Tag: electricity system

Millions of UK homes now at risk of 3-hour rolling blackouts with just 8 hours’ notice

In the Great Britain electricity system, “demand control” refers to a set of last-resort tools under the Grid Code (primarily Operating Code No. 6, or OC6) that allow the National Energy System Operator (NESO) and Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) to deliberately reduce electricity demand when generation/supply is insufficient to meet it, or when the system faces other operating problems (frequency, voltage, or thermal issues).

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In Great Britain, the National Energy System Operator (NESO/Neso) has new rules (effective around 10 August 2026) allowing it to impose short-notice rolling/rotating power cuts (demand control) as a last-resort measure to prevent a full system collapse during electricity shortages.

Key details from reports (primarily The Telegraph and The Guardian):

NESO can now instruct distribution networks to disconnect enough demand in designated areas to cut electricity use by more than a fifth (or similar large shares), with typically eight hours’ notice. Cuts would last up to about three hours per area and rotate across the country to share the impact.

This is distinct from (and more flexible/quicker than) the government’s longstanding Electricity Supply Emergency Code, which requires Energy Secretary approval, is geared toward prolonged crises (over 24 hours), and has never been invoked. The new protocol is industry-led under Grid Code powers and designed for shorter-duration shortfalls.

NESO already had the ability to disconnect up to ~20% of power at as little as five minutes’ notice in imminent-collapse scenarios. The update expands options for rotating disconnections across more of the demand (with protected sites such as hospitals, water treatment works, and national-security facilities exempt).

NESO has described it as a “last-resort contingency measure” for “the most extreme and unlikely circumstances,” only after other tools (voltage reduction, industrial demand disconnection, etc.) are exhausted. It aims to stabilise the grid and avoid uncontrolled nationwide blackouts.

The changes were approved by the regulator Ofgem and came into effect the week of the reports.

Coverage notes the timing amid broader discussions of grid challenges (renewables integration, margins, weather extremes, etc.), though NESO frames the tool as prudent contingency planning rather than an indication of imminent risk.

No actual widespread use has been reported in the immediate coverage.

The Electricity Supply Emergency Code (ESEC) is the UK Government’s official guidance and framework for managing a prolonged electricity supply emergency in Great Britain. It outlines how to ration electricity fairly through planned “rota load disconnections” (rotating/rolling power cuts) while prioritising critical infrastructure.

It addresses situations defined under:

  • Section 96(7) of the Electricity Act 1989 (a “civil emergency” — any natural disaster or other emergency that the Secretary of State believes is or may disrupt electricity supplies).
  • Section 3(1)(b) of the Energy Act 1976 (an actual or threatened emergency affecting fuel or electricity supplies requiring exceptional government powers to control energy sources and availability).

The goal is equal distribution of available supply “as far as reasonably practicable,” while keeping Protected Sites (critical national infrastructure such as major hospitals with A&E, water treatment, air traffic control, and certain national-security or continuous-process sites) supplied for as long as possible. Protected Sites are listed on a formal Protected Sites List and must still reduce consumption where possible. Ordinary homes and most businesses cannot qualify as Protected Sites.

How It Works

Rota Load Disconnections: Distribution Network Operators divide their networks into roughly 18 “Load Blocks” (each ~5% of demand, labelled A–U or similar). Blocks are switched off in a rotating schedule, typically for nominal three-hour periods. Severity is scaled by “levels” (higher levels disconnect more blocks). Schedules are published via Activation Schedules issued by the National Energy System Operator (NESO).

Implementation requires government emergency powers (directions under the relevant Acts), usually after advice from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) Emergency Response Team and often involving COBR. It is intended for longer-duration shortfalls (typically more than a day), not sudden operational imbalances.

Public appeals for voluntary restraint would normally accompany it. Full restoration follows once generation can meet demand again.

ESEC is not used for day-to-day faults, storm damage, or rapid/short-notice generation shortfalls.

Those are handled by NESO under the Grid Code (including tools such as the newer Demand Control Rotation Protocol). ESEC has never been invoked in practice.

Recent Updates

The guidance was last substantially updated in April 2026 (following a 2023 review) and is published on GOV.UK.

It continues to be reviewed and tested by DESNZ with industry partners.

The full document (including detailed rota plans and Protected Site criteria) is available as a PDF from the official GOV.UK page for the Electricity Supply Emergency Code.

In short, ESEC is the government’s contingency plan for structured, fair electricity rationing during a sustained national or regional supply crisis.

“We Don’t Have Control of the System”: NESO Engineers Warn Renewables Boom Has Left Britain’s Grid Unmanageable

Britain’s electricity system is shifting from a small number of large, dispatchable (easily controllable) power stations to a highly distributed mix dominated by wind, solar, batteries, and smaller/local generators. Engineers in the leaked report claim this expansion has outstripped NESO’s real-time visibility, forecasting accuracy, and centralized modeling capabilities.

Grid balancing is the continuous process of matching electricity supply and demand on a second-by-second basis while maintaining system frequency (50 Hz in the UK/Europe) and voltage stability. It ensures reliable power delivery without blackouts or equipment damage.

Traditional vs. Modern Grid Balancing

Reduced System Inertia and Frequency Stability
Inverter-based resources (solar, most wind, batteries) respond electronically rather than mechanically. Frequency changes faster after a disturbance (higher Rate of Change of Frequency — RoCoF). This narrows the time window for corrective action and raises blackout risks if a large generator trips. Solutions include grid-forming inverters, virtual/synthetic inertia from batteries, and synchronous condensers.

Forecasting and Visibility Issues
Wind and solar output is hard to predict accurately days or even hours ahead. Distributed generation (rooftop solar, local batteries) often sits behind distribution networks and isn’t fully visible to national operators like NESO. This leads to reliance on estimates, as highlighted in recent UK whistleblower reports.

Ramp Rates and the “Duck Curve”
Solar drops sharply in the evening while demand may rise (evening peak). This creates steep net load ramps that require fast-responding resources (batteries, flexible gas, demand response).

Network Constraints and Congestion
Renewables are often located far from demand centers (e.g., Scottish wind). Transmission limits cause curtailment (wasting clean energy) or high balancing costs. “Constraint costs” in the UK have risen significantly.

New Risks from Flexibility Assets
Batteries can help but also create issues — e.g., simultaneous charging during stress events could worsen shortages. “Skip rates” (assets not being called when needed) remain a challenge despite improvements.

Longer-Term and Seasonal Balancing
Daily/weekly variability is manageable with batteries and interconnectors, but seasonal mismatches (e.g., low winter solar) require longer-duration storage, hydrogen, or overbuild + curtailment.

Tools and Solutions for Balancing

  • Short-term (seconds to minutes): Frequency response services, fast batteries, grid-forming inverters.
  • Intraday/Real-time: Balancing Mechanism (BM), where NESO buys/sells adjustments from market participants.
  • Demand-side Flexibility: Shifting consumption (e.g., smart EV charging, industrial demand response).
  • Storage: Batteries for intra-day; longer-duration options (pumped hydro, hydrogen) for multi-hour needs.
  • Interconnectors: Importing/exporting power with neighbors.
  • Operational Changes: Better forecasting, improved visibility (e.g., through digitalization), and market reforms.

UK-Specific Context (2026)

Recent events (e.g., June 2026 heatwave) and the Cornwall Insight report underscore modeling uncertainties that could reach several GW by decade’s end, increasing costs and risks.

NESO is modernizing balancing platforms and working on reforms, while batteries are scaling rapidly but introducing new coordination challenges.

These challenges are real and well-understood in the industry — not insurmountable, but they require significant investment in grid infrastructure, flexibility, and control systems. Costs ultimately flow to consumers unless managed efficiently. The transition rewards systems that combine technological innovation (e.g., advanced inverters) with market design and strategic network buildout.

Countries like the UK, Australia, California, and Texas are at the forefront of testing solutions in real time.

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‘We don’t have control of the system’, warn NESO engineers

Engineers at the UK’s National Energy System Operator (NESO) have issued a stark warning in a leaked confidential report: they no longer feel they have full control of the electricity system. This is due to the rapid growth of variable renewables (wind, solar), batteries, and distributed/local generation, which has outpaced their ability to monitor, forecast, and manage the grid in real time.

Core Issue

Britain’s electricity system is shifting from a small number of large, dispatchable (easily controllable) power stations to a highly distributed mix dominated by wind, solar, batteries, and smaller/local generators. Engineers in the leaked report claim this expansion has outstripped NESO’s real-time visibility, forecasting accuracy, and centralized modeling capabilities.

Control room teams increasingly rely on estimates and forecasts instead of precise data. Without a robust single model for system needs, decisions can vary by operator judgment. This raises risks to balancing supply and demand, frequency stability, and overall security.

Key Points from the Report and Whistleblowers

Visibility and Modeling Issues:

The shift away from a few large, predictable power stations to thousands of smaller, intermittent sources means much generation isn’t fully visible in NESO’s control room. Operators rely heavily on forecasts and estimates rather than precise data. There is reportedly no single centralized model for calculating required power to maintain stability, leading to inconsistent methods and heavy dependence on individual operator judgment.

June 23 Incident (Extreme Heat):

During a period of high demand and stressed supply (low wind, pressure on gas and imports), grid frequency moved outside normal operating ranges for ~48 minutes total. Transmission constraints were breached (one by ~700MW). Actions taken included calling on batteries, using interconnectors (with partial success), and emergency measures. NESO maintains the system stayed within statutory limits, no customers lost power, and it was secure. Whistleblowers and internal reports suggest otherwise, with claims of compromised security.

Whistleblower Statements:

Engineers claim they’ve raised safety concerns with Ofgem for two years without adequate investigation. A quoted message: “We don’t have control of the system. We have tried our best. It’s now over to the public and the regulator. Please help.” They describe June 23 as “just another day” and allege attempts to downplay the event or alter records/models.

Broader Implications

This is not an immediate “lights out” crisis—the UK grid remains one of the more reliable globally—but it highlights known transition challenges: lower inertia, variability, forecasting difficulty, and the need for better tools (e.g., improved visibility, digital models, flexibility services). A Cornwall Insight-type analysis suggests inaccuracies could raise consumer costs and risks if unaddressed.

Critics see it as evidence that the net-zero timeline is outpacing engineering reality. Supporters view it as manageable teething issues solvable with investment in grid modernization, storage, and demand flexibility.

This fits into ongoing debates about the UK’s transition to a renewables-heavy system. Similar whistleblower concerns and reports (e.g., from The Times and Daily Mail) highlight risks of blackouts, higher costs, volatility, and modeling uncertainties as more intermittent sources connect. NESO has faced scrutiny over record-keeping, corporate affairs involvement in operations, and transparency. Ofgem is reviewing the June event and compliance.

NESO’s Position (from related coverage):

They insist the system remained secure, use standard tools for balancing, and are investigating allegations and the incident. Margin notices (like the one issued) are routine signals to the market, not indicators of imminent blackout risk.

This reflects real engineering challenges in managing a low-inertia, high-renewables grid with greater variability—issues NESO and others have discussed in operability reports, though the whistleblowers argue the pace of change has created unmanageable gaps in visibility and control.

Can Anyone Save New York From Its Coming Self-Inflicted Climate and Energy Disaster?

New York State has officially ordained the destruction of its electricity system and its economy with a mad dash to energy utopia, as prescribed by a 2019 statute called the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act). The Climate Act mandates a completely unachievable 70% of electricity generation from “renewables” by 2030, with even more draconian mandates following in quick succession thereafter.

From Manhattan Contrarian

By Francis Menton

New York State has officially ordained the destruction of its electricity system and its economy with a mad dash to energy utopia, as prescribed by a 2019 statute called the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act). The Climate Act mandates a completely unachievable 70% of electricity generation from “renewables” by 2030, with even more draconian mandates following in quick succession thereafter. New York City has piled on with its own fantasy energy statute called Local Law 97, mandating, among other things, forced conversion to electric heat by 2030 of most residential buildings over 25,000 square feet. A so-called “Scoping Plan” on how to do all this, issued by the State in 2022, contains no bona fide feasibility analysis, and equally no bona fide cost analysis. Everybody with over a sixth-grade education who has taken any time to look at this knows that it can’t possibly work. The only question is how much destruction will befall us before the whole thing crashes to the ground.

Can anyone save New York from the coming self-inflicted climate and energy disaster?

In the category of people making futile efforts to try to save New York from its own folly, or at least from some portion of it, we have none other than yours truly, the Manhattan Contrarian. As reported here back on February 23, I had just filed, along with co-counsel Cameron Macdonald, an amicus curiae brief at the New York Court of Appeals in support of the plaintiffs in a case called Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. v. City of New York. In this case, owners of a large group of co-op buildings in Queens had sued seeking to have the City’s Local Law 97 declared invalid as pre-empted by the State’s Climate Act. Note that victory by these plaintiffs would not have ended the folly of the State’s Climate Act and its associated destruction of our electricity system; but their victory would have eliminated the mandate to convert to electric heat without sufficient electricity, and therefore would at least have made it possible for residents of large buildings to avoid freezing in the winter when they have converted to electric heat and there is no electricity.

In the Glen Oaks case, the trial court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that it had no basis in law. But an interim appellate court, known as the Appellate Division, had reversed, and said the the plaintiffs should have a chance to prove their case. New York City appealed that ruling to the state’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, asking to have the trial court’s dismissal re-instated.

In my February 23 post, I noted that the plaintiffs were giving the Court of Appeals the chance to save the New Yorkers from their own folly — an opportunity which the Court might or might not take:

The Court of Appeals has a chance here to save New York City and its residents from their own folly. It may or may not take advantage of the opportunity. If it takes a pass, and reinstates the dismissal of the case, Local Law 97 will still fail within a few years at most. It’s just that, in that scenario, a lot of people stand to get hurt.

Perhaps to no one’s surprise, the Court of Appeals took a pass, and re-instated the dismissal. Here is the decision (from May 22). It’s mostly mumbo jumbo about legal standards for deciding if one statute has pre-empted another. But the bottom line is clear: the Court of Appeals is not going to be the one to save New York from its coming climate and energy disaster.

As another candidate for the role of New York’s savior from climate and energy disaster, how about President Trump? Immediately upon entering office back in January, Trump went to work knocking the supports out from under the green energy subsidies and favoritism that form the underpinnings of New York’s Climate Act plans. The biggest item in the Climate Act’s strategy for transitioning New York’s electricity system to renewables is plan for some 9000 MW of offshore wind developments in the Atlantic Ocean off Long Island. But by this January 20 Executive Order, Trump withdrew all of the Outer Continental Shelf for leasing for potential off-shore wind energy projects. A separate January 20 Executive Order then directed a halt to all disbursements of green energy subsidies under Biden-era statutes.

So did these moves completely flummox New York’s plans for electricity from “renewables”? In the succeeding months, New York’s governments have soldiered on as if nothing is amiss. And then last week came news that Trump has somewhat changed direction. The new direction can be summarized as letting New York proceed with at least part of its wind energy fantasies as long as it backs off on suppressing at least some fossil fuel projects.

Here is a New York Times article from May 29, headline “N.Y. Natural Gas Pipelines Get a Second Chance Under Trump.” The gist is that the Trump administration and Governor Hochul have entered into discussion about a deal whereby two natural gas pipelines long blocked by New York would be allowed to move forward, and in return the feds would allow one of the off-shore wind projects to proceed. Excerpt:

A pipeline company is reviving plans to build two natural gas pipelines into New York State, a major reversal that amounts to a bet that the Trump administration will be able to strong-arm states into signing off on energy projects. New York had blocked both pipelines, called Constitution and Northeast Supply Enhancement, over environmental concerns. But the Trump administration has made clear that it wants more oil and gas infrastructure, including in the Northeast, where pipelines had become so hard to build that companies had all but given up on them.

According to the Times, this is all so far in the discussion stage, with no final commitments on either side. Even if finalized, the proposed deal would be far from an end to New York’s energy follies. Like the Glen Oaks lawsuit, if successful the Trump administration gambit would have the effect of keeping natural gas available as a back-up for when the electricity system transition inevitably fails.

I’m thankful for every bit of help we can get. But ultimately, our salvation will have to come from New York’s own voters. The question is, rather than getting saved by outside forces, would this benighted State and City actually be better off to go through an energy disaster and, perhaps, have its voters learn a little something from the experience?

Net Zero to add £900 to cost of living by 2030

Ed Miliband’s Clean Power 2030 plan will add at least £25 billion per year to the cost of the electricity system. This will cause prices to soar, hitting every household in the UK with a cost-of-living increase of over £900.

From NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

By Paul Homewood

Net Zero to add £900 to cost of living by 2030

Ed Miliband’s Clean Power 2030 plan will add at least £25 billion per year to the cost of the electricity system. This will cause prices to soar, hitting every household in the UK with a cost-of-living increase of over £900.

The figures are the work of Professor Gordon Hughes, one of the UK’s leading energy system experts and comes after Mr Miliband cancelled a similar costing exercise commissioned by his predecessor Claire Coutinho.

Professor Hughes has found that Mr Miliband’s plans will increase the cost of almost every aspect of the electricity system, including the direct cost of power generation, capacity levies and system balancing costs. Increasing scarcity of carbon emissions permits will drive the costs up even further.

Professor Hughes said:

“While Mr Miliband’s department have resolutely refused to put a cost on the Net Zero grid, it is vital that we understand the direction he is taking us. The plan is clearly unaffordable.”

Andrew Montford, the director of Net Zero Watch said:

“It is vital that Sir Keir Starmer put a stop to Ed Miliband’s madness. This will be a disaster for the UK economy.”

Notes for editors

Professor Hughes is arguably the UK’s pre-eminent energy economist. He was previously an academic at Edinburgh and Cambridge, and has worked as an advisor to the World Bank.

His estimates are published in an article at his Substack, and have been reproduced as a paper by Net Zero Watch.

Professor Hughes estimates costs of key elements of the electricity system for two different electricity systems: the system in the Clean Power 2030 plan and the current system. It is not possible to model every element of the system, so the estimate should be viewed as conservative.

In delivering the electricity demand predicted for 2030, the 2024 system will cost £58.9m per year, whereas the current system would only cost £34.1m, a difference of £24.8m. In per-unit terms, the 2024 system would be at least 7.5p/kWh (£75/MWh) more expensive.

Notably, the cost of balancing the grid – mostly payments to windfarms to switch off – would be £4 billion higher.

The key results are as follows:

,Hughes-SystemCost2030Herunterladen

New report warns of growing risk to Britain’s energy security

As Britain’s electricity system becomes increasingly reliant on interconnection with European nations, a new report published by the Global Warming Policy Foundation warns about the growing risks to the UK’s energy security and security of supply.

From NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

London, 12 September: As Britain’s electricity system becomes increasingly reliant on interconnection with European nations, a new report published by the Global Warming Policy Foundation warns about the growing risks to the UK’s energy security and security of supply.


Interconnectors are seen as key to managing periods of low wind output in an electricity system increasingly dependent on intermittent renewables. But what if the markets at the other end of those interconnectors are also experiencing dunkelflaute conditions of low wind?


As most of these countries have similar weather to the UK, and share similar wind-led Net Zero targets, the risk to Britain’s security of supply is growing significantly.


Kathryn Porter, the report’s author, warns:
“The rules governing the behaviour of interconnectors do not guarantee they will import to Britain during times of electricity shortages – they could even export instead. Some countries are expressing doubts about their commitment to trading electricity, and have passed laws allowing them to suspend exports under critical conditions. They are also considering imposing export taxes in order to prevent domestic prices rising too much, which may reduce the availability of exports.

0Porter-InterconnectorsHerunterladen