Global warming, climate change, all these things are just a dream come true for politicians. I deal with evidence and not with frightening computer models because the seeker after truth does not put his faith in any consensus. The road to the truth is long and hard, but this is the road we must follow. People who describe the unprecedented comfort and ease of modern life as a climate disaster, in my opinion have no idea what a real problem is.
On Friday, Oct 31, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change turns 20. It was commissioned by Tony Blair’s government and led by economist Nicholas Stern and became hugely influential in framing climate inaction as far more expensive than action.
In The Guardian, it was described as having been found sound — “if anything, he underestimated both the rapidity of heating and economic consequences.”
Pielke argues the opposite on one key pillar: extreme weather losses.
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change was published 20 years ago today, and the Guardian’s environment editor Fiona Harvey marked the occasion early with a column under the headline “The climate crisis will destroy our economies – we learned this 20 years ago.”
Her verdict on how the review held up:
But Stern stuck to his analysis, and in the 20 years since it has been found sound – if anything, he underestimated both the rapidity of heating and economic consequences and overestimated the cost of renewable energy.
No source is given for “found sound” or for “underestimated.” One part of the review’s economic consequences can be checked against two decades of bookkeeping, because Stern put a number on it. From Chapter 5:
The costs of extreme weather events are already high and rising, with annual losses of around $60 billion since the 1990s (0.2% of World GDP), and record costs of $200 billion in 2005 (more than 0.5% of World GDP). New analysis based on insurance industry data has shown that weather-related catastrophe losses have increased by 2% each year since the 1970s over and above changes in wealth, inflation and population growth/movement.
The review then ran that 2% forward. Footnote 27 explains how:
Based on simple extrapolation through to the 2050s. The lower bound assumes a constant 2% increase in costs of extreme weather over and above changes in wealth and inflation. The upper band assumes that the rate of increase will increase by 1% each decade, starting at 2% today, 3% in 2015, 4% in 2025, 5% in 2035, and 6% in 2045. These values are likely underestimates
That is where the executive summary got its headline that “costs of extreme weather alone could reach 0.5 – 1% of world GDP per annum by the middle of the century.”
The “new analysis” was a white paper by Muir-Wood, Miller and Boissonade prepared for a May 2006 workshop at Hohenkammer, Germany, organized by Munich Re and Roger Pielke Jr. The workshop’s own consensus statement, five months before Stern published, said this:
8. Analyses of long-term records of disaster losses indicate that societal change and economic development are the principal factors responsible for the documented increasing losses to date.
11. Because of issues related to data quality, the stochastic nature of extreme event impacts, length of time series, and various societal factors present in the disaster loss record, it is still not possible to determine the portion of the increase in damages that might be attributed to climate change due to GHG emissions
What the Stern Review does not report of Muir-Wood et al. is that they find no trend in losses over the longer period 1950–2005 and that Muir-Wood et al. acknowledge that the trend that they find is “dominated” by the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons in the US. In other words, the trend is not global but the result of hurricane losses in the US.
So the 2% a year came from a 35-year window that ended with Katrina, and the review stacked a rising rate on top of it and called the result an underestimate.
Twenty years on, Pielke has now checked the projection against the loss data, using Munich Re, the source Stern relied on, and Aon as a second set. Starting each projection from the data available before the review, and leaving out earthquakes:
With Munich Re data, losses exceeded Stern’s projection in one year of twenty (2017). In 2025 they were 0.18% of GDP, versus a projected 0.41%. Since 1990 there has been no upward trend at all in total losses from weather extremes as a proportion of GDP.
Using Aon data, the story is the same: 0.22% of GDP in 2025 versus 0.46% projected, and below the projection every year since 2017.
Chart from figures as published by Roger Pielke Jr.
The 2025 number is easy enough to check from public figures. Munich Re reported overall natural disaster losses of about $224 billion for 2025, 92% of them from weather. That is about $206 billion against world GDP of $118.4 trillion from the World Bank, or 0.17%, and that year included the Los Angeles fires at $53 billion, the costliest wildfire on record.
Added up over the whole period:
Over 2006 to 2025, the Stern Review’s projection implied $7.0 trillion in weather losses based on Munich Re’s data, in 2026 dollars. Actual losses were $4.3 trillion, $2.8 trillion less. Using Aon’s data, the shortfall is $1.5 trillion.
Harvey’s column ends with the economics profession needing to catch up with Stern, and along the way it says “the supercharged El Niño threatens trillions of dollars in damages.” Which forecast of trillions would that be?
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Loss figures: Munich Re NatCatSERVICE via Pielke Jr., The Honest Broker, Oct 29 2026; Munich Re 2025 press release; World Bank world GDP (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
Scientists have created the first “anti- spin ice” using colloidal particles that attract each other, inverting the usual ice rule so the system maximizes (rather than minimizes) local topological charges.
The team inverted the interactions to attractive and isotropic. They used ~2.8 µm paramagnetic polystyrene colloids (with iron-oxide grains) in lithographic elliptical wells, one particle per well.
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Scientists have created the first “anti- spin ice” using colloidal particles that attract each other, inverting the usual ice rule so the system maximizes (rather than minimizes) local topological charges.
This comes from a Nature Communications paper (published September 2026) by Renaud Baillou, Matthew Terkel, Cristiano Nisoli, and Pietro Tierno (University of Barcelona and Los Alamos National Laboratory).
A Phys.org feature summarizing it appeared on November 1, 2026, under the exact headline: Breaking the ice: Scientists use attracting particles to form an anti-spin ice.
Background: ordinary spin ices and the ice rule
Artificial spin ices (and colloidal particle ices) mimic the geometric frustration of water ice.
In water ice, each oxygen has two hydrogens close and two farther away (the “ice rule”). Analogous systems, arrays of nanomagnets or colloidal particles in lattice traps, follow a similar local rule that minimizes topological charge at each vertex (junction).
Because many arrangements satisfy the rule equally well, the systems often remain disordered or show residual entropy. Colloidal versions typically use repulsive paramagnetic particles confined in double- well grooves; repulsion keeps charges as balanced and small as possible.
The anti- spin ice approach
The team inverted the interactions to attractive and isotropic. They used ~2.8 µm paramagnetic polystyrene colloids (with iron-oxide grains) in lithographic elliptical wells, one particle per well.
A fast in- plane rotating magnetic field (typically 1- 50 Hz) induces dipoles that average to net attraction in every direction: head- to- tail attraction is stronger than side- by- side repulsion, yielding isotropic attraction whose strength is tuned by field amplitude.
Under attraction the particles crowd toward some vertices and away from others, so the system maximizes topological charge (e.g., all particles near a vertex or all far away) instead of minimizing it. This breaks the conventional ice rule.
Key results
Bipartite lattices (square, honeycomb): Simulations and experiments show spontaneous symmetry breaking into a staggered “charge crystal”. High positive and high negative charges alternate in a checkerboard-like pattern (a single ordered ground state). This differs from the repulsive case, where the honeycomb lattice is highly degenerate.
Non- bipartite pentaheptite lattice (network of five- and seven- sided polygons): Charge crystallization is frustrated. Even at the strongest attraction, roughly one in four vertices remains low- charge. Odd- sided loops prevent perfect alternation of maximal charges, producing a new form of topological-charge frustration and a degenerate manifold of near- ground states. Experiments on a pentaheptite lattice of ~205 particles matched the simulations.
The work shows that frustration can arise from the inability to maximize charges globally when lattice topology forbids it, not only from the inability to minimize them. Because the interaction sign is controlled by the magnetic-field orientation (a conical field can switch between attraction and repulsion around the “magic angle”~54.7°), the same platform can be programmed to act as either conventional colloidal ice or anti- spin ice. The authors suggest this concept could extend to nanomagnetic, superconducting, or metamaterial artificial-ice systems.
In short, by flipping repulsion to attraction the researchers reversed the organizing principle of spin ice and uncovered both ordered charge crystallization and a novel kind of frustration.
A pentaheptite lattice of lithographic double wells each filled with one paramagnetic colloid. The particles are subjected to an in-plane rotating magnetic field and attract each other at any vertex of the lattice. Credit: Renaud Baillou and Matt Terkel.
Emergent charge crystallization and frustration in a particle anti-spin ice
Abstract (key points)
Artificial spin ices are versatile platforms for engineering exotic states of matter. They are typically governed by the ice rule, which enforces minimization of local topological charge and often produces degeneracy and constrained disorder.
This work reports the first realization of an “anti- spin ice”: a system in which the ice rule is inverted. The system seeks to maximize (rather than minimize) spin- ice charges.
Method: Fast- rotating in- plane magnetic fields generate isotropic attraction between colloidal particles, reversing the usual repulsive interactions used in colloidal spin ices.
Lattices studied: Bipartite square and honeycomb lattices and non- bipartite pentaheptite geometries (experiments and simulations).
Main findings: Rules for order and disorder in the anti- spin ice are established. On the pentaheptite lattice, a new form of frustration appears, topological charge frustration, arising from networks of unequal, odd- sided polygons that suppress charge crystallization even at high interaction strengths.
Core idea and results
In conventional colloidal particle ice, repulsive paramagnetic colloids in double- well traps follow the ice rule (balanced topological charge at vertices).
Here, a rapidly rotating in- plane magnetic field averages the dipolar interactions into net isotropic attraction. Particles therefore crowd toward some vertices and away from others, maximizing local charges.
Bipartite lattices (square, honeycomb): Spontaneous symmetry breaking produces a staggered “charge crystal” in which high positive and high negative charges alternate. A single ordered ground state emerges in both geometries (in contrast to the highly degenerate honeycomb case under repulsion).
Pentaheptite lattice (5- and 7- sided polygons): Perfect staggered crystallization is topologically impossible. Roughly one- quarter of the vertices remain low- charge even at the strongest attractions tested, producing a degenerate manifold of near-ground states. This is a distinct form of frustration driven by the inability to maximize charge globally.
The interaction sign can be tuned continuously (e.g., via a conical field around the “magic angle” ≈ 54.7°), so the same platform can switch between conventional ice and anti-spin ice behavior.
The authors note that the concept could extend to other artificial- ice platforms (nanomagnetic, superconducting, metamaterial, etc.).
The full paper (including figures, methods, and supplementary videos of particle collapse and lattice dynamics) is freely available at the link you provided. An earlier arXiv version is also available (arXiv:2603.29389).
Paper:Emergent charge crystallization and frustration in a particle anti-spin ice
Next month, some 100,000 politicians, bureaucrats, functionaries, activists and other grifters will descend on Antalya, Turkey (COP folks prefer Türkiye) for COP31, the UN’s annual climate Conference of the Parties. They will fly in, talk endlessly, and enjoy the best hotels, food, beverages, and hospitality Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can offer. Then they’ll fly home having plotted how to pry trillions more out of whatever wealthy nations are still willing to pay.
America has walked out of the UN climate racket. The rest of the world hasn’t gotten the message.
Next month, some 100,000 politicians, bureaucrats, functionaries, activists and other grifters will descend on Antalya, Turkey (COP folks prefer Türkiye) for COP31, the UN’s annual climate Conference of the Parties. They will fly in, talk endlessly, and enjoy the best hotels, food, beverages, and hospitality Recep Tayyip Erdoğan can offer. Then they’ll fly home having plotted how to pry trillions more out of whatever wealthy nations are still willing to pay.
Even now, after real-world scientific, energy, and economic realities have bashed the UN’s fraudulent science, garbage-in/garbage-out climate models, anti-fossil-fuel activism, and renewable energy fantasies, climate crisis assertions still dominate news cycles, policy, and spending.
Türkiye will serve as a “bridge” between developed and developing countries. Co-host Australia will push global “clean energy acceleration” — the very policies that are crippling its own citizens’ energy reliability, jobs, economy, and living standards.
Like COP30, this will be an “implementation” conference, focused on turning existing commitments into “investment-ready projects”, especially by browbeating reluctant, once-wealthy nations into financing it all with trillions more dollars. The agenda hasn’t changed: “clean” energy, electrifying everything that now runs on “evil” fossil fuels, slashing methane and (plant-fertilizing) carbon dioxide emissions, and a new “Climate Implementation Bridge” to turn plans into projects, which, by the COP31 president’s own admission, comes with no new funding to pay for those projects.
Here’s what the COP dignitaries know but won’t say.
More than 80% of global energy still comes from fossil fuels. China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Argentina and others are building coal and gas-fired power plants at breakneck speed to industrialize and lift people out of poverty. The most important government on Earth has walked away from the UN climate treaty, is skipping their gabfest — and is doing all it can to spur oil, gas, and coal production and use across the United States and the world.
And Canada, Britain, Germany, and the other countries they’ve counted on to bankroll their pipe dreams have wrecked their own economies with net-zero policies.
So, they are hedging their bets with a plethora of new crises, themes, and programs. Above all, they don’t want to lose their sinecures, program budgets, prestige, or power. Among them:
Dynamic and resilient health systems (running on expensive, unreliable wind, solar, and backup power)
Recycling materials of every description (they prefer the term “circularity”)
Resilient, sustainable food policies (to restrict meat consumption and use of nitrogen fertilizers, biotech crops, and even tractors)
Youth education (indoctrination and fearmongering, instilling fervent activism alongside the belief that they have no future)
They’ll have help from nearly 100 “civil society” groups: Climate Action Network, Greenpeace, 350.org, Amnesty International, the Turkish Climate Network, and more. All support the official “implementation” agenda but really intend to rant their demands for a “just, orderly and equitable” transition to “clean, green, renewable, sustainable” energy — and money (to them and their comrades) to make it happen. They want “accountability” for corporate and government “greenwashing” — but never for their own lies.
Now for the realities they want the world to keep ignoring.
Host country Turkey still generates 46% of its electricity with coal and natural gas. It uses less electricity than the increasingly reduced European average. And it remains one of Russia’s biggest natural gas customers.
“Green” energy is not clean, renewable, or sustainable. Wind, solar, backup, and transmission installations require massive amounts of metals, minerals, and plastics. They also generate monumental amounts of pollution and waste materials in mining, processing, manufacturing, and disposal. It cannot power modern industrial economies or build thriving communities where squalor and disease now reign.
Still-impoverished countries need abundant, reliable, affordable electricity, fuels, and petrochemical products to lift their people out of poverty, disease, malnutrition, and hopelessness. They should do what we did: employ their God-given free will, fundamental rights, and natural resource bounties to finance and build their own futures.
For decades, “We the People,” the taxpayers of America, helped bankroll these junkets and the schemes cooked up at them. Taxpayers in Britain, Germany, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere still pay for COP attendees’ airfare, hotels, and dining, and for the rising energy costs net-zero policies impose on workers and families, driving entire companies and industries to China and other nations still using fossil fuels.
None of this is just or equitable. It is eco-imperialism and carbon-colonialism.
The United Nations and its climate COPs have outlived their usefulness. The United States has finally said so. Every nation that truly cares about its people and future should follow, defund these programs — and reject the net-zero insanity these grifters intend to inflict on us all.
New research from the University of Melbourne (with the Indian Institute of Science and University of Southampton), published in Nature Climate Change (October 2026), shows that the Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW), a vast, relatively fresh ocean layer spanning much of the Southern Hemisphere, has abruptly reversed long- term trends in salinity, density, and depth since around 2016, linked to major Antarctic sea ice loss.
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New research from the University of Melbourne (with the Indian Institute of Science and University of Southampton), published in Nature Climate Change (October 2026), shows that the Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW), a vast, relatively fresh ocean layer spanning much of the Southern Hemisphere, has abruptly reversed long- term trends in salinity, density, and depth since around 2016, linked to major Antarctic sea ice loss.
What is the AAIW and why does it matter?
The AAIW is a layer typically found roughly 500- 1,500 meters (or more specifically ~700- 1,200 m in some descriptions) below the surface. It forms partly from Antarctic surface waters influenced by sea ice melt and spreads northward into the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans.
It helps:
Store and redistribute heat, freshwater, and carbon.
Supply oxygen.
Support parts of the global ocean overturning circulation (a key climate regulator).
The ocean absorbs over 90% of excess heat from human activities (mostly in the upper ocean) and a large share of CO₂ emissions, acting as a climate buffer.
The observed shift
Pre- 2016 (roughly 1990s and 2004- 2015): Antarctic summer sea ice melt supplied large volumes of freshwater (estimated at ~triple the Amazon River’s annual discharge, or ~17,400 gigatons in some accounts). This made the AAIW progressively fresher, lighter, and shallower.
2016- 2024: Record- low Antarctic sea ice sharply reduced this meltwater input (dropping toward roughly double the Amazon’s flow). The AAIW rapidly became saltier, denser, and deeper across multiple ocean basins. This is the first direct observational evidence of such a change, detected via Argo floats (thousands of robotic ocean profilers), satellite data, and other records.
Researchers note the last comparable major switch in AAIW properties occurred at the end of the previous interglacial period (~130,000 years ago), when Antarctic ice was minimal, but that transition unfolded over thousands of years, not roughly a decade or two.
Implications for heat and carbon storage
A denser and weaker or altered AAIW could reduce the effectiveness of the density barrier (pycnocline) that limits vertical mixing, potentially allowing more excess heat to move into deeper ocean layers. Climate models may therefore be underestimating deep-ocean warming, regional sea- level rise, and longer- term surface temperature responses.
Changes in how surface water is subducted could affect the ocean’s capacity to lock away atmospheric carbon, though the magnitude and timing remain uncertain.
As the altered water mass spreads north, it forms part of the upper limb of the global overturning circulation and could eventually influence systems like the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), as well as Southern Hemisphere atmospheric circulation, storm tracks, rainfall, and weather patterns over years to decades. Effects could cascade more widely.
The lead researchers (including Associate Professor Bishakhdatta Gayen and PhD student Kaushik Mishra) describe this as revealing a critical missing feedback and an urgent signal that the ocean is responding faster than previously appreciated.
Ongoing monitoring (especially Argo data) and improved climate model representation of these processes are highlighted as priorities, particularly while Antarctic sea ice remains at record lows.
In short, the findings raise important questions about whether current projections fully capture the ocean’s evolving role in heat and carbon storage under rapid polar change.
The study itself focuses on the observational reversal rather than detailed future projections or quantified environmental impacts.
Sea ice off Victoria Land, Antarctica, with Mount Melbourne in the background. Credit: Alberto C Naveira Garabato
Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW) plays a key role in oceanic carbon storage and redistribution as part of the Southern Ocean’s contribution to the global carbon cycle.
AAIW forms in the polar Southern Ocean (primarily in the Polar Frontal Zone, between the Subantarctic and Polar Fronts). Surface waters there are influenced by sea-ice processes, winds, and mixing.
These waters exchange gases with the atmosphere, absorbing substantial amounts of CO₂ (both natural and anthropogenic) through air- sea gas exchange. Cold temperatures enhance CO₂ solubility, aiding uptake.
Once formed, AAIW is subducted (sunk) to intermediate depths, typically around 500–1,500 meters (often cited as ~700– 1,200 m), and spreads northward into the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans as part of the upper limb of the global overturning circulation. This process isolates the absorbed carbon from the atmosphere for decades to centuries.
Specific contributions to carbon storage
Major anthropogenic CO₂ sink: Modern AAIW is a significant reservoir for anthropogenic carbon. Its associated carbon inventory has been estimated to exceed ~20 Pg C (petagrams of carbon).
Redistribution and transport: AAIW acts as a lateral conduit, carrying carbon (along with nutrients and oxygen) from high-latitude Southern Ocean uptake regions to lower latitudes. This links Southern Ocean air- sea CO₂ exchange with biogeochemical processes in subtropical and tropical oceans.
Physical and biological pumps: It participates in the solubility pump (temperature- and salinity- driven CO₂ uptake and isolation at depth) and supports aspects of the biological pump by transporting nutrients that fuel productivity elsewhere. Stratification and density structure associated with AAIW help regulate how effectively carbon is retained versus returned to the surface.
Broader Southern Ocean context: The Southern Ocean as a whole dominates global oceanic uptake of anthropogenic heat and carbon. AAIW (together with Subantarctic Mode Water) is central to the rate of water- mass formation and subduction that determines how much CO₂ is taken up and sequestered.
Relevance to recent changes
In the context of the recent research (the abrupt post- 2016 shift toward saltier, denser, and deeper AAIW due to reduced Antarctic sea- ice meltwater), scientists note that alterations to AAIW properties or the way surface water is carried into deeper layers could change how much carbon the ocean locks away.
The magnitude and timing of any such effect remain uncertain, but it raises questions about the future efficiency of this carbon storage pathway.
In summary, AAIW functions as both a direct storage reservoir for absorbed atmospheric CO₂ at intermediate depths and a key transporter that redistributes carbon within the global ocean, helping moderate atmospheric CO₂ levels on multi- decadal to centennial timescales.
Its effectiveness depends on formation rates, surface conditions (temperature, salinity, ice melt), stratification, and circulation.
Sea ice floes from a marine voyage. Credit: Alberto C Naveira Garabato
Reversal of Antarctic Intermediate Water trends triggered by sea ice decline
Abstract
Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW), a key component of the global overturning circulation and a major regulator of pycnocline structure, forms in the polar Southern Ocean, where sea-ice processes shape its properties. Sustained sea-ice expansion over several decades up to 2015 enhanced summertime meltwater input, stratifying the upper polar ocean and freshening AAIW. However, since 2016, repeated record sea-ice losses have reversed these trends. Using Argo-derived ocean observations supplemented by satellite and re-analysis datasets, we reveal that the abrupt post-2015 shift in sea-ice conditions is on course to alter hemispheric-wide water-mass properties. We estimate a net decline in sea-ice meltwater input of nearly 36 mSv per decade, relative to a pre-2016 increase of 14 mSv per decade. This unprecedented sea-ice loss has triggered densification and salinification of AAIW, whose core has salinified at 4.8×10−3±1.7×10−3 g kg−1 per decade. These changes signal that a hemispheric-scale reconfiguration of the pycnocline is underway.
Key points from the paper
Pre- 2016 trend: Decades of Antarctic sea- ice expansion increased summertime meltwater, which freshened and lightened AAIW while helping stratify the upper ocean.
Post- 2016 reversal: Record sea- ice losses sharply reduced meltwater input. This caused AAIW (and related Winter Water) to become saltier, denser, and deeper across the Southern Hemisphere.
Quantitative estimates:
Net decline in sea- ice meltwater input: ~36 mSv per decade (vs. a prior increase of ~14 mSv per decade).
AAIW core salinification rate: per decade.
Methods: Primarily Argo float data (upper-ocean profiles), combined with satellite sea- ice observations, reanalysis products, and supporting datasets (e.g., EN4, IAP, CFC- 11 tracers).
Broader implication: The shift indicates an ongoing hemispheric- scale reconfiguration of the ocean’s pycnocline (the density gradient layer that regulates vertical mixing, heat, and carbon exchange).
Figures (titles)
Climatological state of Winter Water (WW) and AAIW
Evolution of Antarctic sea ice and northward transport of sea- ice meltwater
Evolution of WW and AAIW core salinity anomalies
Evolution of WW core density and depth
Evolution of AAIW core density and depth
Schematic of AAIW regime shift linked to changes in Antarctic sea-ice cover
Data and code
Data sources include RG- ARGO, IAP, EN4, NSIDC sea- ice products, GLORYS, SOSE, and others (full links in the paper).
The full text is behind a paywall (institutional access, Nature+, or purchase required). The abstract and supporting materials above capture the core findings. This is the primary research paper underlying the University of Melbourne press coverage discussed earlier.
Researchers from Meijo University (led by Professor Takeshi Ohura, with graduate student Natsuki Nasuda) and the National Institute of Animal Health (Dr. Keerthi S. Guruge) have identified bromochloropyrene (BrClPy) as an environmental contaminant in industrial soils and sediments in Japan.
The discovery of bromochloropyrene (BrClPy) has primarily precautionary implications for human health rather than demonstrated acute or widespread risks at current environmental levels.
The aryl hydrocarbon receptor (AhR, also called AHR) is a ligand- activated transcription factor of the basic helix- loop-helix and Per- ARNT-Sim (bHLH- PAS) family.
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Researchers from Meijo University (led by Professor Takeshi Ohura, with graduate student Natsuki Nasuda) and the National Institute of Animal Health (Dr. Keerthi S. Guruge) have identified bromochloropyrene (BrClPy) as an environmental contaminant in industrial soils and sediments in Japan.
It is a hetero- halogenated (mixed bromine- and chlorine- containing) polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) with hybrid properties that do not simply match those of purely brominated or chlorinated analogs.
Key findings
Occurrence: BrClPy was detected in 10 of 20 surface soil samples from industrial areas along Tokyo Bay (mean concentration 0.13 ng/g) and in 1 of 3 sediment samples from Nagoya Port (mean 0.42 ng/g). Soil concentrations correlated strongly with brominated pyrenes, suggesting formation is more closely tied to bromination processes than to chlorinated pyrenes.
Photostability: Under simulated sunlight, BrClPy was roughly half as stable as 1-chloropyrene (similar to the behavior of brominated pyrenes). It primarily lost bromine, forming 1-chloropyrene; loss of chlorine was not observed.
Biological activity: In a yeast- based aryl hydrocarbon receptor (AhR) assay, BrClPy showed an estimated potency of 0.18 relative to benzo[a]pyrene. This was similar to dichloropyrene and about 4- 5 times higher than dibromopyrene.
Overall, BrClPy combines the environmental and photolytic behavior of brominated pyrenes with the stronger AhR-mediated activity more typical of chlorinated ones. This points to “emergent” properties of hetero -halogenated PAHs that cannot be predicted from single -halogen compounds alone.
The work (published online September 22, 2026, in Emerging Contaminants, DOI: 10.1016/j.emcon.2026.100758) provides the first evidence of BrClPy contamination in real urban/industrial soils and sediments.
The authors note that monitoring programs may currently overlook mixed-halogen pollutants and call for further research on formation pathways, environmental fate, and biological effects of related compounds to improve risk assessment and regulation.
The study was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI grants.
Researchers detected bromochloropyrene, a pollutant containing both bromine and chlorine, in soil and sediment samples from industrial areas in Japan, establishing a new class of environmental contaminants with unique biological activities. Credit: tocalcollege from Openverse
The discovery of bromochloropyrene (BrClPy) has primarily precautionary implications for human health rather than demonstrated acute or widespread risks at current environmental levels.
Direct human toxicity data for BrClPy do not yet exist, as it is a newly identified contaminant. Implications are inferred from its aryl hydrocarbon receptor (AhR) activity, its classification as a hetero- halogenated PAH, and the broader toxicology of related halogenated PAHs (HPAHs or XPAHs).
AhR- mediated activity and potential effects
BrClPy activates the AhR with an estimated relative potency of 0.18 compared with benzo[a]pyrene (BaP) in a recombinant yeast assay. This is comparable to dichloropyrene and roughly 4- 5 times higher than dibromopyrene.
AhR is a ligand- activated transcription factor involved in the toxicity of dioxins, certain PCBs, and many PAHs/HPAHs. Chronic activation is associated with:
Carcinogenicity (via induction of CYP enzymes, oxidative stress, and related pathways).
Endocrine disruption.
Immunotoxicity.
Developmental and reproductive effects (observed in various model systems for AhR agonists).
BaP itself is an IARC Group 1 human carcinogen, so a compound with measurable relative potency raises concern as a potential contributor to dioxin-like or PAH- like toxicity.
Halogenated PAHs frequently show higher AhR potency than their parent (non-halogenated) counterparts in mammalian and other assays, and they are considered to possess dioxin- like properties.
Exposure context and risk levels
Detected concentrations were low: mean ~0.13 ng/g in industrial soils and ~0.42 ng/g in one harbor sediment sample.
These levels suggest limited direct human exposure via soil contact or dust under typical conditions. Possible routes include:
Inhalation of combustion- related particles (HPAHs form during incomplete combustion).
Ingestion via contaminated food (bioaccumulation potential in the food chain is a general concern for persistent HPAHs).
Dermal contact with soils and sediments in industrial or urban areas.
For the broader class of HPAHs and XPAHs, dietary and indoor air and dust exposure assessments have generally found incremental lifetime cancer risks (ILCR) below or near common thresholds (e.g., 10⁻⁶ to 10⁻⁴) for individual compounds or matrices. However, cumulative risks from multiple PAHs and HPAHs can approach or exceed unacceptable levels in some scenarios.
No quantitative human risk assessment specifically for BrClPy is available yet.
Broader implications
Monitoring and regulation gaps: Current environmental monitoring often focuses on parent PAHs or single- halogen compounds and may miss mixed-halogen species like BrClPy. The researchers note that better characterization could improve estimates of human exposure and associated effects, potentially informing future regulations.
Additive or synergistic effects: BrClPy’s hybrid photolytic and biological behavior (brominated- like environmental persistence and photolysis combined with stronger chlorinated- like AhR activity) means it may contribute to overall toxic load in ways not fully captured by existing toxic equivalency factors (TEQs) based solely on chlorinated or brominated analogs.
Research needs: Further studies are required on bioaccumulation, metabolic activation, chronic toxicity, and actual human biomarkers of exposure. Related work on other HPAHs supports structure–activity relationships linking halogenation pattern and position to AhR potency and downstream effects (e.g., enzyme induction, oxidative stress).
In summary, BrClPy is unlikely to pose significant individual health risks at the trace levels reported, but it adds to the cumulative burden of AhR- active environmental contaminants. Its identification highlights the value of expanding monitoring to hetero- halogenated PAHs for more accurate long-term risk assessment, particularly in industrial and urban settings with combustion sources.
The aryl hydrocarbon receptor (AhR, also called AHR) is a ligand- activated transcription factor of the basic helix- loop-helix and Per- ARNT-Sim (bHLH- PAS) family.
It functions as an environmental and endogenous sensor. Originally identified as the mediator of toxicity from dioxins (e.g., TCDD), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and related compounds (including halogenated PAHs such as bromochloropyrene), it also responds to dietary, microbial, and metabolic ligands and regulates diverse physiological processes.
Canonical (genomic) pathway
This is the primary and best-characterized mechanism:
Inactive cytoplasmic complex: In the absence of ligand, AhR resides in the cytoplasm as part of a multiprotein complex. This typically includes:
Two molecules of heat shock protein 90 (HSP90)
Co-chaperone p23 (PTGES3)
AhR-interacting protein (AIP/XAP2/ARA9)
Often the tyrosine kinase c-Src HSP90 stabilizes AhR, prevents degradation, and masks its nuclear localization signal (NLS).
Ligand binding: Agonists (environmental toxins like TCDD, BaP, or BrClPy; endogenous ligands such as FICZ, kynurenine, or microbial metabolites) bind the PAS- B domain. This triggers a conformational change that exposes the NLS and promotes dissociation (or rearrangement) of chaperones.
Nuclear translocation: The ligand- bound AhR moves into the nucleus (sometimes still associated with HSP90 initially).
Heterodimerization: AhR partners with the AhR nuclear translocator (ARNT, also known as HIF- 1β). Structural studies show intimate PAS-B domain interactions between AhR and ARNT in the active complex.
DNA binding and transcription: The AhR– ARNT heterodimer binds xenobiotic and dioxin response elements (XREs and DREs; core motif typically 5′-TNGCGTG- 3′ or similar) in the regulatory regions of target genes. It recruits co- activators and the transcriptional machinery, inducing expression of genes such as:
Feedback and termination: Induced CYP enzymes metabolize many ligands (creating a negative feedback loop). AhR itself is subject to ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation. AHRR can compete with AhR for ARNT or DNA binding.
Ligand potency, residence time, and structure influence the strength and duration of the response. Persistent ligands like TCDD produce prolonged activation and more severe toxicity than rapidly metabolized ones like many PAHs.
Non- canonical pathways
AhR signaling is highly context-dependent (cell type, ligand, microenvironment) and extends beyond the classic AhR– ARNT– XRE route:
c- Src release and kinase signaling: Ligand binding can free c- Src from the cytoplasmic complex. c- Src then phosphorylates targets such as the epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR), activating downstream MAPK or other pathways.
Crosstalk with other transcription factors: AhR can interact with NF- κB, estrogen receptor (ER), HIF- 1α (competing for ARNT under hypoxia), STATs, or others, leading to trans- repression or alternative gene sets.
Non- XRE DNA binding: Partnerships with factors such as KLF6 at non-canonical response elements can drive distinct epigenetic and transcriptional outcomes (e.g., cell- cycle regulation via p21).
E3 ubiquitin ligase activity: Ligand- activated AhR can promote ubiquitination and degradation of specific proteins (including itself or other targets).
Ligand- independent or stress- induced activation: Mechanical stress, oxidative stress, or other signals can sometimes activate AhR without classical ligands.
Cytoplasmic or membrane- proximal effects: Additional non- genomic actions contribute to rapid responses.
Physiological and pathological roles
AhR integrates environmental and endogenous signals. Beyond xenobiotic metabolism and toxicity (carcinogenesis, developmental disruption, immunotoxicity via prolonged activation by pollutants), it regulates:
Host– microbe interactions and diet sensing (tryptophan metabolites)
Cancer (context- dependent tumor promotion or suppression)
Therapeutic interest has grown: the AhR agonist tapinarof is approved for psoriasis, and other modulators are in trials for inflammatory diseases, cancer, and infections.
In the context of compounds like bromochloropyrene, AhR activation (measured by reporter assays or CYP induction) serves as a key indicator of potential dioxin- like biological activity and toxicity risk, even though full downstream effects depend on dose, duration, tissue, and co-exposures.
Structural advances continue to clarify ligand recognition (promiscuous but with conserved residues in the PAS- B pocket) and the transition from chaperone- bound to ARNT- bound states, aiding both toxicology and drug design.
Hetero-halogenated polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons as environmental contaminants: Occurrences, photostability, and AhR-mediated activity of bromochloropyrene
This is the peer- reviewed paper underlying the Meijo University press release we discussed earlier.
Main findings (from the abstract, press materials, and available excerpts)
Researchers synthesized a reference standard of bromochloropyrene (BrClPy; tentatively a mixture of 1- bromo- 6- chloropyrene and 1- bromo- 8-chloropyrene) for the first time and used it to analyze environmental samples.
Occurrence: Detected in 10 of 20 surface soil samples from industrial areas along Tokyo Bay (mean 0.13 ng/g; range <LOD–1.21 ng/g) and in 1 of 3 sediment samples from Nagoya Port (0.42 ng/g mean; one sample 1.27 ng/g). This provides the first evidence of hetero-halogenated (mixed Brand Cl) PAHs in real urban and industrial soils and sediments. Concentrations correlated strongly with brominated pyrenes (1- BrPy and Br₂Py), suggesting formation pathways more similar to bromination processes.
Photostability: Under simulated sunlight, BrClPy followed first- order kinetics with a photolysis rate constant of ~0.162 h⁻¹. Photostability was approximately half that of 1- chloropyrene (and similar to 1-bromopyrene and dibromopyrene). The dominant pathway was debromination, producing 1-chloropyrene; dechlorination products were not observed.
AhR- mediated activity: In a recombinant yeast assay, BrClPy showed a dose–response relationship (EC₅₀ ≈ 0.43 μM) with a relative potency (REP_BaP) of 0.18 versus benzo[a]pyrene. This was similar to dichloropyrene (REP ≈ 0.20) and 4- 5 times higher than dibromopyrene (REP ≈ 0.04).
Conclusion of the study: BrClPy exhibits hybrid (“emergent”) properties—environmental behavior and photolysis resembling brominated pyrenes, but biological (AhR) activity closer to chlorinated pyrenes. The authors highlight the need for further research on formation, fate, and effects of other hetero-halogenated PAHs to improve monitoring and risk assessment.
Funding came from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI grants 23K21754 and 25K15471.
The full text is behind ScienceDirect’s access controls for many users (institutional or personal subscription and open- access options may apply).
The key results and conclusions are publicly summarized in the EurekAlert release and research- map excerpts.
Title: Hetero-halogenated polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons as environmental contaminants: Occurrences, photostability, and AhR-mediated activity of bromochloropyrene
Authors: Natsuki Nasuda a, Keerthi S. Guruge b, Takeshi Ohura a
aGraduate School of Agriculture, Meijo University, 1-501 Shiogamaguchi, Nagoya, 468-8502, Japan
bDivision of Hygiene Management Research, National Institute of Animal Health, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, 3-1-5 Kannondai, Tsukuba, 305-0856, Japan
Abstract
Homo-halogenated polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (HPAHs), such as chlorine- or bromine-substituted PAHs, have been ubiquitously distributed in the environment. Conversely, hetero-halogenated PAHs, including chlorine- and bromine-substituted PAHs (halomix PAHs), have not been reported to occur in the environment. This study investigated the environmental occurrence and behavior of bromochloropyrene (BrClPy) as a representative halomix PAH. A BrClPy standard (tentatively a mixture of 1-bromo-6-chloropyrene and 1-bromo-8-chloropyrene) was synthesized for the first time and used for environmental analysis. BrClPy was frequently detected in environmental samples, with mean concentrations of 0.13 ng/g in surface soils from industrial areas and 0.42 ng/g in sediments from industrial harbors. The photostability of BrClPy under simulated sunlight was approximately twofold lower than that of 1-chloropyrene, which was somewhat consistent with the photostability values obtained for 1-bromopyrene and dibromopyrene. The aryl hydrocarbon receptor-mediated activity of BrClPy measured using a recombinant yeast assay showed a potency close to that of dichloropyrene rather than dibromopyrene with an estimated potency of 0.18 relative to benzo[a]pyrene. Consequently, the environmental behavior and biological properties of BrClPy could exhibit the combined characteristics of brominated and chlorinated pyrene.
When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, the world relearned a lesson it keeps forgetting crude oil, by itself, moves nothing. Trucks, tractors, aircraft and ships run on diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and bunker fuel — transportation fuels that exist only after crude oil has passed through a refinery.
Woman construction engineer wear safety white hard hat at construction site industry worker. Female engineer worker civil engineering with hard hat safety helmet. Woman construction Engineer concept
When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, the world relearned a lesson it keeps forgetting crude oil, by itself, moves nothing. Trucks, tractors, aircraft and ships run on diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and bunker fuel — transportation fuels that exist only after crude oil has passed through a refinery.
Asia felt the shock first. As crude supplies tightened, Asian refiners cut throughput and some curbed transportation fuel exports to protect their own markets. Even after the April ceasefire, tanker traffic through the strait remained far below pre-war levels.
Seven months later, Gulf crude exports are recovering, though many cargoes now travel longer and costlier routes. Diesel is not. In August, Gulf diesel exports were barely a quarter of pre-war levels, as refineries damaged in the war remained offline. In Russia, Ukrainian drone strikes have forced half of the country’s six largest diesel refineries to cut or halt output, and Moscow has banned diesel exports. In February, the Gulf and Russia together supplied nearly half of the world’s seaborne diesel. A damaged diesel unit cannot be replaced quickly, and the diesel capacity lost to war and refinery closures may take years to replace.
The ripple reached California. The state has spent years making refining harder. Two refineries have recently closed, and more of the remaining seven are expected to follow. The gap is filled by imports, much of it from Asia. California’s policies did not reduce the state’s demand for refined products. They simply moved the source of those products across the Pacific — and into the path of a crisis on the other side of the world.
The step that makes raw crude oil resources usable
Modern life demands thousands of products, from medicines and fertilizers to plastics, lubricants, and transportation fuels. Most begin as crude oil, natural gas, or coal, which must be refined, gasified, or cracked before they can serve as feedstocks for manufacturing. Crude oil alone yields more than 6,000 products.
Natural resources have latent value. Processing is what makes that value usable. A nation that controls this step controls much of its economic future.
The developing world wants its own refineries
It is no surprise, then, that nations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East want refineries of their own. Rising incomes mean rising transportation fuel demand, and the Hormuz crisis has shown every importer the cost of depending on someone else’s refinery.
Industry databases list roughly 180 new refinery projects announced or planned worldwide for this decade, about 70 of them in Africa. OPEC expects some 5.8 million barrels per day of new refining capacity by 2030, more than 90 percent of it in Asia-Pacific, Africa and the Middle East.
Announced is not built
Engineers know that a project announcement is only the beginning. A refinery must pass through planning, environmental assessment, permitting, financing, front-end engineering, construction, and commissioning. Each stage is a filter.
One of us studied China’s coal-to-gas sector during its boom a decade ago, when dozens of synthetic natural gas projects were announced. Years later, only four were in operation.
Refining is proven technology, so attrition will be far lower. But the lesson holds: count what is being built, not what is being announced. Even so, roughly half of expected capacity growth is already operating or under construction — several million barrels per day. The demand for refined crude oil is real and growing worldwide.
Who can build refineries?
The bottleneck is not ambition. It is capability.
The core process technologies — hydrocracking, catalytic cracking, reforming—are licensed by only a handful of companies. Perhaps two or three dozen engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractors worldwide can deliver a large grassroots refinery. Heavy-wall reactors and large compressors come from a limited number of manufacturers, with long delivery times. The same contractors, compressor makers, and commissioning teams are now needed to repair war-damaged refineries in the Gulf — competing directly with new projects in the developing world. And a refinery needs trained operators, maintenance crews and a regulatory system capable of overseeing it safely. The refinery technical talent cannot be imported overnight.
A refinery can be closed in months. Building one takes five to seven years or more.
Who will pay?
A large refinery costs billions of dollars. Nigeria’s 650,000-barrel-per-day Dangote refinery cost roughly $20 billion.
At the very moment developing nations need this capital, multilateral lenders and many Western banks have stepped back from fossil fuel projects in the name of climate policy. Chinese contractors, meanwhile, arrive with state-backed financing and a construction team in a single package.
Whatever one thinks of the “debt trap” debate, the structure is clear: those who finance and build a nation’s refineries gain lasting influence over its transportation fuel supply. Western climate finance policies have not reduced developing nations’ need for refined products. They have only changed who builds the refineries.
Pollution moves; it does not disappear
Imported fuels must meet U.S. product specifications, and ships are subject to international limits on fuel sulfur, with stricter rules near North American coasts. But the emissions and safety standards at the refinery itself are set where the refinery stands — often far looser than in California.
Closing a tightly regulated California refinery and importing from one with weaker standards, then shipping the product thousands of miles, does not clean the air. It exports the emissions and adds the voyage.
A view from Asia
For Asia, conflict in the Gulf is not a distant event. It is paid for at the pump in Tokyo, Seoul, Mumbai, and Manila, and in the price of every product that depends on refined crude oil. When the strait closes, Asian refineries run short, and the shortage travels on to California.
What the world needs is not another round of escalation but the restoration of free and stable navigation. America should remember that some 95 percent of the world’s 8 billion people live outside its borders. It can end the policies that are forcing its own refineries to close, and help developing nations build theirs well — with technology, training, and financing.
Japan knows this work. For decades, Japanese engineering firms have built refineries, petrochemical complexes, and gas plants across the Middle East and trained the people who run them.
Crude oil is not useless; it is unfinished. Refining completes it. The nations that understand this are building refineries. The question is whether America, Japan, and other partners will help them do it — or leave the job, and the influence, to others.
An improved multi- year record of atmospheric CO₂ from NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory instruments (OCO- 2 and OCO- 3), based on updated data-processing algorithms.
It primarily improves observational constraints and validation for carbon- cycle and atmospheric inversion models, which in turn support and refine the carbon- cycle components of broader climate- Earth- system models.
It affects climate projections mainly indirectly, by improving constraints on the carbon cycle, the processes that determine how much of emitted CO₂ stays in the atmosphere versus being absorbed by land and oceans.
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An improved multi- year record of atmospheric CO₂ from NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory instruments (OCO- 2 and OCO- 3), based on updated data-processing algorithms.
The Eos Research Spotlight (published 30 October 2026 by science writer Sarah Stanley) summarizes a paper by Taylor et al. in Earth and Space Science. Every day, OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 collect more than a million observations of sunlight reflecting off Earth’s surface.
An algorithm converts these into estimates of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (specifically, the column- averaged dry- air mole fraction, XCO₂).
OCO-2 has operated as a free- flying satellite since its 2014 launch; OCO- 3 was installed on the International Space Station in 2019. Together they have provided extensive global coverage and supported studies of the carbon cycle’s responses to events such as wildfires, droughts, and El Niño.
Researchers applied version 11 (v11) of the Atmospheric Carbon Observations from Space (ACOS) Level 2 full- physics retrieval algorithm.
Improvements include:
Better instrument calibration
Updated handling of factors such as clouds, aerosols, and how sunlight reflects off the ocean
Refined quality filtering and bias correction
The resulting record runs from September 2014 through (at least) August 2026-more than a decade. Compared with earlier algorithm versions, the new data generally agree more closely with highly accurate ground-based measurements from the Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON).
OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 also show close agreement with each other (mean difference <0.2 ppm in collocated observations), despite different viewing angles, times, and orbital paths.
The upgraded dataset supports month- by- month (rather than only year- by-year) tracking of atmospheric CO₂ buildup. This enables nearer- real- time monitoring of how extreme events affect the carbon cycle.
The publicly available record is positioned as a benchmark for advancing understanding of the global carbon cycle and for assessing the effectiveness of climate policies.
This image is a visual representation of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels as modeled by NASA’s Goddard Earth Observing System, which incorporates data from the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 satellite. Credit: Scientific Visualization Studio, NASA
It primarily improves observational constraints and validation for carbon- cycle and atmospheric inversion models, which in turn support and refine the carbon- cycle components of broader climate- Earth- system models.
NASA’s OCO- 2 (since 2014) and OCO- 3 (since 2019) measure the column-averaged dry- air mole fraction of CO₂ (XCO₂). The v11 algorithm updates (better calibration, handling of clouds- aerosols- and ocean- reflectance, quality filtering, and bias correction) produce a more consistent record from September 2014 onward that agrees more closely with ground- based TCCON measurements and shows reduced variance and less temporal divergence relative to atmospheric inversion models used as “truth proxies”. OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 also agree with each other to within a mean difference of <0.2 ppm.
These improvements affect modeling in several concrete ways:
Stronger constraints on surface flux inversions Atmospheric inversion models (top- down approaches) assimilate XCO₂ data (alongside in- situ measurements) to estimate net CO₂ fluxes between the surface and atmosphere, i.e., the balance of anthropogenic emissions, land sinks, and ocean uptake. The cleaner, more consistent v11 data reduce systematic errors and provide better- characterized uncertainties. This leads to higher-fidelity estimates of regional- to- global fluxes, seasonal- to-interannual variability, and responses to events such as wildfires, droughts, and El Niño. An OCO- 2 v11 Model Intercomparison Project (MIP) is already underway to quantify the impact of the version change on flux estimates.
Better evaluation and diagnosis of carbon- cycle processes in Earth- system models Climate and Earth- system models include interactive land and ocean carbon components that simulate photosynthesis, respiration, fires, ocean uptake, etc. The multi- year satellite record serves as an independent check on simulated atmospheric CO₂ growth rates, seasonal amplitudes, and spatial patterns. Prior OCO data have already highlighted discrepancies (e.g., many dynamic vegetation models underestimating the seasonal amplitude of the terrestrial carbon cycle). The upgraded record, with lower errors and month- by- month tracking capability, allows finer diagnosis of model strengths/weaknesses, especially for extreme- event responses and carbon- climate feedback.
Support for higher- resolution and near- real- time applications The ability to monitor atmospheric CO₂ accumulation on monthly rather than only annual timescales helps evaluate how models represent short-term variability and extreme events. Combined OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 sampling also improves coverage in some regions (though OCO- 3’s orbit introduces its own sampling challenges that inversions must handle).
Indirect benefits for climate projections and policy assessment More accurate flux estimates and carbon- cycle understanding feed into assessments of the remaining carbon budget, the strength of natural sinks, and the effectiveness of mitigation policies. These, in turn, inform the scenarios and feedback parameterizations used in climate projections. The paper positions the v11 record as a “benchmark” for space- based global carbon-cycle research precisely because of these uses.
The data improve constraints and validation, not the underlying model physics directly. Differences between v10 and v11 XCO₂ will propagate into revised flux estimates, so earlier inversion results may need updating. OCO-3’s irregular sampling and limited high-latitude coverage still require careful treatment in inversions. Overall agreement with models and TCCON is improved but not perfect; residual biases remain at the level of tenths of a ppm in some cases.
In short, the upgrade delivers a more reliable observational backbone for carbon -cycle science. This tightens the link between satellite measurements, flux estimates, process understanding, and the carbon- cycle modules embedded in climate models, ultimately supporting more robust assessments of how the Earth system is responding to rising CO₂.
It affects climate projections mainly indirectly, by improving constraints on the carbon cycle, the processes that determine how much of emitted CO₂ stays in the atmosphere versus being absorbed by land and oceans.
This reduces uncertainty in carbon- climate feedback, which are a significant source of spread in future warming estimates for any given emissions pathway.
Climate projections (e.g., those from CMIP Earth – system models used in IPCC assessments) depend on:
Emissions scenarios (SSPs or similar).
Climate sensitivity.
Carbon- cycle feedback: how warming, droughts, fires, and other changes alter natural sinks, potentially leaving more CO₂ in the air and amplifying warming.
The upgraded OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 ACOS v11 XCO₂ record (2014– present, with better calibration, lower systematic errors, closer agreement with ground measurements, and consistency between the two instruments) strengthens the observational foundation for the carbon- cycle side in these ways:
Better flux estimates via atmospheric inversions The cleaner, longer, and more consistent satellite data are assimilated into inversion models to estimate surface CO₂ fluxes (net land and ocean sinks). Reduced variance relative to prior versions and truth proxies (including inversion models themselves) and the ongoing OCO-2 v11 Model Intercomparison Project should yield more reliable regional- to- global flux estimates and better characterization of interannual variability. These observationally constrained fluxes serve as benchmarks for the carbon- cycle modules in Earth-system models.
Improved evaluation of carbon- cycle processes and feedback Prior OCO data already showed that many dynamic vegetation models underestimate the seasonal amplitude of the terrestrial carbon cycle compared with satellite- and in- situ- constrained fluxes; models with larger (more realistic) amplitudes also tend to show greater sensitivity to climate change over the historical period. A higher- quality multi- year record allows tighter evaluation of how models represent responses to extremes (El Niño, droughts, wildfires). Recent analyses using OCO- related data have highlighted unusually weak land sinks in some years, testing whether models adequately include rapid carbon-loss processes (e.g., extreme fires, climate- driven mortality). Deficiencies here can make some projections of remaining carbon budgets overly optimistic.
Month- by- month monitoring capability The improved record supports tracking atmospheric CO₂ accumulation on monthly rather than only annual timescales. This enables nearer- real- time detection of carbon- cycle anomalies linked to extreme events, providing an early-warning capability that can inform updates to near- term projections, carbon budgets, and model benchmarking for decadal predictions.
Support for remaining carbon budgets and policy assessment More accurate knowledge of current sink strengths and their variability helps refine estimates of how much CO₂ can still be emitted while staying below temperature targets (the remaining carbon budget). It also aids evaluation of whether observed atmospheric growth rates are consistent with reported emissions and policy actions, feeding into updated scenario assessments.
The upgrade does not directly alter emissions scenarios, equilibrium climate sensitivity, or the physical climate components of models. Quantitative impacts on specific projected temperature ranges or carbon budgets from the v11 dataset itself are not yet available (the paper is very recent). Effects will appear gradually as the data are incorporated into inversions, model evaluations, and subsequent assessment cycles.
In summary, the upgraded satellite record provides a stronger observational benchmark for the carbon cycle. This helps reduce (or at least better quantify) a key uncertainty in climate projections, the strength of carbon- climate feedback, and supports more reliable estimates of remaining carbon budgets and the effectiveness of mitigation efforts.
The OCO-2 and OCO-3 ACOS Version 11 XCO2 Data Products: A Benchmark Record for Space-Based Global Carbon Cycle Research
This is the primary research paper behind the Eos spotlight.
NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory- 2 (OCO-2, since September 2014) and OCO-3 (on the ISS since August 2019) measure the column- averaged dry- air mole fraction of CO₂ (XCO₂) from reflected near- infrared sunlight. This paper describes the version 11 (v11) Atmospheric Carbon Observations from Space (ACOS) Level 2 full- physics retrieval algorithm, including updates to quality filtering and bias correction.
Key improvements and results:
Updates include better instrument calibration, spectroscopy (ABSCO tables), meteorology and prior profiles, ocean surface reflectance parameterization, digital elevation model, and handling of clouds and aerosols.
The resulting XCO₂ products show reduced systematic errors and better agreement between actual and theoretical uncertainties (especially for OCO- 3) compared with the previous v10 versions.
Validation against the Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON) and atmospheric inversion models (used as truth proxies) shows reduced variance and less temporal divergence.
Collocated OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 observations agree to a mean difference of <0.2 ppm across their overlapping period, better than either dataset agrees with the validation sources.
The unified, inter- calibrated record spans September 2014– August 2026 (OCO-2) and August 2019 onward (OCO- 3). Data are publicly available from the NASA Earthdata Cloud (including both X2007 and X2019 WMO scales, plus low-latency forward-stream files).
Conclusions from the paper
The lower and better- characterized errors “should enable higher- fidelity carbon cycle science studies, at local, regional, and global scales.” Together with related GOSAT v11 data, these products form a long- term global benchmark record for space- based carbon- cycle research.
The paper itself focuses on the retrieval algorithm, data quality, and validation rather than directly quantifying impacts on climate models or projections. Those applications (flux inversions, carbon- cycle evaluation, remaining carbon budgets, etc.) are enabled by the improved dataset, as discussed in our earlier exchanges.
Full text is available via the Wiley link (institutional access or purchase may be required) or through repositories such as CaltechAUTHORS. Data products can be downloaded from NASA Earthdata.
NASA Earthdata is the primary public portal for accessing the upgraded OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 data products discussed in the Taylor et al. (2026) paper.
All Level 2 Lite File (LtCO2) products, forward- stream files, and related documentation for the ACOS Version 11 XCO₂ data are freely available through the NASA Earthdata Cloud / GES DISC.
NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) and OCO-3 have been observing Earth’s atmosphere from space since September 2014 and August 2019, respectively. The version 11 (v11) Atmospheric Carbon Observations from Space (ACOS) Level 2 full physics (L2FP) retrieval algorithm has been used to provide estimates of the column-averaged dry-air mole fraction of carbon dioxide (XCO2) from OCO measurements of surface reflected near-infrared solar radiation. In this work, updates to the ACOS v11 retrieval algorithm are discussed, and the quality filtering and bias correction of the XCO2 products are described. XCO2 estimates from OCO-2 and OCO-3 are compared to Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON) observations and to atmospheric inversion models, which serve as truth-proxies for XCO2. In addition, a direct comparison of collocated soundings between OCO-2 and OCO-3 is performed. Variations in v11 XCO2 over small areas show improvement in agreement between actual and theoretical uncertainties, suggesting a reduction in systematic errors compared to v10, especially for OCO-3. There is reduced variance in the new v11 XCO2 product relative to truth-proxies, including less divergence in the XCO2 values with time against models. The collocations of XCO2 observations between OCO-2 and OCO-3 indicate an overall mean difference of <0.2 ppm across the overlapping time range. Furthermore, OCO-2 and OCO-3 agree better with each other than they do with the validation sources, suggesting a well conditioned and unified set of XCO2 concentrations that can be used concurrently for carbon cycle studies to provide a benchmark record spanning September 2014 through August 2026.
European (especially German and EU) wholesale natural gas prices have recently been trading at roughly 10- 12 times U.S. levels, creating severe competitive pressure on energy- intensive basic industries.
Hans- Werner Sinn, the former long- time president of the ifo Institute, delivered a sharp critique of Germany’s Energiewende (energy transition) in a lecture on 9 October 2026 at the University of Lucerne (hosted by the Institut für Schweizer Wirtschaftspolitik- IWP).
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European (especially German and EU) wholesale natural gas prices have recently been trading at roughly 10- 12 times U.S. levels, creating severe competitive pressure on energy- intensive basic industries.
As of late October 2026, the Dutch TTF benchmark (Europe’s main wholesale gas price reference) has climbed above €97– €100 and more /MWh (and higher intraday), its highest levels since late 2022.
This follows a sharp rise from earlier 2026 levels around €30- €35/MWh, driven by winter demand concerns, storage dynamics, Middle East tensions affecting energy markets, and Europe’s structural reliance on higher- cost LNG after the loss of most Russian pipeline supply.
In contrast, the U.S. Henry Hub benchmark has been around $2.80–$3.00/MMBtu (roughly equivalent to €7–8/MWh after unit conversion). Converted to comparable energy units, this produces a European premium of about 10–12× (sometimes cited near 11- 13× on peak days).
Why the gap exists and persists
Natural gas markets are regional rather than fully global. U.S. shale production keeps domestic prices low and abundant. Shipping gas to Europe requires liquefaction, tanker transport, and regasification, adding substantial cost, so Europe’s marginal supply is often LNG priced well above Henry Hub.
Pre- 2022, Europe benefited from cheaper Russian pipeline gas; the shift to LNG (and earlier policy choices on domestic production/nuclear) has left a structural premium. Even in quieter periods the ratio has often stayed in the 3–5 times range; recent spikes have pushed it much higher.
German official data (Destatis) reflect rising industrial energy costs: producer prices for energy rose sharply year- on- year in recent months (e.g., energy component +14.9% in one September report), with natural gas distribution prices elevated. This feeds into higher costs for manufacturing.
Impact on basic industry
Energy- intensive sectors, chemicals, fertilizers (ammonia), steel, glass, ceramics, paper, use natural gas both as fuel and feedstock. A 10 times price differential makes European production structurally uncompetitive against U.S. (or other low- cost) rivals.
Consequences already observed or warned about include:
Reduced capacity utilization (e.g., German chemical plants operating well below historical norms).
Temporary shutdowns, permanent closures, or relocation of production/investment.
Erosion of export margins and acceleration of deindustrialization risks in Germany and wider Europe.
Higher electricity prices (gas often sets the marginal price), compounding the problem.
Industry voices and analyses (including earlier Draghi competitiveness reports noting 4- 5 times gaps) have long flagged this as a core competitiveness handicap. Current spikes intensify warnings that basic industry faces decline without relief on energy costs, storage security, or alternative supplies.
In short, the headline accurately captures a real and acute market reality as of late October 2026: Europe’s gas costs remain dramatically higher than the U.S., threatening the viability of energy- intensive manufacturing.
Hans- Werner Sinn, the former long- time president of the ifo Institute, delivered a sharp critique of Germany’s Energiewende (energy transition) in a lecture on 9 October 2026 at the University of Lucerne (hosted by the Institut für Schweizer Wirtschaftspolitik- IWP).
Key points from Sinn’s assessment
Broken promises: Politicians had claimed the transition would deliver cheap energy, open new export markets for German technology, and establish Germany as a global climate leader. Sinn argues none of these materialized. Instead, electricity costs remain high, industry is under severe pressure, and Germany has not become a model others follow.
Technical and economic flaws: Wind and solar are weather- dependent. This requires near-full back up from conventional (often fossil) plants, storage, and expanded grids, creating a costly dual system with high fixed costs. He estimated renewables (especially wind and solar) still account for only a modest share of total final energy consumption (around 9 percentage points from wind and solar in some of his figures, with overall renewables higher but far short of full replacement). Achieving climate neutrality by 2045 would require roughly a tenfold expansion of wind and solar within about two decades, something he views as unrealistic given storage, grid, permitting, and acceptance constraints.
Climate targets: Germany’s statutory goals (65% emissions cut by 2030 vs. 1990, 88% by 2040, net- zero by 2045) are, in his view, out of reach under current technology and economics. Past emissions reductions partly reflect industrial decline rather than pure efficiency or clean- energy success.
Carbon leakage and unilateral action: Unilateral European cuts in fossil demand simply shift production (and emissions) elsewhere while potentially lowering global fossil prices, encouraging more consumption abroad. He applies similar logic to the combustion- engine phase- out and oil- heating bans: reduced German demand does not eliminate the fuel; it is burned elsewhere, sometimes with higher overall emissions.
Broader context: Sinn frames the Energiewende as part of a deeper structural crisis, the most severe since World War II, driven by high energy costs (linked to the nuclear phase, out and loss of cheap Russian gas), bureaucracy, ESG rules, and social policy. He has called for “unwinding 15 years of Merkel policies”, a return to nuclear power, accelerated depreciation to spur investment, longer working lives, workfare over welfare, and a more realistic international climate approach rather than European go-it-alone targets.
Sinn does not deny human- caused climate change. His long- standing critique focuses on the design and feasibility of Germany’s specific policy path: intermittency costs, missing storage at scale, carbon leakage, and the damage to industrial competitiveness. The IWP lecture and subsequent coverage (including podcasts and articles) present this as a comprehensive settling of accounts with the transition’s results versus its original sales pitch.
Parts of the Tibetan Plateau’s near-surface permafrost (frozen ground) have been gaining ground ice since around 2000, despite regional warming, due to increased precipitation driven by stronger westerly winds.
The Karakoram anomaly (also called the Karakoram glacier anomaly) refers to the unusual behavior of glaciers in the Karakoram Range, where they have remained roughly stable or shown slight mass gains (and sometimes advances or increased surge activity) over recent decades, while most mountain glaciers worldwide, including those elsewhere in High Mountain Asia (the Himalayas, etc.), have been losing mass and retreating due to climate warming.
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Parts of the Tibetan Plateau’s near- surface permafrost (frozen ground) have been gaining ground ice since around 2000, despite regional warming, due to increased precipitation driven by stronger westerly winds.
This comes from a July 2026 study in Science Advances titled “Westerly induced precipitation increases drives near- surface ground ice gain on the Tibetan Plateau despite warming,” led by Yi Zhao and Dongfeng Li (Peking University) with co- authors including Jan Nitzbon (Alfred Wegener Institute) and others.
Key findings
Across roughly 35% of the plateau’s permafrost area (mainly the interior, westerly- influenced regions), near- surface ground ice (frozen water content or FWC in the soil pores) has increased at the base of the active layer (the seasonally thawing top layer, typically ~1.4– 3.2 m depth). The southeastern monsoon- dominated areas show the expected ice loss.
Evidence includes:
Borehole data from 369 sites (194 pre- 2000, 175 post- 2000): older holes averaged ~16% ice by volume; newer ones ~25%. Paired nearby boreholes drilled years apart consistently showed higher ice in the later samples, concentrated at the active- layer base.
A physics- based permafrost model (SHAW) driven by climate data (1979–2018), validated against the boreholes and supported by satellite InSAR ground- deformation data.
Model estimates: westerly- fed regions gained ~144 km³ (~35 cubic miles) of ice in the top ~3.2 m between 1979 and 2018; monsoon areas lost less; net plateau- wide gain ~98 km³.
Why this happens despite warming
The Tibetan Plateau is warming roughly twice as fast as the global average, which would normally promote thaw and ice loss. However, strengthened westerlies have increased annual precipitation in the interior by about 60% after 2000 (from ~227.5 mm to ~364.8 mm), bringing extra moisture from the Mediterranean/Iran region.
Extra rain and snowmelt infiltrate the thawed active layer in summer, reach the cold base (near or below 0 °C year- round), and refreeze there. Near- surface ice still melts seasonally. Model experiments isolating variables confirmed precipitation increase as the dominant driver: holding precipitation at pre-2000 levels produced ice loss under observed warming, while holding temperature steady and allowing precipitation to rise produced even faster ice gain.
This is analogous to the “Karakoram anomaly”, where some nearby glaciers have held or gained mass due to increased snowfall from similar circulation changes.
Implications
Accumulated ice amplifies seasonal freeze- thaw heave and settlement (InSAR shows higher deformation rates, ~18 mm/year vs. ~14 mm/year elsewhere), which can destabilize landscapes, infrastructure (roads, buildings), and increase erosion or sediment delivery to rivers.
The ice gain may be temporary; in some modeled areas it slowed or reversed as thaw deepened. Long- term projections still indicate substantial permafrost degradation later this century.
The study highlights that rapid precipitation changes can locally outweigh temperature effects on cryosphere evolution.
Note: The provided attribution (Ahsan Tanveer, Akaash Babar, Peking University) does not match the paper’s authors; Tanveer is a robotics researcher at PKU, so this may refer to a news summary or secondary piece. The primary research is the Science Advances paper by Zhao, Li et al.
Where the plateau’s frozen ground is gaining ice. Green areas on this model-based map show ice increasing between 1979 and 2018; brown areas show it decreasing. The gains cluster in the west, along the path of the westerly winds. Credit: Peking University
The Karakoram anomaly (also called the Karakoram glacier anomaly) refers to the unusual behavior of glaciers in the Karakoram Range, where they have remained roughly stable or shown slight mass gains (and sometimes advances or increased surge activity) over recent decades, while most mountain glaciers worldwide, including those elsewhere in High Mountain Asia (the Himalayas, etc.), have been losing mass and retreating due to climate warming.
Key details
Location: The Karakoram is a high mountain range straddling parts of Pakistan, India, China, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. It contains some of the world’s tallest peaks (including K2) and one of the largest concentrations of glaciers outside the polar regions (thousands of glaciers covering more than 20,000 km²).
Observations: Noted from the 1990s onward (formally named by glaciologist Kenneth Hewitt around 2005), remote sensing, geodetic measurements, and field data showed balanced to slightly positive mass budgets, stable or advancing termini in places, increased ice- flow speeds in some cases, and widespread surging. Similar (though weaker or shifting) behavior has been observed in nearby areas such as the Western Kunlun and parts of the Pamir (sometimes called the broader Pamir- Karakoram anomaly).
Contrast: Globally, glaciers outside Greenland and Antarctica lost substantial mass (on the order of hundreds of kg m⁻² per year on average in recent decades). Most of High Mountain Asia followed this pattern of retreat and mass loss.
Main explanations
The leading drivers involve regional meteorology rather than (or in addition to) local factors like heavy debris cover on glaciers or steep topography and avalanche feeding:
Strengthened or shifted westerly winds (mid-latitude circulation) delivering more winter snowfall and moisture from the Mediterranean, Caspian, or North Atlantic regions.
Related changes such as increased precipitation intensity, possible summer cooling or reduced melt energy (via cloud cover, albedo, or other factors), and interactions with the region’s extreme topography.
A 2020 review in Nature Geoscience summarized complementary meteorological and process explanations but noted that understanding remains incomplete.
Recent status and outlook
More recent studies (into the 2020s) indicate the anomaly has weakened or shifted. Some analyses show near- equilibrium overall for Karakoram glaciers over ~2000– 2023 but with emerging mass deficits in parts (e.g., recent years or eastern sectors), a westward migration of the stable and gain core, and clearer losses in adjacent ranges like the Pamir. Temperature rise is increasingly dominant, and long- term persistence is considered unlikely under projected continued warming.
This phenomenon was referenced in the recent Tibetan Plateau permafrost study as a parallel example of localized cryospheric ice gain (or stability) driven by precipitation changes outweighing warming effects in specific High Mountain Asia settings.
How the ice builds up and fades. As rain increases, ice collects at the bottom of the layer that melts each summer (middle); with further warming, that ice melts again (right). Credit: Peking University
Westerly induced precipitation increase drives near-surface ground ice gain on the Tibetan Plateau despite warming
Abstract (key points)
Near- surface ground ice loss is typically a key sign of permafrost degradation under global warming, affecting ground stability and carbon feedback. However, field evidence shows ground ice can locally accumulate.
Using borehole ground- ice observations, a physics- based permafrost model (SHAW), and satellite- based ground deformation (InSAR) data, the authors identify an anomalous increase in ice at the bottom of the active layer across the interior Tibetan Plateau. This affects about 35% of the plateau’s permafrost area, despite ongoing climate warming.
Mechanism: Strengthened mid- latitude westerlies have increased precipitation (by ~60% after 2000 in the affected regions), supplying extra soil moisture that infiltrates the seasonally thawed active layer and refreezes at its cold base.
The freeze- thaw cycles linked to this accumulated ice amplify ground deformation, which can destabilize landscapes and infrastructure.
The authors note this as a divergent cryospheric response (local ice gain) against the global trend of ice loss, paralleling the Karakoram glacier anomaly, and highlight that rapid precipitation increases can locally outweigh temperature effects in driving cryosphere changes on the Tibetan Plateau.
Additional highlights from the paper and coverage
Borehole data (369 sites): higher ice content post-2000, especially at 1.4–3.2 m depth.
Model results (1979– 2018): net ground- ice gain of ~+98 km³ across the plateau’s permafrost (gains of ~+144 km³ in westerly regions offsetting losses of ~–46.5 km³ in monsoon regions).
Scenario experiments confirmed precipitation (wetting) as the dominant driver over warming.
Implications for infrastructure stability and regional hydrology.
The full paper (including figures, methods, and supplementary materials) is available at the link you provided.
Journal:Science Advances, (Vol. 12, Issue 30), open- access paper
On October 26, Our World in Data published a piece by Hannah Ritchie and Pablo Arriagada asking how much development aid is spent on climate change. Ritchie opens by saying she cares a lot about climate and a lot about bed nets, and that the two could collide.
Count only the projects where climate is the main objective and the share falls from 34% to 13%. Then they open up individual projects.
On October 26, Our World in Data published a piece by Hannah Ritchie and Pablo Arriagada asking how much development aid is spent on climate change. Ritchie opens by saying she cares a lot about climate and a lot about bed nets, and that the two could collide.
With a fixed aid budget, every dollar spent on climate programs is one less dollar for everything else. And with large cuts to foreign aid in the last few years, that budget is shrinking.
The data come from the OECD’s RioMarkers database, which tags bilateral aid projects by whether they target climate mitigation or adaptation. The answer:
Around one-third of this funding — $50 billion — was committed to climate-related projects in 2024.
That is a third of project-specific bilateral aid, almost a quarter of all bilateral aid, and by their estimate about a fifth of all development aid. In 2010 the project share was around 18%. By 2024 it was 34%.
Across the rich world, nearly a quarter of all development aid now goes to climate projects.
The core problem is opportunity cost. Every dollar subsidizing solar panels or carbon accounting is a dollar not spent on schools, maternal health or clean water.
Across the rich world, nearly a quarter of all development aid now goes to climate projects.
The core problem is opportunity cost. Every dollar subsidizing solar panels or carbon accounting is a dollar not spent on schools, maternal health or clean water.…
That second paragraph is lifted from a Financial Post op-ed he wrote with Indermit Gill, the former chief economist of the World Bank, which puts the rich-world figure at US$49 billion.
Here is where it gets interesting. Ritchie and Arriagada went looking at what the label covers.
As you can see in the chart, more than half of climate-related funding goes to projects where it’s only a secondary objective. All funding for these projects is counted in its full value, not just the share we might attribute to climate.
Count only the projects where climate is the main objective and the share falls from 34% to 13%. Then they open up individual projects. Japan’s $310 million water supply project in drought-prone Samawah, Iraq, is tagged as adaptation with climate as the main objective. France’s $122 million Kakono hydro plant in Tanzania, climate as a primary objective. And this one:
Finally, South Korea provided $163 million for a hospital and training center in Tanzania. Building a hospital and healthcare facilities is a fairly standard development aid project. But because it’s built with energy efficiency and low-carbon design in mind, it’s counted as mitigation as a secondary objective. It doesn’t exist to tackle climate change, but all of this $163 million counts as climate-related aid.
Water for a desert town and power for Tanzania were aid projects long before anyone attached a climate tag. Ritchie says as much: rich countries were funding energy infrastructure in poor ones “long before aid statistics had a climate tag attached.”
So which is it, money diverted or money relabelled? The authors say probably both, and that the data can’t tell them how much of each. The donors have a reason to prefer the second. Climate finance pledges are supposed to be new money. A hospital that counts toward the pledge and the aid budget at the same time lets a government tick both boxes with one cheque.
The OWID data hold a hint. In constant 2024 dollars, bilateral project aid from DAC members that carried no climate tag at all was $97.6 billion in 2010 and $95.8 billion in 2024. Total project aid grew. Everything that grew wore the climate label.
The donors aren’t uniform either.
Chart from Our World in Data.
South Korea tags more than 60% of its bilateral aid as climate-related, Japan between about 50% and 80%, France above 40%. The United States and Canada sit below a fifth. Ritchie asks whether that is a real difference in what they fund or just a difference in how keen they are to tick the box. Given the Tanzanian hospital, I’d bet on the box.
And the money isn’t going mostly to the poorest. OWID notes that climate-related projects dominate aid spending in Brazil and India, both middle-income countries.
Meanwhile, what do the recipients want? Gill and Lomborg:
Tellingly, Africans ranked climate change 31st among 34 priorities in a recent Afrobarometer survey.
They also cite Copenhagen Consensus estimates that US$2.50 of micronutrient supplements for an expectant mother returns nearly US$100 in long-term benefits, and that tuberculosis and malaria treatment returns more than $45 per dollar. Their suggestion comes from Norway, where an expert group has recommended separating climate finance from the development budget.
Ritchie ends by inviting someone to go through historical aid projects and find out how much of the climate column is new. That would be worth reading.
How many other hospitals are in the $50 billion?
And how much of the pledged climate finance turns out to be the old aid budget with a green sticker on it?
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Charts and quotes from Our World in Data, CC BY 4.0.
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