High-Precision Dating Reveals What Sparked a 79-Million-Year Magma Surge in the North Cascades

A new high- precision timeline of a ~79- 60 Ma magmatic flare- up in the North Cascades (Washington), based on CA- ID- TIMS U- Pb zircon dating and whole- rock geochemistry, indicates that crustal thickening followed (rather than triggered) the surge in magma flux.

U- Pb zircon dating is one of the most precise and widely used methods for determining the absolute age of rocks, especially igneous and metamorphic rocks. It relies on the radioactive decay of uranium (U) isotopes to lead (Pb) isotopes within the mineral zircon (ZrSiO₄).

Infographic of snow-covered North Cascades mountains with zircon crystal analysis, U-Pb geochronology timeline, concordia diagram, and subsurface magma system visualization.
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A new high- precision timeline of a ~79- 60 Ma magmatic flare- up in the North Cascades (Washington), based on CA- ID- TIMS U- Pb zircon dating and whole- rock geochemistry, indicates that crustal thickening followed (rather than triggered) the surge in magma flux.

The Eos research spotlight by Sarah Stanley (published 6 November 2026) summarizes work by Karmakar et al. in Tectonics (doi:10.1029/2026TC009604).

Continental arcs above subduction zones commonly experience episodic “flare-ups”, periods when magma addition rates to the crust rise dramatically (up to ~15- 20 times background levels) for tens of millions of years.

The North Cascades preserve the deep, crystallized roots of an ancient continental arc active roughly 150- 50 Ma; these rocks were later uplifted and form much of the present mountain range (distinct from the younger Cascades volcanism that began ~40 Ma and produced peaks such as Mount Rainier and Mount Baker).

Key findings from the high- precision dating (chemical abrasion- isotope dilution- thermal ionization mass spectrometry on zircon, with age uncertainties as low as ~0.05%) and geochemical proxies for crustal thickness:

  • The flare- up was highly episodic, consisting of discrete, short- lived pulses of pluton emplacement separated by quieter intervals rather than continuous magmatism.
  • Crustal thickening did not precede the flare- up; it began afterward. Enhanced magma flux and localized thickening are spatially and temporally correlated during the event.
  • Crustal thickness showed no significant change between this flare- up and an earlier one (~96- 86 Ma).
  • Most magmas appear derived from juvenile, mantle- dominated sources (supported by zircon Hf isotopes in related work), with only local interaction with crustal or sediment- derived melts.

These results favor increased mantle melt production as the primary trigger of the flare-up, with subsequent crustal thickening, assimilation, and deformation developing as consequences and feedback of the elevated magma flux, rather than tectonic shortening and under thrusting initiating the surge by generating large volumes of crustal melt.⁠

Related work by the same research group (including conference abstracts and a thesis) reinforces the episodic character of the ~79– 63 Ma activity and the conclusion that tectonic shortening was not the principal driver.

Snow-capped mountain range above a dense evergreen forest beneath a partly cloudy blue sky
Advancements in high- precision rock dating are helping to clarify the complex geologic history of the North Cascades in Washington. Credit: Sourav Karmakar

U- Pb zircon dating is one of the most precise and widely used methods for determining the absolute age of rocks, especially igneous and metamorphic rocks. It relies on the radioactive decay of uranium (U) isotopes to lead (Pb) isotopes within the mineral zircon (ZrSiO₄).

Why zircon?

Zircon is ideal because:

  • It incorporates uranium (typically tens to thousands of ppm) into its crystal structure when it forms, but almost no lead.
  • It is extremely resistant to chemical and physical alteration, weathering, and high temperatures.
  • It has a high closure temperature for Pb diffusion (typically >900 °C), meaning the U- Pb system “locks in” the crystallization age and is rarely reset except under extreme conditions.
  • It often shows internal growth zoning that can record multiple events.

The radioactive decay systems

Two independent decay chains are used:

  • 238U → 206Pb (half-life ≈ 4.47 billion years)
  • 235U → 207Pb (half-life ≈ 704 million years)

Because both parent isotopes are in the same mineral and decay to different Pb isotopes, the dual system provides an internal check for reliability. Ages are plotted on a concordia diagram. If the two systems give the same age (a “concordant” date), the system has remained closed. Discordant dates usually indicate Pb loss or inheritance of older cores.

Main analytical methods

There are three primary techniques, differing in precision, spatial resolution, sample throughput, and cost:

  1. CA- ID- TIMS (Chemical Abrasion– Isotope Dilution– Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry)
    • Highest precision method (often 0.05% or better on individual dates; weighted means can reach ~0.02%). This is the technique used in the North Cascades study discussed earlier.
    • Process:
      • Zircon grains are separated from the rock.
      • Chemical abrasion (Mattinson, 2005): Grains are annealed at high temperature (~900 °C for ~48 hours) to repair minor radiation damage, then partially dissolved in hydrofluoric acid. This preferentially removes radiation- damaged domains that have lost Pb, leaving more pristine material.
      • Individual grains (or fragments) are fully dissolved with a precisely calibrated isotopic tracer (spike) containing known amounts of artificial isotopes (e.g., 205Pb and 233U or 235U).
      • U and Pb are chemically separated via ion- exchange chromatography in ultra-clean labs.
      • Isotopic ratios are measured on a thermal ionization mass spectrometer (TIMS).
    • Strengths: Extremely precise and accurate; considered the “gold standard”.
    • Limitations: Destroys the grain (no spatial resolution within the crystal), labor-intensive, low throughput, expensive. Best for simple, high- value samples where the highest temporal resolution is needed (e.g., resolving short magmatic pulses).
  2. LA- ICP- MS (Laser Ablation– Inductively Coupled Plasma– Mass Spectrometry)
    • High spatial resolution and high throughput.
    • A UV laser ablates a small spot (typically 10– 50 µm diameters) on a polished zircon mount. The vaporized material is ionized in a plasma and analyzed by mass spectrometry.
    • Strengths: Fast, relatively inexpensive, can analyze many grains or spots quickly; good for detrital zircon studies or complex zoning.
    • Limitations: Lower precision (typically 1– 3% or more on individual spots). Requires careful standardization.
  3. SIMS and SHRIMP (Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry and Sensitive High-Resolution Ion Microprobe)
    • Highest spatial resolution (spots as small as ~10 µm, very shallow depth).
    • A focused ion beam sputters secondary ions from the zircon surface for analysis.
    • Strengths: Excellent for complex, zoned, or small zircons; minimal sample destruction.
    • Limitations: Precision is intermediate (better than LA- ICP- MS but worse than CA- ID- TIMS); slower and more expensive than LA- ICP- MS.

Comparison summary

MethodPrecision (typical)Spatial resolutionThroughputBest for
CA- ID- TIMSHighest (~0.05%)None (whole grain)LowPrecise crystallization ages, short timescales
LA- ICP- MSModerate (1–3%)High (10– 50 µm)HighDetrital studies, large datasets
SIMS and SHRIMPIntermediateHighest (~10 µm)MediumComplex zoning, small domains

In the North Cascades research, CA- ID- TIMS was chosen specifically because the scientific question required resolving discrete magmatic pulses within a flare- up at sub- million- year resolution.

The chemical abrasion step is critical for removing domains affected by Pb loss, which is common in older or radiation- damaged zircons and can otherwise bias ages younger.

These methods are complementary: in- situ techniques (LA- ICP- MS or SIMS) are often used first to screen grains and characterize zoning, followed by high-precision CA- ID- TIMS on the most suitable crystals.

U- Pb (and U- Th- Pb) dating of monazite is a powerful geochronological method used to determine the absolute age of rocks, particularly metamorphic and peraluminous igneous rocks. Monazite [(Ce, La, Nd,Th)PO₄] is a light rare-earth element phosphate mineral that serves as an excellent chronometer, complementary to zircon.

Why monazite is useful for dating

  • It incorporates high concentrations of uranium (U, often hundreds to thousands of ppm) and especially thorium (Th, commonly several weight percent).
  • It incorporates very little common (initial) lead at the time of crystallization.
  • It has a high closure temperature for Pb diffusion (typically estimated around 700- 800 °C, though it can retain Pb at higher temperatures under certain conditions), making it resistant to resetting except under high- grade metamorphic conditions.
  • It commonly forms or recrystallizes during metamorphism and fluid- related events, so it often records metamorphic or hydrothermal ages that zircon may miss.
  • It is less prone to radiation damage than zircon despite high Th and U contents.
  • It frequently shows compositional zoning that can record multiple growth or recrystallization events.

Monazite is especially valuable in peraluminous granites (where zircon often has inheritance issues) and in medium- to high- grade metamorphic rocks for dating metamorphism, deformation, or fluid flow.

The radioactive systems used

Monazite dating typically uses the full U- Th- Pb system:

  • 238U → 206Pb (half- life ≈ 4.47 billion years)
  • 235U → 207Pb (half- life ≈ 704 million years)
  • 232Th → 208Pb (half- life ≈ 14.1 billion years)

Because monazite is Th- rich, the 208Pb and 232Th age is often particularly precise and useful. The dual U- Pb systems allow construction of a concordia diagram to check for closed- system behavior.

Important complication, excess 206Pb: Monazite strongly prefers Th over U. This can lead to incorporation of excess 230Th (an intermediate daughter in the 238U decay chain) at the time of crystallization. The subsequent decay of this excess 230Th produces “excess” 206Pb, which makes 206Pb/238U ages appear slightly too old (reverse discordance). A correction based on the Th and U ratio of the mineral and host rock is often applied, especially for young samples.

Analytical methods

The same main techniques used for zircon are applied to monazite, with some differences due to its chemistry and zoning:

  1. ID- TIMS / CA- ID- TIMS (Isotope Dilution– Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry, sometimes with chemical abrasion)
    Highest precision (often <0.1%). Whole grains or fragments are dissolved after optional chemical abrasion, spiked with a tracer, and analyzed. Best for simple, high- value samples but destroys spatial information.
  2. LA- ICP- MS (Laser Ablation– Inductively Coupled Plasma– Mass Spectrometry)
    Most common modern method for monazite. A laser ablates small spots (often 5– 20 µm) on polished grains or thin sections. High throughput and good spatial resolution. Precisions are typically 1– 3% for individual spots. Matrix-matched standards are critical because monazite composition varies widely.
  3. SIMS / SHRIMP (Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry)
    Excellent spatial resolution (down to ~5– 10 µm) and sensitivity. Useful for complex zoning or very small domains. Somewhat slower and more expensive than LA -ICP- MS.
  4. Electron Probe Microanalysis (EPMA / chemical dating)
    Measures total Th, U, and Pb concentrations (not isotopes) to calculate a chemical age. Very high spatial resolution (1– 5 µm) and non-destructive of isotopic systems but assumes negligible common Pb and closed- system behavior. Widely used for rapid screening and mapping age domains within single grains.

Key differences from zircon dating

  • Monazite often records metamorphic rather than purely magmatic ages.
  • Higher Th content makes Th- Pb ages more robust and common- Pb corrections less critical in many cases.
  • Stronger compositional zoning requires careful imaging (BSE, X- ray mapping) before analysis.
  • Greater susceptibility to dissolution- reprecipitation reactions in the presence of fluids, which can reset ages without high temperatures.
  • Excess 206Pb from 230Th is a more common issue than in zircon.

Typical applications

  • Dating metamorphism and polyphase metamorphic histories
  • Constraining the timing of deformation or fluid flow
  • Dating peraluminous granites and pegmatites
  • Detrital studies (though monazite is less durable than zircon in sedimentary cycles)
  • Hydrothermal and ore- deposit studies

In summary, U- Th- Pb monazite dating is a versatile tool that often provides complementary (and sometimes superior) age information to zircon, especially in metamorphic and fluid- influenced systems. High- precision work still frequently relies on ID- TIMS, while in- situ methods (LA- ICP- MS and SIMS) dominate modern studies of complex, zoned grains.

High Temporal Resolution Record of Flare- Up Magmatism Reveals Tectonic and Local Controls on Crustal Thickening in the Cretaceous Continental Arc of the North Cascades

This is the primary research paper highlighted in the Eos article by Sarah Stanley. The full text appears to be behind the Wiley/AGU paywall (the landing page loads but content retrieval is restricted).

Key points (from the Eos summary and related thesis work by lead author Sourav Karmakar)

  • The study focuses on a major magmatic flare- up (~79- 60 Ma, or more precisely ~79- 63 Ma in some descriptions) in the Cretaceous North Cascades continental arc (Washington state).
  • Methods: High- precision chemical abrasion– isotope dilution– thermal ionization mass spectrometry (CA- ID- TIMS) U- Pb zircon geochronology (age uncertainties as low as ~0.05%) combined with whole- rock geochemical proxies for crustal thickness, plus supporting zircon Hf isotope data.
  • Magmatism was highly episodic: plutons assembled via discrete, short- lived intrusive pulses separated by quieter intervals, rather than continuous emplacement. At sub- million- year resolution, preserved plutonic flux variations largely reflect the crust’s capacity to accommodate magma.
  • Crustal thickening was progressive but spatially variable. Importantly, thickening (and associated forearc under thrusting) accompanied or followed the onset of high-flux magmatism, it did not precede it.
  • Most plutons derived from juvenile, mantle- dominated parental magmas. Less radiogenic compositions occur locally via interaction with crustal or sediment-derived melts.
  • Main conclusion: Increased mantle melt production initiated the flare- up. Crustal thickening, assimilation, and deformation were consequences and feedback of the elevated magma flux, not the primary trigger. Tectonic shortening was not the principal driver.

This work refines understanding of how continental arc flare-ups operate and the relative roles of mantle vs. tectonic controls on crustal thickening.

For the publicly available overview, see the Eos research spotlight:
What Triggered an Ancient Magma Surge in the North Cascades? (Sarah Stanley, 6 November 2026).⁠

Related material includes Karmakar’s PhD thesis (High- Resolution Records of Magma Emplacement Through Deep Time…), which covers chapters on this North Cascades flare- up with matching conclusions.

Journal: Tectonics, Open Access, (2026)

DOI: 10.1029/2026TC009604

Provided: Eos

First published: 16 October 2026

Authors: Sourav Karmaka, Sarnav Bakshi, Michael P. Eddy, Robert Miller, Stacia M. Gordon

Abstract

Magmatic output in continental arcs is often variable, with short-lived flare-ups separated by prolonged lulls. Flare-ups commonly coincide with increased crustal thickness, which has been interpreted as both a cause and a consequence of elevated magmatism. Crustal thickening may promote magmatism by transporting melt-fertile rocks to depth, or result from mantle-to-crust mass transfer and deformation within a hot, weak arc. Consequently, the timing and origin of crustal thickening during flare-ups remain uncertain. Thus, there are important questions surrounding when and how the crust thickens during flare-up magmatism and how it is related to the drivers of magmatic flare-ups. To address these questions, we investigated a Late Cretaceous-Paleocene (79–60 Ma) flare-up in the North Cascades, Washington, USA, using CA-ID-TIMS U-Pb zircon geochronology and whole-rock (La/Yb)n ratios as a proxy for crustal thickness. The geochronologic data resolve incremental pluton emplacement, while (La/Yb)n trends indicate that individual plutonic systems experienced independent crustal thickening histories. We interpret this record to indicate that the change in crustal thickness was largely driven by magmatic addition to the crust. Regional tectonic shortening, perhaps enhanced by an arc crust that was rheologically weakened by higher geothermal gradients and the widespread presence of magma, played a secondary role in crustal thickening. Importantly, we see no evidence for crustal thickening immediately before initiation of the flare-up, suggesting that the 79–60 Ma flare-up in the North Cascades was driven by increased production of magma in the mantle wedge, and that shortening was a consequence of, not a cause for, flare-up magmatism.


Southern Italy Rising Up to 10 Times Faster Than Thought as Tectonic Slab Tears Beneath Calabria

University of Oregon geologist Becky (Rebecca) Dorsey and colleagues found that high- elevation marine terraces in southern Calabria, Italy (up to ~1,000 m or 3,300 ft above sea level), are rising 5– 10 times faster than previously estimated, linked to an active tear in the Ionian slab beneath the region.

Annotated cross-section illustration of Calabria’s rising edge, showing uplifted marine terraces, brittle crust, crustal layers, Ionian oceanic slab detachment, mantle flow, and rapid isostatic rebound.
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University of Oregon geologist Becky (Rebecca) Dorsey and colleagues found that high- elevation marine terraces in southern Calabria, Italy (up to ~1,000 m or 3,300 ft above sea level), are rising 5– 10 times faster than previously estimated, linked to an active tear in the Ionian slab beneath the region.

In 2025 fieldwork, a UO- led team sampled sands from these step- like marine terraces along the Siculo- Calabrian rift zone (a >100- mile or ~160 km fault belt).

They applied luminescence dating, previously avoided at such heights because the terraces were thought to be ~1 million years old and beyond the method’s range.

The samples yielded a weighted mean burial age of about 118.8 ± 8.7 thousand years (ka). Combined with mapping and fault morphology, this indicates the terraces are erosional remnants of a single, once- continuous surface that has been rapidly deformed and uplifted.⁠

Calculated uplift rates range from <1 to >12 mm per year, with active normal-fault throw rates of 0.8– 4.2 mm/yr, much faster than earlier long- term estimates based on the older assumed ages.

The rapid post-~120 ka uplift is interpreted as an ongoing isostatic response to tearing of the Ionian slab (an oceanic segment of the African plate) directly under southern Calabria, rather than slower, more uniform processes.⁠

The results, published 6 November 2026 in Communications Earth & Environment, challenge prior models of the terraces and improve constraints for seismic- hazard assessment in this active region.

Insights into slab dynamics here may also inform understanding of other subduction zones, such as Cascadia.⁠

Related earlier work by Dorsey and others (using ⁴⁰Ar and ³⁹Ar dating) already suggested the highest terraces are younger than ~0.5 Ma (roughly half the widely cited ~1 Ma age), implying long- term average uplift >2.5 mm/yr; the new luminescence data refine the recent, faster rates.

Map of the Siculo-Calabrian Rift Zone showing active normal faults across southern Italy, elevation, marine terraces, and a geological cross-section.
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Slab tear (or slab tearing and break- off) is a geodynamic process in which a subducting oceanic plate (the “slab”) ruptures and partially or fully detaches from the rest of the lithosphere.

This commonly occurs in subduction zones that experience rollback, oblique collision, or a transition from oceanic to continental subduction.

How the mechanism works

  1. Subduction and density contrast
    Dense oceanic lithosphere sinks into the mantle under its own weight (slab pull). When lighter continental lithosphere begins to enter the trench, or when the slab is stretched by rapid trench retreat (rollback), tensile stresses build up inside the slab.
  2. Initiation of the tear
    A rupture nucleates, often near the ocean– continent transition or at a pre-existing weak zone. The tear can propagate:
    • Vertically (through the thickness of the slab), creating a “window”.
    • Laterally (along the strike of the subduction zone), allowing the tear to lengthen over time.
  3. Propagation and detachment
    Once the tear advances, the detached portion of the slab continues to sink independently. Mantle material (asthenosphere) can flow through the gap (toroidal flow around the torn edges). The remaining attached segment may continue to subduct or experience further tearing.
  4. Surface response– isostatic rebound
    Removal of the dense slab load beneath the overriding plate causes the crust above to rise rapidly (isostatic uplift). Predicted rates for this transient phase are typically 5– 14 mm/yr over timescales of a few hundred thousand years or less, much faster than the longer- term rates produced by other processes such as crustal thickening or steady mantle flow.

Application to southern Calabria and the Ionian slab

In the Calabrian Arc (southern Italy):

  • The Ionian slab (an oceanic remnant of the African plate) has been retreating southeastward for millions of years, opening the Tyrrhenian Sea behind it.
  • Tomographic and seismic data indicate that slab tearing is already complete beneath the southern Apennines, northern Calabria, and northeast Sicily.
  • A ~50– 100 km segment remains (or was until recently) more continuous beneath southern Calabria. Evidence points to an active, southward-propagating tear under this region.
  • The high -elevation marine terraces dated at ~119 ka record uplift rates of up to ~12 mm/yr. These rates match the rapid, short- lived isostatic rebound expected from ongoing slab tearing and unloading, rather than slower, longer-lived processes such as toroidal mantle flow alone.

In short, the tear removes a heavy “anchor” from beneath the crust, allowing the surface to spring upward quickly. This produces the fast, transient uplift documented in the southern Calabria study and helps explain the region’s elevated seismic hazard, as the same process drives active normal faulting.

The same style of slab tearing and rebound is inferred in other subduction systems worldwide where similar rapid topographic growth is observed.

Map of Sicily and southern Italy showing major faults around the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas, including Mount Etna, Catania, Messina, and Reggio Calabria.
Main faults of the Siculo-Calabrian rift zone (northernmost section not shown)
Siculo-Calabrian Rift – Siculo-Calabrian rift – Wikipedia

Rapid transient uplift driven by active slab tear, southern Calabria, Italy

Southern Italy preserves a well-studied record of deformation and uplift related to migrating oblique collision, trench retreat, and tearing of subducted ocean slabs. However, the surface expression of these processes is incompletely understood due to a lack of reliable ages for marine terraces >200 m above sea level. Here we use luminescence methods to date marine terrace sands from 118 to 955 m elevation in southern Calabria and interpolate the results with surface mapping. Burial ages overlap across the full range of sampled elevations with a weighted mean of 118.8 ± 8.7 thousand years before present. Calculated uplift rates vary from <1 to ~12 mm yr⁻¹ and throw rates on active normal faults are 0.8–4.2 mm yr⁻¹. We infer that rapid uplift is an ongoing isostatic response to active tearing in the Ionian slab, consistent with recent geophysical observations and predictions of geodynamic models. These results are useful for assessment of geohazards in southern Calabria and northeast Sicily, one of the highest seismic risk areas in the Mediterranean region.

Key findings

  • Luminescence dating (single- grain post- infrared infrared stimulated luminescence on K- feldspar) of sands from marine terraces at elevations of ~107– 1040 m asl yields overlapping burial ages with a weighted mean of 118.8 ± 8.7 ka.
  • The terraces are interpreted as erosional remnants of a single, once- continuous deformed surface that has been differentially uplifted and faulted.
  • Time- averaged uplift rates calculated from the mean age and elevations range from <1 to ~12 mm yr⁻¹ (commonly reported in related coverage as 5– 10 times faster than earlier long- term estimates based on ~1 Ma ages for the highest terraces).
  • Active normal- fault throw rates are 0.8– 4.2 mm yr⁻¹.
  • The rapid post-~120 ka uplift is best explained as ongoing isostatic rebound from active tearing of the Ionian slab (an oceanic segment of the African plate) beneath southern Calabria, rather than slower processes such as toroidal mantle flow. This is consistent with geophysical data and geodynamic models predicting faster rates (5– 14 mm yr⁻¹) over shorter timescales (<500 kyr) for slab- breakoff unloading.⁠

The work integrates new luminescence ages with surface mapping, fault- zone morphology, and prior constraints (including evidence that high terraces are <0.48– 0.50 Ma).

It improves understanding of mantle- driven surface processes and seismic hazards in the Siculo- Calabrian rift zone.

A PDF download is available from the Nature page. Let me know if you’d like more details on methods, figures, specific rates, or related papers.

Journal: Communications Earth & Environment, volume 7, Article number: 858 (2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s43247-026-04207-2

Published: 6 November 2026, Open access

Authors: Rebecca J. Dorsey,
Nathan D. Brown,
Sergio G. Longhitano,
Marco Meschis,
Domenico Chiarella &
Charles P. Ogle

Wrong, Newswise, Irresponsible Climate Messaging, Not Climate Change Itself, Is Fueling Student Anxiety

Newswise, cites a University of Utah article “How Anxiety Over Climate Change Affects Students,” to claim that that hundreds of undergraduates feel powerless, frustrated, and anxious about climate change, arguing that universities need more resources to help them cope.

The anxiety may be real, but the implication that physical climate change is causing it is false, and unsupported by the study.

Cartoon classroom showing students anxious about exaggerated climate news headlines, with a banner stating that irresponsible climate messaging fuels student anxiety.
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From ClimateRealism

By Anthony Watts

Screenshot of a Newswise article from the University of Utah about how climate change anxiety affects students, overlaid with large red text reading “BLAME THE MEDIA.”

Newswise, cites a University of Utah article “How Anxiety Over Climate Change Affects Students,” to claim that that hundreds of undergraduates feel powerless, frustrated, and anxious about climate change, arguing that universities need more resources to help them cope. The anxiety may be real, but the implication that physical climate change is causing it is false, and unsupported by the study. The study itself points toward a different explanation: generalized anxiety, political ideology, and repeated exposure to alarming climate information in classrooms and online.

University of Utah researchers surveyed 547 students and found that 54 percent frequently or strongly felt powerless about climate change and 55 percent felt frustrated. Yet the researchers explicitly caution that their findings do not establish a causal connection between climate change and anxiety. One author acknowledges the relationship could run in either direction, with people already prone to generalized anxiety potentially being more susceptible to climate anxiety.

That distinction is crucial. A student saying, “I’m terrified of climate change” demonstrates that the student is frightened. It does not demonstrate that the physical climate caused the fear.

In fact, the study itself provides evidence that climate messaging may be the biggest part of the problem. Students with greater exposure to stories about climate change in classrooms and online reported greater climate anxiety. Students holding more liberal political views also tended to report greater anxiety. The researchers found a “strong positive correlation” between exposure to online climate information and climate anxiety.

That should have been the headline.

The survey didn’t examine temperature, sea level, hurricane, flood, drought, or wildfire incidences or trends. It measured what students believe about climate change. Its Climate Anxiety Index asked students about propositions such as “The things I most value will be destroyed,” “The future is frightening”, and “Humanity is doomed”. Those are measurements of beliefs about catastrophe, not measurements of knowledge of real climate information.

There is another revealing number. Only 14.8 percent of respondents listed climate change among their three greatest concerns. The sample was also drawn from three Environmental and Sustainability Studies courses and one communications course, and 63 percent of respondents leaned politically left. The researchers themselves caution against broadly generalizing the results.

Other research points directly toward the media’s role. A 2024 study in the Journal of Health Communication examined climate anxiety and media exposure among college students. Media-exposure variables explained about 33 percent of the variance in climate anxiety, with frequency of media use and attention to climate news significantly predicting greater anxiety.

Students aren’t simply looking out the dormitory window, observing modest long-term warming, and spontaneously descending into despair. What they are being told is what makes them anxious.

After years of headlines warning about a “climate emergency,” an “existential threat,” tipping points, disappearing coastlines, civilization-threatening weather, and only a few years left to “save the planet,” why would anyone be surprised that many young people are frightened?

Climate Realism has documented this problem before, noting that climate anxiety is routinely presented as evidence of how dangerous climate change is without asking whether relentless catastrophic messaging helped create the anxiety. Another Climate Realism analysis discussed the widely cited survey in which 56 percent of young respondents said they believed humanity was doomed.

Humanity is not doomed. Even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report doesn’t say that. It identifies risks, largely manageable risks, from additional warming, but that is worlds apart from telling students civilization has no future or that having children may be irresponsible.

Another peer-reviewed study makes the point even more sharply. Hannes Zacher and Cort Rudolph examined 2,066 people in a 2023 Climatic Change paper, “Environmental knowledge is inversely associated with climate change anxiety.” They found that greater general environmental knowledge and greater climate-specific knowledge were both associated with less climate anxiety, even after controlling for demographics, personality, and environmental attitudes.

In plain English, the people who knew more of the facts and had a better understanding of science were less anxious about climate change.

That matters because much of the popular conception of the world’s climate future comes from computer projections, including extreme emissions scenarios presented as likely futures. RCP8.5 is the classic example. Climate researchers warned in Nature against treating that very high-emissions pathway as the most likely future. Roger Pielke Jr. and Justin Ritchie likewise documented the misuse of extreme climate scenarios as “business as usual.”

A hypothetical worst case escaped the scientific literature and became, in popular culture, a forecast. Then adults seem surprised when young people believe it.

Watts Up With That has addressed the same issue in; “A Generation of Kids Thinks They Have No Future. Science Just Admitted Why” asked whether adults had frightened young people by presenting extreme projections as their expected future. “Worry About Climate Fearmongering, Not Climate Change” noted that young people already face academic pressure, social media, finances, relationships, and uncertainty about their futures. Adding repeated warnings that Earth itself is becoming uninhabitable hardly improves their mental health.

Meanwhile, real-world indicators don’t suggest a planetary apocalypse. Our World in Data shows that death rates from natural disasters have fallen dramatically during the past century. Better forecasting, infrastructure, communications, agriculture, emergency response, and rising wealth have made humanity far more resilient to environmental hazards.

Students should be taught the difference between observations and projections, plausible scenarios and extreme scenarios, manageable risks and planetary doom. They should also learn about adaptation, technological progress, uncertainty, and human resilience.

Instead of merely creating climate-anxiety support groups and steering frightened students toward climate advocacy or psychiatric care, universities might try something more fundamental: report the state of the climate accurately. Tell them humanity isn’t doomed. Tell them computer models are not observations. Tell them the worst emissions scenario are in fact impossible. Tell them humans are remarkably adaptable. Better yet, buy them a copy of Climate at a Glance and assign it as required reading.

The University of Utah study has identified a real problem, but Newswise has the diagnosis backwards. It does not demonstrate that climate change is psychologically harming students. It shows that students who are generally more anxious, politically predisposed to climate concern, and more frequently exposed to climate information in classrooms and online report greater climate anxiety.

If young people are repeatedly told that their planet is dying, their future is frightening, humanity may be doomed, and having children might be irresponsible, we shouldn’t be astonished when surveys discover that they’re anxious.

Perhaps before universities create another climate-anxiety support group, educators and journalists should consider whether the first treatment for climate anxiety ought to be less alarmism, more context, and a much larger dose of reality grounded in real world data, which with regard to extreme weather and human health, is generally positive.

The Sheer #%&@! Gall of Nature Magazine. EU Chief Science Advisers Say Democracy Depends on Trusted Science, and Ignore How the Trust Was Squandered

Nature ran a Comment on November 3 by the seven members of the European Commission’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, Martin Kahanec, Naomi Ellemers, Adam Izdebski, Rafal M. Łukasik, Dimitra Simeonidou, Rémy Slama and Mangala Srinivas, headlined “How democracy depends on science — and must protect it.”

Vintage-style Nature Magazine cover featuring a bold editorial headline about EU chief science advisers, public trust in science, and democracy.
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From Watts Up With That?

By Charles Rotter

Nature ran a Comment on November 3 by the seven members of the European Commission’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, Martin Kahanec, Naomi Ellemers, Adam Izdebski, Rafal M. Łukasik, Dimitra Simeonidou, Rémy Slama and Mangala Srinivas, headlined “How democracy depends on science — and must protect it.”

The standfirst sets the terms:

Verified information from trusted experts is crucial to help the public and governments navigate rapid changes and increasing complexity.

How democracy depends on science — and must protect it | Nature

The advisers are worried that the public has stopped listening:

But for science to strengthen democracy, researchers must be trusted, too. Moreover, the legitimacy of expertise has become increasingly contested over the past few years in Europe and elsewhere.

Scientific advice is subjected to politicization in many countries, with consensual insights and clear evidence (such as on climate change) being dismissed as ‘just another opinion’ or as being driven by a political agenda. Public trust in expertise has become polarized along political lines.

How democracy depends on science — and must protect it | Nature

In their telling the politicization is something done to science by outsiders, with a little help from “a small number of powerful technology companies,” and by people whose doubts spread “through networks of people connected by identity, grievance or distrust.” It doesn’t seem to occur to seven chief scientific advisers that the distrust was earned, or that the institutions they speak for did a good share of the polarizing themselves. They come close to saying it in one paragraph:

Expertise strengthens democratic legitimacy when it is transparent, diverse, independent and open to scrutiny — as prescribed by the rules of science. But it weakens legitimacy when it is perceived as opaque, unclear, politicized, elitist or disconnected from people’s lived experiences.

How democracy depends on science — and must protect it | Nature

“Perceived” is doing the heavy lifting there. The record of the last six years shows scientific institutions being opaque, politicized and elitist in plain view, in their own emails and their own journals, and the public noticed.

Start with lockdowns. On October 4, 2020, Martin Kulldorff, Jay Bhattacharya and Sunetra Gupta published the Great Barrington Declaration, arguing for focused protection of the elderly instead of blanket lockdowns. Four days later the director of the NIH, Francis Collins, wrote to Anthony Fauci, in an email Bhattacharya later put before Congress:

This proposal from the three fringe epidemiologists who met with the Secretary seems to be getting a lot of attention – and even a co-signature from Nobel Prize winner Mike Leavitt at Stanford. There needs to be a quick and devastating published take down of its premises. I don’t see anything like that online yet – is it underway?

https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/115561/witnesses/HHRG-118-IF16-Wstate-BhattacharyaJ-20230328.pdf

Collins wanted a takedown rather than a debate, and he was the man who controlled most of the biomedical research money in the United States, aiming it at professors from Stanford, Harvard and Oxford. Bhattacharya now runs the NIH, which is one way to settle an argument about who was fringe.

The advisers write that “the opinion of a single scientist might result in partial understanding” or “reliance on a dissenting voice that differs from the majority view,” and that high-level expert groups do better. The highest-level expert opinion of early 2020 on where the virus came from was a five-author paper, “The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2,” published in Nature Medicine, a Nature journal, on March 17, 2020. It said “we do not believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible.” The authors’ private Slack messages, released in 2023, say something else. Kristian Andersen, on February 1, 2020:

I think the main thing still in my mind is that the lab escape version of this is so friggin’ likely to have happened because they were already doing this type of work and the molecular data is fully consistent with that scenario.

Top Scientists Misled Congress About Covid Origins, Newly Released Emails And Messages Show

The channel was named “project-wuhan_engineering” until February 6, when it became “project-wuhan_pangolin.” The House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, in its December 2024 final report, found that the virus “Likely Emerged Because of a Laboratory or Research Related Accident” and that Proximal Origin was “‘Prompted’ by Dr. Anthony Fauci to ‘Disprove’ the Lab Leak Theory.” The subcommittee’s Democrats disputed the Fauci finding. The FBI (moderate confidence) and the Department of Energy (low confidence) lean toward a lab origin, and in January 2025 the CIA joined them, with low confidence. The origin is officially still unproven either way, which is exactly the point, since the paper that called the lab scenario implausible has never been retracted, despite the reams of evidence against it, and the journal that published it is the one now lecturing about “communicating disagreement” and “quantifying uncertainties.”

Then came the mRNA vaccines. In March 2021 CDC director Rochelle Walensky told MSNBC that vaccinated people “do not carry the virus,” and the CDC had to walk it back. Pfizer’s trial was never designed to measure transmission, which Pfizer executive Janine Small confirmed to the European Parliament in October 2022, while mandates and vaccine passports across Europe had been sold on the duty to protect others. In 2025 the FDA required stronger myocarditis warnings on the mRNA vaccines, with the highest risk in males aged 16 to 25, a group whose own risk from COVID was low and who were being told to get boosted to keep their jobs and their places at university.

Then there’s the Lancet. In July 2024 it published a three-author correspondence, not a peer-reviewed study, that took the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry’s count of direct deaths, applied a rule of thumb of four indirect deaths for every direct one, and floated a figure of up to 186,000. The number went around the world under the Lancet’s name. The statistician Mike Spagat, who has spent decades studying war mortality, took the method apart, and the Lancet later ran a letter of concern about it. Whatever one thinks of the war, a medical journal lending its name to a multiplier applied to figures from one of the combatants is not the “verified information from trusted experts” the advisers have in mind.

On climate, the advisers’ example of a consensual insight being unfairly dismissed is climate change itself. Their reference for the dismissing is Lewandowsky, Ecker and Cook, and their reference for the doubt-manufacturing is Oreskes and Conway’s Merchants of Doubt, which tells you which side of the argument the European Commission’s science advice listens to. For a decade the most extreme emissions scenario, RCP8.5, was described in papers and press releases as “business as usual,” until Zeke Hausfather and Glen Peters wrote in Nature itself in 2020 that the “business as usual” story is misleading. I’ve written about that at length. In 2023 Patrick Brown, a co-author of a Nature paper on wildfire, wrote in The Free Press that he had left out the non-climate drivers of fire because he believed a paper focused on climate change was what high-profile journals wanted. Nature disputed his account, but nobody disputed that he knew which story would sell.

Gender medicine is where the “majority view” of the expert bodies held up worst. In August 2023 the American Academy of Pediatrics reaffirmed its 2018 policy on puberty blockers and hormones for minors while commissioning, after the fact, a systematic review of the evidence for it. The Cass Review for NHS England, published in April 2024 after commissioned systematic reviews from the University of York, called the evidence base “remarkably weak.” Court documents reported by the BMJ and others show that WPATH, the professional body whose standards of care the American societies relied on, commissioned evidence reviews from Johns Hopkins and then claimed approval rights over what could be published. WPATH denies it prohibited publication. The children and their families were owed the evidence, whatever it said, and the people who were supposed to produce it treated it as a communications problem.

And then the journals decided to campaign. In October 2020 Nature published “Why Nature supports Joe Biden for US president.” Scientific American, which had never endorsed a candidate in its first 175 years, endorsed Biden the same year and Kamala Harris in 2024. Nature even measured what its endorsement did, in a preregistered experiment by Floyd Jiuyun Zhang published in Nature Human Behaviour in 2023:

The endorsement message caused large reductions in stated trust in Nature among Trump supporters. This distrust lowered the demand for COVID-related information provided by Nature, as evidenced by substantially reduced requests for Nature articles on vaccine efficacy when offered. The endorsement also reduced Trump supporters’ trust in scientists in general. The estimated effects on Biden supporters’ trust in Nature and scientists were positive, small and mostly statistically insignificant. I found little evidence that the endorsement changed views about Biden and Trump.

Political endorsement by Nature and trust in scientific expertise during COVID-19 | Nature Human Behaviour

The endorsement changed nobody’s vote and cost Nature, and scientists in general, the trust of half the American electorate. Pew found that 87% of Americans had at least a fair amount of confidence in scientists in April 2020 and 76% in 2024, and among Republicans the share fell from 85% to 66%. That is the polarization “along political lines” the advisers complain about, and Nature’s own journal published the experiment showing how a Nature editorial helped cause it.

The advisers’ remedy is more of what produced the problem. They want “high-level expert groups, which engage directly with senior decision makers,” protection from the “dissenting voice that differs from the majority view,” and “independent monitoring and assurance of algorithmic systems,” which in the European Commission’s vocabulary means someone deciding which information reaches the public. Every episode above was a high-level majority view, and in most of them the dissenting voices, the ones the “trusted institutions” set out to suppress and even censor, were the ones that turned out closer to right.

The authors, shamelessly circling the wagons of their failing institutions, of course declare no competing interests.

=====

Quotes from Kahanec et al., “How democracy depends on science — and must protect it,” Nature, November 3, 2026, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-026-03510-4.

Drought on Both Sides of the Atlantic: How 1930s Europe Compared to America’s Dust Bowl

The 1930s in Europe fell within the Early Twentieth Century Warming (ETCW), a period of notable global and regional warming (especially in the Arctic and high northern latitudes) from roughly the 1910s- 1940s, driven by a mix of natural variability (including a positive phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation- AMO), greenhouse gases, and other factors.

Illustration comparing 1930s drought in America’s Dust Bowl and Europe, with cracked farmland, families, a European village, and a map of the Atlantic.
AI generated by Grok

The 1930s in Europe fell within the Early Twentieth Century Warming (ETCW), a period of notable global and regional warming (especially in the Arctic and high northern latitudes) from roughly the 1910s- 1940s, driven by a mix of natural variability (including a positive phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation- AMO), greenhouse gases, and other factors.

Temperatures were generally elevated relative to the late 19th and early 20th century in many areas, but weather was highly variable by region and year, with extremes including droughts, heat, floods, and (by the end of the decade) severe cold.

Overall Climate Context

  • Warming was particularly strong in the European Arctic, Scandinavia, and northern and eastern areas during the 1920s- 1930s, with wintertime increases most pronounced. Circulation patterns often favored warmer air advection.⁠
  • The North Atlantic was warmer, with reduced sea ice in northern regions in parts of the period.
  • Precipitation and temperature showed strong regional contrasts. Eastern Europe tended toward dryness and heat in summers of the mid- to- late 1930s, while western and central areas experienced more mixed or wetter conditions in some years.

This region stood out for a prolonged, intense drought (roughly 1934- 1940, with roots earlier) that has few or no analogues in the instrumental record for duration and severity (per Palmer Drought Severity Index analyses).

Key features included:

  • Hot, dry summers (notable in 1931 and especially 1936- 1939) combined with precipitation deficits, including in the cold season.
  • Major hydrological impacts: multi- year deficits in river runoff (e.g., Volga runoff deficit averaging ~18% over a 9- year stretch starting around 1930, the longest such period on record in some analyses).
  • Linked to persistent anticyclonic conditions over Eastern Europe, broader AMO- related patterns, and North Atlantic SST anomalies.⁠

These conditions caused significant agricultural and water- resource stress.

Weather was more variable year- to- year:

  • Early 1930s examples (e.g., 1930 in France and UK areas): Mild or snow- poor winters in places; mixed summers with wet and flood- prone periods (e.g., heavy July rains and flooding in parts of France) alongside heatwaves (late August heat in France reaching the mid-30s °C in some spots). The UK had a generally poor summer with heavy rains and crop damage in parts of the year, plus a notable late- August heatwave.⁠
  • Heat extremes occurred in various years (e.g., high temperatures in Belgium and elsewhere in the mid- 1930s).
  • Some wet periods and floods contrasted with drier conditions elsewhere. Local station data (e.g., Strasbourg, Munich) show typical annual ranges with occasional extremes but no uniform continental pattern of aridity like the U.S. Dust Bowl.
  • Teleconnections from North American drought and heat may have influenced northern European extremes in some summers via atmospheric wave patterns.

The relatively mild winters of prior decades ended abruptly.

The winter of 1939– 40 was exceptionally cold across much of Europe (one of the most severe in decades or longer in many places), with follow- on cold winters into the early 1940s in some areas.

Impacts included widespread freezing of rivers and harbors, heavy snow, and record or near- record low temperatures in the UK, Germany, Low Countries, Scandinavia, and further east and south. This marked a shift after a run of milder conditions.

Regional details vary significantly (e.g., Mediterranean vs. Scandinavia vs. the plains), so specific countries or years can show different patterns.

_______________________________________________

The 1930s in Europe formed part of the Early Twentieth Century Warming (ETCW), also called the Early 20th Century Warm Period. This was a distinct phase of elevated temperatures (especially pronounced in the Arctic, northern high latitudes, and parts of Europe) that began accelerating in the 1910s- 1920s and peaked or remained elevated through the 1930s into the early 1940s in many regions.

The Little Ice Age (roughly mid- 14th to mid- 19th century, with residual cooler conditions lingering into the late 19th and early 20th century in some European records) was followed by a general recovery and warming.

The ETCW represented a relatively rapid phase of that recovery in the early- to-mid 20th century, driven by a combination of:

  • Natural variability (notably a positive phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation- AMO and associated atmospheric circulation changes),
  • Rising greenhouse gases,
  • Reduced volcanic activity in parts of the period,
  • And other factors.

Warming was particularly strong in winter over northern Europe, Scandinavia, and the European Arctic, with surface air temperatures rising notably from the cooler conditions of the preceding decades.

European picture in the 1930s

  • Northern and high- latitude Europe experienced some of the strongest regional warming of the ETCW.
  • Eastern Europe (East European Plain) saw the warming expressed partly through prolonged drought and heat in the mid- to- late 1930s.
  • Western and central Europe had more variable year- to- year weather, but the broader background was warmer than the late 19th and early 20th century baseline.
  • The decade ended with a sharp interruption in the form of the severe winters of 1939- 40 (and following years in some places), which stood out against the preceding milder conditions.

In short, the 1930s continued the ETCW’s regional warming trajectory after the Little Ice Age, even while individual years and sub- regions showed the usual weather extremes (droughts, floods, heatwaves, and the late- decade cold snap).

This period is well- documented in both instrumental records and modern reanalyses.

_______________________________________________

Comparison of 1930s weather and climate in Europe vs. the U.S. Dust Bowl

Both occurred during the Early Twentieth Century Warming (ETCW) and a positive phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), against the backdrop of the Great Depression. However, they differed significantly in spatial scale, intensity of land- surface impacts, and overall character.

Similarities

  • Multi- year drought and heat:
    • U.S. Dust Bowl (mainly 1930- 1939/40): Severe, prolonged drought across the Great Plains (especially Southern and Central Plains), with extreme summer heat waves.
    • Europe: Eastern Europe (East European Plain) experienced a comparable multi-year drought (peak intensity roughly 1934- 1940), with hot, dry summers (notably 1931 and 1936- 1939) and major river- runoff deficits (e.g., prolonged low Volga flows).⁠
  • Natural climate drivers: Both linked to anomalous atmospheric circulation (persistent high- pressure systems), sea- surface temperature patterns in the Atlantic and Pacific, and broader ETCW warmth. Some research indicates teleconnections, where the intense North American drought and soil drying may have influenced Northern European summer temperatures via jet- stream wave patterns.⁠
  • Agricultural stress: Crop failures, water shortages, and economic hardship in the affected regions during the Depression era.

Key Differences

AspectU.S. Dust Bowl (1930s)Europe (1930s)
Core regionGreat Plains (Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, etc.)Strongest drought in Eastern Europe / East European Plain; Western & Central Europe more variable
Dominant featuresExtreme drought + intense heat + massive dust stormsDrought & heat in the East; mixed wet/dry, floods, heatwaves in the West; severe cold winters at decade’s end (1939–40)
Dust storms and erosionIconic “black blizzards”; severe soil loss from over-plowed grasslandsNo equivalent widespread dust-bowl conditions or catastrophic wind erosion
Spatial extentConcentrated but devastating in the Plains; some broader U.S. effectsMore heterogeneous across the continent; not a single coherent “dust bowl”
Human amplificationMajor role: conversion of native prairie to cropland left soil exposedLand-use effects present but less decisive than in the U.S. Plains
Temperature contextRecord or near-record heat in the PlainsBroader ETCW warming (strongest in Arctic/northern latitudes); Eastern heat, but Western Europe saw more variability
End of periodDrought eased around 1939–40 with El Niño influencesShift to very cold winters (1939–40 was one of the most severe in decades across much of Europe)
ImpactsMass farm failures, ecological disaster, large-scale migration (“Okies”), health effects from dustSignificant agricultural and hydrological stress in the East; less continent-wide social upheaval of the same type (Europe was also moving toward WWII)

Overall Character

  • The Dust Bowl was a more extreme, self- reinforcing regional disaster in which drought, heat, and poor land management combined to produce dramatic dust storms and long- term soil degradation.
  • Europe experienced parallel drought and heat in the East as part of the same large- scale climate regime, but the continent as a whole was far more variable. Western and Central Europe saw wetter periods, flooding in some years, and ordinary heatwaves rat

In short: both featured multi- year drought and warmth tied to the ETCW, but the U.S. Dust Bowl was more intense, localized, and dramatically amplified by land- use practices, producing the iconic dust storms that have no close European counterpart in the 1930s. Eastern Europe’s drought was the closest analogue in severity and duration, while the rest of Europe experienced a more mixed climate.

Ice Age Climate Shifts Were Much Slower Than We Thought

Researchers from Xi’an Jiaotong University’s Institute of Global Environmental Change (led by first author Xiyu Dong, with contributions from Hai Cheng, Xu Zhang, and others) analyzed high- resolution oxygen isotope (δ¹⁸O) records from annually laminated speleothems.

In short, abrupt climate change is a well- established feature of Earth’s past climate system, driven by internal thresholds and feedback, and remains a key concern for understanding both historical variability and potential future surprises.

Illustration of an icy coastline and ocean currents with charts showing slow Ice Age climate shifts, AMOC circulation, speleothem records, and North Atlantic temperatures.
AI generated by Grok

A new study published in Science (DOI: 10.1126/science.aed4270) on November 5, 2026, finds that abrupt climate shifts during the last ice age, specifically Dansgaard- Oeschger (DO) events linked to the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), took substantially longer than previously inferred from Greenland ice- core records.

Researchers from Xi’an Jiaotong University’s Institute of Global Environmental Change (led by first author Xiyu Dong, with contributions from Hai Cheng, Xu Zhang, and others) analyzed high- resolution oxygen isotope (δ¹⁸O) records from annually laminated speleothems.

These came from Cherrapunji Cave (northeast India) and Shuixi Cave (southwest China), combined with published data from Zhangjia Cave. The records cover DO events 1 through 8.

Key findings:

  • Transitions in the Asian monsoon speleothem records consistently lasted longer than 100 years and averaged about 180 years.
  • This is far slower than the decadal- scale shifts seen in Greenland ice -core δ¹⁸O records, which had been used as the main proxy for the speed of AMOC strengthening.⁠

The annual laminae in the speleothems provided precise relative timing of transition durations (complementing absolute U– Th ages).

Modeling indicates a two- stage process: rapid retreat of sea ice in the northeastern North Atlantic quickly adjusted regional atmospheric circulation, producing the sharp Greenland δ¹⁸O rise.

Full AMOC strengthening and further northwestern North Atlantic sea- ice retreat followed more gradually, without major additional changes in atmospheric circulation modes or moisture pathways that would further alter Greenland δ¹⁸O.

Asian monsoon speleothem records capture the complete AMOC strengthening process.⁠

Implications: Natural AMOC transitions were not as rapid as ice- core data alone suggested. When discussing potential future AMOC tipping risks, the duration of any transition is as important as the climatic impacts.

The study highlights the value of combining high- quality, annually resolved paleoclimate records with process- based (isotope- enabled) Earth system models.

The authors note that additional high- quality speleothem records of DO events, better North Atlantic sea- ice reconstructions, and models that incorporate ice- sheet processes will further improve understanding.⁠

This revises the view of how quickly these past high- latitude Northern Hemisphere warmings (5- 16 °C) and associated AMOC changes unfolded, offering a more measured perspective for interpreting both past and potential future abrupt climate shifts.

Rapid Warming Could Tip the AMOC at Just 2°C — Slow the Pace and It May Survive Beyond 5°C

Rapid Warming Could Tip the AMOC at Just 2°C — Slow the Pace and It May Survive Beyond 5°C – Climate- Science.press

Abrupt climate change refers to large- scale shifts in the climate system that occur much faster than the gradual external forcing (such as orbital changes or rising greenhouse gases) that triggers them.

These transitions happen on timescales of years to a few decades, persist for decades or longer, and can cause major disruptions to ecosystems and human societies.

Two complementary definitions are commonly used:

  • Physical: The climate system crosses a threshold or tipping point and switches to a new state at a rate set by internal dynamics (e.g., feedbacks involving ocean circulation, sea ice, or ice sheets), faster than the forcing itself.
  • Impacts- based: A change so rapid and unexpected that natural or human systems struggle to adapt.

The best- documented cases come from the last glacial period (~120,000–11,700 years ago):

  • Dansgaard- Oeschger (DO) events: Repeated abrupt warmings of 5- 16 °C over Greenland (and the North Atlantic region), often within decades according to ice- core records, followed by gradual cooling. These occurred roughly every 1,000- 1,500 years. They are strongly linked to strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), which transports heat northward.⁠
  • Heinrich events: Massive iceberg discharges into the North Atlantic that disrupted ocean circulation, often associated with the coldest phases of DO cycles.
  • Younger Dryas (~12,900- 11,700 years ago): A sudden return to near- glacial conditions in the Northern Hemisphere during the last deglaciation, ending with rapid warming.

Other examples include the end of the Carboniferous rainforest collapse and possibly the Paleocene- Eocene Thermal Maximum.

Abrupt changes typically involve nonlinear feedbacks and thresholds:

  • Changes in AMOC strength (weakening or collapse reduces heat transport to the North Atlantic).
  • Sea -ice and ice- sheet dynamics (ice- albedo feedback amplifies warming or cooling).
  • Freshwater input from melting ice that stratifies the ocean and suppresses deep- water formation.
  • Atmospheric reorganization (shifts in monsoons, storm tracks, and the Intertropical Convergence Zone).

A recent Science study (November 2026) used annually laminated speleothems from Asia to show that the full AMOC strengthening during DO events 1- 8 actually took longer than previously thought, consistently over 100 years and averaging ~180 years, rather than the decadal scale suggested by Greenland ice- core δ¹⁸O alone.

Modeling indicates a two-stage process: rapid northeastern North Atlantic sea- ice retreat drives the sharp Greenland signal, while the complete AMOC recovery and further sea- ice loss occur more gradually. Asian monsoon records capture the fuller transition.⁠

This revises the view of how quickly these past “abrupt” ocean- circulation shifts unfolded and underscores that transition duration is as important as the magnitude of change when assessing future risks.

Modern climate models and observations raise concerns about possible abrupt shifts under anthropogenic warming, including:

  • Weakening or collapse of the AMOC.
  • Rapid ice- sheet mass loss (Greenland, West Antarctica) and associated sea-level rise.
  • Permafrost thaw releasing additional greenhouse gases.
  • Amazon rainforest dieback or other ecosystem tipping points.

While the current warming is primarily gradual and forced by greenhouse gases, the climate system can still exhibit nonlinear, abrupt responses once thresholds are crossed.

Paleoclimate records remain the primary evidence for such behavior, informing risk assessments for the coming decades to centuries.

In short, abrupt climate change is a well- established feature of Earth’s past climate system, driven by internal thresholds and feedback, and remains a key concern for understanding both historical variability and potential future surprises.

Rapid Natural Warming Spikes Occurred 25 Times — Last Ice Age Edition

Rapid Natural Warming Spikes Occurred 25 Times — Last Ice Age Edition – Climate- Science.press

The linked Science paper is titled “Glacial abrupt transitions in ocean circulation were much slower than ice-core records imply” (DOI: 10.1126/science.aed4270), published 5 November 2026.

It is a peer- reviewed research article from researchers including Xiyu Dong (first author), Xu Zhang, Hai Cheng, and co-authors from Xi’an Jiaotong University and collaborating institutions. The full text is behind Science’s paywall and subscriber access, but detailed summaries, the dataset, and press materials are publicly available.

Dansgaard– Oeschger (DO) events involved rapid high- latitude Northern Hemisphere warmings of 5- 16 °C, tightly linked to strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC).

Prior estimates of AMOC transition speeds (often within decades) relied heavily on Greenland ice-core δ¹⁸O records, which reflect both temperature and moisture- source changes.

Using high- resolution δ¹⁸O records from annually laminated speleothems (cave deposits) that more directly track AMOC- driven changes in the Asian monsoon:

  • Two new records from Cherrapunji Cave (northeast India) and Shuixi Cave (southwest China), plus published data from Zhangjia Cave.
  • Coverage of DO events 1- 8.

Results: The transitions consistently lasted >100 years and averaged ~180 years, substantially longer than the decadal- scale shifts in Greenland ice- core δ¹⁸O.⁠

Annual laminae enabled precise relative dating of transition durations (complementing absolute U– Th ages).

Modeling supports a two- stage process:

  1. Rapid sea- ice retreat in the northeastern North Atlantic quickly adjusted regional atmospheric circulation, producing the sharp Greenland δ¹⁸O rise.
  2. Further AMOC strengthening and northwestern North Atlantic sea- ice retreat occurred more gradually, without major additional shifts in atmospheric circulation or moisture pathways that would further change Greenland δ¹⁸O.

Asian monsoon speleothem δ¹⁸O records capture the full AMOC strengthening process.

Natural AMOC transitions were slower than previously inferred from ice cores alone. The authors note that discussions of future AMOC tipping risks should emphasize transition duration alongside potential impacts.

Supporting data (U- Th dates, δ¹⁸O time series, annual lamina thicknesses, anchored ice- core records, stacked series, and lamina- counting code) are archived on Dryad (doi:10.5061/dryad.xgxd254wx).⁠

The study underscores the value of combining annually resolved speleothem records with isotope- enabled Earth- system modeling for quantifying rates of past abrupt climate change.

Milankovitch Cycles, the Last Glacial Period, and Why Earth Is Still in an Ice Age

Milankovitch Cycles, the Last Glacial Period, and Why Earth Is Still in an Ice Age – Climate- Science.press

Journal: Science, Vol 394, Issue 6824

DOI: 10.1126/science.aed4270.

Provided: Xi’an Jiaotong University

Authors: Xiyu Dong, Xu Zhang, Yuchen Sun, Gayatri Kathayat, Youwei Li, Sune O. Rasmussen, Anders Svensson, Christo Buizert, Ashish Sinha , Stephen Barker, Carlos Pérez-Mejías, Gregor Knorr, Rishui Chen , Kan Zhao, Wenjing Du, Haiwei Zhang, Hanying Li, Andrea Columbu, Liangcheng Tan , Yuao Zhang, Youfeng Ning, Martin Werner, Yongjin Wang, R. Lawrence Edwards and Hai Cheng

Abstract

Dansgaard-Oeschger (DO) events during the last ice age are thought to reflect rapid shifts in the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Greenland ice cores suggest warming transitions within only a few decades—or even just over 10 years. Using precisely dated speleothem oxygen-isotope records from the Asian monsoon region, we have shown that the same DO warmings unfolded over more than a century. Isotope modeling revealed that Greenland records primarily capture a rapid atmospheric reorganization triggered by the initial sea-ice retreat in the northeastern North Atlantic, whereas the parallel AMOC recovery and hemispheric thermal adjustment proceeded much more slowly. These findings reveal that natural AMOC transitions evolved more slowly than the rapid North Greenland oxygen-isotope shifts would imply, thereby refining our understanding of “abruptness” during DO events.

AMOC Collapse Would Be Catastrophic: And Ice- Age Records Show It’s Happened Before

Potential Catastrophe: The Impact of AMOC Collapse on Climate

North Atlantic’s Cold Blob Reveals Complex, Shifting Link to Weakening Ocean Current

North Atlantic Cold Blob Reveals AMOC Weakening Is Complex

Ocean Circulation Continues for Centuries Even After Key AMOC Engine Shuts Down

How Ocean Circulation Endures After Key AMOC Shutdown

Study: Paper Straws Carry Higher Environmental Toll Than Plastic Ones

A recent South Korean government-commissioned life-cycle assessment found that paper straws (and other common “eco-friendly” alternatives) had higher impacts than conventional plastic straws in multiple environmental categories.

Paper straws: ~6.33 times higher human carcinogenic impact (a modeled life-cycle emissions metric, not a measure of cancer risk from drinking through the straw); ~2.04 times higher acidification impact.

Balance scale comparing paper and plastic straws, with text stating paper straws have a higher environmental impact.
AI generated by Grok

A recent South Korean government- commissioned life- cycle assessment found that paper straws (and other common “eco- friendly” alternatives) had higher impacts than conventional plastic straws in multiple environmental categories.

The study (commissioned by the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment and conducted by the Korean Society for Life Cycle Assessment, roughly May 2025- April 2026) compared four single- use straw types across 16 impact categories covering raw- material production through disposal: conventional plastic (typically polypropylene), paper, biodegradable plastic, and bio- based polyethylene (bio- PE, e.g., from sugarcane or similar plant sources, which is chemically similar to conventional PE and does not readily biodegrade).

Disposal assumptions reflected national statistics (about 73.6% incineration and 26.4% landfill). The results were publicly disclosed around mid- to- late October 2026 by Rep. Kim Wi- sang.⁠

Key comparative findings (relative to conventional plastic):

  • Paper straws: ~6.33 times higher human carcinogenic impact (a modeled life-cycle emissions metric, not a measure of cancer risk from drinking through the straw); ~2.04 times higher acidification impact. They ranked highest impact in three categories overall (e.g., mineral resource depletion, ionizing radiation, freshwater eutrophication in some reports).
  • Bio- PE straws: Even higher in several areas, ~16.18 times carcinogenic impact and ~5.9 times acidification; highest impact in 10 of 16 categories (including ozone depletion, acidification, and smog-related measures in reports).
  • Biodegradable plastic straws: ~3.34 times carcinogenic impact and ~1.98 times acidification.
  • Conventional plastic had the lowest impact in 10 of the 16 categories, including climate change, acidification, particulate matter, and human toxicity (in the reported results).⁠

Researchers noted that all straw types are difficult to recycle in practice (small size hinders sorting; coatings and adhesives on paper versions add complications).

A related survey found strong preference for plastic straws among respondents. The recommendation was to stop providing any disposable straws by default and offer them only on request, focusing on reducing single- use items overall rather than material substitution. South Korea had restricted plastic straws in cafes and restaurants in 2022 but later extended a grace period amid practical issues.⁠

This aligns with the broader pattern in life- cycle assessments of single- use items: “greener” material switches can shift burdens (e.g., to production energy, water use, chemicals, or different emissions) rather than eliminate them, and real -world end -of- life performance often differs from idealized claims.

Earlier studies on straws and similar products have sometimes reached mixed or context- dependent conclusions depending on location, energy mix, and impact categories prioritized.

The carcinogenic and acidification figures here are relative modeled impacts from the full life cycle, not direct consumer health risks from use.

Southern Ocean’s Hidden Highways: How Two Water Masses Shape Global Ocean Life Over Decades

This study examines how Subantarctic Mode Water (SAMW) and Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW) evolve over decades as they travel northward from the Southern Ocean. Using CFC-derived ages as a time clock plus physical, biogeochemical, and optical data from a research cruise, the authors show the two water masses follow distinct nutrient- recycling pathways.

SAMW remineralizes nitrate and phosphate faster, while AAIW regenerates silicate more rapidly. These differences can favor different phytoplankton groups (non-siliceous taxa vs. diatoms) farther north. Nutrient regeneration in these waters supports roughly three-quarters of primary production north of 30°S, highlighting their global biogeochemical importance.

Infographic of Southern Ocean currents flowing from an iceberg toward global ocean gyres, transporting nutrients that support phytoplankton blooms and marine life.
AI generated by Grok

A new study led by Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean Sciences shows that two major Southern Ocean water masses, Subantarctic Mode Water (SAMW) and Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW), follow distinct nutrient recycling (remineralization) pathways as they travel northward over decades, influencing global phytoplankton communities and supporting a large share of primary production north of 30°S.

The Southern Ocean is connected to the rest of the world’s oceans via large-scale circulation. Deep waters up well, undergo winter mixing to form these distinct water masses, and then subduct, beginning a multi- decade northward journey.

Along the way, organic matter breaks down (remineralizes), releasing inorganic nutrients such as nitrate, phosphate, and silicate that act as fertilizers when the water eventually returns toward the surface elsewhere.⁠

Published in the Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans (DOI: 10.1029/2025JC023265), the research tracked physical, biogeochemical, and optical properties of SAMW and AAIW.

Researchers used data from a cruise on the R/V Roger Revelle (from Hawaii south to about 60°S) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as a “time clock”.

CFCs, introduced into the atmosphere mainly by mid- 20th- century refrigerants and air conditioners, leave a distinctive atmospheric signature that is locked into surface waters when they subduct, allowing age estimates and thus rates of change.

Key findings on nutrient pathways:

  • SAMW showed faster remineralization rates of nitrate and phosphate than AAIW. These nutrients are critical for primary production (nitrate is often limiting).
  • AAIW showed faster silicate remineralization. Silicate is essential for diatoms (which build glass- like cell walls).⁠

These differences can shape distant phytoplankton communities: faster N and P regeneration in SAMW may favor non- silica- requiring groups such as coccolithophores and dinoflagellates, while greater silicate regeneration in AAIW may favor diatoms.

Lead author Barney Balch (senior research scientist emeritus at Bigelow) noted that integrating these waters globally, the nutrient regeneration in SAMW and AAIW supports about three- quarters of primary production north of 30°S.⁠

The study also observed age- related changes in temperature and salinity that may record shifts in Southern Ocean conditions at the time of water- mass formation.

Co- author David Drapeau highlighted the interdisciplinary nature of the work, linking Southern Ocean physics and chemistry to global ocean biology.

Collaborators included scientists from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Arizona State University, the Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences, Texas A&M University, and the University of Miami; the work was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation.⁠

In short, the research provides a detailed view of how these “global windmill” water masses differentially condition nutrients over decades, with implications for the composition and productivity of phytoplankton far from the Southern Ocean.

Large iceberg floating in a rough, dark blue ocean with waves breaking in the foreground
An iceberg spotted near the most southern point of the research cruise’s transect highlights some of the challenges and dangers of gathering data from this part of the ocean (Credit: Sunny Pinkham).

CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) act as a chemical “time clock” for ocean water masses because their atmospheric concentrations changed in a well-documented way over recent decades, and these concentrations are imprinted into surface seawater before it sinks.

Here’s how it works:

  • CFCs are man- made, chemically inert gases that were widely used in refrigeration, air conditioning, and other applications starting in the mid- 20th century. Their atmospheric levels rose sharply from the 1930s- 1940s onward, peaked in the late 20th century, and then declined after international regulations (the Montreal Protocol) restricted their production.
  • Different CFC compounds (e.g., CFC- 11 and CFC- 12) had slightly different production timelines and atmospheric trends, so both their absolute concentrations and their relative ratios changed predictably over time.
  • When seawater is at the ocean surface, it equilibrates with the atmosphere and absorbs CFCs at the concentrations present at that moment. Once that water is subducted (pulled downward into the interior ocean), it is isolated from the atmosphere and carries the CFC “fingerprint” of the year it last contacted the air.
  • Scientists measure the CFC concentrations (and ratios) in a water sample today. By matching those values against the known historical atmospheric CFC record, they can estimate the year the water was last at the surface—i.e., its “age” or ventilation time.

In the Southern Ocean study, this age information was combined with nutrient measurements. That allowed the researchers to calculate rates of nutrient remineralization (how quickly nitrate, phosphate, and silicate were regenerated) as the water masses traveled northward over decades, rather than just seeing the total accumulated changes.

Worker in safety gear collecting a water sample from industrial filtration equipment
The study’s lead author, Barney Balch, samples chlorofluorocarbons to help determine water age. (Credit: Sunny Pinkham)

On the Differential Conditioning of Sub- Antarctic Mode Water and Antarctic Intermediate Water Over Decadal Time Scales

The full paper is published by AGU/Wiley and is typically behind a paywall or institutional access. The open_page tool could not retrieve the full text (common for subscription journals).

Key points from the publicly available press materials (Bigelow Laboratory and Phys.org)

  • The study examines how Subantarctic Mode Water (SAMW) and Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW) change as they travel northward over decades after forming in the Southern Ocean.
  • Researchers used CFC-derived ages as a time clock, combined with physical, biogeochemical, and optical measurements collected on a cruise of the R/V Roger Revelle.
  • Main finding: The two water masses follow distinct nutrient- recycling pathways:
    • SAMW shows faster remineralization of nitrate and phosphate.
    • AAIW shows faster remineralization of silicate.
  • These differences can influence which types of phytoplankton dominate in regions farther north (e.g., favoring non- siliceous groups like coccolithophores and dinoflagellates vs. diatoms).
  • Nutrient regeneration in these water masses is estimated to support roughly three- quarters of primary production north of 30°S.

Lead author Barney Balch (Bigelow Laboratory) emphasized that combining the chemical and biological data with the CFC age clock uniquely allows calculation of rates of change rather than just net accumulation.

If you have institutional access, the link should take you directly to the paper (abstract, PDF, supporting information, etc.).

Title: On the Differential Conditioning of Sub‐ Antarctic Mode Water and Antarctic Intermediate Water Over Decadal Time Scales

Journal: Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans (2026)

DOI: 10.1029/2025JC023265

Provided: Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean Sciences

First published: 01 November 2026

Authors: W. M. Balch, D. J. McGillicuddy Jr., H. Oliver, N. R. Bates, P. L. Morton, D. T. Drapeau, S. R. Pinkham, B. C. Bowler, R. Garley, M. Enright, J. Happell

Abstract

We report results from a meridional transect performed along 150°W, 30°S to 60°S in the Southern Ocean (SO). This study aimed to document the rates of conditioning of Subantarctic Mode Water (SAMW) and Antarctic Intermediate Water (AAIW), which are formed during deep mixing events in the austral winter. The water masses are subducted as they flow toward the northern hemisphere. Chloroflourocarbons (CFCs) were sampled along the section in order to estimate the time since atmospheric equilibration of SAMW and AAIW. Combining this information with standing stock information of other biogeochemical variables along isopycnals allowed rates of change of these variables to be deduced. Results demonstrated that temperature and salinity varied with water mass age, possibly reflecting changes in source waters over decadal time scales. Results also showed remineralization rates of nitrate and phosphate in northbound SAMW were faster than remineralization rates in AAIW. In contrast, silicate remineralization rates were faster in AAIW than in SAMW. These trends are expected to affect macronutrient availability, phytoplankton biogeography and productivity in the north Pacific Ocean, especially when the waters are subsequently mixed upwards into the euphotic zone decades later. Vertical mixing of nitrogen-rich, SAMW into surface waters would support the growth of more non-silicious algae (such as nannoplankton, coccolithophores and dinoflagellates) whereas more energetic vertical mixing of deeper AAIW into surface waters will encourage the growth of silicious algae like diatoms.

“Energy is Prosperity” (Claire Coutinho speaks to the UK people)

Ed. Note: This manifesto by Claire Coutinho from last year is reprinted in light of the raging UK debate over “Net Zero” policies pursuant to the Climate Change Act of 2008. A former Cabinet member as Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, and currently an elected member of the Conservative Pary, she has changed views to trenchantly oppose Net Zero.

Industrial energy landscape at sunset with offshore oil platform, power plant cooling towers, refinery, city skyline, and the text "Energy is Prosperity"
AI generated by Grok

From Master Resource

By Robert Bradley Jr.

Ed. Note: This manifesto by Claire Coutinho from last year is reprinted in light of the raging UK debate over “Net Zero” policies pursuant to the Climate Change Act of 2008. A former Cabinet member as Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, and currently an elected member of the Conservative Pary, she has changed views to trenchantly oppose Net Zero.

“I can promise you this. When it comes to energy policy, our priority won’t be ideology, it won’t be vested interests, it won’t be fake promises we can’t deliver. It will be cheap, reliable, abundant energy.”

In the last few decades, we’ve lost sight of a simple truth. Energy is a good thing.

Conservatives know that great eras of British growth and prosperity happen when we have an abundance of cheap, reliable energy. Pitt and Peel who helped to unleash the coal-powered Industrial Revolution. Stanley Baldwin spread electricity across the nation, after the First World War. Mrs Thatcher’s North Sea oil boom got the nation back on its feet after those terrible years of Labour decline.

Today, there is not a single country on earth which has high growth and low energy. That’s because energy is not just part of the economy. It is the economy. It feeds into the costs of every business, every journey, every loaf of bread. That’s why right now, the cost of energy is one of the biggest problems we have. It’s a stealth tax that is making us all poorer. And it’s killing our industry.

Britain has the highest industrial electricity prices in the world. And that has consequences. British industries that use the most energy – like chemicals, glass, and metals – are shutting down week by week. The fibreglass factory in Wigan. The refinery at Grangemouth. Vauxhall in Luton. The North Sea. We’re losing thousands of jobs by the month. And we won’t need any less fibreglass, less gas, or fewer cars – we’ll just import more from abroad, often from countries still powered by coal. Fewer jobs in Britain. Unilateral economic disarmament. For more carbon in the atmosphere.

And this isn’t just about the industries that we already have, the industries of the future need energy too – whether it’s advanced manufacturing or AI. Whether it’s a factory, or a data centre, or a super-lab they will need cheap, reliable energy. And they will go where they find it.

It would be the first time in generations that we would no longer be at the forefront of a technological revolution, and we will be poorer because of it. Those businesses will be created, just not here in Britain. We won’t have saved the planet, we will have failed the next generation. And under Labour this is about to get worse.

Miliband’s Folly

At the last election Ed Miliband promised to cut bills by £300. Keir Starmer promised it. Rachel Reeves promised it. Now last week Ed Miliband had some pretty choice words for Elon Musk about disinformation. So, conference, we’ve got a return message for Ed Miliband. If you want to talk about disinformation, where’s our flipping £300? Far from cutting bills, bills keep going up – and every choice Ed has made is making it worse.

Ed says that building more wind farms will cut bills. But he’s signing up to prices that are the highest in a decade, well above the market price of electricity. Look at this. When he made his promise to cut bills, the price of electricity was £72. That’s that second bar in black you see.

Last year he bought offshore wind at £82, and this year he’s said he’s willing to pay up to £117. Now, that’s before you add in the extra costs for connections, the backup, and the £8 billion we’ll soon be paying wind farms, not to generate any energy, but to turn off when there’s too much wind. And what’s worse, is that he’s extended the wind developer’s contracts to twenty years, locking us into these higher prices for longer.

You can think about it like this. He’s moving our energy onto a fixed-rate mortgage at 10%, because he doesn’t want to be on a 4% variable. Anyone with half a brain can see that won’t cut bills. Now, he says prices are going up because gas is expensive. But that blue bar on the left, £55, that’s gas without taxes. You tell me what’s higher or lower. It’s not hard is it?

He also said that Great British Energy would lead to, and I quote, a “mind-blowing” reduction in bills. But it won’t generate any energy. Only Ed Miliband could launch an £8 billion energy company that won’t produce any energy. Let’s call it what it is. A vanity project that won’t cut bills. So, we will scrap it.

I will give Ed credit for one thing though. He’s managed to do something which is quite difficult, he’s managed to unite the Trade Unions, the Conservative Party, the voters, and Keir Starmer. How? Because they all want the same thing. Turns out they all want him sacked.

And here’s the problem with the Left – they’re infected with a poverty mindset. They believe that Britain has a duty to make itself poorer on the altar of Net Zero. And they think that ordinary people should be the servants of their climate targets.

So, take air conditioning. In America, nearly every single home has air con. Here in Britain? Just 5%. But Sadiq Khan’s London Plan effectively bans air con in all new homes – why? Because it uses too much energy.

Rather than people fitting into the Government’s policy on energy, I believe a Conservative energy policy should serve the needs of the people. Take the North Sea, Ed Miliband’s plans to ban new drilling would make us the only country in the world shutting down our own energy supplies. Up to 200,000 jobs and twelve billion pounds in tax revenue lost.

Why? So that we can import more gas from Norway from the same fields we could drill ourselves. Our imports of liquified gas have soared by over 40 per cent in a single year. Conference, as long as we need gas, as much of it as possible should come from Britain. That’s why we will scrap Ed’s mad ban on new oil and gas licenses, we will reverse the energy profits levy, and we will back the North Sea.

Energy vs. Poverty

We will remember what has been forgotten for too long. Energy is prosperity.

Now, we have to be honest. The poverty mindset has become inseparable from our climate legislation. We shouldn’t have let it sit on the statute book for so long. I wasn’t in Parliament in 2019 when the 2050 Net Zero target was set. But I’ll tell you who was – Kemi Badenoch. She was one of only two people in that entire debate who had the courage to speak up and ask about the costs.

When I came in as Energy Secretary, I started a reset to unpick some of what we got wrong in the face of huge opposition. I started that reset because whilst we have halved our emissions, China has been doing this. Global emissions are rising much, much faster than we can cut them here.

When something clearly isn’t working, we Conservatives should have the courage to tell the truth and say so. Net Zero isn’t working for Britain, and it’s not working for the climate. The British people are no stranger to sacrifice for a just cause. But watching good jobs move abroad is not just. Piling more pain onto people’s bills is not just. And passing down a country that is less secure and less prosperous is not just.

For too many people, Net Zero has become a religion, and for too long we were an unthinking part of the congregation. Here’s the problem with the legislation. We know it’s not working for climate change. But it’s also forcing Ministers to make decisions that make people poorer.

Ed Miliband’s 2008 Climate Change Act sets legally-binding targets. Every five years, targets are drawn up that dictate what products people must buy, and when, and in what quantities, a decade into the future. Conference, we had a name for that back in the 70s, it’s central planning.

If all of our industry shut tomorrow, and we replaced those goods with imports that would be a win for climate targets but a disaster for Britain. If people don’t want a heat pump, the Act requires you to tax or ban them into it.

We are burning wood shipped here from America to produce electricity at three times the cost of gas, and four times the pollution levels of our last coal plant. Why? Because it doesn’t count towards our climate targets.

Those ridiculous prices I just showed you for offshore wind, why would we have to buy any at those prices? You guessed it. Our climate targets.

And here’s the truth, whether it was EU directives, or the Climate Change Committee, or the courts who rule on the activists’ cases, none of them are accountable to the people who will lose their jobs, or people who pay their energy bills, or who need to keep the lights on.

We handed too much control to people who pay no price for being wrong. That was a profound mistake. So, we will set out a new way of doing things. Conference, I know many of you are proud lovers of the environment. I am too. We will not cede that ground. But we will set out new plans under Conservative principles.

Energy Freedom

Our first principle will be to back British innovation. For too long when we talked about innovation, what we meant is that we would force Britain to be the early adopters of technology made in other parts of the world. But look at these charts. Refrigerators, dishwashers, central heating. Here’s the thing, when new tech makes people’s lives better, people will buy it. What we are doing is insisting everyone buys these products before they want to, just to meet a government target. Rather than force our people to be the early adopters, I want us to be the early creators.

The early creators of technology we can export around the world. We’re only 1% of emissions. 99% are happening elsewhere and they’re rising. We clearly have not got this right yet. We have not created all of products we need. But if we can create technologies that others can’t, that will be by far Britain’s biggest contribution to tackling climate change.

Our second principle will be to protect nature. For centuries, environmentalism was the domain of ordinary people – people who were rooted in a sense of place and a love of home. They wanted to protect and cherish the world they loved around them. Roger Scruton called this the “small-scale wisdom of the human heart”. But nature is not Net Zero, in fact some of the time it pulls in the opposite direction. I can think of no better image than this – the Amazon Rainforest being carved up to build a motorway to the latest Climate conference in Brazil.

But what’s worrying is that’s not so dissimilar to what we’re pursuing here. On the left, that tiny dot is the land needed for a nuclear power plant, underneath is what’s needed to get the same amount of energy from wind and solar. Because wind and solar use up to 3,000 times more land. To generate the same amount of power as a nuclear power station, you would need a wind farm the size of the New Forest, or a solar farm the size of the Isle of Wight. On a small island like ours where every inch of countryside is precious, that matters. So instead of carpeting the countryside in wind and solar farms, we will make it easier and cheaper to build dense, reliable, secure, clean nuclear energy.

Repeal the Climate Change Act!

Our third and most important principle will be to prioritise cheap, abundant energy. And we will do that unashamedly. That’s why the next Conservative Government will repeal the Climate Change Act. If a law is not working in the national interest, it is not just possible for us to change it – it’s our duty to do so. All it takes is courage.

Increasing the cost of electricity is the worst possible climate policy too. If you want people to use electric cars, here’s a revolutionary idea. Make electricity cheap. If you want people to use electric heating. Make electricity cheap. If you want to build data centres, to cut bills, to reduce poverty and drive growth. Make electricity cheap.

At the moment Labour’s giving handouts to people to buy electric cars and electric heating at the very same time they’re making electricity unbearably expensive. That’s back to front and we will reverse it. Our priorities will be the priorities of the British people, a strong economy, protecting nature, and cutting bills. So, conference, today I can announce the first policies from our Cheap Power Plan.

First up, the next Conservative Government will axe the Carbon Tax on electricity generation. When Ed Miliband blames gas for high energy bills, what he doesn’t tell you is that over 30% of what we pay for gas power is not to pay for fuel, but to pay for a Carbon Tax that the government chooses to impose.

Now, we know we will need gas to keep the lights on for decades – so it just adds extra costs to our bills for no reason. But here’s the rub – the Carbon Tax inflates the cost of almost all other types of electricity too. So, all the wind and solar farm owners pocket those higher prices as higher profits.

And since the start of the year, guess what Ed has done to Carbon Taxes? That. We warned Ed about doing this. He didn’t listen. Labour’s EU deal increased the Carbon Tax by 70 per cent in the space of 9 months. They did not have to do this. It was a political choice. A political choice that we Conservatives fought against.

Axing the Carbon Tax would cut bills instantly by almost £8 billion a year. Next. We’ll scrap Ed Miliband’s old rip-off wind farm subsidies. Back in 2008, Ed Miliband, in his infinite wisdom, chose to double the subsidies on offer for wind farms. That means when the wind blows, there are wind farms getting up to three times the market price of electricity – and you’re paying for that through your bills. It’s the biggest racket going. We closed the scheme when we were in office, but we’ll go further and say we must scrap those subsidies for good.

Our energy system is not here to prop up the profits of multi-million-pound wind developers at billpayers’ expense. It’s here to deliver cheap, reliable energy for the country.

Together, our policies to Axe the Carbon Tax and scrap Ed’s rip-off wind subsidies would cut people’s electricity bills by 20 per cent. The average family will save £165 a year off their electricity bill. And I realise this sounds less than the promises other parties have made. Ed promised to cut your bills by £300, but we all know that’s a fantasy.

But Reform are just as bad. They’ve promised to cut your electricity bill by £1,000. Do you know how I know that’s garbage? The average bill is only £850. What’s he gonna do, go round writing people cheques?

If you think any politician can promise you electricity for free, then I’ve got a bridge to sell you. They are just as ideological as Labour, it’s just the mirror image. The difference with our policy is that this is real. It’s in the gift of Ministers. This could be done tomorrow. And it would cut your electricity bill by 20%.

So, I can promise you this. When it comes to energy policy, our priority won’t be ideology, it won’t be vested interests, it won’t be fake promises we can’t deliver. It will be cheap, reliable, abundant energy.

Now Conference, being in opposition can be tough. Although I’d like to thank the wider Energy team – Andrew, Malcolm, Nick, Greg, and Bradley for all their excellent work. We know this half-baked tax-and-spend socialism of Labour is a disaster for Britain. When we said in the election, that if you name it, Labour will tax it, we meant it.

Anti-Progress Mentality

There’s a farmer’s tax, a groceries tax, a jobs tax, a jets tax, a lets tax and a bets tax, an oil tax, the soil tax, and a boiler tax. There’s even rumours of a taxi tax! The truth is they would rather tax the pants off this country than get their spending under control.

And it reveals a fundamental belief. If you try to do well for yourself, get a good job, pay for your child’s education, buy a house, start a successful business – they don’t celebrate you. They sneer at you. They want to redistribute away your success. They talk about poverty like they care. But their policies are making energy, food, childcare and housing more expensive. And their answer is always more redistribution rather than confronting the truth that this Government is choosing, choosing to raise the cost of almost every basic good.

Now, Reform I’m afraid to say have the economic policies of Jeremy Corbyn. They’re promising nationalisations we can’t afford, more tax for more welfare, more spending, which means more borrowing, which means more debt for our children. If Government is here to serve the liberties of the people, that means allowing them to keep more of the money that they earn.

Now Conference, we know growth is the biggest challenge we face. But growth is not created by Government subsidies. It is created by millions of people. And I worry, our system as it stands is teaching people to be less capable than they are. We cannot survive if our culture becomes a competition of victimhood.

The risk is people start to ask themselves, not what can I do, but why bother at all? Every person who takes on more hours, comes up with bright ideas, take risks, saves and invests in their future and their family’s future. Personal agency. The sense that you can take control of your life and reap the rewards of your efforts. That’s the real engine of growth.

Everything we do as a Party will be in their interests. And we will start by giving them cheaper energy.

Thank you.

North Atlantic’s Cold Blob Reveals Complex, Shifting Link to Weakening Ocean Current

Penn State researchers report that the link between the North Atlantic “cold blob” (also called the North Atlantic warming hole) and the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) is more complex and phase- dependent than previously assumed.

The North Atlantic “cold blob” (also called the North Atlantic warming hole) is a region south and southeast of Greenland that has cooled or lagged substantially behind global ocean warming over the past century (by up to ~1– 1.8°F / ~0.5– 1°C in some estimates).

Illustration of ocean currents swirling around Greenland and the North Atlantic, with orange and blue flow arrows.
AI generated by Grok

Penn State researchers report that the link between the North Atlantic “cold blob” (also called the North Atlantic warming hole) and the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) is more complex and phase- dependent than previously assumed.

The cold blob is a roughly 965,000- square- mile region south and southeast of Greenland that has cooled by as much as 1.8°F over the past century while most other ocean waters have warmed.

It has long been linked to a weakening AMOC, the ocean “conveyor belt” that transports warm surface water northward and denser cold water southward in the deep ocean. A sustained AMOC decline (influenced by climate change) is viewed as a key driver of the cooler surface temperatures there.⁠

In a Nature Communications paper, a team led by Laifang Li (assistant professor of meteorology and atmospheric science) and including lead author Yifei Fan (doctoral candidate) used climate model simulations across many scenarios.

These incorporated varying greenhouse- gas levels, past and present climate conditions, ocean heat transfer, ocean– atmosphere heat exchange, and atmospheric radiation (including low -cloud effects). The work builds on their 2025 finding that atmospheric radiation also helps keep the region cooler.

The cooling effect of a weakening AMOC on surface temperatures is not constant:

  • When the current weakens from its greatest strength, surface temperatures drop only modestly.
  • When it weakens from mid- range strength, the temperature drops roughly triples, and the cold blob expands across the subpolar basin.
  • When the current weakens further from an already diminished state, the cooling effect fades; the cold blob shifts northeast toward Iceland and the Norwegian Sea. Variable atmospheric heat radiation and low- cloud reflections contribute to these shifts.

Models project that AMOC will move from its current higher- strength phase toward its lowest- strength phase by 2100. The cold blob’s most significant temperature shift could occur as late as 2067 or could already have begun as early as 2021.

Earlier peaks in temperature change would correspond to an earlier fading of the cool patch. Once AMOC is weak enough, the ocean is expected to absorb more heat from the atmosphere and approach its capacity to buffer climate change, increasing uncertainty in future surface temperatures, currents, weather and climate effects.

Heat map of the Atlantic Ocean and surrounding continents with a large blue cold region near Greenland and warm red-orange areas elsewhere.
The 965,000-square -mile area in the North Atlantic Ocean south and southeast of Greenland, the so- called cold blob, cooled by as much as 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit over the past century as other ocean waters warmed. Credit: NASA.

The North Atlantic “cold blob” (also called the North Atlantic warming hole) is a region south and southeast of Greenland that has cooled or lagged substantially behind global ocean warming over the past century (by up to ~1–1.8°F / ~0.5– 1°C in some estimates).

It stands out as one of the few areas resisting the broader warming trend.

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) acts as a major “conveyor belt”: it carries warm, salty surface water northward into the subpolar North Atlantic, where the water cools, becomes denser, sinks, and returns southward at depth. A weakening AMOC reduces northward ocean heat transport (OHT) into this region, which is widely hypothesized as the primary cause of the cold blob.

Recent observational analyses (including full- depth ocean heat content data back to the 1950s and satellite records) support this view.

They show that the cooling extends below the surface, surface heat loss from the region has actually decreased in recent decades, and multidecadal heat-content variations correlate more strongly with horizontal ocean heat transport changes than with atmospheric surface fluxes.

This points to reduced heat delivery by the AMOC rather than increased atmospheric extraction of heat.

Climate models and reconstructions generally link the blob’s emergence to anthropogenic forcing (primarily greenhouse gases, with contributions from aerosols and Greenland meltwater freshening that inhibits deep convection).

Direct AMOC measurements (e.g., RAPID array since ~2004) and indirect indicators also indicate a weakening trend over recent decades, though natural variability remains significant.

A 2026 Nature Communications study (Fan, Chan, Zhang, Li et al., using large ensembles of CESM2 simulations across paleoclimate to future scenarios, plus other CMIP6 models) demonstrates that the AMOC- subpolar SST relationship is not stationary.

It shifts across three regimes defined by AMOC strength (change points near ~20 Sv and ~11.5 Sv):⁠

  • Regime 1 (strong AMOC, > ~20 Sv): Low sensitivity (~0.09 °C per Sv). Classic dipole fingerprint—cooling in the central subpolar basin paired with warming along the Gulf Stream extension. The cold blob begins to emerge. Oceanic, clear-sky radiative, and cloud processes contribute roughly equally and modestly.
  • Regime 2 (intermediate AMOC, ~11.5– 20 Sv): Sensitivity more than triples (~0.31 °C per Sv). Cooling intensifies and expands across the entire subpolar basin (strongest in the Irminger and Labrador Seas). This is the “maturing” stage of the warming hole. The amplification is driven primarily by atmospheric radiative processes: reduced clear- sky longwave radiation (from cooler and drier troposphere) and increased shortwave reflection by low- level clouds. Ocean heat transport changes are largely offset by compensating turbulent fluxes.
  • Regime 3 (weak AMOC, < ~11.5 Sv): Sensitivity drops again (~0.12 °C per Sv). The canonical cold blob decays or shifts northeastward toward Iceland and the Norwegian Sea. Radiative amplifiers weaken and relocate; the subpolar region can begin absorbing more heat from the atmosphere.

These regimes map onto historical-to-future trajectories in models (e.g., CESM2 transitions through them from the late 20th century into the 21st). The year of peak AMOC- SST sensitivity can help predict the shift into the weak regime and associated decay of the classic warming hole. Atmospheric radiative processes dominate the regime shifts; oceanic processes contribute more indirectly via air– sea coupling.

Implications

  • The cold blob is a useful but imperfect and non- stationary indicator of AMOC strength. Its presence or intensity does not map linearly to AMOC decline, and its future disappearance would not necessarily signal AMOC recovery.
  • Models project continued AMOC weakening under greenhouse- gas forcing, with the system potentially moving from the current stronger and intermediate regimes toward the weak regime by 2100. The timing of major shifts in the blob carries uncertainty (model-dependent estimates range from the early 2020s to the 2060s).
  • Broader climate effects of a weaker AMOC (and associated blob) include potential influences on the jet stream, storm tracks, European and North American weather extremes, and regional sea- level patterns. A full AMOC collapse remains a low- probability but high- impact tipping- point risk this century under high- emissions scenarios; most assessments project substantial weakening rather than abrupt shutdown.
  • Improved monitoring (satellites, ocean arrays, sustained heat- content observations) and model constraints that account for regime dependence will reduce projection uncertainties.

In short, the cold blob is tightly linked to AMOC weakening via reduced ocean heat transport, but the strength of that coupling, and the resulting SST pattern- depends strongly on the background AMOC state and is mediated importantly by atmospheric radiation and clouds. This adds important nuance to interpreting both past observations and future projections.

Scatter plot of AMOC versus WHSST across three regimes, with colored climate model data, change points, fitted lines, and an inset North Atlantic map.
AMOC– North Atlantic SST relationship in model simulations. Credit: Nature Communications (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-76149-4

Regime shifts of AMOC- sea surface temperature relationship

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) regulates climate, and subpolar North Atlantic sea- surface temperature (SST) patterns are commonly used as proxies for its strength.

This study shows the AMOC- SST relationship is state- dependent, not stationary.

Using Community Earth System Model (CESM2) simulations across diverse climate states plus a multi- model ensemble, the authors identify three distinct regimes:

  • Strong AMOC: typical dipole SST fingerprint.
  • Intermediate AMOC: amplified subpolar SST anomalies.
  • Weak AMOC: muted North Atlantic signals.

These regimes arise primarily from changes in atmospheric radiative processes (ocean processes contribute more indirectly via air–sea interactions).

The year of peak AMOC- SST sensitivity can predict the transition into the weak- AMOC regime and the associated decay of the North Atlantic warming hole (“cold blob”).

This provides a physically based constraint on model uncertainties in climate projections and implies that SST- based AMOC indicators must account for state dependence.

AMOC is indexed as maximum overturning transport below 500 m at 40°N. The warming- hole SST index (WHSST) is the difference between subpolar North Atlantic mean SST (roughly 45°- 60°N, 20°- 50°W) and the global mean.

Objective change-point detection on CESM2 simulations (paleoclimate to future scenarios) yields two change points (~20.0 Sv and ~11.5 Sv), defining three regimes:

RegimeAMOC strengthWHSST sensitivity to AMOCSpatial SST pattern with weakening AMOC
1 (strong)> ~20 SvLow (~0.09 °C Sv⁻¹)Classic dipole: cooling in central subpolar basin and warming along Gulf Stream extension
2 (intermediate)~11.5- 20 SvHigh (~0.31 °C Sv⁻¹; >3 times Regime 1)Intensified cooling across the entire subpolar basin (strongest in Irminger and Labrador Seas)
3 (weak)< ~11.5 SvLow again (~0.12 °C Sv⁻¹)Cooling shifts northeast into the Norwegian Sea and Iceland basin; canonical warming hole decays

The pattern is robust across alternative SST and AMOC metrics and appears in at least four additional CMIP6 models.

These regimes correspond to stages of the North Atlantic warming hole: emerging (Regime 1), maturing (Regime 2), and decaying (Regime 3).

Historical and 21st- century CESM2 trajectories cross these regimes between ~1985 and 2100.

A partial temperature-change decomposition attributes WHSST anomalies mainly to:

  1. Oceanic processes (ocean heat transport convergence and local heat storage, largely balanced by turbulent heat fluxes).
  2. Surface downward clear- sky radiation (dominated by longwave).
  3. Cloud radiative effects.
  • Regime 1: All three process groups contribute roughly equally (modest net cooling).
  • Regime 2: Sensitivity tripling is radiatively driven. Clear- sky longwave (linked to tropospheric cooling and reduced water vapor) supplies ~2/3 of the increase; enhanced shortwave reflection by low- level clouds supply most of the rest. Oceanic terms stay nearly neutral.
  • Regime 3: Radiative amplifiers (clear- sky longwave and cloud shortwave) weaken and shift northeast, so the canonical subpolar warming hole fades even as AMOC continues to decline. Oceanic contributions remain secondary.

Ocean heat transport changes scale with AMOC but are largely offset by compensating turbulent fluxes, so they do not drive the regime shifts directly.

Implications

  • SST fingerprints of AMOC are non- stationary; interpreting the observed cold blob (or its future evolution) as a simple AMOC proxy requires regime awareness.
  • The timing of peak AMOC- SST sensitivity offers a useful predictor for when the system enters the weak- AMOC regime, and the warming hole begins to decay.
  • This framework helps explain and constrain inter- model spread in 21st-century North Atlantic SST projections.

The paper builds directly on the authors’ prior work linking atmospheric radiation to the cold blob and aligns with the Penn State news summary discussed previously.

Full text, figures, methods, and supplementary material are available at the Nature Communications page and PDF.

Journal: Nature Communications, volume 17, Article number: 9416 (2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-76149-4, Open access

Published: 05 August 2026

Provided: Pennsylvania State University

Authors: Yifei Fan,
Duo Chan,
Gokhan Danabasoglu,
Who M. Kim,
Pengfei Zhang&
Laifang Li (corresponding), among others

Abstract

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) plays critical roles in regulating climate, and subpolar North Atlantic sea-surface temperature (SST) patterns are widely used to infer changes in its strength. Yet the stationarity of their relationship remains unclear. Here, using Community Earth System Model simulations spanning various climate states and a multi-model ensemble, we show that this relationship is state-dependent. We identify three distinct regimes: strong AMOC with the typical dipole fingerprint; intermediate AMOC with amplified subpolar SST anomalies; and weak AMOC with muted North Atlantic signals. These regimes arise primarily from changes in atmospheric radiative processes, while ocean processes contribute indirectly through air–sea interactions. The year of peak AMOC–SST sensitivity emerges as a predictor of the transition into the weak-AMOC regime and associated decay of the North Atlantic warming hole, offering a physically-based constraint on model uncertainties in climate projections. Our findings also imply that SST-based AMOC indicators must account for state dependence.