in the background, any shortfall must be covered by imports or backup generation — both of which are subject to volatility, whether geopolitical or meteorological.

Some voices in Germany, particularly in the political center-right, have begun to reopen the debate about nuclear. During the 2025 federal election, leaders such as Friedrich Merz and other CDU figures campaigned on an energy policy that would reconsider nuclear’s role and prioritize pragmatic solutions to energy security. Those proposals did not make it fully into government plans, but the dialogue reflects growing unease with the existing strategy and its vulnerability to events like the LNG disruption.

This rethinking is overdue. Baseload power sources — whether nuclear or coal — were dismissed prematurely with pie-in-the-sky magical-thinking that a renewables-centric system could replace them quickly. But the reality of an industrialized society is that demand does not pause when the wind stops blowing or when Baltic ice slows a tanker. In that context, abandoning dispatchable power before firm, proven alternatives are in place looks less like foresight and more like ideology driving policy.

Germany’s latest energy travails are a living demonstration of the importance of robust, reliable baseload generation as part of any real-world energy mix. The LNG terminal running out of gas because hardware failed to function in predictable winter conditions is a direct consequence of decades of policy choices that underestimated the complexity of powering a modern economy.

If Germany truly wants secure, affordable energy — not just aspirational percentages on a graph — then reintegrating reliable sources like nuclear and maintaining sufficient flexible dispatchable generation will be unavoidable parts of that conversation moving forward. After all, baseload doesn’t wait for the wind to blow.

H/T ozspeaksup

“Unexpected: Cooler Little Ice Age Had More Fires – And Medieval Warmth Outpaced Today in New Brunswick”

The paper “High-resolution Forest and fire dynamics from Fish Lake, New Brunswick, Canada, during the last millennium” (published in The Holocene provides a detailed palaeoecological reconstruction from a 124 cm sediment core collected in February 2023 from Fish Lake.

The paper “High-resolution Forest and fire dynamics from Fish Lake, New Brunswick, Canada, during the last millennium” (published in The Holocene, 2026, Vol. 36(1), pp. 15–27; DOI: 10.1177/09596836251378004) by Ryan J. Collins, Jeannine-Marie St-Jacques, Kelly A. Kyle, Les C. Cwynar, and Charles V. Cogbill provides a detailed palaeoecological reconstruction from a 124 cm sediment core collected in February 2023 from Fish Lake (46° 8′ 38.32″N, 66° 53′ 12.64″ W, 206 m elevation, near Fredericton, NB).

The core spans approximately AD 890 to 2023, with pollen analysis at 1 cm intervals (10-year resolution across 125 samples), microcharcoal for fire history, and pollen-based climate reconstructions. The age-depth model uses rplum (Bayesian framework) with four AMS ¹⁴C dates on terrestrial macrofossils and 15 ²¹⁰Pb dates, ensuring a robust chronology (e.g., no reversals, high model agreement index).

Core Chronology and Methods

  • Dating: Bayesian rplum model in R, incorporating 4 AMS ¹⁴C dates on terrestrial macrofossils (conifer needles/wood at depths yielding calibrated ranges like AD 1032–1177 to AD 1722–1814) and 15 ²¹⁰Pb dates (CRS model for upper 32 cm). The core spans AD ~890–2023 with high confidence (no age reversals, good MCMC agreement).
  • Pollen: 125 samples at 1 cm intervals (10-year resolution), minimum 400 terrestrial grains counted, processed with standard methods (HCl, KOH, acetolysis). Zonation via CONISS + broken stick test; PCA for ordination.
  • Charcoal: Macrocharcoal (>150 μm) at 0.5 cm intervals (249 samples), analyzed via WinSeedle for area, peaks detected with CharAnalysis (SNI ≥3, 99th percentile threshold).
  • Climate Inference: WA-PLS on pollen percentages calibrated to a Maritimes subset (301 sites, 43°–50°N, 61°–74°W) from the North American Modern Pollen Database (v1.8). Best performance: spring (MAM) temperature (2 components, R² = 0.57, RMSE = 1.50°C, average bias = -0.02°C, max bias = 3.07°C via leave-one-out cross-validation). Modern analogs assessed via squared chord distance (close ≤15.87 for 75% of samples; modern ≤24.37 for another 22%; poor/no analogs mostly post-~1800–1900).

Vegetation Dynamics (Pollen Zones) Six zones highlight shifts in the Acadian Forest (mixed hardwood-softwood, red spruce Picea rubens signature):

  • Zone I (AD ~895–1045, early MCA): Deciduous-dominated (high Betula, Tsuga canadensis, Fagus grandifolia); mature closed forest.
  • Zone II (AD ~1045–1265, mid-MCA): Rise in Pinus diploxylon; declines in Betula, Tsuga, Fagus; some disturbance indicators (Salix, Myrica).
  • Zone III (AD ~1265–1530, MCA-LIA transition): Conifer resurgence (Picea mariana/rubens/glauca, Abies balsamea); further deciduous drops; Ostrya peak.
  • Zone IV (AD ~1530–1720, mid-LIA): Conifer dominance accelerates; Ambrosia (ragweed) first appears ~AD 1680 (early Acadian French agriculture signal).
  • Zone V (AD ~1720–1840, early colonial): Continued conifer rise (P. glauca notable); herbs/Poaceae/Ambrosia increase; Pinus strobus recovery then decline.
  • Zone VI (AD ~1840–present): Peak disturbance (highest Poaceae, Ambrosia, herbs); conifers high but influx declining; P. strobus max percentage; “borealization” trend (deciduous decline, conifer/herb rise) climate-initiated in LIA but human-accelerated post-settlement.

What the Article Claims

Richard’s post states:

  • Pollen-reconstructed spring (MAM) temperatures affirm the Medieval Climate Anomaly (MCA, AD 900–1400) was 1°C warmer (3.2°C) than both the Little Ice Age (LIA, AD 1400–1850) at 2.2°C and the modern period (1850 to present).
  • It cites the study’s MCA average of 3.2°C and LIA average of 2.2°C.
  • It extends this to claim the MCA was warmer than today, adding references to other regional sites showing “no net warming since the 1800s and 1-3°C cooling from the MCA to the LIA.”
  • It highlights higher LIA fire frequency as counter to expectations (more fires in cooler period due to fuel changes).

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

New Study: Canada’s New Brunswick Was 1°C Warmer Than Today During The Medieval Warm Period

From No Trick Zone

By Kenneth Richard

Pollen-reconstructed New Brunswick (Canada) spring temperatures affirm the Medieval Warm Period or Medieval Climate Anomaly (MCA, 900-1400 CE) was 1°C warmer (3.2°C vs. 2.2°C) than both the Little Ice Age (LIA, 1400-1850 CE) and modern period (1850 to present).

Other sites in this region also show no net warming since the 1800s and 1-3°C cooling from the MCA to the LIA.

This new research also identifies a higher frequency of natural forest fires during the LIA cooling period than the warmer MCA.

Image Source: Collins et al., 2026

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Leaked German Committee Minutes Dismiss Gas Shortage Fears- But Reality Shows 20.5% Storage and Iran Risks

Outdoor Chiemgau (a Bavarian YouTuber focused on energy crisis and blackout prep) claims about Germany’s gas situation is far more dangerous than officials admit.

Outdoor Chiemgau (a Bavarian YouTuber focused on energy crisis and blackout prep) claims about Germany’s gas situation is far more dangerous than officials admit.

Outdoor Chiemgau claiming:

Germany at ~20.5% fill level (he calls it the “magical 20% threshold”); one facility down to 0.7%. He does math showing daily withdrawals (e.g., 1700–2500 GWh) are unsustainable without cut-offs if cold weather returns, even with warmer forecasts helping temporarily.

Leaked/exclusive committee minutes – From a special Bundestag Wirtschaftsausschuss session (Feb 17, 2026, with Minister Katherina Reiche and BNetzA’s Klaus Müller).

Geopolitical/Iran risk -big emphasis on potential war/escalation.

[~0:04 – 0:50]

20.5% in storage. From now on, it mustn’t get cold anymore, because that would simply mean we could inject around 3000 gigawatt hours per day. We’ve already consumed 3400 gigawatt hours this year, hence this magical 20% mark that we’ve now practically reached. We’ll look at how the weather is getting warmer now—how will that affect things long-term? We’ll take a look at the situation across Europe. My biggest concern right now is the Netherlands with only 12%. There are new outages in Austria and new ones in Norway. LNG has improved a bit. We’ll look at the individual storage levels because we have the first storage below 0.7%, and we’ll mainly focus on Check 1.

[~0:50 – 1:32]

I told you about this special session on Wednesday. That video really got to me emotionally—you might have noticed—and now I’ve received the minutes of that meeting… and what can I say? Yes, I’d say let’s just take a look at it. And we see there’s also some positive news to report: it’s not only getting warmer, but wind is picking up again and we’re using less gas. So, a few positive things. We’ll see if that’s enough. If you’re interested, just stay tuned.

[~1:32 – 3:02]

So, folks, in the midday video I complained that I hadn’t heard anything from the AfD yet.

Apparently, they took that as a cue to send me the internal protocol. And the first thing that stands out: the Committee on Economic Affairs and Energy has a total of 42 members.

And those who were there were Katharina Reiche and Klaus Müller… (lists attendees: CDU members like Mr. Lenz, Saska Ludwig; SPD’s Ms. Scher; AfD’s Mr. Holm and Mr. Kotre; The Left’s Mr. Jesane; Greens’ Ms. Verlinde and Mr. Kellner).

That means out of 42 people, only nine were present at this important meeting… I sometimes wonder what we pay our parliamentarians for if they’re just a bunch of no-shows at such a crucial special session.

The assessment presented in the special session on gas shortage paints an overall picture of widespread reassurance. It was unanimously stressed that there is no acute gas shortage, the market is liquid, sufficient import options exist, and even low storage levels give no reason for quality changes—availability is simply a question of price.

[~3:02 – 3:35]

I’m simply speechless again today when I read something like this. Physics exists, dear politicians… The pipelines from Norway are delivering the maximum amount… With LNG it can sometimes take three to four weeks until the ship arrives. The next question is whether there will even be so many ships in the future if there’s a war with Iran.

[~3:35 – 5:03]

The central starting point… is the thesis that security of supply is guaranteed even with historically low gas storage fill levels. Storage levels around 20–25% have repeatedly been described as unproblematic… Gasspeicher now at 20.5%…

We have net imports of 315 TWh, but 720 go abroad… So, we’re left with 2425… But we consumed 4117… That means on average we’ve withdrawn 1720 gigawatt hours from the gas storages… How the hell are we supposed to manage without gas storages if we can only add 2400 and in the worst case maybe only 3400 gigawatt hours…

[~5:03 – 9:46]

If something like the Strait of Hormuz happens… geopolitical tensions, possible sabotage… War Iran… LNG underway… 25% of global LNG flows through there.

[~9:46 – 10:21]

For that, LNG has now delivered 500 gigawatt hours for the first time in a while. So twice as much as recently. A new small ship has arrived… LNG is running again.

[~10:21 – 11:07]

Europe itself is just barely over 30%… The Belgian one is now at 24% too… We already mentioned the Netherlands, currently at 256 TWh, while Germany still has 21.07… and if you open Germany today, it’s dark red here, so many storage areas are already red, dark red… Our largest storage capacity is still at 5%.

[~11:07 – 13:32]

Gas storage dashboard… The KT on March 6th is at 17.7%. But what does that mean?

Well, I said at 20% we can roughly withdraw 3000… At 15% we might only get 2134 out of the gas storages… and we regularly exceed those values… That means at 15% someone probably already has to be switched off… And at 10% we can only store 1500 more today.

[~13:32 – 14:29]

We have further unavailable storages at Seven Fields in Austria… Seenfield now has a compressor problem… Talesbrunn… another 250 fewer unplanned outages… Storage at 0.7%.

[~14:29 – 16:23]

We have another problem coming our way, folks, and that’s Donald Trump… He promised the Iranians he would support them… That means he could then attack Iran from here and there…

Over 250 fighter jets are currently on their way there… If that happens, they’ll hit back and block the Strait of Hormuz… 25% of global LNG flows through there… most of it goes to Asia… If the Asians no longer get LNG, they’ll go to the world market… that could hit us.

[~16:23 – end]

Okay folks, that was a quick summary of the current situation. Things have improved a bit… We’re importing a bit more LNG; it’s running again… LNG is running again. The wind is picking up again. We’re also generating less electricity from gas right now. It’s getting warmer… We’ll probably have some calm for the next week or two… Still… whether that will be enough for everyone between now and April remains to be seen.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The official Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) is the primary, transparent, and real-time database for Europe’s underground natural gas storage levels, maintained by Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE). It’s the exact source referenced in the Outdoor Chiemgau video, German media, and official reports (including Bundesnetzagentur and EU dashboards).

Direct Access to Germany’s Data

  • Main Dashboard URL: https://agsi.gie.eu
    • This is the live platform (free, no login required for basic views).
    • On load, it shows an EU overview; select Germany from the country list (or search/filter for it).
    • Key views include:
      • Overall fill level (%)
      • Working gas volume (in TWh)
      • Daily injection/withdrawal rates (GWh/day)
      • Historical charts/trends (compare to 5-year averages, previous years)
      • Individual storage facilities (click “Details” for breakdowns by site, operator, status)
      • Data updates daily (usually around midday CET, confirmed status “C” for verified).

Latest Snapshot for Germany (as of February 20/21, 2026 – based on most recent AGSI data pulls)

  • Fill Level: 21.07% (one of the lowest mid-February figures since at least 2011, per cross-referenced reports).
  • Working Gas in Storage: ~52.91 TWh (down from ~54.34 TWh the previous day).
  • Daily Change: -0.56% (net withdrawal).
  • Injection Rate: +17.15 GWh/day (slight net injection starting to show in milder weather).
  • Context: This is historically low for late winter (normal mid-Feb averages 40–50%+), driven by prolonged cold snaps earlier in the season. EU-wide is higher (33–39% range in reports). No immediate crisis per government, thanks to Norwegian pipelines, LNG imports, and market mechanisms—but refill for next winter will be challenging.

The official Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) from Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), Germany’s underground natural gas storage fill level was exactly 21.07% as of the latest confirmed data point on February 20, 2026 (at 6:00 AM CET, published daily around evening CET).

Gas Infrastructure Europe – AGSI

Latest Snapshot for Germany (as of February 20/21, 2026 – based on most recent AGSI data pulls)

  • Fill Level: 21.07% (one of the lowest mid-February figures since at least 2011, per cross-referenced reports).
  • Working Gas in Storage: ~52.91 TWh (down from ~54.34 TWh the previous day).
  • Daily Change: -0.56% (net withdrawal).
  • Injection Rate: +17.15 GWh/day (slight net injection starting to show in milder weather).
  • Context: This is historically low for late winter (normal mid-Feb averages 40–50%+), driven by prolonged cold snaps earlier in the season. EU-wide is higher (33–39% range in reports). No immediate crisis per government, thanks to Norwegian pipelines, LNG imports, and market mechanisms—but refill for next winter will be challenging.

The 0.7% storage level mentioned in the Outdoor Chiemgau video refers to an individual underground gas storage facility (not the national average) that had dropped to critically low capacity during mid-February 2026. This is a specific site showing near-empty status, which the host highlighted as a warning sign amid the broader national low of ~21% (which you’ve confirmed at 21.07% on AGSI for Feb 20/21, 2026). What It Means in Context:

  • Germany’s overall storage (aggregated across 50+ facilities) was historically low for mid-winter (21–24% range in Feb 2026 reports), but still functional thanks to ongoing imports (Norway pipelines at max, LNG arrivals improving).
  • Individual facilities can vary wildly: Some are almost full, others critically low due to:
    • Technical issues (e.g., compressor failures limiting injection/withdrawal).
    • Operational decisions (e.g., not refilling because of high costs or low profitability).
    • Location-specific demand (e.g., regional industrial use or export flows).
  • A single site at 0.7% (or below ~5–10%) is a red flag because:
    • Below ~10–15% fill, pressure drops make it hard/impossible to withdraw gas efficiently (physics limit: gas needs pressure to flow out).
    • It reduces the system’s flexibility—if that site is key for a region or connected infrastructure, it could force reliance on other sources or trigger local alerts.
    • In the video, the host ties this to “unavailable storages” (Ausfälle) in Austria-linked sites, suggesting cross-border impacts (Germany relies on some Austrian facilities via pipelines).

Why It Matters (Host’s Point)

  • Even if national average is 21%, one near-empty site can signal:
    • Broader infrastructure strain (overloaded compressors from max Norwegian flows).
    • Reduced buffer if cold snaps return.
    • Risk of localized shortages or higher costs to reroute gas.
  • Officials downplayed it (“no acute quantity problem”), focusing on imports, but skeptics like the YouTuber see it as evidence of vulnerability.

Claim: 99.999% of Climate Scientists Agree Australia was Cooler in the 1890s

Senator Malcolm Roberts schooling the green Aussie Senate Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change Inquiry on the evidence.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by  Eric Worrall

Left: TV Personality Dr Karl. Right One Nation Senator Malcolm Roberts. Source Senator Malcolm Roberts Video.

Senator Malcolm Roberts schooling the green Aussie Senate Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change Inquiry on the evidence.

One Nation Senator’s wild climate change claim

…

One Nation’s Malcolm Roberts asked a series of questions about science, including data showing cause and effect, when Dr Karl had an issue with his line of questioning.

“Let’s see if we can agree on something. Do you agree that the climate records show that the last 10 years have been the hottest on record worldwide?” he asked.

Senator Roberts immediately disagreed, claiming the past decade had been “cooler than the 1880s and 1890s in Australia”.

…

Dr Karl was left dumbfounded by the response.

“I feel like I’m talking to a schoolchild who says seven times two is not 14, but instead seven times two is a bicycle,” he said.

Senator Roberts said that response was “one way to make me look like a fool”.

“No, but all the scientists disagree with you,” Dr Karl hit back, adding that “99.999 per cent of the scientists” had a different opinion.

…Read more: https://www.news.com.au/technology/environment/climate-change/one-nation-senators-wild-climate-change-claim/news-story/76d8ab81f626ebff36324b9ae8e4411f

A more complete record of the conversation is available on Senator Malcolm Roberts’ facebook page – https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1200025185620305

There is substantial evidence Australia was scorching hot in the 1890s. The following is a picture of the Murray River, part of Australia’s largest river system, running bone dry at the height of the 1895-1903 Federation Drought. Imagine the Mississippi running so dry you could drive a horse and cart over the river- bed, and you will get an idea of how devastating this event must have been.

Federation Drought Australia’s largest river system, the Murray River, running bone dry at the height of the drought. Source National Museum Australia

The Federation Drought caused large scale ecosystem collapse;

Megadrought caused mega biodiversity loss

Researchers at CSIRO, Australia’s national science agency, have painstakingly reconstructed the nation’s ‘once in a century drought’ in the early 1900s, revealing that it caused mass ecosystem collapse and dramatic declines in plant and animal populations across more than a third of the continent.

16 JULY 2019
NEWS RELEASE

As part of efforts to prepare for and adapt to future droughts, CSIRO ecologists recreated the megadrought through historical records, including the study of tens of thousands of newspaper articles, to build a picture of the event’s effects on the nation published today in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

“With many of Australia’s landscapes more fragmented and degraded, and species under pressure from invasive plants and animals, a similar drought today could spell disaster on an even more devastating scale,” CSIRO researcher Dr Robert Godfree said.

Australia’s Federation Drought, spanning 1895 to 1903, was one of the world’s worst recorded megadroughts. Much of the country received less than 40 per cent of its average rainfall, and 1902 was the driest year on record.

“Australia saw widespread economic depression. In New South Wales, most rivers stopped flowing. Dust storms filled dams, buried homesteads and created ghost towns as people fled,” Dr Godfree said.

…Read more (includes video): https://www.csiro.au/en/news/All/News/2019/July/Megadrought-caused-mega-biodiversity-loss

Huge dust storms devastated farms and entire regions.

Federation Drought – Dust Storm Engulfs Broken Hill, circa 1900. Source National Museum Australia

So, we have evidence that something pretty terrible happened in Australia, but is there evidence which can provide a global dimension to this Aussie megadrought disaster? Turns out there may be.

In the early 1900s, California suffered a series of severe flooding events.

1904, 1907 & 1909 – Sacramento Valley Flood
1905-1907 – Salton Sea Formation

There were also a bunch of other flood events in the USA during this period, such as flooding associated with the USA’s deadliest natural disaster, the 1900 Galveston storm which claimed 8000 lives.

Galveston Hurricane Cleanup (1900). Source Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas.

The Wikipedia El Niño page lists 1903-1904 as a likely El Niño event, and National Museum Australia suggests the Federation Megadrought was caused by a strong El Niño event.

There are other ocean cycles such as the Indian Ocean Dipole, which also influence Australian rainfall. It would fit the narrative to claim all these cycles combined into a super cycle, but I didn’t find sufficient evidence to support this proposition.

There were other factors, such as poor agricultural practices, which likely contributed to the devastation, just as poor agricultural practices likely contributed to the devastation of the 1930s US dust bowl. But if human activity was the main cause of the Federation Drought, the drought wouldn’t have ended.

Were conditions during the Federation Drought hotter than today?

Despite this evidence of extreme conditions, possibly coinciding with an unusually strong planet warming El Niño, Dr Karl is claiming only 0.001% of scientists are prepared to consider the possibility that whatever caused the the Federation drought, a scorching hot prolonged drought which dried up Australia’s largest river system, also caused a significant spike in the continental temperature of Australia.

For the sake of open scientific inquiry, I sure hope Dr Karl is wrong. I don’t know that the years leading up to the drought and the Federation Drought itself were hotter than today, I haven’t seen Senator Roberts’ evidence. But given droughts in Australia are normally associated with hot, dry weather, and the Federation Drought is regularly referred to as a megadrought, the proposition that temperatures during that period were hotter than today seems plausible.

Why didn’t Dr. Karl provide a reasoned response to Senator Malcolm Roberts’ temperature claims? Perhaps Dr. Karl responded with bluster rather than reasoned argument because he didn’t know what Senator Roberts was talking about. Maybe Dr Karl sensed an intellectual trap, but he hadn’t done his homework, so he didn’t know where Senator Roberts was leading. Or maybe Dr Karl did know what Senator Roberts was talking about, but couldn’t think of a convincing response. Either way, Dr Karl provided a disappointing performance for someone who claims to be a public climate authority.

Despite the availability of temperature records stretching back into the mid 1800s, the official Australian instrumental temperature record starts in 1910, seven years after the official end of the Federation Drought. Though to be fair Aussie temperature records were sparse in the 1800s, and it is likely the Federation Drought itself was the motivation for a substantial expansion in Australia’s weather monitoring infrastructure.

Had been climate change the greatest financial scam in history?

Environmental scholar Bjorn Lomborg recently calculated that across the globe, governments have spent at least $16 trillion feeding the climate change industrial complex.

And for what?

From CFACT

By Stephen Moore

Environmental scholar Bjorn Lomborg recently calculated that across the globe, governments have spent at least $16 trillion feeding the climate change industrial complex.

And for what?

Arguably, not a single life has been or will be saved by this shameful and colossal misallocation of human resources. The war on safe and abundant fossil fuels has cost countless lives in poor countries and made those countries poorer by blocking affordable energy.

Since the global warming crusade started some 30 years ago, the temperature of the planet has not been altered by one-tenth of a degree — as even the alarmists will admit.

In other words, $16 trillion has been spent — a lot of people got very, very rich off the government largesse — but there is not a penny of measurable payoff.

But it’s much worse than that. In economics there is a concept called opportunity cost: What could we have done with $16 trillion to make the world better off?

What if the $16 trillion had been spent on clean water for poor countries? Preventing avoidable deaths from diseases like malaria? Building schools in African villages to end illiteracy? Bringing reliable and affordable electric power to the more than one billion people who still lack access? Curing cancer?

Many millions of lives could have been saved.

We could have lifted millions more out of poverty. The benefits of speeding up the race for the cure for cancer could have added tens of millions of additional years of life at an economic value in the tens of trillions of dollars.

Instead, we effectively poured $16 trillion down the drain. For this reason, it is important that we identify the green “climate change” derangement syndrome as perhaps the most inhumane political movement in history.

The people at the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the United Nations, and politicians like Al Gore, Joe Biden, and John Kerry who voted for and carried out this Green New Deal scam, should be placed on a wall of shame. Biden’s administration alone wasted $400 billion on green energy and other sham climate change programs.

The one sliver of good news is that it appears the climate change neuroses have finally started to subside. We’ve reached peak global warming craziness in the U.S., for sure, and even Europe seems to have turned its back on its economically masochistic net zero fossil fuels obsession.

Donald Trump is wisely and rapidly dismantling the climate change industrial complex. Of all his pro-growth economic policies, there may be none with a higher longtime payoff than his recent order to repeal the mother of all costly regulations: the anti-fossil fuels “endangerment rule” taxing carbon dioxide emissions. The cost of that regulation had been estimated to exceed $1 trillion over time.

We can’t recapture the $16 trillion wasted on a false crisis. Sunk costs are, alas, sunk. But we can stop the madness of actually believing that politicians who can’t even pay off the balance on their credit cards can somehow change the world’s temperature.

This article originally appeared at RealClear Politics

How Miliband’s Green Dream Turned Aberdeen into a Housing Ghost Town

The Telegraph criticizes UK Energy Secretary Ed Miliband’s aggressive net zero policies, arguing they have contributed to a localized housing market collapse in Aberdeen, a key hub for the North Sea oil and gas industry.

The Telegraph criticizes UK Energy Secretary Ed Miliband’s aggressive net zero policies, arguing they have contributed to a localized housing market collapse in Aberdeen, a key hub for the North Sea oil and gas industry.

It is Miliband` push for a rapid transition to clean energy- including pledges to replace oil and gas jobs with green ones- has accelerated the decline of the North Sea energy sector. Factors include tumbling oil prices, high taxes on fossil fuels, and insufficient growth in renewables to offset losses.

Around 18,000 energy-related jobs disappearing in the region since 2010.

People leaving Aberdeen for work elsewhere, creating a surplus of homes (a “glut” of properties).

A sharp drop in house prices: The average home now sells for about £136,000 (the lowest since 2006), with more than two-thirds of properties falling in value last year according to Zoopla data.

A stark contrast to the boom period a decade ago, when Aberdeen prices were nearly double the Scottish average and had risen 165% in 10 years.

Miliband and supporters argue such transitions are necessary for long-term climate goals and could eventually lower bills through clean power.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

How Ed Miliband’s net zero folly stoked a house price crisis

In Aberdeen, jobs are disappearing and people are fleeing, leaving a glut of properties behind

Just over a decade ago, Aberdeen was thriving. The Telegraph has the story.

It was the gateway to Britain’s North Sea oil and gas industry. Average weekly earnings were higher only in London and it consistently ranked among the top UK cities for business and jobs growth.

At £215,000, property prices were nearly double the Scottish average, having risen 165pc in just 10 years as the area boomed.

Following the scent of oil and gas, new arrivals appeared in their droves to fill highly paid positions. Between 2004 and 2015, the population jumped by nearly 20,000 and local businesses flourished.

The picture is starkly different today. Tumbling oil prices, punitive taxes and the underwhelming advance of renewables have tipped the North Sea energy industry into a spiral of accelerated decline that is taking Aberdeen’s property market down with it.

Energy Secretary Ed Miliband’s pledge to deliver a net zero transition for the area – in which jobs in oil and gas are replaced by ones in clean energy – has also fallen flat.

Rather than a renewables energy boom, some of the biggest companies in the region have scaled back investment or withdrawn entirely, seeking more profitable opportunities in other places as far-flung as the Persian Gulf.

Many of the most skilled workers have gone with them.

Around 18,000 jobs have disappeared from Aberdeen since 2010. Without intervention, the local economy will lose the equivalent of 1,000 workers a month between now and 2030, according to trade association Offshore Energies UK.

As more people flee the region, homeowners in Aberdeen watch with a mixture of anger and dismay as the value of their homes sinks while a glut of properties hits the market.

More than two thirds of homes in Aberdeen fell in value last year, according to Zoopla. The average home now sells for just £136,000 – the lowest price since 2006.

At the same time, many have found their livelihoods hit by the energy sector’s declining activity. Falling profits at some of the region’s biggest employers have left residents directly employed in oil and gas, who account for more than one in 10 locals, at risk of losing their jobs. Many more in adjacent roles face the same fate.

Some of those who bought at the peak of the housing market in 2014 have taken house price hits as high as £90,000, blasting a hole in retirement plans. By contrast, UK house prices have risen on average by more than 53% since 2014.

More than two thirds of homes in Aberdeen fell in value last year, according to Zoopla. The average home now sells for just £136,000 – the lowest price since 2006.

Read the full story here.