NASAโ€™s Decade of Space-Based COโ‚‚ Data Gets a Major Upgradeโ€”Sharpening the View of Earthโ€™s Carbon Cycle

An improved multi- year record of atmospheric COโ‚‚ from NASAโ€™s Orbiting Carbon Observatory instruments (OCO- 2 and OCO- 3), based on updated data-processing algorithms.

It primarily improves observational constraints and validation for carbon- cycle and atmospheric inversion models, which in turn support and refine the carbon- cycle components of broader climate- Earth- system models.

It affects climate projections mainly indirectly, by improving constraints on the carbon cycle, the processes that determine how much of emitted COโ‚‚ stays in the atmosphere versus being absorbed by land and oceans.

Infographic of NASA's Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO-2 and OCO-3) tracking global carbon dioxide levels, featuring Earth with CO2 concentration data, orbital tracks, and satellite specifications.
AI generated by Grok

An improved multi- year record of atmospheric COโ‚‚ from NASAโ€™s Orbiting Carbon Observatory instruments (OCO- 2 and OCO- 3), based on updated data-processing algorithms.

The Eos Research Spotlight (published 30 October 2026 by science writer Sarah Stanley) summarizes a paper by Taylor et al. in Earth and Space Science. Every day, OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 collect more than a million observations of sunlight reflecting off Earthโ€™s surface.

An algorithm converts these into estimates of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (specifically, the column- averaged dry- air mole fraction, XCOโ‚‚).

OCO-2 has operated as a free- flying satellite since its 2014 launch; OCO- 3 was installed on the International Space Station in 2019. Together they have provided extensive global coverage and supported studies of the carbon cycleโ€™s responses to events such as wildfires, droughts, and El Niรฑo.

Researchers applied version 11 (v11) of the Atmospheric Carbon Observations from Space (ACOS) Level 2 full- physics retrieval algorithm.

Improvements include:

  • Better instrument calibration
  • Updated handling of factors such as clouds, aerosols, and how sunlight reflects off the ocean
  • Refined quality filtering and bias correction

The resulting record runs from September 2014 through (at least) August 2026-more than a decade. Compared with earlier algorithm versions, the new data generally agree more closely with highly accurate ground-based measurements from the Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON).

OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 also show close agreement with each other (mean difference <0.2 ppm in collocated observations), despite different viewing angles, times, and orbital paths.

The upgraded dataset supports month- by- month (rather than only year- by-year) tracking of atmospheric COโ‚‚ buildup. This enables nearer- real- time monitoring of how extreme events affect the carbon cycle.

The publicly available record is positioned as a benchmark for advancing understanding of the global carbon cycle and for assessing the effectiveness of climate policies.

Thomas E. Taylor et al., โ€œThe OCO-2 and OCO-3 ACOS Version 11 XCOโ‚‚ Data Products: A Benchmark Record for Space- Based Global Carbon Cycle Research,โ€ Earth and Space Science (2026), https://doi.org/10.1029/2026EA005360.[](https://phys.org/news/2026-10-decade-carbon-dioxide-space.html)

The Eos article itself is available at: https://eos.org/research-spotlights/a-decade-of-carbon-dioxide-data-from-space-gets-an-upgrade.

View of Earth from space with a reddish haze, indicating atmospheric distortion or pollution.
This image is a visual representation of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels as modeled by NASA’s Goddard Earth Observing System, which incorporates data from the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 satellite. Credit: Scientific Visualization Studio, NASA

It primarily improves observational constraints and validation for carbon- cycle and atmospheric inversion models, which in turn support and refine the carbon- cycle components of broader climate- Earth- system models.

NASAโ€™s OCO- 2 (since 2014) and OCO- 3 (since 2019) measure the column-averaged dry- air mole fraction of COโ‚‚ (XCOโ‚‚). The v11 algorithm updates (better calibration, handling of clouds- aerosols- and ocean- reflectance, quality filtering, and bias correction) produce a more consistent record from September 2014 onward that agrees more closely with ground- based TCCON measurements and shows reduced variance and less temporal divergence relative to atmospheric inversion models used as โ€œtruth proxiesโ€. OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 also agree with each other to within a mean difference of <0.2 ppm.

These improvements affect modeling in several concrete ways:

  • Stronger constraints on surface flux inversions
    Atmospheric inversion models (top- down approaches) assimilate XCOโ‚‚ data (alongside in- situ measurements) to estimate net COโ‚‚ fluxes between the surface and atmosphere, i.e., the balance of anthropogenic emissions, land sinks, and ocean uptake. The cleaner, more consistent v11 data reduce systematic errors and provide better- characterized uncertainties. This leads to higher-fidelity estimates of regional- to- global fluxes, seasonal- to-interannual variability, and responses to events such as wildfires, droughts, and El Niรฑo. An OCO- 2 v11 Model Intercomparison Project (MIP) is already underway to quantify the impact of the version change on flux estimates.
  • Better evaluation and diagnosis of carbon- cycle processes in Earth- system models
    Climate and Earth- system models include interactive land and ocean carbon components that simulate photosynthesis, respiration, fires, ocean uptake, etc. The multi- year satellite record serves as an independent check on simulated atmospheric COโ‚‚ growth rates, seasonal amplitudes, and spatial patterns. Prior OCO data have already highlighted discrepancies (e.g., many dynamic vegetation models underestimating the seasonal amplitude of the terrestrial carbon cycle). The upgraded record, with lower errors and month- by- month tracking capability, allows finer diagnosis of model strengths/weaknesses, especially for extreme- event responses and carbon- climate feedback.โ 
  • Support for higher- resolution and near- real- time applications
    The ability to monitor atmospheric COโ‚‚ accumulation on monthly rather than only annual timescales helps evaluate how models represent short-term variability and extreme events. Combined OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 sampling also improves coverage in some regions (though OCO- 3โ€™s orbit introduces its own sampling challenges that inversions must handle).
  • Indirect benefits for climate projections and policy assessment
    More accurate flux estimates and carbon- cycle understanding feed into assessments of the remaining carbon budget, the strength of natural sinks, and the effectiveness of mitigation policies. These, in turn, inform the scenarios and feedback parameterizations used in climate projections. The paper positions the v11 record as a โ€œbenchmarkโ€ for space- based global carbon-cycle research precisely because of these uses.

The data improve constraints and validation, not the underlying model physics directly. Differences between v10 and v11 XCOโ‚‚ will propagate into revised flux estimates, so earlier inversion results may need updating. OCO-3โ€™s irregular sampling and limited high-latitude coverage still require careful treatment in inversions. Overall agreement with models and TCCON is improved but not perfect; residual biases remain at the level of tenths of a ppm in some cases.

In short, the upgrade delivers a more reliable observational backbone for carbon -cycle science. This tightens the link between satellite measurements, flux estimates, process understanding, and the carbon- cycle modules embedded in climate models, ultimately supporting more robust assessments of how the Earth system is responding to rising COโ‚‚.

Global map showing locations of OCO-3 SAMs/Targets acquired from July 2019 to December 2025, with a bar chart indicating the number of acquisitions by category.
The OCOโ€2 and OCOโ€3 ACOS Version 11 XCO<sub>2</sub> Data Products: A Benchmark Record for Spaceโ€Based Global Carbon Cycle Research – Taylor – 2026 – Earth and Space Science – Wiley Online Library

It affects climate projections mainly indirectly, by improving constraints on the carbon cycle, the processes that determine how much of emitted COโ‚‚ stays in the atmosphere versus being absorbed by land and oceans.

This reduces uncertainty in carbon- climate feedback, which are a significant source of spread in future warming estimates for any given emissions pathway.

Climate projections (e.g., those from CMIP Earth – system models used in IPCC assessments) depend on:

  • Emissions scenarios (SSPs or similar).
  • Climate sensitivity.
  • Carbon- cycle feedback: how warming, droughts, fires, and other changes alter natural sinks, potentially leaving more COโ‚‚ in the air and amplifying warming.

The upgraded OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 ACOS v11 XCOโ‚‚ record (2014โ€“ present, with better calibration, lower systematic errors, closer agreement with ground measurements, and consistency between the two instruments) strengthens the observational foundation for the carbon- cycle side in these ways:

  • Better flux estimates via atmospheric inversions
    The cleaner, longer, and more consistent satellite data are assimilated into inversion models to estimate surface COโ‚‚ fluxes (net land and ocean sinks). Reduced variance relative to prior versions and truth proxies (including inversion models themselves) and the ongoing OCO-2 v11 Model Intercomparison Project should yield more reliable regional- to- global flux estimates and better characterization of interannual variability. These observationally constrained fluxes serve as benchmarks for the carbon- cycle modules in Earth-system models.โ 
  • Improved evaluation of carbon- cycle processes and feedback
    Prior OCO data already showed that many dynamic vegetation models underestimate the seasonal amplitude of the terrestrial carbon cycle compared with satellite- and in- situ- constrained fluxes; models with larger (more realistic) amplitudes also tend to show greater sensitivity to climate change over the historical period. A higher- quality multi- year record allows tighter evaluation of how models represent responses to extremes (El Niรฑo, droughts, wildfires). Recent analyses using OCO- related data have highlighted unusually weak land sinks in some years, testing whether models adequately include rapid carbon-loss processes (e.g., extreme fires, climate- driven mortality). Deficiencies here can make some projections of remaining carbon budgets overly optimistic.โ 
  • Month- by- month monitoring capability
    The improved record supports tracking atmospheric COโ‚‚ accumulation on monthly rather than only annual timescales. This enables nearer- real- time detection of carbon- cycle anomalies linked to extreme events, providing an early-warning capability that can inform updates to near- term projections, carbon budgets, and model benchmarking for decadal predictions.โ 
  • Support for remaining carbon budgets and policy assessment
    More accurate knowledge of current sink strengths and their variability helps refine estimates of how much COโ‚‚ can still be emitted while staying below temperature targets (the remaining carbon budget). It also aids evaluation of whether observed atmospheric growth rates are consistent with reported emissions and policy actions, feeding into updated scenario assessments.

The upgrade does not directly alter emissions scenarios, equilibrium climate sensitivity, or the physical climate components of models. Quantitative impacts on specific projected temperature ranges or carbon budgets from the v11 dataset itself are not yet available (the paper is very recent). Effects will appear gradually as the data are incorporated into inversions, model evaluations, and subsequent assessment cycles.

In summary, the upgraded satellite record provides a stronger observational benchmark for the carbon cycle. This helps reduce (or at least better quantify) a key uncertainty in climate projections, the strength of carbon- climate feedback, and supports more reliable estimates of remaining carbon budgets and the effectiveness of mitigation efforts.

Scatter plot comparing GEOS5 FP-IT prior wind speeds against AMSR2 medium frequency wind speeds.
The OCOโ€2 and OCOโ€3 ACOS Version 11 XCO<sub>2</sub> Data Products: A Benchmark Record for Spaceโ€Based Global Carbon Cycle Research – Taylor – 2026 – Earth and Space Science – Wiley Online Library

The OCO-2 and OCO-3 ACOS Version 11 XCO2 Data Products: A Benchmark Record for Space-Based Global Carbon Cycle Research

This is the primary research paper behind the Eos spotlight.

NASAโ€™s Orbiting Carbon Observatory- 2 (OCO-2, since September 2014) and OCO-3 (on the ISS since August 2019) measure the column- averaged dry- air mole fraction of COโ‚‚ (XCOโ‚‚) from reflected near- infrared sunlight. This paper describes the version 11 (v11) Atmospheric Carbon Observations from Space (ACOS) Level 2 full- physics retrieval algorithm, including updates to quality filtering and bias correction.

Key improvements and results:

  • Updates include better instrument calibration, spectroscopy (ABSCO tables), meteorology and prior profiles, ocean surface reflectance parameterization, digital elevation model, and handling of clouds and aerosols.
  • The resulting XCOโ‚‚ products show reduced systematic errors and better agreement between actual and theoretical uncertainties (especially for OCO- 3) compared with the previous v10 versions.
  • Validation against the Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON) and atmospheric inversion models (used as truth proxies) shows reduced variance and less temporal divergence.
  • Collocated OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 observations agree to a mean difference of <0.2 ppm across their overlapping period, better than either dataset agrees with the validation sources.
  • The unified, inter- calibrated record spans September 2014โ€“ August 2026 (OCO-2) and August 2019 onward (OCO- 3). Data are publicly available from the NASA Earthdata Cloud (including both X2007 and X2019 WMO scales, plus low-latency forward-stream files).

Conclusions from the paper

The lower and better- characterized errors โ€œshould enable higher- fidelity carbon cycle science studies, at local, regional, and global scales.โ€ Together with related GOSAT v11 data, these products form a long- term global benchmark record for space- based carbon- cycle research.

The paper itself focuses on the retrieval algorithm, data quality, and validation rather than directly quantifying impacts on climate models or projections. Those applications (flux inversions, carbon- cycle evaluation, remaining carbon budgets, etc.) are enabled by the improved dataset, as discussed in our earlier exchanges.

Full text is available via the Wiley link (institutional access or purchase may be required) or through repositories such as CaltechAUTHORS. Data products can be downloaded from NASA Earthdata.

NASA Earthdata is the primary public portal for accessing the upgraded OCO- 2 and OCO- 3 data products discussed in the Taylor et al. (2026) paper.

Main access point

All Level 2 Lite File (LtCO2) products, forward- stream files, and related documentation for the ACOS Version 11 XCOโ‚‚ data are freely available through the NASA Earthdata Cloud / GES DISC.

Key datasets from the paper

InstrumentVersionProductDOI / Notes
OCO- 2v11.2OCO2_L2_Lite_FP_11.2rhttps://doi.org/10.5067/70K2B2W8MNGY
OCO- 2v11.3OCO2_L2_Lite_FP (recommended after 1 Jan 2024)Current production version (includes icing correction)
OCO- 3v11OCO3_L2_Lite_FP_11rhttps://doi.org/10.5067/8U0VGVQC7HZG
  • Data are provided on both the older X2007 and current X2019 WMO COโ‚‚ scales.
  • Low- latency (forward- stream) daily files are also available (typically within ~2 days of observation).
  • Supporting files include L1b, meteorology, preprocessor, and diagnostic products.

How to get the data

  1. Go to earthdata.nasa.gov and create a free Earthdata Login account (required for downloads).
  2. Use Earthdata Search and search for โ€œOCO- 2โ€ or โ€œOCO- 3โ€ and โ€œLite FPโ€ or the specific version (e.g., โ€œOCO2_L2_Lite_FP_11โ€).
  3. Or go directly via the GES DISC portal linked from Earthdata.

Useful documentation

  • Data Userโ€™s Guide for OCO- 2 (v11.3) and OCO- 3 (v11)
  • Data Release Statements for each version
  • Available on the GES DISC documentation pages or via the links in the Taylor et al. paper.

Journal: Earth and Space Science, Open Access, Volume13, Issue10

DOI: 10.1029/2026ea005360

First published: 22 October 2026

Provided: Eos

Authors: Thomas E. Taylor, Christopher W. Oโ€™Dell, Albert Chang, Abhishek Chatterjee, Cecilia Cheng, Lan Dang, Saswati Das, Brendan Fisher, Dejian Fu, Jonathan Hobbs, Nicole Jacobs โ€ฆ

Abstract

NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) and OCO-3 have been observing Earth’s atmosphere from space since September 2014 and August 2019, respectively. The version 11 (v11) Atmospheric Carbon Observations from Space (ACOS) Level 2 full physics (L2FP) retrieval algorithm has been used to provide estimates of the column-averaged dry-air mole fraction of carbon dioxide (XCO2) from OCO measurements of surface reflected near-infrared solar radiation. In this work, updates to the ACOS v11 retrieval algorithm are discussed, and the quality filtering and bias correction of the XCO2 products are described. XCO2 estimates from OCO-2 and OCO-3 are compared to Total Carbon Column Observing Network (TCCON) observations and to atmospheric inversion models, which serve as truth-proxies for XCO2. In addition, a direct comparison of collocated soundings between OCO-2 and OCO-3 is performed. Variations in v11 XCO2 over small areas show improvement in agreement between actual and theoretical uncertainties, suggesting a reduction in systematic errors compared to v10, especially for OCO-3. There is reduced variance in the new v11 XCO2 product relative to truth-proxies, including less divergence in the XCO2 values with time against models. The collocations of XCO2 observations between OCO-2 and OCO-3 indicate an overall mean difference of <0.2โ€‰ppm across the overlapping time range. Furthermore, OCO-2 and OCO-3 agree better with each other than they do with the validation sources, suggesting a well conditioned and unified set of XCO2 concentrations that can be used concurrently for carbon cycle studies to provide a benchmark record spanning September 2014 through August 2026.

Experimental Lab Research The Climate Sensitivity To A 400-Fold Increase In CO2 Is 0.1ยฐC

โ€œSlight warming of the air is also observed with [100,000 ppm] CO2 but is close to the temperature resolution of the sensors with ยฑ0.1ยฐC. Given an approximately 400 times lower CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, this warming is likely negligible.โ€ โ€“ Schnell and Harde, 2026

From NoTrickZone

By Kenneth Richard

โ€œSlight warming of the air is also observed with [100,000 ppm] CO2 but is close to the temperature resolution of the sensors with ยฑ0.1ยฐC. Given an approximately 400 times lower CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, this warming is likely negligible.โ€  โ€“ Schnell and Harde, 2026

New lab experiment research shows that the addition of 100,000 ppm (10%) CO2 โ€“ a volume orders of magnitude greater than todayโ€™s 425 ppm (0.0425%) โ€“ leads to a temperature change of about 1.0ยฐC.

(Interestingly, the experiment shows this magnitude of temperature change can also be accomplished by adding argon (Ar), a non-greenhouse gas, and hydrocarbon gas (HCG), a propane/isobutane mixture.)

โ€œWith an initial temperature of the earth plate of +30ยฐC, a temperature increase of 1.0ยฐC can be observed after adding [100,000 ppm] CO2.โ€

But this CO2-induced (or Ar or HCG) temperature change (~1.0ยฐC) is accomplished when assessing only radiation heat transfer effects and excluding the effects of convection. In the real world, heat is not transferred solely via radiation. In fact, convection, not radiation, dominates the heat transfer process here at the surface and throughout the lower troposphere.

So when convection is included as a contributing factor in these lab experiments (see also Wagoner et al., 2010 or Seim and Olsen, 2020), the temperature effect of adding 10% CO2 is reduced to just 0.1ยฐC. This temperature change is so negligible that it is effectively below the resolution of the measurement sensors.

The real-world atmosphere has convective heat transfer dominating and 100s of times smaller CO2 concentrations than in this lab experiment. Thus, it can be concluded that the climate sensitivity to even a massive CO2 increase is effectively zero.

โ€œHCG [hydrocarbon gas] causes a cooling of 2.5ยฐC without convection, compared to only 1.3ยฐC with convection; CO2 [100,000 ppm] leads to a cooling of 0.8ยฐC compared to 0.1ยฐC with convection. This shows that convection is a dominant heat transport mechanism that reduces the radiative effect.โ€

โ€œWhen convection is allowed, greenhouse gases only slightly reduce the radiation reflected from the dome to the warm plate, causing a slight cooling, and correspondingly, only a slight decrease in the radiation emitted to space.โ€

Image Source:ย Schnell and Harde, 2026

New Study: NASAโ€™s Models Wildly Underestimate The Capacity Of Clouds To Alter Solar Radiation

Todayโ€™s climate models are so inaccurate they must be improved a hundredfold just to detect a CO2 signal in climate change.

From NoTrickZone

By Kenneth Richard 

Todayโ€™s climate models are so inaccurate they must be improved a hundredfold just to detect a CO2 signal in climate change.

Though clouds โ€œare the largest moderator of Earthโ€™s radiation budget and their absorption of solar radiation directly influence our understanding of climate change,โ€ NASAโ€™s models of the cloud capacity to alter solar radiation diverge from satellite observations (MERRA2) by 18.8 W/mยฒ (Fu et al., 2026).

โ€œโ€ฆthe NASA MERRA2 modeled value [of the cloud capacity to absorb solar energy] is less than one-quarter of the observed.โ€

Image Source: Fu et al., 2026

To put this in perspective, the reported models-versus-observations discrepancy (18.8 W/mยฒ) is 94 times larger than 10 years of accumulated clear-sky-only CO2 impacts (0.2 W/mยฒ per Feldman et al., 2015).

NASA has previously admitted cloud impacts are so large and uncertain models โ€œmust be improved about a hundredfold in accuracyโ€ to detect a human or CO2 impact on climate.

Image Source: NASA

Everything About Net Zero is Fake

Skepticism is not an optional extra in science โ€” it is science.

The scientific method fundamentally relies on doubt, falsification, rigorous testing, and continuous scrutiny. Without it, you get dogma, authority-based claims, and “settled science” that stops questioning itself.

The Net Zero debate has suffered from too little of the former and too much of the latter. Continuing to pressure for better data, lower-confidence language where warranted, and cost-benefit realism serves truth-seeking far better than consensus enforcement.

All the claims about Net Zero from the temperature record through catastrophic warming to cheap renewables and becoming a green energy superpower are fake

By David Turver

“When the truth offends, we lie and lie until we can no longer remember it is even there.”

โ€œEvery lie we tell incurs a debt to the truth. Sooner or later that debt is paid.โ€

Attributed to Valery Legasov in the mini-series Chernobyl.

Introduction

There is a series of steps you must go through to conclude that Net Zero is a good idea which basically go like this. Eigen Values has the story.

The Earth is warming because we are burning fossil fuels; the climate is extremely sensitive to changes in carbon dioxide concentrations and so we are facing a climate emergency which must be addressed by installing lots of cheap wind and solar power that will make us a green energy superpower with lots of green jobs in a green economic utopia.

The trouble is almost all the arguments used to support this line of reasoning are simply not based on truth. Western economies have been incurring this debt to the truth for at least two decades and now we are paying the price of Net Zero lies.

Before we begin and to avoid being called a โ€œclimate denierโ€ I do believe that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas and increasing concentrations will have a small impact on climate. Theย Stefan-Boltzmann Lawย indicates climate sensitivity to a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration, without unproven feedback, is about 1 K (or 1oC) which might be a problem but is certainly not a crisis. It certainly does not justify total a rewiring of the economy.

The first problem is the temperature record itself. Over the years, Tony Heller has worked tirelessly to show how the global temperature record has been manipulated as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Changes in GISS Global Temperature Anomaly
Figure 1 – Changes in GISS Global Temperature Anomaly

In 2005, the GISS global temperature record showed about 0.55 degrees of warming between 1910 and 2005. By 2013, the amount of warming between the same two dates had grown to 0.75 degrees. In effect, the past has been cooled and the present has been warmed to exaggerate the amount of warming that has occurred. HADCRUT also tripled the warming between 1998 and 2013 between versions 4 and 5.

This is not the full extent of the problem, because recent analysis of Met Officeโ€™s temperature record by Ray Sanders and Chris Morrison shows that it relies on dodgy weather stations. First, more than three quarters of the weather stations used by the Met Office are CIMO Class 4 or 5, meaning they have a margin of error of 2-5oC. It is inconceivable that such weather stations can produce a temperature record accurate to less than one tenth of s degree. Second, some of the weather stations used by the Met Office no longer exist. For instance, Lowestoft weather station has been closed since 2010 and the data for Lowestoft has been synthesised from nearby stations since then. However, the nearest climate stations to Lowestoft, Hemsby (four miles away), Coltishall (25 miles), Scole (26 miles) and Morley St Botolph (30 miles) are all closed too. Third, newer weather stations are highly sensitive to transient spikes in air temperature. The alleged temperature record at RAF Coningsby in 2022 occurred just as three Typhoon fighter jets landed.

If the fundamental temperature records are questionable, then everything that is built on them is questionable too.

Faulty Climate Models and Flawed Climate Sensitivity

Some estimates ofย climate sensitivityย derive from the instrumental record, and these estimates must also be called into question because of the weaknesses identified above. These high estimates of climate sensitivity are then fed into climate models that consistently over-estimate global temperatures, see Figure 2 from the US Department of Energyโ€™sย Critical Review of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate (p33).

Figure 2 – Comparison of Models and Observations of Global Temperature

Note that the low sensitivity (Low-ECS) column on the left more closely matches the observed temperature. The high sensitivity column (High-ECS) on the right over-estimate’s global temperatures. Note also that the amount of observed warming in the black lines from satellite measurements (UAH) is lower than all the instrumental records from HadCRUT, NOAA and GISTEM.

These faulty climate models are then fed with estimates of greenhouse gas emissions to create what are termed Representative Concentration Pathways. The high emissions scenarios such as RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 are then used to create scare stories about 4 or 5oC of warming by 2100.

We now know these scenarios and their associated scare stories are fake because the IPCC has eliminated them from its analysis framework. This means that many thousands of scientific papers peddling climate catastrophe (maybe 97% of the total) were based on the false RCP8.5 scenario. In addition, the fake alarmism has caused 59% of young people to be โ€œvery r extremely worriedโ€ about climate change and 140+ central banks stress-tested their financial systems against it.

Fake Climate Emergency

The results of the faulty models, using fake emissions scenarios were used to justify the fake โ€œClimate Emergency.โ€ We know the Climate Emergency was built on a foundation of sand because even the IPCC has been unable to find much in the way of extreme Climate Impact Drivers (CIDs) even using the now withdrawn RCP8.5 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 – IPCC Table 12-12 from Assessment Report Six (AR6)

The dark blue cells indicate a high confidence of an increase and they are only really confident of an increase in land and ocean temperatures and rising carbon dioxide concentrations. The dark orange cells indicate a high confidence in a decrease. They have found a reduction in lake, river and sea ice. The white cells indicate a โ€œlow confidence in the direction of change.โ€ Even using the now discredited extreme RCP8.5 scenario, the white cells predominate which indicates they cannot find evidence of extreme weather to justify a climate emergency.

The DOE report linked above comes to the same conclusion, saying:

โ€œMost types of extreme weather exhibit no statistically significant long-term trends over the available historical record.โ€

In addition, they found no trend in global major hurricane frequency or wildfires. As might be expected, the Climate Emergency narrative built on faulty models and fake emissions scenarios is also fake.

Read the full story here.

Chasing The Elusive Climate Sensitivity

I got to thinking about how much the world will warm in the long run when the radiation absorbed by the surface increases. I figured I could use that to estimate the long-term climate sensitivity, which is usually expressed as how much the surface will warm if CO2 doubles. (2xCO2).

From Watts Up With That?

Guest Post by Willis Eschenbach (@WEschenbach on X, my personal blog is here)

I got to thinking about how much the world will warm in the long run when the radiation absorbed by the surface increases. I figured I could use that to estimate the long-term climate sensitivity, which is usually expressed as how much the surface will warm if CO2 doubles. (2xCO2).

To begin with, I looked at the total amount of power absorbed by the surface, in watts per square meter (W/m2). This includes solar radiation from the sun, longwave radiation from the atmosphere, and advected heat, which is the power constantly being moved horizontally from the equator to the poles. Fig. 1 shows the result, both without (left) and with (right) advected heat. Note how the poleward advection of heat evens out the heating of the planet.

Figure 1. Surface power absorption both without (left) and with (right) advected power.

Now, the Stefan-Boltzmann equation relates radiated power to temperature. The formula says that the radiated power is a constant times the emissivity of the surface times the fourth power of the temperature. So โ€ฆ given that equation and the temperature of the Earth, how much should an increase of 1 watt per square meter (W/m2) warm up the planet? Figure 2 shows the calculated result.

Figure 2. Calculated theoretical temperature change using the Stefan-Boltzman equation, on the order of 0.2ยฐC per W/m2. (Thanks to Arjan Duiker who pointed out below that the legend in the graphic is wrong, it should be C per W/m2.)

Note the variations in the calculated temperature changes due to temperature and emissivity. As expected, because of the fourth power relationship, a one-watt per square meter change makes more difference at the poles than in the tropics.

Next, I looked at the real-world relationship between the net absorbed power (including advection) and the temperature. Fig. 3 shows the result as a scatterplot of the temperature versus the total absorbed power.

Figure 3. Scatterplot, surface temperature versus net gridcell power absorption (including advection)

Note that the slope (trend) of the yellow line is the sensitivity of temperature in ยฐC with regard to the net power absorbed by the gridcell.

This is a most interesting graph. First, the slope is almost constant from the extreme cold of the south pole up to about 26ยฐC. This is a surprise, because the Stefan-Boltzmann equation would lead us to think the sensitivity should be greater in the cold regions. But apparently, this is offset by the advection of heat from the tropics to the poles.

Second, the clustering is very tight. This shows the close relationship between absorbed radiation and temperature at all levels of radiation.

Third, the slope goes almost flat at the highest temperatures. This means that no matter how much additional power is going to the warmest gridcells, they are not warming any further.

To understand more about the slope, Fig. 4 shows the slope overlaid on Fig. 3 along with the average value.

Figure 4. As in Figure 3, but with the red line showing the slope of the yellow trend line (right scale) and the area-weighted average trend.

A question arises. Is this average slope of ~0.14ยฐC per W/m2 just a one-off, or is this a more permanent feature of the Earthโ€™s climate? Will it change if the total power absorbed by each gridcell increases due to any reason?

To investigate that, I looked at the 25 individual years of CERES data. To start with, hereโ€™s the range of the gridcell absorbed power over the 25 years.

Figure 5. Boxplot, range of gridcell power absorbed by each of the 25 years of the CERES data.

Note that the range goes from 507 W/m2 up to 513 W/m2, a range of 6 W/m2. This is far more than the expected change from CO2.

Now look below at how small the change is in the expected sensitivity of temperature to surface power absorption.

Figure 6. Boxplot, range of temperature sensitivity for each of the 25 years of the CERES data.

Above, I rounded the sensitivity to 0.14ยฐC per W/m2. Despite the absorbed power varying by 6 W/m2, the calculated average sensitivity only varies from 0.133 to 0.140ยฐC per W/m2. This is small enough to be lost in the noise. So we can see that this relationship between temperature and gridcell absorbed power is a stable feature of the climate.

So โ€ฆ how does this all relate to the equilibrium climate sensitivity? To calculate that, we need to take a look at how the changes in the poorly-namedโ€ greenhouse radiationโ€ relate to downwelling longwave at the surface. In other words, if the greenhouse radiation increases by 1 W/m2, how much does the downwelling radiation at the surface increase? Once again, I turn to the CERES data. Fig. 7 shows the result.

Figure 7. Scatterplot, surface downwelling longwave radiation versus top-of-atmosphere (TOA) โ€œgreenhouseโ€ radiation.

Now we can put it all together:

Change in surface temperature per 1 W/m2 gridcell power absorption = 0.14 ยฐC per W/m2

Change in TOA downwelling โ€œgreenhouse radiationโ€ per doubling of CO2 = 3.7 W/m2 per 2xCO2

Change in gridcell power absorption per 1 W/m2 TOA โ€œgreenhouseโ€ radiation = 1.46 W/m2 per W/m2

Expected change in temperature from a doubling of CO2 =

0.14 ยฐC per W/m2 times 3.7 W/m2 per 2xCO2 times 1.46 W/m2 per W/m2 =

0.75ยฐC per 2xCO2

Uncertainty analysis: the uncertainty in the slope can be estimated by taking the standard deviation of the slopes of the 25 individual years making up the average slope shown in Fig. 3. This is 0.006 ยฐCper W/m2. This also shows the temporal stability of this type of analysis

The uncertainty in the change in downwelling surface radiation is 0.069 W/m2 per W/m2.

The uncertainty in the estimated increase in CO2 forcing from a doubling of CO2 is 0.35 W/m2

Combined, this gives a final value of the climate sensitivity estimate of:

0.76 ยฑ 0.08 ยฐC per 2xCO2

I note that in my post โ€ฆ

โ€ฆ I had calculated a maximum estimated climate sensitivity of 1.1ยฐC per 2xCO2. I said it was a maximum because it did not include the moderating effect of clouds and other phenomena on the changes.

This current estimate of 0.76 W/m2 per 2xCO2 includes not only clouds but all other weather phenomena that affect the sensitivity. So I would say that it is a best estimate, rather than a maximum estimate.

As always, comments and corrections welcome.

My best to all,

w.

My Customary Ask: When you comment, QUOTE THE EXACT WORDS you are referring to. I can defend my own words. I canโ€™t defend your interpretation of my words. Thanks.

Another Climate Pipe Dream: Capturing Carbon Out of Thin Air

Removing one billion metric tons of CO2ย would reduce the concentration by only 1/10 of 1 ppm and based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changeโ€™s climate sensitivity estimates, by 0.003 ยฐC.

From Watts Up With That?

By Jonathan Lesser

Most policies designed to reduce carbon emissions have focused on reducing reliance on fossil fuels, primarily through state and federal mandates, including requirements to increase reliance on wind and solar power, replace oil and gas furnaces and water heaters with electric heat pumps, and force automobile manufacturers to sell electric vehicles that most consumers donโ€™t want. These mandate โ€œsticksโ€ have all been accompanied by subsidy โ€œcarrots,โ€ paid for by taxpayers and ratepayers.

Many of the subsidies were increased under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. But the largest subsidy of all was entirely new: A payment of up to $180 per metric ton to capture carbon dioxide, literally out of thin air, and thereby mitigate climate change by reducing the atmospheric concentration of CO2. The carbon dioxide captured by Direct Air Capture (DAC) could then be reused, for example, in enhanced oil recovery, or permanently buried underground.

A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) report issued at the end of the Biden Administration estimated that the U.S. would need to remove between 100 million metric tons and 2 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide using Direct Air Capture technology to address climate change.

In essence, DAC involves large fans that draw outdoor air through liquid or solid media that capture CO2, remove it via chemical processes, and then compress it for transport and either use or sequester it. There are several dozen small DAC facilities in operation, mostly in Europe. The goal of DAC advocates is to build large-scale facilities, each capable of extracting 1 million metric tons of CO2 each year. Two companies, ClimeWorks and Carbon Engineering, have commercialized different technologies for DAC. Currently, the only large-scale facility is under construction by Occidental Petroleum in the Permian Basin of Texas. That facility, called Stratos, is designed to capture up to 500,000 metric tons of CO2 annually, which will be injected into the companyโ€™s oil wells to enhance crude oil production.

But as I explain in my new report, these technologies, and all potential DAC technologies, have an Achilles Heel: The laws of thermodynamics. Regardless of the technology employed, extracting CO2 directly from the atmosphere is inherently energy-intensive.

Because burning fossil fuels to power DAC facilities would reduce, or even negate, the carbon-reduction goal, DAC technologies have focused on using electricity generated from zero-emissions sources.

For example, the theoretical minimum of energy needed to meet a one billion metric ton objective would require the equivalent of 10% of all electricity generated in the U.S. in 2024. The practical energy required would be at least 30%, as no technology can be 100% efficient. Producing that much electricity would require building hundreds of new nuclear plants. If wind and solar power were relied on, it would require an area larger than the state of Florida, and hundreds of thousands of megawatts of battery storage facilities to compensate for windโ€™s and solarโ€™s inherent intermittency. The cost to build the required generating capacity alone would be trillions of dollars. Building additional transmission lines and the DAC facilities themselves would cost hundreds of billions of dollars more. In total, the cost is likely to be over $400 per metric ton of CO2 removed. Thatโ€™s far higher than even the most recent estimates of the social cost of carbon, which supposedly measures the damages to the climate from each additional ton of CO2 emitted.

Despite the huge energy requirements, the impacts on atmospheric CO2ย concentrations and global temperatures would be minuscule. The current atmospheric CO2ย concentration is approximately 425 parts per million (ppm).

Removing one billion metric tons of CO2ย would reduce the concentration by only 1/10 of 1 ppm and based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changeโ€™s climate sensitivity estimates, by 0.003 ยฐC.

Thatโ€™s about 40 times less than the assumed margin of error in measuring global temperatures. Even if billions of metric tons of CO2ย were captured and sequestered annually, the impact on world temperatures by the year 2100 would be too small to have any noticeable impact on the climate.

Finally, storing CO2 underground poses environmental and health risks because it could escape, as in Cameroon in the 1980s, when Lake Nyos โ€œburpedโ€ several hundred thousand tons of CO2, leading to the deaths of 1,700 people and thousands of cattle. It would be unreasonable to assume that, after sequestering billions of tonnes of CO2 underground, similar events could not take place.

Taken together, these physical, economic, and environmental realities mean that DAC is a technology whose time will never come.

Jonathan Lesser is a Senior Fellow with the National Center for Energy Analytics. His report, โ€œA Cost-Benefit Analysis of Using Direct Air Capture to Remove Atmospheric Carbon,โ€ was just published.

This article was originally published by RealClearEnergy and made available via RealClearWire.

Studying Skeptics Through a Keyhole: Why Climate Communication Research Canโ€™t See What It Refuses to Understand

This is the title of a recent article published on January 7, 2026, by Charles Rotter on Watts Up With That.
Charles Rotter tells the story behind an academic paper by Bernhard Forchtner, titled “The Rise of (Affective) Obstruction: Conceptualizing the Evolution of Far-Right Climate Change Communication (1986โ€“2018),” which was published in the journal Environmental Communication in late 2025.

A person looking towards a house with a light on, surrounded by dark trees, with the text "SOMEONE is WATCHING" prominently displayed.

This is the title of a recent article published on January 7, 2026, by Charles Rotter on Watts Up With That.

Charles Rotter tells the story behind an academic paper by Bernhard Forchtner, titled “The Rise of (Affective) Obstruction: Conceptualizing the Evolution of Far-Right Climate Change Communication (1986โ€“2018),” which was published in the journal Environmental Communication in late 2025.

A man in a suit observes a foggy glass surface while taking notes. The glass has ghostly images of people and symbols faintly visible behind it. The scene is divided into four quadrants, each displaying different color tones and effects.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

From Watts Up With That?

By Charles Rotter

Research article titled 'The Rise of (Affective) Obstruction: Conceptualizing the Evolution of Far-Right Climate Change Communication (1986โ€“2018)' published in Environmental Communication.
Full article: The Rise of (Affective) Obstruction: Conceptualizing the Evolution of Far-Right Climate Change Communication (1986โ€“2018)

Bernhard Forchtnerโ€™s paper, โ€œThe Rise of (Affective) Obstruction: Conceptualizing the Evolution of Far-Right Climate Change Communication (1986โ€“2018)โ€, is presented as a neutral, longitudinal investigation into how climate skepticism supposedly โ€œevolvedโ€ on the political right. It spans more than thirty years, codes 733 articles, and deploys a sophisticated vocabulary of โ€œaffect,โ€ โ€œemotive economies,โ€ and โ€œmelodramatic narrationโ€ to explain why opposition to climate policy exists at all.

Yet from the outset, the paper makes clear that it is not trying to understand skeptics. It is trying to explain them away.

ABSTRACT

Research has illustrated that todayโ€™s far right in the Global North takes largely climate obstructionist stances, commonly featuring ageist/misogynistic/racist tropes. However, little is known about how this present became to be, how climate change was articulated in the 2000s and earlier. I therefore ask: how has far-right climate communication evolved between 1986 and 2018? Have there been notable changes at the level of both specific claims and their emotiveness โ€“ and if so, what might explain them? In response, I analyze 733 articles printed across four exemplary, continuously published (non-)party sources covering the Austrian and German far-right spectrum, in order to offer a novel conceptualization of three periods: benevolent silence (1986-1996), concerned acceptance (1997-2006), and antagonistic obstruction (2007-2018). Thus, I show that the far right became todayโ€™s (affective-)obstructionist force and link this shift to: the US climate countermovement; dynamics in the political field; and, interrelated, increasingly melodramatic (affective) climate communication, turning climate change into another site for the making of far-right subjectivity. By conceptualizing three periods, by considering the development over time of both specific claims and affect, and by suggesting reasons behind this evolution, I substantively contribute to understanding far-right climate obstruction and the anti-liberal/anti-democratic backlash it facilitates.

The author states early on that the far right โ€œtakes largely obstructionist stances, i.e. opposing effective climate action.โ€ That sentence looks innocuous until one pauses to notice what is being smuggled in. โ€œEffective climate actionโ€ is treated as a settled category, not an open question. Opposition is therefore not disagreement but obstruction by definition. No evaluation of policy outcomes is offered. No costโ€“benefit analysis is attempted. Effectiveness is assumed, not demonstrated.

This framing is never revisited. It is the theological axiom on which the entire paper rests.

Throughout the study, skepticism is defined not as an intellectual challenge to climate claims or climate policy, but as a cultural and emotional deviation. Forchtner repeatedly emphasizes that obstruction is not primarily about evidence or uncertainty, but about feelings:

โ€œObstruction revolves not simply around propositional knowledge (specific claims) but โ€˜affective positioningโ€™; obstruction is also affective obstruction.โ€

This is not an incidental remark. It is the paperโ€™s central move. By redefining skepticism as affective positioning rather than analytical judgment, the author exempts himself from having to engage with skeptical arguments at all. One does not debate emotions; one diagnoses them.

Later, skepticism is explicitly framed as a community-building exercise rather than a reasoned stance:

โ€œThe far right is also a โ€˜community of feelingsโ€™ which offers โ€˜alternative perceptions, interpretations and feelings about everyday phenomena, political debates and the right-wing project itselfโ€™.โ€

Note what is absent. There is no mention of alternative models, alternative interpretations of climate sensitivity, alternative readings of observational data, or alternative risk assessments. The alternatives that matter here are emotional, not analytical.

This pattern continues when the paper describes how skepticism allegedly functions psychologically:

โ€œClimate change became another siteโ€ฆ of (re)producing far-right subjectivity and Othering of, e.g. โ€˜globalist elitesโ€™, โ€˜Greensโ€™, โ€˜the leftโ€™ and racialized Others.โ€

Here, disagreement with climate policy is not treated as disagreement with policy. It is treated as a tool for identity construction, moral boundary drawing, and social antagonism. Skepticism is not wrong; it is suspect.

The authorโ€™s own language makes clear that skepticism is viewed as a moral failure rather than an epistemic one. Opposition to climate policy is said to โ€œfacilitate the anti-liberal/anti-democratic backlash.โ€ This claim appears in both the abstract and the conclusion, functioning as a kind of moral bookend to the analysis.

But nowhere is this causal chain demonstrated. No evidence is presented that skepticism causes authoritarianism, nor that acceptance of climate alarmism prevents it. The association is asserted, not argued.

The most revealing passages are those in which the author describes the emotional โ€œinversionโ€ he believes characterizes skepticism:

โ€œWhat was accepted and an object of concern (human-induced climate change), became opposed, with concern attached to climate protection and contempt for those driving it.โ€

This sentence is meant as an indictment. In reality, it is an admission.

Yesโ€”concern shifted from speculative climate projections to concrete climate policies. That shift was not emotional pathology. It was rational prioritization. Policies are tangible. They have measurable costs. They affect energy prices, industrial competitiveness, household budgets, grid stability, and food production. Climate models, by contrast, are abstractions with widening uncertainty ranges the further they project.

The paper never asks why concern might rationally move in that direction. Instead, it treats the shift as evidence of โ€œmelodrama,โ€ โ€œantagonism,โ€ and โ€œaffective obstruction.โ€

That framing becomes explicit when the author claims:

โ€œPeriod 3 is characterized by an increasingly antagonistic attitude of clear-cut boundaries and certainty rather than rhetorical constraint, ambiguity, and doubt.โ€

This is one of the paperโ€™s most ironic passages. Climate skepticism is being criticized for certainty by an academic field that routinely declares โ€œthe science is settled,โ€ labels dissent as dangerous, and frames climate change as an existential emergency requiring immediate, sweeping intervention.

If anyone has abandoned rhetorical constraint and doubt, it is not the skeptics.

The paperโ€™s treatment of scientific disagreement further illustrates its ideological enclosure. When skeptics invoke uncertainty, alternative explanations, or methodological critiques, these are framed not as arguments but as imported talking points, often attributed to malign influence:

โ€œThe article traces this evolution back toโ€ฆ the US climate change countermovement which diffused obstructionist views within the European far right already during the 1990s.โ€

This explanation absolves European skeptics of agency while simultaneously denying them intellectual autonomy. They did not reason their way to skepticism; they were infected by it. Ideas do not spread because they explain anomalies or resolve contradictions. They spread because of networks, ideology, and affect.

That is the worldview on display.

Even when the paper acknowledges internal dissentโ€”articles within the same publications defending mainstream climate science or warning against conspiratorial thinkingโ€”these are treated as deviations from the narrative rather than evidence that skepticism is internally contested and intellectually heterogeneous.

One such intervention is quoted by the author himself, warning that denying greenhouse-gas risks would be โ€œfatalโ€ from a scientific point of view. Yet this moment is not used to interrogate why skepticism persists despite such warnings. Instead, it is presented as a lost battle against an inevitable slide into obstruction.

The possibility that skepticism might be responding to real weaknesses in climate science or climate policy is never entertained.

Most striking is the paperโ€™s repeated insistence that skepticism is fundamentally melodramatic:

โ€œThrough melodrama, powerful affective responses are circulated to โ€˜stick toโ€™ and โ€˜stick togetherโ€™, to increase polarization of โ€˜good vs. evilโ€™.โ€

This would be a devastating critiqueโ€”if it were not a perfect description of mainstream climate communication itself. Apocalypse framing. Moral binaries. Urgency narratives. Children as symbols. Dissenters as villains. These are not inventions of skeptics. They are staples of climate advocacy.

Yet the paper treats melodrama as a one-way phenomenon, flowing outward from skeptics while leaving the dominant narrative untouched.

In the end, the paper accomplishes exactly what climate communication research has been doing for years: it studies opposition without granting it intellectual dignity. It catalogs language without engaging substance. It interprets disagreement as pathology. It substitutes affect theory for epistemology.

The most honest sentence in the entire paper is likely unintentional. When Forchtner writes that skepticism turns climate change into โ€œanother site for the making of far-right subjectivity,โ€ he reveals the underlying assumption: climate change already belongs to one side. To resist that ownership is not to argue, but to trespass.

Until climate researchers are willing to step outside that assumptionโ€”until they can imagine that skepticism might arise from disciplined uncertainty rather than emotional deficiencyโ€”they will continue producing elaborate studies that explain everything except the thing that matters.

They may quote skeptics endlessly.

They may code them meticulously.

They may analyze their โ€œaffective economiesโ€ until the funding runs out.

They will still have no idea why climate skepticism exists.

A man in a suit is holding a clipboard and listening through a wall, observing a group of indistinct figures in the background.

A World Without Air

Hereโ€™s a thought experiment. Consider the Earth with no atmosphere and with the same surface albedo of 12.5% that it has now. How warm would it be?

A digital illustration of Earth with a sunrise in the background, showing the planet partially illuminated, with the Moon visible in the foreground.

From Watts Up With That?

Guest Post byย Willis Eschenbach (@weschenbach on X, blog atย Skating Under The Ice)

Like Don Quixote suffering a coffee overdose, once again I mount my steed, take up my lance, and go tilting at windmills.

Hereโ€™s a thought experiment. Consider the Earth with no atmosphere and with the same surface albedo of 12.5% that it has now. How warm would it be?

In this condition, because there is no atmosphere, there are no heat losses from the surface by sensible or latent heat. For the same reason, thereโ€™s no reduction in incoming solar power as a result of reflection from clouds or solar radiation absorbed by the atmosphere. Solar radiation absorbed at the surface is radiated straight back to space. So, we can calculate the temperature directly from the absorbed radiation using the Stefan-Boltzmann equation. This equation relates watts per square meter of surface radiation to the corresponding temperature of the radiating surface. I used the S/B equation with the average emissivity of the Earth, which is ~ 0.98, to calculate the surface temperature. All values are in watts per square meter (abbreviated variously as W/m2 or W/m2).

Diagram illustrating Earth's radiation without atmosphere, showing downwelling solar radiation, total absorbed energy, and reflected solar radiation, with a temperature calculation.
Figure 1. Total surface radiation absorption, Earth with no atmosphere, with the same albedo as the current Earth. Total absorbed solar radiation is the incoming 340ย W/m2ย minus the 43 W/m2ย reflected solar radiation. Integer errors are due to rounding. All values are in watts per square meter (abbreviated as W/m2 or W/m2)

Minus two degrees C. What you might call totally chill. Just below freezing, in fact.

Now, over millions of years, letโ€™s slowly add in an atmosphere and when it matches the modern atmosphere in all respects, let it percolate for another few million years.

After adding the atmosphere, there are lots of changes. Atmospheric absorption cuts down on the amount of solar radiation hitting the surface, which cools the surface. Of course, reduced surface radiation also reduces the amount reflected. However, this reduction in solar radiation at the surface is more than compensated for by the atmosphere adding in 340 W/m2 of downwelling longwave (thermal) radiation from the atmosphere to the surface (yellow arrow in Figure 2 below), which provides significant warming.

And back to the chill side, having an atmosphere allows for sensible and latent heat loss to the atmosphere, which cools the surface. In addition, with an atmosphere we get atmospheric absorption of sunlight, emergent phenomena like thunderstorms, and cloud radiative effects, all of which cool the surface.

Itโ€™s a mixed atmospheric bag that ends up with about 20ยฐC less temperature change from the no-atmosphere to the with-atmosphere condition than youโ€™d expect based on the large increase of ~ 212 W/m2 in absorbed radiation at the surface.

With that as prologue, hereโ€™s the surface radiation absorption with our current atmosphere to the same scale as Figure 1.

Graph illustrating the Earth's radiation balance with an atmosphere, showing total absorbed radiation of 510 W/m2, downwelling solar radiation of 187 W/m2, downwelling longwave radiation of 346 W/m2, and reflected solar radiation of 23 W/m2.
Figure 2. Total surface radiation absorption, Earth with an atmosphere. This 510 W/m2ย is all the power absorbed by the surface. (Yeah, yeah, I know thereโ€™s geothermal heat. Itโ€™s on the order of tenths of one W/m2, so itโ€™s always ignored for this level of analysis.) The yellow/black arrow is the downwelling longwave (thermal) radiation from the atmosphere to the surface.

OK. Some simple math.

A comic strip featuring two characters, one a young boy and the other a tiger, discussing math. The boy appears puzzled while the tiger provides humorous answers to his questions about measurement and understanding math.

The amount of radiation absorbed by the surface increased from 298 W/m2 with no atmosphere, to 510 W/m2 with an atmosphere, an increase of 212 W/m2.

Due to surface cooling from reduced solar hitting the surface as well as sensible and latent heat loss to the atmosphere, when the atmosphere was added, the temperature only went from -2ยฐC to 18ยฐC, an increase of 20ยฐC.

This means that for each additional W/m2 absorbed by the surface, including all possible influences and feedbacks from clouds, water vapor, sensible and latent heat loss, etc., in the long term the temperature increased by 20ยฐC / 212 W/m2 = 0.09ยฐC per W/m2

If we use the IPCC canonical value of 3.7 W/m2 per doubling of CO2, this would mean that the equilibrium climate sensitivity at the surface is 0.35ยฐC per doubling of CO2.

โ€œBut waitโ€, I hear you thinking. โ€œClimate sensitivity is how much the temperature changes, not with downwelling longwave radiation at the surface, but how much temperature changes with the โ€œgreenhouse effectโ€ radiation (GHE) from the atmosphere and the clouds, as measured at the top of the atmosphere (TOA)โ€.

And youโ€™d be right. Thatโ€™s the definition.

However, we can allow for this by understanding the relationship of surface downwelling longwave and downwelling โ€œgreenhouse radiationโ€ from the atmosphere and clouds.

When we look at the current global correlation between the poorly named atmospheric โ€œgreenhouse radiationโ€ measured at the top of the atmosphere (TOA) and the surface downwelling longwave radiation, when the TOA-measured greenhouse radiation changes by 1 W/m2, due to internal feedbacks, the surface downwelling longwave radiation changes by 1.26 W/m2. Or vice versa. In either case, they move in synchrony.

Scatterplot showing the relationship between monthly surface downwelling longwave radiation and greenhouse radiation from March 2000 to February 2024, indicating an increase of 1.26 W/m2 in surface downwelling longwave for each 1 W/m2 increase in greenhouse radiation.
Figure 3. Scatterplot, surface downwelling longwave radiation versus TOA-measured โ€œgreenhouseโ€ radiation from the atmosphere and the clouds. At the monthly level, there is no temporal lag between the two. Current average GHE radiation is 158 W/m2.

Multiplying the surface sensitivity by 1.26 to convert to sensitivity to greenhouse gases increases the equilibrium climate sensitivity from the surface value of 0.35ยฐC per doubling of CO2 calculated above, to a final figure of 0.44ยฐC per CO2 doubling.

OK, thatโ€™s one way to get there. Interestingly, for verification of the sensitivity estimate, we can calculate the equilibrium climate sensitivity in a totally different manner. Consider the same thought experiment as above.

With no atmosphere, the GHE radiation is zero W/m2. Currently, the GHE radiation is 158 W/m2. That gives us 20ยฐC / 158 W/m2 * 3.7 W/m2_per_CO2_doubling = 0.47ยฐC per CO2 doubling โ€ฆ compared to the 0.44ยฐC from the previous calculation using a different method, thatโ€™s excellent agreement. So to be conservative, let me call the warming on the order of half a degree C from a doubling of CO2.

This ~ half degree C of surface warming per doubling of CO2 represents a long-term equilibrium calculation, because it includes all known and unknown atmospheric factors and feedbacks involving water vapor, cloud radiative effects, latent and sensible heat losses, atmospheric absorption of solar radiation, all of that. The climate system during the Holocene is basically in a long-term (millennia) dynamic steady-state.

One advantage of using this method to calculate climate sensitivity is that the radiation numbers are large. As a result, small variations or uncertainties in them donโ€™t change the answer much. For example, the current calculated ~ 2 W/m2 increase in โ€œgreenhouse radiationโ€ since โ€œpre-industrialโ€ times is not significant because it is only ~ 1% of the change in downwelling longwave radiation from the no-atmosphere to the with-atmosphere condition. Basically, the answer is the same whether itโ€™s included or not.

And while my estimate of the equilibrium climate sensitivity of ~ half-degree per CO2 doubling is well below the three degrees per doubling that the IPCC uses as the sensitivity, itโ€™s not outside historical estimates.

A graph depicting 172 estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity, showing a range of values plotted over the years, with different categories represented by various colored circles.
Figure 4. A large number of different estimates of the equilibrium climate sensitivity over the last half century, coded by color. Pale blue lines show the IPCC uncertainty values. My estimate of a half-degree per doubling is shown by the horizontal dotted black line.

Here are the authors, dates, and values of the best estimates shown in Figure 4 that are under 1 W/m2.

       Author             Year ECS      Class
1  Specht et al.        2016  0.37 Theory & Reviews
2 Idso                       1998  0.42 Theory & Reviews
3 Lindzen and Choi 2009  0.47   Observations
4 Harde                   2017  0.65 Theory & Reviews
5 Lindzen and Choi  2011  0.72   Observations
6 Bates                    2016  0.92   Observations

References are in the paper here.

In closing, in my post โ€œTesting A Constructal Climate Modelโ€œ, I described how the Constructal model estimates a climate sensitivity of 1.1ยฐC per doubling of CO2. However, in that post I said:

Finally, this is a maximum sensitivity which does not include the various emergent thermoregulatory mechanisms that tend to oppose any heating or cooling. This means the actual sensitivity is lower than ~1.1ยฐC per 2xCO2.

This latest result, of ~ half a degree warming per doubling of CO2, which includes not only emergent phenomena but all atmosphere-related phenomena, is in line with that assessment.


In related news, providing this method holds up, this means

โ€œAPOCALYPSE CANCELLED! SORRY, NO REFUNDS!โ€

Itโ€™s very unlikely that we will double the current CO2 level. Burning all total known reserves, not just the proven reserves, but all known reserves, will emit about 4,800 gigatonnes of CO2. This will raise the CO2 level in the atmosphere by ~ 280 ppmv. Thatโ€™s far from doubling the current 420 ppmv atmospheric CO2 level.

This means that about a third of a degree of future warming lies in the ground in the form of fossil fuels.

Sadly, I fear the chance that this analysis will convince any true believers is small. Theyโ€™re caught in the Upton Sinclair Trap. He famously said:

โ€œIt is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.โ€

It does seem recently, however, that more and more people are seeing through the climate grift. At least the US Government seems to be getting off the climate merry-go-round of endless failed predictions.

And to return to my analysis, what am I missing here? Where are my math mistakes or the holes in my logic? Why isnโ€™t this a solid estimate of the equilibrium climate sensitivity, giving the same answer when calculated in two different ways?

Regards to all on a cloudy fall day,

w.

[UPDATE] In response to comments, a clarification.

A general comment for all, to clarify my position.

I do think that radiatively active gases affect the temperature. But I donโ€™t think that small variations of a few watts per square meter in the resulting downwelling radiation change the temperature anywhere near as much as the conventional wisdom would have you alarmed to believe.

In addition to theoretical arguments and other evidence, my own climate model is able to do a very good job of emulating the real-world temperature using only albedo and the Ramanathan โ€œgreenhouse factorโ€, the percentage of upwelling surface radiation that is absorbed in the atmosphere.

Here is a more recent graphic from my ever-evolving Constructal climate model, showing how those two measurable environmental variables, albedo and greenhouse factor, are all you need to emulate the absolute temperature.

Graph comparing hot zone and cold zone temperatures based on CERES data and a constructal model from 2020 to 2024, showing correlations between observed and modeled temperatures.

This also makes physical sense. Albedo controls how much energy is entering the system at any time. The greenhouse factor controls how much energy is leaving the system at any time. Any imbalance between those two will be reflected in a temperature change โ€ฆ just not as much as folks think.

This excellent goodness of fit of the Constructal climate model is further evidence that the greenhouse factor, the percentage of upwelling radiation absorbed by radiatively active gases in the atmosphere, does in fact affect the surface temperature.

Regards to everyone,

w.

As Is My Habit: I ask that when you comment, you QUOTE THE EXACT WORDS you are discussing. This is essential to prevent misunderstandings.

Addressing misconceptions about Climate Sensitivity research: a Response to recent Criticisms

The determination of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS)โ€”the long-term warming response to doubled atmospheric CO2 concentrationsโ€”remains one of the most crucial yet challenging problems in climate science. Recent exchanges in the literature have highlighted both the complexity of this endeavor and the importance of maintaining rigorous methodological standards in the pursuit of reliable estimates.

A group of researchers in a modern lab analyzing climate data on multiple computer screens.

From Climate Etc.

by Nic Lewis

The determination of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS)โ€”the long-term warming response to doubled atmospheric CO2 concentrationsโ€”remains one of the most crucial yet challenging problems in climate science. Recent exchanges in the literature have highlighted both the complexity of this endeavor and the importance of maintaining rigorous methodological standards in the pursuit of reliable estimates.

Background and Context

In 2020, Steven Sherwood and twenty four co-authors published a comprehensive assessment of Earthโ€™s climate sensitivity (S20) that claimed to substantially narrow the โ€˜likelyโ€™ (66% probability) uncertainty range to 2.6โ€“3.9ยฐC, with a best estimate of 3.1ยฐC. Their assessment was undertaken under the auspices of the World Climate Research Programmeโ€™s Grand Science Challenge on Clouds, Circulation and Climate Sensitivity, following a 2015 workshop that I participated in at Ringberg Castle in Germany.

S20 has been an exceptionally influential study. Its observationally-driven ECS approach and range was approximately adopted in the 2021 IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6). This represented a significant departure from the broader ranges that had persisted in IPCC assessments since the late 1970s: previous IPCC best estimates had usually been 3ยฐC, but their uncertainty ranges had remained much wider, almost always spanning 1.5ยฐC to 4.5ยฐC.  Moreover, AR6 gave a 90% probability (โ€˜very likelyโ€™) range for the first time, of 2.0โ€“5.0ยฐC, widened slightly from the S20 estimate of 2.3โ€“4.7ยฐC.

In 2022, I published a detailed peer-reviewed examination (Lewis22) of S20โ€™s methodology, identifying what I believed to be several significant issues with their analysis. My revised assessment, using their basic framework but with corrected and improved methodologies and carefully justified updatings and other revisions to some of their input data, suggested a substantially lower and narrower likely range for ECS of 1.75โ€“2.7ยฐC, with a median estimate of 2.16ยฐC, and a 90% probability range of 1.55โ€“3.2ยฐC .

As in S20, ECS estimation in Lewis22 was based on combining historical period evidence with that from the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) and mid-Pliocene Warm Period (mPWP) paleoclimate periods, and from process understanding (estimates of individual climate feedbacks). Like S20, Lewis22 actually estimated S, the usual proxy for ECS in GCMs, which is generally slightly lower than their estimated true ECS. The two terms are only distinguished here when discussing their relationship.

In 2024, Sherwood, together with another scientist, Chris Forest,[1] published an opinion piece in Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics journal (ACP) questioning whether climate sensitivity uncertainty had really been narrowed since S20, and specifically challenging several aspects of my 2022 analysis. I considered that their article contained fundamental mischaracterizations of my work that warranted clarification, along with broader methodological concerns that merited discussion. My endeavor to do so has now been published in ACP as โ€˜Comment on โ€œOpinion: Can uncertainty in climate sensitivity be narrowed further?โ€ by Sherwood and Forest (2024)โ€˜.

Methodological Errors and Inconsistencies in the original Sherwood et al. study

My 2022 study identified several methodological problems in the S20 analysis, some of which significantly affected their results. Sherwood and Forest claimed, incorrectly, that these merely represented โ€œdifferences in opinion on methodological choices and priorsโ€, not errors, and that โ€œthey moreover were acknowledged to have little effect on the outcomeโ€.

The most fundamental error involved was the use in S20 of an invalid likelihood estimation methodology. The likelihood functionโ€”which quantifies how well different values of the parameter being estimated match observational evidenceโ€”is fundamental to Bayesian estimation, indeed to all statistical estimation of uncertain parameters. Lewis22 used three quite different likelihood estimation methods,[2] which all produced the same results. Moreover, S20 used an uncertainty estimate that was a factor of ten lower than stated for Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) CO2 forcing, due to a coding error[3].

The resulting errors in S20โ€™s likelihood estimates are shown in Figure 1.The estimates of historical and PETM evidence likelihoods at high climate sensitivity values were particularly affected. Although S20 did not use PETM evidence for its main results, and the underestimation of historical likelihood at high ECS values had only a small effect on the combined-evidence likelihood, unsound derivation of likelihoods is a very serious statistical error.  Sherwood has admitted, in a detailed comment (here: CC1) during the peer review process prior to my Comment on their 2024 opinion piece being accepted, that the sampling method S20 used to derive its likelihoods was โ€œprobably not optimalโ€, but has not published any related correction to S20.

Graph showing likelihood estimates related to climate sensitivity using various methods. The chart features multiple curves representing different scenarios: LGM, mPWP, and PETM, along with process and paleoclimate estimates.
Fig. 1ย ย Reproduced from Lewis22 Fig.2. Likelihoods forย Sย based on S20โ€™s data-variable assumptions as derived in Lewis22 (solid lines) and, for comparison, those shown in S20 (dotted lines). (a) Likelihoods from evidence for the three paleoclimate periods. (b) Likelihoods from Process evidence and from combining Paleoclimate evidence for the LGM and mPWP. (c) Likelihoods from Historical evidence for bothย Sย andย Shist(Sย without an adjustment for the historical pattern effect). (d) Likelihoods from combined Process, Paleoclimate (LGM plus mPWP), and Historical evidence.

Additionally, Lewis22 identified a mathematically incorrect treatment in S20 of CO2ย forcing estimates used to estimate ECS process and historical evidence. When deriving ECS from climate feedback estimates, they used an effective radiative forcing (ERF) value for a doubling of CO2ย concentration (F2ร—CO2) based on fixed sea surface temperature (SST) simulations, while they should have used regression-based forcing estimates, which are lower. This unjustifiable choice biased S20โ€™s process and historical evidence-derived estimates upward by approximately 16%. This issue is illustrated in Figure 2, using data for a typical GCM.

Graph depicting the relationship between scaled changes in GMAT and TOA net radiation, highlighting regression estimates and historical energy balance methods for climate sensitivity.
Fig. 2. Reproduced from Lewis22ย Supporting Informationย Fig.S1.1. Illustration of the need to reduce the fixed-SST simulation based estimate of the actualย F2ร—CO2ย to a linear regression based estimate to avoid overestimation ofย S. The grey dots show annual mean values over 150 years after CO2ย concentration is abruptly quadrupled in a representative GCM, MRI-ESM2-0, scaled to a doubling of CO2. The black line shows the regression fit and, at itsย x-axis intercept (the definition ofย S), the resulting correctย Sย estimate of 3.08 K (3.08ยฐC). The slope of the black line isย ฮป,ย the climate feedback value that both S20 and Lewis22 estimate. The black lineโ€™sย y-axis intercept is the regression-based estimate ofย F2ร—CO2.ย  This is lower than the more accurate fixed SST simulation based value shown by the magenta cross, due to the actual relationship between theย x-axis variable (global warming) and theย y-axis variable (the top-of-atmosphere radiative imbalance) being non-linear, withโ€“as in almost all GCMsโ€“a steeper initial slope than that after a decade or two. The red line and itsย x-axis intercept show the overestimation ofย Sย resulting from dividingย ฮปย into the fixed SST estimate ofย F2ร—CO2, which is what S20 did. For process evidence this is obvious, sinceย ฮปย was estimated so as to be consistent withย ฮปย in CO2ย quadrupling GCM simulations. For historical evidence, the steeper blue line corresponds to estimation ofย Shist; to estimateย Sย its slope was adjusted to correspond toย ฮป, again resulting in estimation corresponding to the red line and an excessiveย Sย estimate. In both cases use of a regression-basedย F2ร—CO2ย value is required for correct estimation ofย S, despite thatย F2ร—CO2ย valueย  being an underestimate of the true value.ย ย ย ย 

Also, S20 converted their paleoclimate based estimates of true equilibrium climate sensitivity to estimates of S using an ECS to S ratio (1+ฮถ) estimated by comparing ECS derived from long GCM CO2 doubling simulations, with S derived from 150 year CO2 quadrupling simulations by the same eight GCMs. They scaled the CO2 quadrupling simulation based estimates down by a factor of two, rather than by the true ratio of ERF from a quadrupling of CO2 (F4ร—CO2) to F2ร—CO2 of about 2.1. This resulted in an inconsistency between S20โ€™s paleoclimate estimates of S and those from its process and historical evidence (which were based on estimates of F2ร—CO2, not of F4ร—CO2/2). Lewis22 avoided this inconsistency by basing its estimates of the ECS to S ratio on comparison of estimated true ECS with S estimated from regression over the first 150 years, separately within each of sixteen long CO2 doubling or CO2 quadrupling GCM simulations, avoiding the need for any F4ร—CO2 to F2ร—CO2 scaling factor[4].  

These issues represent more than methodological preferencesโ€”they constitute conceptual errors and inconsistencies that materially affected the final results. When I corrected these problems while retaining all other aspects of S20 analysis, the climate sensitivity estimates shifted substantially downward.

Clarifying Misrepresentations

Sherwood and Forestโ€™s article contains several significant mischaracterizations of my work. Most importantly, they claim that by rejecting the possibility of a large historical โ€˜pattern effectโ€™ and downwardly revising estimated historical aerosol cooling, Lewis22 had concluded that โ€œthe historical record rules out a high ECS level.โ€ This characterization is entirely incorrect.

My analysis of historical evidence alone yielded a 90% uncertainty range of 1.2โ€“7.6ยฐC, which clearly does not rule out high sensitivity values. Even with the addition of a reasonable prior constraint (0 <  ECS < 20 ยฐC), based on the Earth not having experienced runaway warming or cooling, the range was 1.15โ€“6.1ยฐC. Both ranges substantially exceed the 4.7ยฐC upper (95%) bound from S20โ€™s combined-evidence estimate.

The narrowing in my final estimates resulted from combining multiple independent lines of evidenceโ€”process understanding, historical observations, paleoclimate reconstructionsโ€”using appropriate statistical methods, with a prior distribution designed to have minimal influence on the results. This is precisely how one expects Bayesian analysis should work when evidence is combined: no single line of evidence may rule out particular values, but their combination may provide strong constraints.

The Challenge of Aerosol Forcing Uncertainty

One reason historical evidence alone cannot definitively constrain high ECS values lies in the substantial uncertainty surrounding historical aerosol forcing. Aerosols from fossil fuel burning and other anthropogenic sources have provided uncertain amounts of cooling that have partially masked greenhouse gas warming, creating a fundamental difficulty in interpreting the historical temperature record.

In Lewis 2022 I revised the aerosol forcing distribution used in the original S20 analysis, reducing the probability assigned to very strong cooling, based on observational constraints. However, this revision followed evidence from other researchers against very strong aerosol cooling, and importantly, had minimal impact on my final combined-evidence ECS estimates. When I reverted to S20โ€™s original aerosol assumptions while maintaining all other revisions, the median Lewis22 ECS estimate changed by less than 0.05ยฐC. Lewis22 did not test using the AR6 aerosol distribution, however its median value is almost identical to that of S20โ€™s aerosol distribution.   

This demonstrates that my studyโ€™s lower ECS estimates were not driven by its revision to aerosol assumptions, contrary to the assertions in Sherwood and Forestโ€™s critique of Lewis22.

Reassessing the Pattern Effect

The โ€œpattern effectโ€โ€”how the geographical distribution of SST warming affects climate feedbacksโ€”represents another area where Sherwood and Forestโ€™s 2024 opinion piece challenged my analysis. While I had adopted a smaller estimate based on my evaluation of the available evidence, they argued that recent studies strongly support a large historical pattern effect. Sherwood doubled down on this in his comment (CC1) on my 2025 manuscript, writing that Lewis22 argued in particular that โ€œthe aerosol forcing and historical pattern effect were each smaller and better known than in either S20 or AR6โ€.

In fact, more recent work by Modak and Mauritsen (2023) supports smaller pattern effect estimates, obtaining a slightly lower estimate than per Lewis22 when averaged across multiple SST datasets. Notably, they found that the most commonly used, AMIPII, SST dataset, which produces the largest pattern effect estimates, appears to be an outlier among available datasets.

Moreover, upon examining the three studies Sherwood and Forest cited, I found that two of them focused on recent decades (post-1980 and post-2000) rather than the full historical period relevant to climate sensitivity estimation in S20 and Lewis22. The third study, when its data from an alternative SST dataset to AMIPII is analyzed using approaches that minimize bias from interannual variability and account for model structural similarities, yields an estimate closely in line with my adopted value.

As regards how well the historical pattern effect is known, in L22 I adopted the same large estimate of the degree of uncertainty involved as Sherwood et al. used in S20 and the IPCC assessed in AR6.

Statistical methodology and Prior selection

Beyond specific technical disputes lies a more fundamental disagreement about statistical methodology. For scientific inference to be reliable, the statistical methods employed must be calibrated to produce uncertainty ranges that approximate true confidence intervals. Where the data are weak, this requires either objective Bayesian methods with noninformative priors or frequentist approachesโ€”both of which are designed with this goal in mind.

The original Sherwood et al. study employed what statisticians term a โ€œsubjective Bayesianโ€ approach, incorporating a prior distribution for the parameter being estimated based on expert judgment. Such an approach may produce very ill-calibrated uncertainty ranges, although in S20โ€™s case the chosen prior (a uniform prior in ฮป) was close enough to a noninformative one that the mis-calibration was minor.

In Lewis22, I adopted an โ€œobjective Bayesianโ€ methodology using a computed Jeffreysโ€™ prior for the combined evidence, designed to minimize the influence of the prior on the resulting estimate. Note that this is different from using an objective (noninformative) prior for one line of evidence and using the resulting posterior pdf as the prior for estimation from the likelihood from the next line of evidence analyzed, and so on. Although such โ€˜Bayesian updatingโ€™ is standard statistical practice, contrary to general belief it is not soundly based mathematically and it may not result in well-calibrated estimation. See here.

The distinction between subjective and objective Bayesian estimation matters significantly when dealing with highly uncertain parameters like ECS. Subjective Bayesian methods are not designed to produce well-calibrated confidence intervals, and their uncertainty ranges can be severely biased when data are insufficient to dominate prior assumptionsโ€”a common situation in climate sensitivity estimation.

I demonstrated this problem in my Comment article by showing that a seemingly reasonable uniform prior in ECS (spanning 0โ€“20ยฐC), as used in the IPCC AR4 report, produced unreasonable results when applied to S20โ€™s historical evidence alone, yielding a median estimate of 8.5ยฐC with a 95% bound of 18.6ยฐC, compared to a median estimate of 4.2ยฐC with a 95% bound of 13.7ยฐC when using a noninformative computed prior. The mathematical properties of a uniform prior in ECS makes it highly informative rather than neutral in this case, concentrating probability at extremely high values.

Steven Sherwood claimed in his comment (CC1) that โ€œThe main impact of L22โ€™s objective prior is to narrow the pdfโ€”i.e., claim ECS to be known more confidently.โ€ The truth is the opposite. Adopting L22โ€™s objective prior in place of S20โ€™s prior actually widened and slightly raised S20โ€™s ECS range. I provided a full response (AC2) to all the points in Sherwoodโ€™s comment.

Structural Model Uncertainties

Both Sherwood and Forest and I agree that structural uncertainties in the models used may affect ECS estimates. They focused on assumptions in โ€˜forwardโ€™ models used to predict what would be observed given a particular ECS, however these typically include assumptions based on GCM behavior.

The most significant structural uncertainty may concern tropical warming patterns. Climate models consistently predict that greenhouse warming should weaken the east-west temperature gradient across the tropical Pacific, with the eastern regions warming faster than the western regions, contrary to what appears to have happened during most of the historical period warming. This predicted pattern change underlies the weakening of climate feedbacks over time in GCM simulations, which contributes to their higher ECS estimates and underlies the pattern effect based upwards adjustment to climate sensitivity estimates based directly on historical warming and forcing (Shist).

However, several recent studies suggest that this predicted pattern change may be unrealistic, with western Pacific sea surface temperatures actually being more sensitive to greenhouse gas forcing than eastern Pacific temperatures, contrary to model predictions. If correct, this would imply that the feedback weakening simulated by models over 150-year timescales following abrupt CO2 increases is also unrealistic.

This structural uncertainty affects not only historical ECS estimates but also those based on process understanding and emergent constraints, since these typically rely on model behavior that incorporates the potentially erroneous tropical warming patterns. If the GCM-predicted weakening of the tropical Pacific east-west temperature gradient is not realistic, all these types of ECS estimates would likely be biased toward overestimating ECS. Even if the Pacific east-west temperature gradient does eventually weaken to the extent simulated by GCMs, a multidecadal-to-centennial delay in that weakening could imply a significantly lower warming this century than implied by GCM behavior.

Summary

My 2022 analysis systematically addressed multiple aspects of the original Sherwood et al. study, correcting erroneous likelihood computation, replacing unsatisfactory methodological choices that resulted in biased and/or inconsistent estimation with more appropriate ones, and revising certain input data assumptionsโ€“mainly updating them based on more recent evidence. The resulting ECS estimates were lower and more tightly constrained.

My published Comment includes a detailed sensitivity analysis that I conducted, which shows how different classes of revisions contributed to the differences between the S20 results (after correcting S20โ€™s likelihood errors and adopting computed Jeffreysโ€™ priors, which slightly raised the S20 ECS estimate) and the final Lewis22 results. The largest contribution (55% of the total reduction in median ECS) came from remedying the F2ร—CO2 and the ECS-to-S ratio estimation to avoid bias and inconsistencies, and updating the S20 estimates of non-aerosol forcing and of the ratio of ocean surface air temperature to SST warming, using IPCC AR6 values. These changes  should be uncontroversial. Most of the remaining reduction came for reappraising LGM cooling and forcing estimates, and using more recent and appropriate estimates for two mPWP-specific ratios. The justification for each of these revisions is discussed in my published Comment on Sherwood and Forestโ€™s article. In the light of conflicting evidence and resulting large uncertainty concerning cloud feedback and aerosol forcing, the Lewis22 revisions to those items, and possibly also to pattern effect estimates, are more uncertain. However, even without adopting any changes to the S20 estimates of those three items, over 80% of the reduction in median ECS in Lewis22 is retained.

Implications for Climate Science

The exchange with Sherwood and Forest highlights several important issues for the climate sensitivity estimation field.

First, the reluctance to abandon statistical methods that can produce systematically biased results is concerning. The continued use of subjective Bayesian approaches for ECS estimation, despite their known limitations when data are weak, compromises the reliability of ECS estimation.

Second, the possibility that fundamental aspects of climate model behaviorโ€”particularly tropical warming patternsโ€”may be incorrect has broad implications. If models systematically overestimate the weakening of climate feedbacks over time, this could affect not only ECS estimates but also projections of near-term warming rates and regional climate changes. Resolving this issue should be a key objective.

Third, careful methodological scrutiny is important. Climate sensitivity estimates inform policy decisions with enormous economic and social consequences. Ensuring that these estimates are based on rigorous and unbiased analysis is essential for maintaining public trust in climate science.

Moving Forward

My intention in my published Comment and this article has been to contribute to a more accurate understanding of climate sensitivity estimation, in particular by correcting misunderstandings of the causes of the differences between estimates in S20 and in Lewis22. The poor understanding displayed in Sherwood and Forestโ€™s article of the effects of the revisions made to historical aerosol forcing and pattern effect estimates, and by their claim that as a result in Lewis22 the historical record rules out a high ECS level, are worrying. It is clear from L22โ€™s results tables that the historical record does not rules out a high ECS levelโˆ’it is paleoclimate and process evidence that do so. Steven Sherwoodโ€™s incorrect assertions in his comment (CC1) on my 2025 manuscript that the main impact of L22โ€™s objective prior is to narrow the pdf [for ECS], when it in fact Lewis22 showed that it slightly widens S20โ€™s pdf, and that L22โ€™s multiplication of fixed-SST F2ร—CO2 estimates by 0.86 when estimating S from process and historical evidence introduces n inconsistency between forcing and feedback, when it actually avoids such an inconsistency, are also concerning.

The ongoing debate over climate sensitivity reflects the inherent difficulty of the problem, and some methodological weaknessesโ€“particularly regarding statistical issuesโ€“in published research, rather than any fundamental disagreement about the reality of human-caused climate change. While climate sensitivity research has progressed substantially over the last decade or two, significant uncertainties remain. Debate and disagreements are healthy, but should centre on evidence and its interpretation, not on baseless claims.


[1] Ironically, Forest was  lead author of a key ECS study in the IPCCโ€™s fourth assessment report (AR4) that Lewis had shown in a peer reviewed 2013 paper to be riddled with errors in its likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, although Forest (with his joint author) corrected those errors in a later study using the same methodology, he never corrected the same errors in his AR4 study โ€“ which has been cited nearly fifty times since my 2013 paper showed it was erroneous.

[2] Two for historical evidence, as the third method was defeated by S20โ€™s highly asymmetrical aerosol forcing distribution. See Lewis22 Supporting Information Figs. S1, S2, and S3

[3] I pointed this coding error out to the S20 authors in September 2022. They have now corrected this error in the online version of S20, albeit without acknowledgement of my having notified them of  it

[4] Even when using their method, S20 would have estimated the ECS to S ratio at a value very close to that derived in Lewis22 had they not included an outlier CO2 quadrupling simulation result from a GCM in which it exhibited near runaway warming.

CERES Satellite Data Suggests Low Climate Sensitivity

From theย Friends of Science Societyย Newsletter, where they give our own Willis Eschenbach props and suggestions for his important recent work โ€“ Anthony

Dramatic sky with dark clouds and sunlight peeking through, illuminating patches of the landscape.

From Watts Up With That?

By Anthony Watts

From the Friends of Science Society Newsletter, where they give our own Willis Eschenbach props and suggestions for his important recent work โ€“ Anthony

The Clouds and the Earthโ€™s Radiant Energy System (CERES) project provides satellite-based observations of Earthโ€™s radiation budget and clouds. CERES instruments on several satellites measure longwave and shortwave radiation from the Earth. The longwave radiation is the radiation emitted upward to space from the Earthโ€™s surface and clouds. The upward shortwave radiation is the reflected solar radiation which doesnโ€™t enter the climate system. If the outgoing longwave radiation is less than the absorbed solar radiation, there is a positive top-of-atmosphere radiative imbalance (imbalance) which increases the global average temperature.

A graph depicting the historical ranges of climate sensitivity in degrees Celsius in response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide, showing ranges from little effect to greater future warming.
Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) is a measure of how much the Earthโ€™s global average surface temperature will eventually increase in response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. Image by Anthony Watts

Willis Eschenbach used the CERES database, which gives the monthly radiative fluxes in each 1ยฐ latitude by 1ยฐ longitude starting March 2000, to calculate the equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) to greenhouse gases. He produced a graph of imbalance versus the surface temperature by 1ยฐ latitude by 1ยฐ longitude with time averaged over 24 years. Eschenbach applied a lowess fit to the data. He calculated the slope of that fit and calculated the area weighted imbalance per degree of temperature change.  Eschenbach asks โ€œHow much does the earth have to warm up to restore the 3.7 watts per square meter (W/m2) of TOA radiation imbalance that is said to result from a doubling of CO2 (2xCO2)?โ€ Willis says the amount of warming required to rebalance the imbalance is called the ECS, but I believe that isnโ€™t correct. The imbalance is not at an equilibrium state but is the result of a continual increase of greenhouse gases.

The transient climate response (TCR) is the change in temperature after a doubling of CO2 at a constant increase of a 1%/year, which would result in a doubling in 70 years. The actual average CO2 increase from 2000 to 2024 was 0.567%/year. Willis calculates the imbalance at 6.6 W/m2 per ยฐC of surface temperature change. This equates to a TCR 3.7/6.6 = 0.56 ยฐC, which is the TCR at 0.567%/year CO2 increase. I call this the โ€œslowTCRโ€, to distinguish it from the normal TCR with a 1%/yr CO2 increase. Using a simple 1-D climate model tuned to 3-D models, with CO2 increasing at the actual rate, I calculated that the slowTCR of 0.56 ยฐC corresponds to an ECS of 0.68 ยฐC, which seem much too low compared to other observation-based estimates.

I did a similar calculation using the same CERES data. Each data point is 1ยฐ latitude by 4ยฐ longitude. I applied a 4th-order polynomial fit to the average 25-year data (16200 data points) as shown in this graph. I made another graph of the slope of the fitted curve and calculated a global average imbalance of 3.95 W/m2 per ยฐC of surface temperature change, which corresponding to a slowTRC of 0.94 ยฐC and an ECS of 1.14 ยฐC. The lowess fit heavily discounts data further away from the mean to discount outliers. The polynomial fit might be better as all the data is of equally high quality. Changing the best fit method has a large effect on the results.

Several papers, see here and , here, argue that cloud cover can change due to atmospheric circulation changes caused by a temperature change. The analysis by Eschenbach and myself using time averaged CERES data doesnโ€™t account for this possible effect and assumes that any potential temperature-caused air circulation changes will not significantly change the relationship between imbalance and temperature over the next few decades of climate change. Therefore, I did the same calculation using the four coldest years of the CERES data (2000, 2001,2008, 2011) and the four warmest years (2018, 2019,2023, 2024). The global average temperature difference between these year groups is 0.68 ยฐC. If the air circulation changes were causing more warming, the result of the warm years would show a lower imbalance change per temperature change than the cold years. In fact, the warm years analysis has a slightly smaller change of 0.13 W/m2/ยฐC, so it appears that this effect is leading to more warming. Therefore, the method we used to estimate ECS is likely inaccurate. It is not a simple task to estimate the ECS.