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The 4.2 ka Mega-Drought That Brought Down the Harappan Civilization

The Harappan Civilization (also called the Indus Valley Civilization or Indus Civilization) was a Bronze Age urban culture that flourished in the northwestern regions of South Asia, primarily in the basins of the Indus and Ghaggar- Hakra rivers.

The 4.2 ka event (also called the 4.2-kiloyear event or 4.2 ka BP aridification event) was a major climatic episode of prolonged drought and aridification that began around 4,200 years before present (approximately 2200 BCE). It ranks among the most severe climatic events of the Holocene epoch and formally marks the boundary between the Northgrippian and Meghalayan stages of the Holocene.

A dramatic landscape featuring an ancient, weathered structure resembling a pyramid, set against a backdrop of a setting sun and clouds, with a dusty, cracked ground indicative of arid conditions. — AI generated by Grok

The Harappan Civilization (also called the Indus Valley Civilization or Indus Civilization) was a Bronze Age urban culture that flourished in the northwestern regions of South Asia, primarily in the basins of the Indus and Ghaggar- Hakra rivers (modern- day Pakistan and northwestern India).

It ranks as one of the world’s three earliest civilizations alongside Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt, and it was the most geographically extensive of the three. The civilization is named “Harappan” after its type site, Harappa, the first major site identified by modern archaeology.

Chronology

Overall span: roughly 3300-1300 BCE.
Early Harappan phase: ~3300-2600 BCE (village and early settlement development).
Mature (urban) Harappan phase: ~2600-1900 BCE (peak of city life, standardization, and trade).
Late Harappan phase: ~1900-1300 BCE (decline and transformation).

The mature phase produced large planned cities and a high degree of cultural uniformity across a vast area.

Major Sites:

Harappa and Mohenjo- daro

These two cities were the first discovered and remain among the best- known and largest centers (other major urban sites include Rakhigarhi, Dholavira, and Ganweriwala).

Harappa (Punjab province, Pakistan, on the old course of the Ravi River):

Discovered and first systematically excavated in 1921 by Daya Ram Sahni.
Suffered significant damage in the 19th century when bricks were removed for railway ballast.
Featured a fortified citadel (west) and a larger lower town (east), large granaries, workers’ quarters (rows of small identical houses), and a cemetery (R37).
Estimated population in the range of ~23,500- 35,000.

Mohenjo- daro (“Mound of the Dead”; Sindh province, Pakistan, near the Indus River):

Identified in 1922 by R. D. Banerji and extensively excavated under John Marshall and others.
Best- preserved major Indus site and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
Also divided into a raised western citadel and eastern lower town.
Famous structures include the Great Bath (a large, carefully waterproofed public or ritual pool), a large granary complex, an assembly hall, and an elaborate system of wells and covered drains.
Estimated population ~35,000- 41,000 or higher; the city was rebuilt multiple times on raised platforms to counter flooding.

Both cities show remarkably similar urban planning: streets laid out on a rough grid (often north- south and east- west), standardized baked bricks (typically in a 1:2:4 ratio), sophisticated drainage and sanitation systems connected to individual house bathrooms, and private wells. Houses were generally made of baked brick with flat roofs.

Key Characteristics

Urban planning and technology: High degree of standardization in bricks, weights and measures, and architecture across distant sites. Advanced water management (drains, soak pits, public baths, wells) stands out for its time.

Economy: Based on agriculture (wheat, barley, pulses, sesame, and some of the earliest evidence of cotton) supported by river floods and irrigation, supplemented by animal husbandry, craft production (beads, seals, pottery, copper/bronze metallurgy), and long- distance trade (including with Mesopotamia).

Material culture: Thousands of steatite seals (often with animal motifs such as the “unicorn” or bull and short inscriptions in the still- undeciphered Indus script), standardized cubical weights, jewelry, figurines (including the famous bronze “Dancing Girl” and the soapstone “Priest- King” from Mohenjo- daro), and toys.

Society and governance: Evidence of organized civic planning and possible administrative control (uniformity of weights, seals, and urban layouts), yet relatively few clear signs of extreme social hierarchy such as royal tombs or monumental palaces. The political structure remains debated.

Decline

Urban centers began to decline after ~1900 BCE. Populations dispersed, many large cities were largely abandoned or greatly reduced, and the culture transformed into smaller, more rural Late Harappan settlements, with some movement eastward.

Current research points strongly to climate and environmental factors as major contributors: a series of prolonged droughts (some lasting decades to over a century), weakening of the summer monsoon, reduced river flows, and shifts in river courses (including the drying of the Ghaggar- Hakra system).

These stresses would have undermined agriculture and the urban economy. Other contributing factors may have included disruptions in long- distance trade and internal social or economic changes. Older theories emphasizing large- scale invasion are generally no longer favored as the primary cause.

The Indus script remains undeciphered, limiting direct historical insight, so most knowledge comes from archaeology. Over a thousand sites have been identified, with dozens excavated, revealing a sophisticated, peaceful, and highly organized civilization that left a lasting imprint on the cultural history of the Indian subcontinent.

Harappan urban planning stands out as one of the most sophisticated and standardized systems of city design in the ancient world (Mature phase, c. 2600-1900 BCE). Unlike the more organic growth seen in contemporary Mesopotamian or Egyptian cities, Harappan settlements show clear evidence of deliberate, pre-planned layouts shared across sites hundreds of kilometres apart.

Ancient ruins of a large brick structure on a hillside under a blue sky. — Mohenjo-Daro, located in the Sindh province of Pakistan, is one of the most remarkable archaeological sites of the ancient Indus Valley Civilization, dating back to around 2500 BCE. Credit: STDC.

Core Principles of Planning

1. Grid Layout (Gridiron Pattern)
Streets were oriented roughly along the cardinal directions (north- south and east- west) and intersected at right angles, dividing the city into regular rectangular blocks.

Main avenues at sites like Mohenjo- daro could reach 9-10 metres wide, wide enough for two- way cart traffic.
Narrower lanes branched off into residential areas.
House entrances typically opened onto side lanes rather than main streets, enhancing privacy and reducing dust/noise.

This systematic grid facilitated movement, ventilation, drainage flow, and efficient land use.

2. Two- Part Division: Citadel and Lower Town
Most major cities followed a consistent bipartite plan:

Citadel (Upper Town): A smaller, elevated area on the western side, built on massive mud- brick platforms (sometimes 6-12 m high). It housed monumental public structures and was often fortified.
- At Mohenjo-daro: Great Bath, large granary complex, and possible assembly halls or “college.”
- At Harappa: Large granaries with ventilation ducts and workers’ quarters.
Lower Town: The larger eastern residential and commercial zone where most people lived and worked. It contained houses, workshops, and markets arranged in the grid.

Variations existed (e.g., Dholavira had a three-tier system with an additional middle town; some smaller sites lacked a clear citadel).

3. Standardized Construction Materials
Baked (kiln- fired) bricks were used extensively, especially for drains, wells, bathrooms, and important walls. Bricks followed a remarkably consistent ratio of approximately 1:2:4 (thickness : width : length).

Typical house brick: ~7 × 14 × 28 cm.
This uniformity across vast distances (from Punjab to Gujarat) points to shared technical standards and coordinated production.

Mud bricks were also used, particularly for platforms and less critical walls. Structures were often multi-storeyed, with flat roofs.

4. Advanced Water Management and Sanitation
This is widely regarded as the most impressive feature of Harappan planning:

Almost every house had a private bathroom (with a sloping floor) and often its own well.
Vertical pipes or chutes in walls carried wastewater from upper floors or bathing platforms down to street level.
Covered street drains (built of carefully fitted baked bricks, sometimes sealed with gypsum or bitumen) ran alongside roads and connected to larger channels.
Manholes/inspection points and soak pits allowed regular cleaning and maintenance.
Public wells and, at some sites (especially Dholavira), sophisticated reservoirs and water-harvesting systems.

Mohenjo- daro alone had hundreds of wells. The emphasis on hygiene and wastewater removal was unmatched in the contemporary Bronze Age world.

5. Zoning and Functional Organization
Evidence suggests some separation of residential, craft/industrial, and public spaces. Workshops (bead-making, pottery, metallurgy) were often located toward the periphery. Granaries and storage facilities were concentrated near the citadel or river access for efficient food distribution.

Notable Site Variations

Feature	Mohenjo-daro	Harappa	Other Notes
Street Plan	Highly regular grid	Grid, partially excavated	Dholavira more geometric
Citadel	Massive western platform	Western platform	Dholavira has multi-tiered plan
Key Structures	Great Bath, large granary	Multiple granaries, workers’ quarters	Lothal: dockyard
Drainage	Extensive and sophisticated	Well- developed	Almost universal across major sites

Significance

The consistency of these features across a vast area implies either a strong shared cultural tradition, some form of coordinating authority, or both. Planning prioritized practicality, public hygiene, flood protection (raised platforms), and efficient resource use rather than monumental royal or religious architecture.

This level of urban organization, especially the drainage systems, remained exceptional for millennia and continues to impress modern urban planners and archaeologists.

An aerial view of an ancient city with mud-brick buildings, bustling streets, and various market activities. People are seen socializing, working, and transporting goods. A central water feature is visible, surrounded by citizens engaging in daily life. — Ancient Civilizations: The Indus Valley Educational Resources K12 Learning, World, World, History Lesson Plans, Activities, Experiments, Homeschool Help

The 4.2 ka event (also called the 4.2-kiloyear event or 4.2 ka BP aridification event) was a major climatic episode of prolonged drought and aridification that began around 4,200 years before present (approximately 2200 BCE). It ranks among the most severe climatic events of the Holocene epoch and formally marks the boundary between the Northgrippian and Meghalayan stages of the Holocene.

It involved widespread drying across North Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, parts of the Indian subcontinent, and elsewhere. Proxy records (speleothems, lake sediments, marine cores) indicate weakened monsoon systems, reduced precipitation, and cooler or more variable conditions lasting roughly a century or more (with regional variations and sometimes multiple pulses).

Connection to the Harappan (Indus Valley) Civilization

The Mature (urban) phase of the Harappan Civilization peaked roughly 2600-1900 BCE. The 4.2 ka event falls near the transition toward decline and de- urbanization. Many researchers link the event’s climatic stresses to the transformation of the civilization.

Key evidence includes:

Marine sediment records from the Arabian Sea (e.g., oxygen isotope data from foraminifera near the Indus delta) show a prominent reduction in Indus River discharge around 4.2 ka BP, interpreted as decreased monsoon rainfall and runoff.

Speleothem (cave stalagmite) records, such as those from Mawmluh Cave (northeastern India) and Dharamjali Cave (Himalaya), document multi- decadal to centennial- scale dry periods between roughly 4.2 and 3.9 ka BP. Some high- resolution records reveal repeated droughts affecting both the Indian Summer Monsoon (ISM) and winter rainfall (westerly disturbances).

Paleohydrological and settlement data indicate progressive aridification of the Indus and Ghaggar- Hakra (Saraswati) systems. The latter was largely rain-fed and became less reliable, reducing the floods that supported inundation agriculture.

Consequences for Harappan society:

Major urban centers such as Mohenjo- daro and Harappa were largely abandoned or greatly reduced in size.
Populations shifted southeastward/eastward toward regions with more reliable rainfall (including parts of the Ganges-Yamuna interfluve).
The highly uniform urban culture gave way to more localized, rural Late Harappan settlements.
Long- distance trade networks weakened.

The decline was gradual rather than a sudden collapse. Urban life contracted over centuries, with evidence of adaptation (changes in crops, settlement patterns, and resource strategies) before full de- urbanization.

Some studies describe a “double drought” pattern: an earlier reduction in winter rainfall (linked more directly to the classic 4.2 ka signal, ~4.26- 3.97 ka) followed by a longer weakening of summer monsoon rains.

Broader Context and Caveats

The same event is widely associated with stresses on other Bronze Age societies, including the collapse of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia and the end of Egypt’s Old Kingdom.

For the Harappans, climate was a major contributing factor, especially reduced water availability for agriculture and urban systems, but not necessarily the sole cause.

Other elements (trade disruptions with Mesopotamia, internal social or economic shifts, and possible river-course changes) likely interacted with the climatic stresses.

Recent research emphasizes that the 4.2 ka interval involved repeated multi- decadal dry spells rather than one continuous megadrought lasting exactly 200 years.

Societies dependent on monsoon- driven rivers and flood agriculture were particularly vulnerable. Overall, the event is considered a key trigger or amplifier in the transition from the sophisticated urban Mature Harappan phase to the more dispersed Late Harappan cultures.

The Vatican’s Green Gospel

Under Pope Francis and now Leo the Catholic Church has drunk deeply of the climate Kool-Aid, says Professor Roger Watson. It’s about time it quit the pseudo-scientific scaremongering and got back to saving souls.

An illustrated depiction of a religious leader presenting the 'Green Gospel' in a church setting, surrounded by concerned clergy members. Visual elements include climate action plans, targets for carbon reduction, and references to environmental issues, emphasizing the connection between faith and environmental stewardship.

From The Daily Sceptic

By Dr Roger Watson

How the Roman Catholic Church moved from its great commission to save souls to its current obsession with saving the planet is not clear. But it is obvious that the hierarchy of the Church has drunk deeply of the climate change Kool-Aid and, and while it would be unfair to say that it has abandoned saving souls, its mission has certainly drifted considerably into an area which is not exactly within its area of expertise. Wherever it is getting its advice on climate change from, it is most definitely listening to the wrong people.

The problem, as some Catholics see it, is demonstrated amply in a column in the September issue of Middlesbrough Diocesan Catholic Voice – known locally as the Voice – which is distributed to and through parish churches in the Middlesbrough Catholic Diocese. It is always with trepidation that I take a copy from the pile at the back after Sunday Mass.

The Voice, while it contains useful diocesan information, dates of events and news from the parishes, almost always has at least one article which, for me, is an ‘occasion of sin’ as to read it conjures up thoughts which are far from Christian. My only justification being that this is engendered by reading content that is far from Christian. Inevitably, if we do not have a report on the oxymoronic concept of the Diocesan LGBT Masses it will be an article on the so-called climate emergency.

Blessed are the carbon conscious

The September issue of Middlesbrough Diocesan Catholic Voice contains an article by Sir John Battle, former Labour MP for Leeds West and a minister in the Blair government titled ‘Stop taking a climate change gamble’. A Roman Catholic and made a Knight Commander of the Order of St Gregory by Pope Benedict XVI – who clearly didn’t get everything right – Sir John hinges his argument on the gambling industry and the obvious love of gambling among the British people.

The first quarter of the article, on the popularity of gambling and its possibility of easy returns for one’s money, is rather tenuously linked to the gamble that we are taking over climate change. This expectation of quick profit is blotting out people’s minds to the realities of what we can do to mitigate the damage of global warming.

The customary superlatives are used to support his argument. Thus “wildfires rage” across Europe and “devastating floods” hit Bangladesh. Never mind that the fires in Europe were almost certainly deliberately caused by arsonists and that there have been floods in Bangladesh for as long as anyone can remember. Add to that the news that, far from melting, the polar caps are increasing in size, the polar bears and penguins are thriving and coral reefs are growing. The facts must not stand in the way of a good argument. After all, there is a “scientific consensus” on the issue and “daily news reports of worldwide extreme climatic events”. So, it must be true.

Sins of emission

Sir John explains that the much bandied Net Zero mantra “does not mean producing zero emissions but rather taking action to reduce emissions as much as possible”. If so, then why call it ‘Net Zero’ and why does the UK have a target of Net Zero by 2050? According to the University of Oxford’s Net Zero Centre, Net Zero means “balancing the greenhouse gases put into the air with an equal amount taken back out”. That is a subtlety I have never heard any of the zero carbon fanatics explain on BBC Radio 4 Today programme.

Sir John refers to the “merchants of doubt”, pointing the finger at Big Carbon (not Sir John’s description) who have “financial interests” in not reducing our use of hydrocarbon sources. This leads people to doubt anything untoward will happen to them because of climate change due to the gambling mentality referred to in the initial paragraphs of his article. These “powerful vested interests” – spoken like a true socialist Sir John – then try to shift the blame on to consumers and society. But the consumers in turn think ‘why bother?’ when places like China and America carry on emitting greenhouse gases like there is no tomorrow.

Having seemingly criticised Big Carbon and such vested interests in trying to offload their responsibilities for the planet onto the little people, Sir John then quotes arch climate catastrophist Gabriel Winslow-Yost, who reckons climate change to be a “crime” and that we are all “implicated”. Winslow-Yost, clearly a lover of dramatic prose, says, “car rides and plane trips, coffees and burgers, heating and cooling and clothing are paid for in blood, contributing every moment to the suffering and destruction global warming brings”. My goodness, but he sounds like he’d be a regular hoot on a night out, doesn’t he?

The catechism of climate change

As if to give his article some theological clout he quotes Pope Leo who “insists” that climate change is “a scientific reality and a moral responsibility”. I think you’ll find, Pope Leo, that you are wrong on both counts there. Laudato Si’, the late Pope Francis’s execrable encyclical letter, is quoted twice, including his ridiculous exhortation to “ecological conversion”. We Catholics had all hoped for better from Pope Leo, but he seems to have fallen for the climate change catastrophe agenda as much as anyone, referring to concepts such as “environmental justice” and how it is part of the Church’s mission to “promote human dignity, peace and care for creation”.

It is hard to know what lies behind all this nonsense being spouted by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and by senior Catholics who should know better. Are they – as I fear they might be – genuine believers in the climate change catastrophe? Perhaps they are trying to be ‘relevant’ and ‘relatable’ by addressing topical concerns in a vain attempt to fill the pews. If so, why would that work? If people want to hear scientific social justice based gobbledygook, there is always the Anglican Church, the BBC or the Guardian.

The Catholic Church rightly encourages Christians to be good stewards of creation, but has that stewardship begun to eclipse salvation? Reducing carbon emissions seems to be a greater priority than reducing sin. The Church’s unique mission is to proclaim the Gospel, administer the sacraments and prepare souls for eternity. If it chooses to become just another voice in the chorus of climate activism, it should not be surprised if people conclude that it has become more interested in saving the planet than in saving the souls of the people who inhabit it.

Professor Roger Watson is a retired academic, editor and writer. He writes regularly for a range of conservative journals including the Salisbury Review, the European Conservative and the New Conservative. He has travelled and worked extensively in the Far East and the Middle East. His Substack can be found here.

Ancient 400-Mile Volcano Chain Buried Beneath China Reveals Secrets of Supercontinent Rodinia

A real scientific discovery of a ~700 km (about 400- mile) long fossilized Tonian- age magmatic (volcanic) arc belt buried beneath the Sichuan Basin in the Yangtze Block of South China, dating to roughly 820- 770 million years ago.

Rodinia was a Neoproterozoic supercontinent that existed roughly between 1.3- 0.75 billion years ago. It is the best- documented Precambrian supercontinent and played a central role in Earth’s tectonic, climatic, and biological evolution during the late Precambrian.

Illustration depicting the ancient 400-mile volcano chain buried beneath southern China, revealing sections of the supercontinent Rodinia. — AI generated by Grok

Researchers from PetroChina and Nanjing University (and colleagues) combined:

Aeromagnetic surveys that revealed a NE- SW -trending positive magnetic anomaly belt (~700 km long and ~50 km wide), indicating iron- rich/(ultra)mafic rocks in the lower crust.
Seven deep boreholes (3.6- 6.5 km deep) that recovered Tonian (ca. 820- 770 Ma) rhyolites/granites of magmatic-arc affinity, overlain by Ediacaran sediments.
Geochronology, geochemistry, and seismic data confirming juvenile arc- related magmatism.

This places the belt well inland (at least 400- 900 km from the northwestern margin of the Yangtze Block), extending previously known circum-Yangtze Tonian arc systems (such as the Panxi- Hannan arc) into the continental interior. The preferred explanation is flat- slab subduction, in which an oceanic plate slides nearly horizontally far inland before steepening, producing magmatism far from the trench, analogous to processes observed in the modern Andes and inferred for other ancient systems.

The rocks formed during the Tonian period of the Neoproterozoic, around the time of the assembly and breakup of the supercontinent Rodinia. The structures have been dormant and buried under later sedimentary cover for hundreds of millions of years.

Broader implications

It expands understanding of Neoproterozoic tectonics and continental- arc systems in South China.
Large volcanic arcs can influence the global carbon cycle (via CO₂ release during eruptions and later drawdown through weathering), so this system is relevant to debates about Neoproterozoic climate, including possible contributions to “Snowball Earth” conditions, though the paper itself focuses primarily on the tectonic/magmatic evidence rather than claiming it rewrites climate history single-handedly.
It demonstrates how deep drilling and modern geophysics can reveal “hidden” ancient crustal architecture in stable basins that are otherwise inaccessible.

This Phys.org piece is a straightforward, accurate report of the peer- reviewed study (unlike some more sensational popular- science articles).

Geological Context of Rodinia

Rodinia was a Neoproterozoic supercontinent that existed roughly between 1.3- 0.75 billion years ago. It is the best- documented Precambrian supercontinent and played a central role in Earth’s tectonic, climatic, and biological evolution during the late Precambrian.

Timeline

Phase	Approximate Age	Key Events
Assembly	1300- 900 Ma	Global mountain- building (Grenville- age orogenies). Continents accreted mainly around Laurentia (proto- North America).
Stable existence	~900- 825 Ma	Supercontinent largely intact for ~150 million years.
Early rifting / breakup initiation	825- 750 Ma	Mantle superplume activity, widespread rifting, and bimodal magmatism. Major pulses at ~825 Ma, ~780 Ma, and ~750 Ma.
Main breakup	750- 600 Ma	Continents dispersed diachronously. Opening of the proto-Pacific and other oceans.
Aftermath	~630- 530 Ma	Fragments reassembled into the short- lived Pannotia / greater Gondwana.

Configuration

Most reconstructions place Laurentia at the center of Rodinia. Other major blocks (Baltica, Amazonia, Australia, East Antarctica, India, Siberia, Congo, Kalahari, South China, etc.) were arranged around it. Exact positions remain debated, especially for South China:

Older “Missing Link” models placed South China between Laurentia and Australia.
Many recent models favor a peripheral (external) position, often near Australia- India- East Antarctica.

Tectonic & Geodynamic Significance

Rodinia’s assembly involved long- lived accretionary orogens that eventually collided (Grenville, Sveconorwegian, etc.).
Its breakup is widely linked to a mantle superplume (or superswell) that developed beneath the supercontinent due to thermal insulation and slab avalanches. This triggered large igneous provinces, rifting, and eventually continental separation.
The breakup created vast new passive margins and ocean basins, dramatically altering global geography.

Climatic & Biological Context

The breakup of Rodinia coincided with (and likely helped trigger) extreme climate events:

The Cryogenian “Snowball Earth” glaciations (Sturtian ~720- 660 Ma and Marinoan ~650- 635 Ma).
Dramatic changes in the carbon cycle, ocean chemistry, and the eventual rise of complex multicellular life in the Ediacaran and Cambrian.

Link to the Sichuan Basin Discovery

The ~700 km fossilized magmatic arc (820- 770 Ma) under China’s Sichuan Basin formed during the early breakup phase of Rodinia. It records subduction (likely flat- slab) along or near the margin of the Yangtze Block while the supercontinent was beginning to rift apart. This makes the discovery a direct window into the tectonic processes operating at the edges of Rodinia ~800 million years ago.

In short, Rodinia represents a pivotal chapter in Earth’s history, the last major supercontinent before the modern plate- tectonic regime fully matured and complex life exploded onto the scene.

A ∼700-km-Long Fossil Tonian Magmatic Arc Belt Hidden Within the Yangtze Block’s Interior, South China

Scientists have identified a ~700 km (about 400- mile) long fossilized magmatic arc (a chain of ancient volcanoes) buried deep beneath the Sichuan Basin in the interior of the Yangtze Block, South China.

It dates to the Tonian period of the Neoproterozoic era, specifically ca. 820- 770 million years ago.
The arc is marked by an iron- rich strip of rock detected through aeromagnetic surveys.
Confirmation came from seven deep boreholes (3.6- 6.5 km deep) that recovered rhyolites and granites of clear magmatic -arc chemical affinity.
The belt stretches inland at least 400- 900 km from the northwestern edge of the Yangtze Block, much farther inland than typical volcanic arcs.

The researchers attribute the unusually inland position to flat- slab subduction. In this process, an oceanic plate slides nearly horizontally beneath the continent for a long distance before sinking more steeply into the mantle. This can create magmatism far from the continental margin.

The new arc is interpreted as an inland extension of the known Panxi- Hannan arc system and is linked to southeastward oceanic subduction during the assembly and breakup of the supercontinent Rodinia.

Abstract and Core Findings

Fossil magmatic arcs are important records of juvenile magmatism, crustal growth, and differentiation. Some ancient arcs, however, lie buried in continental interiors under thick sedimentary cover, making them hard to detect.

This study uses a combination of:

Seven deep boreholes (∼3,600- 6,500 m deep) that reached the basement of the Sichuan Basin
Geochronology
Geochemistry
Aeromagnetic data
3D seismic reflection profiles

Key results:

Widespread Tonian (ca. 820- 770 Ma) rhyolites and granites occur beneath the central Sichuan Basin, directly overlain by Ediacaran sediments.
Aeromagnetic surveys reveal a NE- SW- trending ∼700- km- long positive magnetic anomaly belt (PMAB) across the central basin. This indicates the presence of (ultra-) mafic rocks in the lower crust.
The felsic rocks recovered from boreholes within the PMAB show geochemical signatures consistent with derivation from a juvenile arc basaltic source.

The authors interpret the PMAB as recording the input of mantle- derived melts and their subsequent differentiation into granitic magmas. This represents a Tonian arc magmatic front that once existed in the interior of the Yangtze Block.

Tectonic Implications

The discovery extends the known circum-Yangtze Tonian continental arc system (including the Panxi-Hannan arc) far into the Yangtze Block’s interior.
The arc reaches at least 400- 900 km landward from the northwestern margin of the Yangtze Block.
The preferred explanation is flat- slab subduction, which allows magmatism to occur unusually far inland.

Significance

This is one of the best- documented examples of a long, inland fossil magmatic arc of Tonian age. It improves our understanding of the tectonic- magmatic evolution of South China during the breakup of the supercontinent Rodinia and shows how deep drilling and modern geophysics can reveal previously hidden crustal architecture.

Title: A ∼700‐km‐Long Fossil Tonian Magmatic Arc Belt Hidden Within the Yangtze Block’s Interior, South China

Published: Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth (2025)

DOI: 10.1029/2024JB030825

Authors: Zhidong Gu, Junyong Li, Xiaolei Wang, Ya Xu, Xiufen Zhai et al.

Abstract

Fossil magmatic arcs preserve important archives of juvenile magmatism, crustal growth and differentiation, thereby aiding in our understanding of continental evolutionary histories. However, some ancient arcs are situated in continental interiors, where they are buried beneath thick cover sequences, making their identification challenging. Here, we present a data set of deep boreholes, geochronology, geochemistry and geophysics to investigate the basement properties and evolution of the Sichuan Basin in the Yangtze Block, South China. These results provide evidence for a large Tonian magmatic arc belt hidden within the Yangtze Block’s interior. Seven deep boreholes (∼3,600–6,500 m) penetrating into basin basement, together with geochronology and 3D seismic reflection profiles, show extensive Tonian (ca. 820–770 Ma) rhyolite/granites overlain by Ediacaran sediments. Aeromagnetic data delineate a NE-SW-trending, ∼700-km-long positive magnetic anomaly belt (PMAB) across the central basin, indicating the presence of (ultra-) mafic rocks in lower crust. Petrogenetic analyses indicate that the Tonian felsic rocks drilled within PMAB range were likely derived from a juvenile arc basaltic source. Thus, we interpret the PMAB recorded input of mantle-derived melts and their subsequent evolution into granitic magmas, associated with a Tonian arc magmatic front that once occurred in the Yangtze Block’s interior. Our finding broadens the range of the Tonian continental arc system in the region, reaching at least 400–900 km landward from block’s northwestern margin. Such a broad orogenic system played a vital role in continental evolution, element recycling and basin formation of the Yangtze Block.

Britain Teaching Kids They have to Save the World from Climate Change

Britain stands on the brink of a self-inflicted green economic catastrophe. But British kids are being indoctrinated to go harder on climate action.

Back in the real world, renewables and climate policy have done nothing to help British energy security.

There is no legitimate reason for Britain to have a gas shortage – Britain is sitting on top of a lake of recoverable gas.

Britain has also recently made North Sea gas extraction more difficult, to the point it is likely no longer economically viable.

A humorous cartoon depicting a passionate teacher urging students to save the planet while one student questions their math homework. The teacher holds a large globe with 'SAVE THE WORLD!' written on it. The classroom features references to climate change, energy issues, and educational materials.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrall

Britain stands on the brink of a self-inflicted green economic catastrophe. But British kids are being indoctrinated to go harder on climate action.

‘Young people have a responsibility on climate change’

Sophie Parker
Sat 19 September 2026 at 12:05 am AEST

A sixth former says young people have a “responsibility as the new generation” and a “chance to make a real difference” when it comes to climate change.

Jed from Royal Wootton Bassett Academy was one of many students from two Wiltshire schools to share his thoughts at the Sustain Britain Schools Conference 2026.

While Anna, a student at Malmesbury school said it is a “very big worry” and “quite frustrating because it just feels like not enough action is being taken”.

…

The conference was started by Sustain Britain after it realised last year it did not have anybody under 35 attending their usual event.

Jed added: “In the future we are the people that uphold the environment and we may have picked up some bad habits from the people that we’ve got it from”.

…

Malmesbury School geography teacher Sarah Blackburn explained that she would be taking some of what was said in the conference back to her lessons, which already include climate change.

…Read more: https://au.news.yahoo.com/teens-describe-hopes-fears-over-113330185.html

Back in the real world, renewables and climate policy have done nothing to help British energy security.

British Gas boss warns UK at risk of winter fuel shortage ‘with almost no gas in storage’

Athena Stavrou
Thu, 27 August 2026 at 11:37 PM AEST

Britain has “almost no gas in storage in the UK for the coming winter”, the boss of British Gas’s owner has said as the UK risks facing a fuel shortage this winter.

The chief executive of Centrica, Chris O’Shea, said “time is rapidly running out” as winter approaches, in what he called a “huge concern” for energy and national security.

It comes as households across Britain already face skyrocketing bills, as the impact of Donald Trump’s war on Iran continues to hit energy prices.

…Read more: https://nz.news.yahoo.com/british-gas-boss-warns-uk-115554775.html

There is no legitimate reason for Britain to have a gas shortage – Britain is sitting on top of a lake of recoverable gas.

Climate change: Cuadrilla ordered to plug and abandon shale gas fracking wells in Lancashire

Cuadrilla claims England’s shale gas could alleviate the cost of living crisis. Critics say fracked gas would have little impact on energy bills and renewables are the way forward.

Victoria Seabrook
Climate reporter @SeabrookClimate
Thursday 10 February 2022 12:11, UK

Cuadrilla is to plug and abandon two shale gas wells in Lancashire following orders from the government’s industry regulator, it confirmed in a statement.

Cuadrilla’s parent company AJ Lucas said the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) had ordered it to permanently seal the two shale gas wells drilled at the Preston New Road (PNR) Lancashire shale exploration site.

…

Cuadrilla claims shale gas from the North of England has the potential to meet the UK’s energy needs and alleviate the cost of living crisis, as well as create jobs and aid levelling up.

Analysts and green campaigners say because gas is globally traded, meaning it is sold to the highest bidder, it is unlikely to help the UK.

Cuadrilla’s chief executive officer, Francis Egan, said he thought the decision had not “been properly thought through”.

“Leaving our own shale gas in the ground will make reducing global emissions even harder,” he said. “Emissions from importing gas are far higher than those from home-produced shale gas.”

…Read more: https://news.sky.com/story/climate-change-cuadrilla-ordered-to-plug-and-abandon-shale-gas-fracking-wells-in-lancashire-12538040

Britain has also recently made North Sea gas extraction more difficult, to the point it is likely no longer economically viable.

Labour tax raids make US gas cheaper than North Sea supplies

Lack of energy security is flowing through into industry.

Britain ‘faces deindustrialisation’ without relief from high energy prices, survey warns

Make UK says manufacturers’ feedback shows sector at risk of collapse as it calls on Treasury to take action

Phillip Inman
Mon 15 Jun 2026 15.00 AEST

Britain’s industrial sector is at risk of collapse as thousands of companies warn that they could face bankruptcy within the next year because of high energy prices, according to an industry survey.

The manufacturers’ body Make UK said the latest feedback from its members found that many would not be able to cope for much longer with energy costs that were twice the average in continental Europe and four times higher than in the US.

A survey revealed that a quarter of manufacturing companies either planned to move their production overseas or had already done so, while one in 10 companies believed it was likely or very likely they would be insolvent within the next 12 months.

…Read more: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/jun/15/britain-faces-deindustrialisation-relief-energy-prices-survey-make-uk

The market has noticed the British economy is in severe difficulties.

UK pays highest borrowing cost since 1998 at gilt sale

Thirty-year gilts priced at a yield of 5.82%, underscoring pressure on public finances from global bond sell-off

Ian Smith in London
PublishedSEP 8 2026
UpdatedSEP 9 2026, 00:18

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The UK has paid the highest borrowing cost on a sale of its debt in almost three decades, as the global bond sell-off intensifies the pressure on public finances ahead of a crunch Budget. A £4bn sale of 30-year debt on Tuesday was priced at a yield of 5.82 per cent, the UK Debt Management Office said, the highest interest rate on any gilt issuance since the DMO’s creation in 1998. “The success of the transaction, notwithstanding a volatile market environment, provides further demonstration of the ongoing strength and depth of the gilt market and the valuable support from its participants for our financing programme,” said Jessica Pulay, the DMO’s chief executive.

…

The UK’s 10-year borrowing costs, which are the more closely watched indicator, are the highest in the G7 at 5.2 per cent. The DMO has already paid its highest 10-year borrowing cost since 2008 earlier this year, after yields climbed.

…Read more: https://www.ft.com/content/b23151c3-b4c1-4f96-a801-f3507d907cc7?syn-25a6b1a6=1

But these poor kids have not been taught the real reason the British economy is in such a mess. When those kids leave school, they’ll vote for more of the same, and support politicians who want to crack down even harder. They will support more taxes on fossil fuel, and a continuation of the gas fracking moratorium. Because they’ve been taught it’s their job to complete the green revolution their parents are hesitating to progress, by educators who seem more interested in indoctrinating little climate warriors than preparing kids for life in the real world.

Satellites Reveal: Greenland and Antarctica Lost Over 11 Trillion Tons of Ice Since the 1970s — 84% Driven by Speeding Glaciers

Satellites show Earth lost more than 12 trillion tons of ice from Greenland and Antarctica over ~47 years (roughly 1979- 2023), according to a major study published in Scientific Data.

SMB models refer to Surface Mass Balance models (or, more precisely, the surface mass balance components derived from regional climate models).

A digital illustration showing glaciers and icebergs in Greenland and Antarctica, accompanied by text highlighting significant ice loss revealed by satellites since the 1970s. — AI generated by Grok

Satellites show Earth lost more than 12 trillion tons of ice from Greenland and Antarctica over ~47 years (roughly 1979- 2023), according to a major study published in Scientific Data.

Key findings from the international collaboration (led in part by the European Space Agency’s IMBIE initiative, incorporating NASA satellite data for a longer record):

Total ice loss: about 12.5 trillion tons (11.3 trillion metric tons). This is enough to cover the continental United States with ice roughly 5 feet (1.5 meters) deep.

Sea- level contribution: This melt alone raised global sea levels by about 1 inch (≈3.1 cm) since 1979 (on top of other factors). Greenland accounts for a somewhat larger share.

Main driver: ~5/6 (about 84%) of the loss comes from dynamic processes, warmer ocean water undercutting and melting ice sheets from below/sides, accelerating glacier flow into the ocean, rather than surface melting from warmer air.

Acceleration: Ice sheets were relatively stable in the 1970s-1990s; losses ramped up later, especially in the 2010s. A temporary slowdown around 2020- 2023 (partly due to heavy snowfall in East Antarctica offsetting West Antarctic losses) was viewed as short- term variability; the longer- term accelerating trend has resumed.

Methods: Combined data from dozens of independent surveys and 27 satellites (including earlier Landsat archives) for the longest continuous satellite- based mass- balance record of the two ice sheets.

Scientists involved (including Ines Otosaka of Northumbria University and Eric Rignot of UC Irvine) emphasize that the dynamical ice discharge raises concerns about potential tipping points or instability, particularly in parts of Antarctica, with implications for continued sea- level rise and coastal flooding risk even if warming stabilizes. Independent experts noted the multi- method approach increases confidence in the upward trend.

The article is an Associated Press report by Seth Borenstein (dated around mid- to- late September 2026 in various outlets).

This extends earlier satellite records (previously focused more on the 1990s onward) and aligns with the broader observed pattern of accelerating polar ice loss linked to climate change.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

SMB models refer to Surface Mass Balance models (or, more precisely, the surface mass balance components derived from regional climate models).

In the context of the Greenland and Antarctic ice- sheet mass- balance study we discussed:

What is Surface Mass Balance (SMB)?

SMB is the net gain or loss of mass at the surface of an ice sheet. It is calculated as:

$\text{SMB} = \text{snowfall accumulation} – (\text{meltwater runoff} + \text{sublimation} + \text{evaporation} + \text{blowing-snow erosion})$

Positive SMB means the ice sheet is gaining mass at the surface (mainly from snowfall). Negative SMB means net surface loss (mainly from melting and runoff).

Role of SMB models in the study

The paper uses regional climate models (RCMs) to estimate SMB. These models simulate the atmosphere– ice- sheet interactions at relatively high spatial resolution over the polar regions. Common examples used in ice- sheet research include:

MAR (Modèle Atmosphérique Régional)
RACMO (Regional Atmospheric Climate Model)
HIRHAM
Other similar atmospheric models forced by global reanalyses (e.g., ERA5) or climate models

These models provide the time- varying SMB fields that are combined with satellite observations in the input- output method (also called the mass- budget method):

Ice discharge (how much ice flows into the ocean) is measured from satellites (velocity + ice thickness).
SMB is taken from the regional climate models.
Mass balance = SMB − ice discharge (plus any basal melt terms where relevant).

Key finding from the paper related to SMB

Of the total 11,309 ± 565 Gt of ice lost from Greenland and Antarctica (1979- 2023):

84% came from ice dynamical imbalance (accelerated glacier flow and discharge into the ocean, largely driven by warmer ocean water).
16% came from reduced SMB (mainly increased surface melting and runoff, especially in Greenland).

In Greenland, the split was roughly 67% dynamics / 33% SMB. In Antarctica, nearly all the loss was dynamical; SMB changes were smaller or even positive in some periods due to increased snowfall.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Mass balance of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets from the 1970s to 2023

The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are major contributors to global mean sea- level rise and the largest source of uncertainty in future projections. This data descriptor compares and combines 42 independent estimates of ice- sheet mass balance derived from satellite observations of changes in ice flow, volume, and gravitational attraction.

It covers:

Greenland Ice Sheet (GrIS): 1972- 2023
Antarctic Ice Sheet (AIS) and its sectors (West Antarctica/WAIS, East Antarctica/EAIS, Antarctic Peninsula/APIS): 1979- 2023

Regional climate models are used to partition total mass balance into surface mass balance (SMB) and ice dynamical imbalance.

Key result: The ice sheets lost 11,309 ± 565 billion tonnes (Gt) of ice between 1979 and 2023. Glacier dynamical imbalance drove 84% of the loss; reduced surface mass balance accounted for the remaining 16%. The dataset supports tracking ice-sheet contributions to sea- level rise and constraining future projections.

Main quantitative findings

Combined (1979- 2023): 11,309 ± 565 Gt lost → 31.4 ± 1.6 mm global sea- level rise.
Antarctica (1979- 2023): 4,780 ± 513 Gt lost → 13.3 ± 1.4 mm sea- level rise. Essentially all of Antarctica’s losses were driven by ice dynamics.
Greenland (1972- 2023): 6,215 ± 467 Gt lost (average rate 119 ± 9 Gt yr⁻¹). ~67% from increased ice discharge, ~33% from reduced SMB. Greenland was near balance in the 1970s; losses rose from ~60 Gt yr⁻¹ in the 1980s to much higher rates later (e.g., hundreds of Gt yr⁻¹ in the 2010s). nature.com

Losses accelerated from the 1990s onward. A temporary slowdown in overall loss rates around 2020- 2023 (linked to high snowfall in East Antarctica and milder Greenland summers) is described as short- term variability rather than a change in the long- term trend.

Methods overview

Techniques: Input- output method (ice discharge and SMB models), satellite altimetry (volume change), and satellite gravimetry (mass change from gravity).

Satellites: Data from 27 missions, including early Landsat archives for velocity back to the 1970s.

Standardization: Individual estimates converted to monthly rates of mass change; reconciled into consensus time series with uncertainties. Peripheral glaciers/ice caps are accounted for where relevant.

Only mass changes that contribute to sea level are included (ice- shelf thinning/retreat and grounded ice below sea level are excluded from the sea-level contribution figures).

Data availability

Reconciled mass- balance time series (rates and cumulative anomalies for total mass, SMB, and dynamics, with uncertainties) are freely available at:

https://doi.org/10.5285/128c5e33-5224-4197-82f0-19dcc95b80a0

Code for aggregation is also openly available.

This extends previous IMBIE assessments (which focused more on the post- 1992 period) and provides the longest continuous satellite- based consensus record of the two ice sheets. The paper is open access.

Published: Scientific Data volume 13, Article number: 1301 (2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s41597-026-08088-0

Authors: Lead authors include Inès N. Otosaka, Andrew Shepherd, and a large international team (IMBIE – Ice Sheet Mass Balance Inter-comparison Exercise).

Abstract

The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are major drivers of global mean sea level rise and are predicted to continue to do so in the future. However, they also represent the largest source of uncertainty in projections of future sea level rise making robust estimates of observed ice sheet mass changes critical. Here, we compare and combine 42 independent estimates of ice sheet mass balance derived from satellite observations of temporal changes in ice sheet flow, volume, and gravitational attraction to determine the ice sheet mass balance from 1972 (Greenland) and 1979 (Antarctica) until 2023. We then use regional climate models to partition the total mass balance into contributions associated with surface mass balance and ice dynamical imbalance. The ice sheets lost 11,309 ± 565 billion tonnes of ice between 1979 and 2023, with glacier dynamical imbalance driving 84% of the ice loss and surface mass balance the remainder. This dataset can be used to track the contribution of the ice sheets to sea level rise and constrain projections of future sea level rise.

Drought and Decline: How the 4.2 ka Climate Event Helped End Malta’s Temple Builders

The Megalithic Temples of Malta (and Gozo) form a group of prehistoric monumental stone buildings constructed mainly between roughly 3600 BC and 2500 BC.

The Megalithic Temples of Malta (including sites such as Ġgantija, Ħaġar Qim, Mnajdra, and Tarxien) are widely understood as sacred and ceremonial spaces central to the ritual life of the Neolithic Temple Period society (c. 3600- 2500 BC).

The 4.2 ka event (also called the 4.2-kiloyear event) was a period of significant climatic aridification centered around 4,200 years before present (approximately 2200 BC). It is often described as lasting one to a few centuries (broadly placed between about 4.3 and 3.8 ka), involving prolonged drought conditions in many regions of the Northern Hemisphere, including parts of the Mediterranean.

Arid landscape with cracked earth, scattered rocks, and dry vegetation under a cloudy sky at sunset. — AI generated by Grok

The Megalithic Temples of Malta (and Gozo) form a group of prehistoric monumental stone buildings constructed mainly between roughly 3600 BC and 2500 BC.

Key points align with archaeological consensus:

Dating and age: The main temple-building phases fall within the Temple Period (broadly c. 4100- 2500 BC), with the prominent free- standing structures belonging to the Ġgantija phase (c. 3600- 3000/3200 BC) through the Tarxien phase (c. 3000- 2500 BC). Sites such as Ġgantija (Gozo) and Ħaġar Qim date primarily to the earlier part of this range (around 3600- 3200 BC), making the oldest examples more than 5,500 years old today. They rank among the earliest known free- standing stone buildings in the world.

Comparison to the Egyptian pyramids: The Great Pyramid of Giza and related Giza structures are conventionally dated to around 2600- 2500 BC (e.g., Khufu’s pyramid c. 2580- 2560 BC). The earliest Maltese temples therefore predate them by several centuries to roughly a millennium.

Builders: They were constructed by a local, indigenous Neolithic population of farmers and herders on the Maltese islands (the culture associated with the Temple Period). This society developed the distinctive temple architecture locally after earlier Neolithic settlement of the islands; there is no evidence of direct external origin for the builders or the temple tradition itself. The culture disappeared around 2500 BC.

Several of these sites (including Ġgantija, Ħaġar Qim, Mnajdra, Tarxien, and others) are UNESCO World Heritage Sites, recognized for their architectural sophistication using local limestone, complex multi- apsed plans, and associated ritual/artistic features, all achieved without metal tools.

In short, the Maltese temples are older than the Giza pyramids and represent the work of the islands’ own Neolithic temple- building culture.

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The Megalithic Temples of Malta (including sites such as Ġgantija, Ħaġar Qim, Mnajdra, and Tarxien) are widely understood as sacred and ceremonial spaces central to the ritual life of the Neolithic Temple Period society (c. 3600- 2500 BC).

Archaeologists infer these functions from the buildings’ distinctive architecture (concave façades with forecourts for gatherings, multi- apsed interiors with restricted access, altars, niches, and “oracle holes”), decorations (spirals, plants, animals), and finds (figurines, pottery, tools, and bones). UNESCO and specialist sources describe them as an important ritual focus of a highly organized society.

Religious rituals and ceremonial practices: Altars (some with plant or spiral reliefs), hearths showing burning, libation holes/grooves for liquid offerings, stone bowls, and possible oracle features point to structured rites. Some temples show astronomical alignments (e.g., solstice or seasonal light effects at Ħaġar Qim and Mnajdra), which may have marked calendrical or seasonal ceremonies.

Community gatherings: Large exterior forecourts, benches, and evidence of large- scale activity (including pottery and animal remains) indicate public assembly, processions, and communal events, sometimes interpreted as including feasting.

Fertility- related practices: Numerous “fat lady” (or obese anthropomorphic) figurines and statues, some clearly female with exaggerated features, others more asexual, along with plant motifs, animal reliefs (including suckling animals), and occasional phallic symbols are commonly linked to fertility, abundance, agriculture, and possibly a mother- goddess or regenerative deity concept. Interpretations vary; some scholars emphasize complementary male/female symbolism rather than a single dominant goddess.

Animal sacrifice: Strong evidence includes concentrations of domestic animal bones (sheep,goats, cattle, pigs), sometimes stacked near or inside altars; flint knives found in altar compartments (notably at Tarxien); tethering holes that may have held animals; and carved animal reliefs (bulls, sows, goats, etc.). These point to ritual slaughter, offerings, and associated feasting.

Ancestor worship: This element is more strongly evidenced in the contemporary underground hypogea (e.g., Ħal Saflieni Hypogeum and the Xagħra Circle), which served as collective burial places for thousands of individuals, often with red ochre, personal offerings, and figurines. The above- ground temples themselves generally lack human remains and appear dedicated to the living; however, the broader ritual landscape links “rituals of life” in the temples with “rituals of death” and ancestry in the hypogea. Some interpretations see continuity or parallel practices involving ancestors.

Exact beliefs remain inferred, as there are no written records. Alternative or complementary views exist, such as the temples functioning partly as community “clubhouses” for social display, feasting, and ritual sodalities, or incorporating practical/domestic elements alongside the sacred. The sudden end of the temple- building culture around 2500 BC leaves many details open to ongoing research. Overall, the sacred, ritual, fertility, sacrificial, and communal roles form the core consensus interpretation.

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During the Temple Period (roughly 3600- 2500 BC), the Maltese islands experienced a Mediterranean climate that supported Neolithic farming and herding, but with progressive aridification and significant human-induced environmental change.

These factors interacted and are widely discussed as contributing (alongside social and other stresses) to the eventual end of the temple- building culture.

Climate conditions

The islands had a typically Mediterranean regime of wetter winters and dry summers. Paleoenvironmental evidence (pollen, molluscs, soils, and sediment cores) indicates that conditions were generally moist enough in the earlier phases to sustain woodland, cereals, and livestock. Over the Holocene, however, there was a long- term trend toward greater aridity in the central Mediterranean. Toward the later Temple Period (especially from around the mid- third millennium BC), records show increasing dryness, reduced cereal pollen (notably around 4.3 ka), and signs of drought stress.

The well- known 4.2 ka climate event (a widespread aridification episode centered roughly around 2200 BC) overlaps with or follows the final phases of the Temple culture. Regional proxies indicate declining precipitation that correlates with reduced archaeological activity in Malta. Some evidence suggests a possible temporary drop in population or near- abandonment in the centuries around or after 2500- 2400 BC before Bronze Age reoccupation.

Human impacts on the landscape

The temple builders transformed the environment substantially:

Deforestation began early (around 3800- 3500 BC) for fuel, agricultural clearance, and wooden elements in temple construction (e.g., roof supports). Pollen and charcoal records document major loss of native woodland.

Agriculture and grazing: Dry farming (cereals) and herding of sheeps and goats expanded. This led to soil erosion, exhaustion/fatigue from overcultivation, soil compaction, and inhibited forest regeneration through overgrazing. Rudimentary terracing was used in places, showing some adaptation.

Other effects included localized quarrying for limestone and overall biodiversity decline.

These anthropogenic pressures degraded soils and resources over centuries, reducing the islands’ carrying capacity despite the builders’ demonstrated resilience in earlier phases.

Role in the decline of the Temple culture

The abrupt cessation of temple building and the distinctive Temple Period culture around 2500 BC (transitioning into the Early Bronze Age- Tarxien Cemetery phase) is often linked to a combination of factors. Environmental degradation (exhausted soils, overgrazing, deforestation) combined with climate variability or droughts is frequently cited as contributing to stress on agriculture, food production, and social cohesion.

Studies (including the FRAGSUS project) indicate that climatic drying interacted with, but did not solely dictate, cultural change, the decline appears to have begun earlier in some places, with possible intensifying activity followed by transformation rather than total sudden collapse. Other hypothesized factors include demographic pressure, social or ritual changes, possible disease, or external contacts. The small size and limited resources of the islands made the society particularly vulnerable to combined environmental and climatic stresses.

In summary, the climate was viable for the sophisticated Neolithic society that built the temples for over a millennium, but progressive aridification plus intensive human land use created fragility. Climate impacts (especially later droughts linked to the 4.2 ka event) likely amplified existing environmental problems and played a role- though not necessarily the only one- in the culture’s end.

(Note: Modern climate and weathering- rain, temperature swings, salt, wind- continue to affect the exposed limestone temples today, which is why some sites have protective shelters.)

Map of Malta and its islands, including Gozo and Comino, highlighting various archaeological sites and locations. — Malta’s Neolithic Sites – ALL I NEED IS MY PASSPORT

The 4.2 ka event (also called the 4.2-kiloyear event) was a period of significant climatic aridification centered around 4,200 years before present (approximately 2200 BC). It is often described as lasting one to a few centuries (broadly placed between about 4.3 and 3.8 ka), involving prolonged drought conditions in many regions of the Northern Hemisphere, including parts of the Mediterranean.

Evidence from proxies such as pollen, lake levels, speleothems (cave deposits), sea- surface temperatures, and oxygen isotopes indicates drier conditions, particularly reduced precipitation, in the Mediterranean Basin.

Impacts varied regionally and seasonally (for example, some records suggest drier winters on top of already dry summers), and the event’s exact global coherence and severity remain debated. It has been linked to societal stresses or transitions elsewhere, such as the end of Egypt’s Old Kingdom and disruptions in Mesopotamia, though climate was rarely the sole cause.

Timing relative to the Maltese Temple Period

The Temple Period on Malta and Gozo began around 5.8 ka (roughly 3800 BC) and is conventionally seen as ending around 4.3- 4.2 ka (approximately 2300- 2200 BC). This places the end of the distinctive temple-building culture close to, or slightly overlapping with, the 4.2 ka event.

Key chronological details from archaeological and environmental studies (including radiocarbon modeling and paleoenvironmental cores) include:

Peak temple activity and relatively higher regional rainfall during the later Tarxien phase.

Decline in both precipitation and indicators of human activity beginning around 4.5 ka (centuries before the main phase of the 4.2 ka event).

Possible Thermi Ware phase (≈ 4.4- 4.2 ka) marking a transitional or final stage, sometimes associated with new influences.

Little archaeological evidence of activity on the islands between roughly 4.2 and 4.0 ka, raising the possibility of significant population reduction or near- abandonment, followed by the appearance of distinct Early Bronze Age cultures.

Role in the end of the Temple Period

Researchers have tested whether the 4.2 ka event caused or strongly contributed to the end of Malta’s Temple Period. A detailed study concludes that the event may have played a role, potentially acting as a final stressor (“coup de grâce”) on an already declining society, but that other factors likely played a larger or predominant part.

Supporting points:

Environmental records from Malta (pollen, molluscs, soils) show aridification trends and reduced cereal production aligning with declining activity from around 4.5 ka onward.
Prior human impacts (deforestation, soil erosion/exhaustion, overgrazing) had already stressed the small, resource- limited islands.
Chronological modeling indicates the society was already transforming or in decline before the peak of the 4.2 ka aridity.
Additional hypothesized factors include social changes, possible disease (e.g., plague), demographic pressure, or external contacts.

In short, the 4.2 ka event coincides with the final stages and apparent end of the Temple Period.

It likely intensified existing climatic drying and environmental degradation on the Maltese islands, contributing to reduced agricultural viability and societal stress, but it does not appear to have been a sudden, isolated cause of collapse on a previously stable culture.

The transition reflects the interaction of climate, long- term human landscape modification, and other social or demographic factors on a small and vulnerable archipelago.

Trump’s EPA Ends America’s War on CO2

The reaction from the climate establishment was as predictable as it was shrill. The green rag Guardian announced that Trump’s EPA had stripped itself of regulating ability, gutting the Clean Air Act in “a gift to planet polluters”.

Cartoon illustration depicting a celebration of the end of EPA regulations on carbon dioxide, featuring characters holding signs with various slogans, a cheerful carbon dioxide character breaking free from chains, and symbols of energy sources like wind and solar power in the background.

From Tilak´s Substack

By Tilak Doshi

On Monday in Houston, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lee Zeldin stood alongside Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum at a G20 ministerial meeting on energy abundance and signed what may be the single most consequential act of environmental deregulation in American history. The final rule, formally the “Partial Repeal of the Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units”, eviscerates the Biden administration’s 2024 mandate requiring coal- and gas-fired power plants to capture 90% of their carbon dioxide emissions or shut their doors. A companion proposal goes further still, moving to rescind the EPA’s underlying claim to authority to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants under the Clean Air Act altogether. It is an attempt not merely to repeal a rule but to permanently dismantle the legal scaffolding beneath the entire punitive regulatory edifice inspired by the Church of Climate.

The reaction from the climate establishment was as predictable as it was shrill. The green rag Guardian announced that Trump’s EPA had stripped itself of regulating ability, gutting the Clean Air Act in “a gift to planet polluters”. Environmental groups vowed immediate litigation, and the Clean Air Task Force branded the repeal unlawful. Sceptics will recognise the pattern by now: any retreat from Net Zero orthodoxy is met not with argument but with moral panic dressed up as science.

Undoing a fraudulent finding

To understand why Monday’s action matters so much, one has to trace the regulatory lineage back nearly two decades. In 2007, the US Supreme Court in Massachusetts v EPA ruled that greenhouse gases could, in principle, be treated as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. The Obama EPA seized on that narrow opening in 2009 to issue what became known as the Endangerment Finding, the proposition that greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles endanger public health and welfare. That single administrative finding, resting on computer models rather than observed harm, became the legal mechanism through which the entire American climate-regulatory apparatus was subsequently built: vehicle mileage mandates, methane restrictions on oil and gas wells, and, in 2024, the power-plant carbon-capture rule that is now being repealed.

Zeldin’s EPA had already struck at that foundation earlier this year, when it finalised the rescission of the 2009 Endangerment Finding itself in February, arguing that the agency lacks statutory authority under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions on the basis of an imagined ‘climate crisis’ rather than demonstrable local harm. Power plants, the second-largest source of America’s greenhouse gas emissions after transportation, were always the next logical target. The courts’ “major questions doctrine”, which holds that agencies need clear congressional authorisation before regulating matters of major economic significance, cuts sharply against the sweeping powers the Obama and Biden EPAs assumed for themselves.

Monday’s rule is designed with that doctrine in mind, and the accompanying proposal is engineered so that no future administration can simply reinstate the old regime by regulatory fiat. Given that the entire edifice was erected on shaky legal and scientific foundations to begin with, its removal is wholly justified.

The scale of what is underway should not be understated. The power-plant rule is only one entry in a list of dozens of environmental regulations Zeldin targeted when he announced what his agency called the most consequential day of deregulation in American history back in early 2025: vehicle emissions standards, the ‘good neighbour’ rule governing cross-state pollution, environmental-justice offices and mercury restrictions have all been in his sights. Zeldin has been careful to stress that the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards themselves remain. The green lobby has been happy to blur this distinction in its rush to cast every rollback as an assault on breathable air. The distinction matters. It is a repeal of climate regulation built on a contested finding about global atmospheric effects, not a repeal of the conventional pollution controls for particulates, sulphur dioxide and mercury that the Clean Air Act was originally written to address and that have genuinely cleaned America’s air over half a century.

Line graph showing the decline of various pollutants from 1990 to 2023, including SOx, NOx, Mercury, Particulate Matter, and Ozone, with each pollutant represented by a different colored line. — Source: Based on data collated by Grok from EPA and EIA sources.

CO2: the gas of life, not a pollutant

What the hysteria over Monday’s announcement obscures is an elementary scientific point that carbon dioxide is not a pollutant. It is a trace gas, present in the atmosphere at a small fraction of one percent, and it is essential to photosynthesis, the biochemical process on which virtually all plant, and by extension all life on Earth depends. Dr Will Happer, the Princeton physicist and CO2 Coalition co-founder, has for years called carbon dioxide the gas of life, not as rhetorical flourish but as biochemical fact: plants cannot grow without it. Satellite records show the planet has measurably greened as CO₂ concentrations have risen and crop yields have benefited accordingly.

The Endangerment Finding inverted this reality, transforming a trace gas integral to agricultural productivity into an object of state-sanctioned hostility. It asked Americans to believe that the same molecule enriching greenhouses to boost tomato yields is simultaneously an existential threat requiring the closure of the power plants that keep their lights on. The absurdity was never really about atmospheric physics. It is about political power, specifically the power to reorganise the American economy around the preferences of a green priesthood that has rarely had to answer for the cost of its prescriptions in higher electricity bills, deindustrialisation and diminished energy security. Zeldin’s EPA estimates that eliminating the power-plant carbon rule alone will remove more than $300 billion in compliance costs. That is the agency’s own figure, not an independent audit, and it deserves the same scrutiny any regulatory-impact estimate does. But even a fraction of that sum, redirected from compliance costs to reliable power generation, is a fraction worth having.

It is worth dwelling on the numbers that the climate alarmists prefer not to mention. Atmospheric carbon dioxide has risen from roughly 280 parts per million before the Industrial Revolution to something over 400 parts per million today, an increase that sounds dramatic until one recalls, as CO₂ Coalition scientists routinely point out, that concentrations were several multiples higher for most of the planet’s geological history, when life was in no way endangered by it. The CO₂ Coalition, of which more than 80 scientists and researchers are members, has argued for years that treating a two-hundredths-of-one-percent increase in a trace gas as the central threat to human civilisation inverts the actual risk ledger: energy poverty, not energy abundance, is what shortens lives and stunts economies. That is not a fringe position but reflects elementary plant physiology better than the vilification campaign the Obama and Biden EPAs built their anti-fossil fuels regulatory onslaught upon.

Houston and the energy counter-revolution

That Zeldin chose to make the announcement in Houston, at a G20 ministerial gathering explicitly billed around the theme of energy abundance, was no accident. It is the latest instalment in the broader Trump energy counter-revolution I have chronicled in these pages since the President’s inauguration. Delegations from China, India, Japan and Germany, alongside major oil producers, gathered in the same rooms where Zeldin, with Chris Wright and Doug Burgum, made their case that reliable, affordable energy, not emissions targets set by unelected bureaucrats, should be the organising principle of energy policy.

The announcement landed even as a war-disrupted oil market has pushed fuel prices higher across the country, a reminder that energy abundance and energy security are not abstractions but kitchen-table concerns for ordinary households. Surging electricity demand from data centres, artificial intelligence infrastructure and advanced manufacturing has made the reliability case for coal- and gas-fired baseload power more urgent, not less. This was a point industry groups were quick to make in welcoming Monday’s repeal as protection for grid reliability at precisely the moment America can least afford to lose it.

The Houston meeting’s guest list underscores just how far the old climate consensus has frayed as a diplomatic project. The talks brought together not only China, India, Japan and Germany but also Saudi Arabia, Canada and, notably, Russian officials attending a G20 energy forum for the first time since the invasion of Ukraine. A Venezuelan delegation was also invited amid Washington’s newly expanded stake in that country’s oil reserves. Whatever one makes of the geopolitics, the symbolism is unmistakable: the world’s major economies, energy producers and consumers alike are gathering under an American Presidency that has explicitly reframed the global energy conversation away from emissions targets and toward supply reliability and low cost. It is the same reorientation when Trump first returned to office promising an “energy dominance” agenda that would find enthusiastic support well beyond America’s shores among governments no longer willing to subordinate their energy security to the Brussels and Davos-style globalist climate agenda.

None of this will stop the green ideologues from fighting a rear-guard action in the courts, and it would be naïve to expect otherwise. But the wider context is instructive. Despite the IPCC’s quiet retirement of its most extreme warming RCP8.5 scenario, the climate establishment has refused to acknowledge the collapse of its own modelling premises. Rather than reassess, it doubles down, through litigation, through international bodies, through central-bank mandates dressed up as prudential risk management. Confronted with an EPA that has simply followed the statute and the underlying physics and economics of reliable energy supply, critics reach not for a rebuttal of the science but for the courts and the language of moral urgency.

Expect, too, the familiar coalition of blue-state attorneys general and legacy environmental groups to pursue litigation that has accompanied nearly every Trump-era rollback since the February rescission of the Endangerment Finding itself. Several states announced plans to sue within hours of the announcement. Some of that litigation may well succeed at the margins. The American legal system gives courts ample room to quibble over procedure even when the underlying policy judgment is sound. The argument that a trace atmospheric gas essential to plant life poses imminent danger to human life and justifies the reorganising of the entire American power grid rests more on speculative modelled projections than on measured harm.

A long-overdue correction

What Monday’s action represents, then, is not simply a rollback but a long-overdue correction. It is a recognition, 17 years late, that carbon dioxide was never the pollutant the 2009 Endangerment Finding pretended it to be. An economy built on affordable, reliable fossil-fuelled power is not a problem to be regulated away but the foundation on which American prosperity and the world’s energy security still rest. The gas of life has, for now, won a favourable hearing in Washington. Whether that verdict survives the inevitable litigation by Leftist-Democrat interests is a question for the courts. That it was ever seriously in doubt is a question for historians of the climate industrial complex that demonises as a poison a trace gas essential to life on Earth.

This article was first published in the Daily Sceptic https://dailysceptic.org/2026/09/18/trumps-epa-ends-americas-war-on-co2/

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

If Every Volcano on Earth Erupted at Once, Humanity Wouldn’t Stand a Chance

It would be a near- extinction- level catastrophe for humanity and most complex life, driven primarily by global ash fallout, a severe volcanic winter, acid rain, and collapse of ecosystems and infrastructure, though it is vanishingly unlikely to occur.

A dramatic scene depicting multiple erupting volcanoes with flowing lava and dark stormy skies, surrounded by a smoky atmosphere and a distant city in the foreground. — AI generated by Grok

There are roughly 1,350-1,500 potentially active volcanoes on land worldwide (about 500 have erupted in historical time), concentrated especially along the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, plus many more undersea volcanoes along mid- ocean ridges that are not fully counted. These are driven by localized magma systems, so simultaneous eruption of all of them would require an impossible coincidence of independent processes.

Immediate effects (hours to days)

Explosive eruptions (stratovolcanoes and any supervolcanoes such as Yellowstone) would produce pyroclastic flows, lava bombs, and shock waves that devastate areas near the volcanoes, collapsing buildings, triggering landslides, and generating tsunamis from undersea or coastal activity.

Ash columns would reach the stratosphere in many cases. Ash is dense (roughly five times denser than water in bulk deposits) and would quickly blanket regions, collapsing roofs, clogging engines and filters, contaminating water supplies, and grounding all air travel. Planes already airborne near eruptions would face extreme risk.

Local death tolls near active volcanic zones (parts of Indonesia, Japan, the western Americas, southern Europe, etc.) would be enormous, but these would be dwarfed by later global effects.

Atmospheric and climate impacts (days to years)

Volcanic ash and especially sulfur dioxide (SO₂) injected into the stratosphere would form sulfate aerosols that reflect sunlight.

Even a single large eruption like Tambora in 1815 cooled the Northern Hemisphere by ~0.5°C and caused the “Year Without a Summer”. Scaling to all volcanoes (including multiple VEI 7- 8 events) would produce far thicker global coverage.

Skies would darken dramatically or turn to prolonged twilight/darkness in many regions as ash and aerosols block sunlight.

Global temperatures could drop by several degrees Celsius (estimates for multiple supervolcanoes reach ~15°C temporarily in extreme scenarios), triggering a volcanic winter lasting months to years. Photosynthesis would collapse, killing most plants and crops.

Acid rain from sulfur compounds would poison soils, freshwater, and further destroy remaining vegetation and infrastructure.

Ocean acidification from gases and ash would harm shellfish, corals, and marine food webs.

Agriculture and food systems worldwide would fail rapidly.

Famine, respiratory illness from ash, and infrastructure breakdown (power grids, transport, water treatment) would kill the vast majority of people even far from volcanoes. Experts describe the result as many times worse than a nuclear winter.

Longer- term effects (years to decades and beyond)

Once aerosols settle, the large release of CO₂ could eventually drive significant greenhouse warming, potentially shifting the climate in the opposite direction after the cold phase.

In extreme interpretations involving massive magma outpourings, some speculative accounts raise the possibility of severe long- term heating or even mass imbalances that could slightly alter Earth’s rotation or axial tilt (drawing analogies to ancient events on Mars), though this is far less certain.

Most complex surface and marine life would face mass extinction.

Microbial and extremophile life would likely persist in protected niches.

Human civilization as we know it would end.

Survival of isolated groups in less- affected or underground or other protected locations is theoretically possible but extremely limited by the global environmental collapse.

In short, the planet itself would survive, but the biosphere and human society would be devastated on a scale comparable to or exceeding past mass- extinction events linked to massive volcanism (e.g., flood basalt episodes). Fortunately, volcanoes are independent systems; simultaneous global eruption is not a realistic geological risk.

Claim: Capitalists and their “Intellectual Enablers” are Responsible for the Climate Crisis

“… The role they discharge as climate criminals is quite willful. …”

Can you imagine the kind of horror show world someone like the author John Clarke would build, if he and his friends were in charge?
Actually we don’t have to imagine what such a world would be like – events like China’s Cultural Revolution and Cambodia’s Pol Pot have already demonstrated how badly intellectuals are treated by “just” socialist societies.

A comic-style illustration depicting a heated conversation about climate change. A young activist in a green shirt shouts at a wealthy capitalist in a suit, who sits comfortably with glasses and a drink, surrounded by other intellectuals discussing funding and capitalism. Smoke billows from industrial factories in the background, highlighting environmental concerns. Text elements emphasize themes of capitalism, climate activism, and societal critiques.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrall

“… The role they discharge as climate criminals is quite willful. …”

Climate Change for Capitalists

John Clarke 16 September 2026

Capitalists have long been aware of the consequences of fossil-fuel use, but the profit system requires them to seek to benefit from it, or escape it as individuals, explains John Clarke

The scale and pace of climate breakdown are now well-established realities of life on this planet, as extreme weather and chronic impacts impose themselves on us to an ever-greater degree.

It is equally well understood that fossil-fuel companies and political leaders are doggedly compounding these catastrophic results by doubling down on oil and gas production, resulting in levels of carbon emissions that will make things even worse.

…

Though the ranks of the ruling establishments include crude climate deniers like Donald Trump, it would be wrong to imagine that the major capitalists and their leading functionaries are unaware of the implications of the course that they are on. The role they discharge as climate criminals is quite willful.

…

It would be useful, however, also to consider how the capitalists themselves, along with their political agents and intellectual enablers, view the question of climate change. We have already seen how they work to stifle a clear understanding of the threat that it poses and try to delay meaningful action to address this dire threat. Nonetheless, the harsh and intensifying reality of the issue can only force itself upon them and they are compelled to consider its implications.

…

Working-class people across this planet have no luxury bunkers to escape into and very limited means of mitigating the impacts of climate breakdown, as they intensify to the point of catastrophe. Our survival hinges on our collective struggles against climate-wrecking capitalism and the creation of a just and sustainable socialist society.

Read more: https://www.counterfire.org/article/climate-change-for-capitalists/

Can you imagine the kind of horror show world someone like the author John Clarke would build, if he and his friends were in charge?

If you disagree with extreme climate claims, you’re not someone with legitimate concerns about the quality of the science, you are an “intellectual enabler”, as much of a criminal as people who build businesses which emit CO2 in order to put food, goods and services at our disposal.

Yet John thinks such a world would be “just”.

Actually, we don’t have to imagine what such a world would be like – events like China’s Cultural Revolution and Cambodia’s Pol Pot have already demonstrated how badly intellectuals are treated by “just” socialist societies. Scientists like Ye Qisun, who trained many famous scientists including a Nobel Prize winner, was brutally persecuted by the Communist regime because – who knows why. But Ye got lucky, if you can call such cruelty luck. Many of his fellow scientists were murdered.

I’m glad the climate alarmists lost, because recent history shows us things could have gotten so much worse. I know places like Britain and Europe and Canada it might not feel like they lost, but they’re on the way out. They will never get the kinds of show trials of capitalist criminals and “intellectual enablers” they appear to want – at least, they’ll need to find a new cause to frighten society into acting like barbarians. Too many people have seen through the fake climate crisis.

What is the Best Human-Centric Climatic Baseline?

The IPCC references global mean temperature increases to the 1850-1900 mean (IPCC, 2021, Ch. 2&4), and radiative forcing increases to 1750 (IPCC, 2021, Ch 7), then uses the two numbers to help them model warming since the pre-industrial period. According to Pages 2K the world warmed 0.1 to 0.2°C (see figure 1) between 1750 and 1850-1990 (Pages2K, 2019). AR6 (p 150) estimates a change of 0.1°C (-0.1 to 0.3°C.

Infographic depicting glacier retreat over time in New Zealand, Alaska, and Europe, showing historical and modern glacier extents from around 1750 to the 2020s.

From Andy May Petrophysicist

By Andy May

“This assessed change in temperature before 1850–1900 is not included in the AR6 assessment of global warming to date, to ensure consistency with previous IPCC assessment reports, and because of the lower confidence in the estimate. There was likely a net anthropogenic forcing of 0.0–0.3 W/m² in 1850–1900 relative to 1750 (medium confidence), with radiative forcing from increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations being partially offset by anthropogenic aerosol emissions and land-use change. Net radiative forcing from solar and volcanic activity is estimated to be smaller than ±0.1 W/m².” (IPCC, 2021, p. 150)

The key assumption in this AR6 quote, unsupported in my view, is that natural climatic forcing is negligible, or varies randomly over shorter climatic periods than 100 years.

Evidence for Solar Forcing

There is considerable evidence for natural solar driven climate oscillations longer than 100 years (Stefani et al., 2024) & (Scafetta & Bianchini, 2022). Figure 1 shows the Pages 2K temperature reconstruction (Pages2K, 2019) since 1600AD, this is one of the temperature reconstructions cited and used in AR6 (IPCC, 2021, p. 61).

Line graph showing Pages2K temperature reconstruction and instrumental record from 1600 to 2000, illustrating temperature anomalies in degrees Celsius over time, with annotations for the Little Ice Age and Modern Solar Maximum. — Figure 1. The Pages 2K proxy reconstruction with uncertainty bounds for 1600-2019. The instrumental record is overlain in blue from 1850 to 2017. The Little Ice Age and the Modern Solar Maximum are identified. The blue bracket identifies the period between the AR6 forcing zero (1750) and temperature zero (1850-1900). Anomaly from 1961-1990. Data source: link.

The AR6 “temperature 0” and “radiative forcing 0” are not from the same point in time and both are within, or just after, the Little Ice Age, a period of rapid natural climate change. In this section I will discuss the AR6 assertion that natural solar forcing is negligible.

Problems with tree-ring data

The Pages 2K estimate of the global warming between 1750 and 1850-1900 is possible given the data available, but, as AR6 notes, the data is sparse and of poor quality before 1850. The data is mostly tree-ring data (see figure 4 here), but its accuracy, at least since ~1950 and probably sooner, is affected by increasing CO₂ concentrations and possibly other anthropogenic factors (Briffa et al., 1998b). Since tree-ring records are calibrated in the modern era, increasing CO₂ creates calibration difficulties. Additional CO₂ accelerates tree growth, independently of temperature and precipitation, this is especially true in the colder, dryer regions preferred for tree ring analysis (Briffa et al., 1998b).

Briffa, et al. emphasize that increasing CO₂, whether from anthropogenic or natural sources, using standard tree ring paleotemperature techniques, can:

“… result in systematic overestimation of past temperatures, particularly in regions where the loss of low-frequency temperature sensitivity in tree growth is greatest (eastern Siberia and eastern North America).” (Briffa et al., 1998b).

Is TSI an adequate measure of the Sun’s climatic effect?

Another problem is that AR6 only considers TSI (total solar irradiance) when evaluating solar forcing, when it has been shown that other solar changes influence our climate (Lean J. , 2017), (Lean & Rind, 1998), (Haigh J. , 2011), (Hoyt & Schatten, 1997). According to Judith Lean, Earth’s climate system somehow amplifies changes in solar output, because the effects (Earth’s surface temperature changes) are larger than can be accounted for from the changes in TSI forcing alone. Exactly how this works is not fully understood due to “ambiguous observations, dubious correlations, and lack of plausible mechanisms.” (Lean J. , 2017).

One long-term TSI reconstruction is from Steinhilber et al. The data I used for figure 2 is from Steinhilber et al. 2012, but also see Steinhilber et al. 2009. AR6 does not directly use Steinhilber’s reconstructions, they use SATIRE-T and NRLTSI2, but Steinhilber’s reconstruction is similar. I prefer Steinhilber’s cosmogenic isotope reconstruction because it shows more detail in periods of low solar activity. The problem with SATIRE-T and NRLTSI2 is that they rely too much on sunspots and zero sunspots does not equate to zero solar activity.

Graph displaying Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) anomalies from 1600 to 1977, showing fluctuations related to the Little Ice Age and the Modern Solar Maximum, with shaded regions indicating uncertainty. — Figure 2. The Steinhilber et al. TSI reconstruction with uncertainty shading. Data source (Steinhilber et al., 2012).

AR6 does not use Steinhilber’s reconstruction because they require annual resolution and Steinhilber’s reconstruction only produces 22-year averages. The sunspot-based magnetic flux models used in AR6 correlate better with modern satellite TSI measurements, but unfortunately due to problems with the satellite datasets, the correlations are ambiguous and open to interpretation, as discussed in more detail here (see especially figure 5 in the linked post). Some sunspot-based reconstructions show up to 5 W/m² difference between 1700 and the present day. The satellite record of total solar irradiance is short and fraught with problems (see especially figure 7 in the linked post).

AR6 explicitly ignores:

Solar magnetic field strength doubled from the beginning of the Modern Solar Maximum around 1930 to the peak of solar cycle 19 (~1958), the strongest solar cycle in recorded history. The solar magnetic field then leveled off until about 1990, followed by a slow gradual decline (Lockwood, 2003).
Solar wind became more geoeffective (efficiency of transferring energy into Earth’s magnetic field) during the Modern Solar Maximum. This led to enhanced coupling with Earth’s magnetosphere.
The Heliosphere has become better at reducing cosmic ray flux.
Solar UV variability is much more variable than TSI.
Stratospheric ozone shows a 1-3% increase at solar maximum.
The Modern Solar Maximum (~1930–2000) is the longest in over 600 years.

As Joanna Haigh writes:

“Understanding the role of variability in solar activity is essential for the interpretation of past climate and prediction of the future. In the past, although much had been written on relationships between sunspot numbers and the weather, the topic of solar influences on climate was often disregarded by meteorologists.” (Haigh J. , 2011).

As an example, the temperature changes in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere (~20 km) are three times higher than at the surface. The main point that Joanna Haigh and Judith Lean make is that the IPCC is oversimplifying the impact of solar variability on climate by only considering TSI. AR6’s estimate of solar forcing is not a measure of the total solar influence on the climate, as Judith Lean writes:

“Because solar radiation impinges primarily at low latitudes, the increased radiant energy alters equator-to-pole thermal gradients, initiating dynamical responses that produce regions of both warming and cooling at mid to high latitudes. Because solar energy deposition depends on altitude as a result of height-dependent atmospheric absorption, changing solar radiation establishes vertical thermal gradients that further alter dynamical motions within the Earth system.” (Lean J. , 2017).

As Christopher Scotese has shown, the equator-to-pole temperature gradient is fundamental to average global surface temperature over geological time (Scotese et al., 2021). A steep gradient means a colder planet and a shallow gradient means a warmer one (see Scotese’s figure 7 for more details).

The Little Ice Age

The deepest and most widespread cold period during the Holocene is roughly 1645-1715AD. After this cold period, glaciers reached their greatest Holocene extent in Europe, Iceland, Alaska and New Zealand. The period contains the historically coldest winters in Europe and North America and follows five consecutive solar grand minima, including the longest solar grand minimum of the past 6,000 years.

There were also numerous large volcanic eruptions during the period, Parker (Philippines, 1641), Serua (Indonesia, 1693), Fuji (Japan, 1707), plus three others that have been identified in sediments and ice with unknown locations. In addition to these, there were probably three other eruptions in the western Pacific in 1654 (Japan), 1673 (Indonesia), and 1674 (Indonesia). The Little Ice Age is identified in figure 3 and compared to high-quality temperature proxies from Indonesia, Greenland, Antarctica, and the logarithm of CO₂ from the Dome C ice record.

Line graph showing Holocene temperature anomalies over time, with data from Dome C, Vinther, Rosenthal, and CO2 levels. Features labeled sections for Holocene Climatic Optimum and Neoglacial periods, plotted against years BCE and CO2 concentration. — Figure 3. Three high-quality temperature proxies for the Holocene are plotted. Rosenthal’s 500-meter Indonesian proxy (black), Vinther’s Greenland ice proxy, and the Antarctic Dome C proxy (blue), along with the logarithm of the Dome C CO₂ proxy in purple. The Little Ice Age, Neoglacial, and Holocene Climatic Optimum periods are identified. Data sources, in the order in the legend: (Jouzel et al., 2007), (Vinther et al., 2009), (Rosenthal et al., 2013), (Bereiter et al., 2015).

The key point of figure 3 is that the Little Ice Age is the coldest period in the entire 12,000-year Holocene Epoch, at least in Greenland, Indonesia, the North Pacific, and in the New Zealand area. It is also cooler in Antarctica, but not as much. For more details on the proxies see here and here. Thus, the AR6 implication that this period (the “pre-industrial”) is somehow preferred to today’s temperature or is some sort of climatic baseline is disingenuous. Further, how can a pre-industrial climatic baseline be composed of a baseline temperature and radiative forcing that are separated by over 100 years and within the climatically unstable Little Ice Age (Parker G. , 2012)?

Antarctic CO₂

Figure 3 also shows that the logarithm of atmospheric CO₂ concentration in Antarctica does not correlate well with temperature in Greenland or Indonesia, although it does visually correlate reasonably well with the Antarctic Dome C ice core temperature proxy. Regional temperatures naturally capture regional amplification effects, but since CO₂ is a well-mixed gas it is supposed to have a global effect. The trends in figure 3 cast considerable doubt on this idea. AR6 relies very heavily on the Dome C CO₂ record (Jouzel et al., 2007) & (Lüthi et al., 2008) for their studies, but it only seems to support a CO₂-temperature correlation for Antarctica, not a global correlation.

The Little Ice Age Glacial Maximum

It was quite cold between 1809 and 1820, at least partly due to the famous Tambora eruption in 1815. But by 1850 the worst of the cold was gone, and the world began to warm. Thus, it is difficult to compare warming from 1850-1900 and radiative forcing since 1750, the climate (or more accurately global mean surface temperature) was quite variable between 1750 and 1900 as shown in figure 1. Table 1 shows glacier losses since the Little Ice Age glacial maximum (~1750) in 1900 and 2020.

Region	Area Remaining in 1900	Area Remaining in 2000–2020	% Loss by 1900	% Loss by 2000–2020
New Zealand (Southern Alps)	~80 %	~45 %	≈ 20 % loss	≈ 55 % loss
Alaska (Glacier Bay region)	~60 %	~25 %	≈ 40 % loss	≈ 75 % loss
Europe (Alps)	~70 %	~35 %	≈ 30 % loss	≈ 65 % loss

Table 1. Glacier loss by region in 1900 and 2020.

I had Microsoft Copilot generate an illustration of the glacier positions in New Zealand, Alaska, and in the European Alps at important times. It is shown in figure 4.

Infographic showing glacier retreat in New Zealand's Southern Alps from c. 1750 to today, highlighting significant changes over time. — Figure 4. Images of the glacier retreats in New Zealand, Alaska, and the European Alps since the Little Ice Age maximum glacier extent around 1750. Source: Microsoft Copilot generated image.

Glacier extent is a very sensitive indicator of climate change, in the sense of average surface temperature change, in the glacier’s region (Bray, 1968) & (Zumbühl & Nussbaumer, 2018). It is well understood from historical records and paleo-glacial-moraine data that the maximum glacier extent in the three regions shown in figure 1 occurred between 1700 and 1800, with a maximum reached around 1750. This is just after the historically coldest part of the Little Ice Age, ~1640-~1715 when one-third of the world’s population died (Parker, 2008) & (Parker G. , 2012). There is a delay between the glacial maximum and the cold that caused it due to the time necessary for the snow to compact, form the glacial ice, and move to its ultimate maximum point.

The data sources for the New Zealand illustrations in figure 4 are the NIWA Climate Database (CliFlo) climate snow and ice records (link), the NIWA Snow and Ice Network (SIN) high-elevation glacier/snow monitoring group (link), and the NIWA Glacier Inventory and terminal position update group (Part of the new Climate Present and Past group: link).

The Alaska data is from the USGS (link and link). More details are available in Connor, et al. (Connor et al., 2009), who write:

“Neoglacial climate and landscape dynamism created difficult but endurable environmental conditions for the Huna Tlingit people living there. Choosing to cope with environmental hardship was perhaps preferable to the more severely deteriorating conditions outside of the Bay as well as conflicts with competing groups. The central portion of the outwash plain persisted until it was overridden by ice moving into Icy Strait between AD 1724—1794. This final ice advance was very abrupt after a prolonged still-stand, evicting the Huna Tlingit from their Glacier Bay homeland.” (Connor et al., 2009)

Thus, the maximum ice advance in southern Alaska was around 1750. Additional sources were the NOAA NSIDC data access portal (link) and NCEI (link).

For the European Alps the data are from WGMS (link, link, and link) and swisstopo (link, link, and link). In 1644 the Mer de Glace reached its maximum extent after swallowing three villages in the mountain valley. The terrified and homeless villagers asked Bishop Jean‑Amédée de Milliet to perform an exorcism ritual at Chamonix, France to halt the advancing ice in 1645. The exorcism’s effect was temporary however, in 1821 the glacier reached a second maximum, which was nearly as far down the mountain as the first in 1644. The glacier’s ultimate retreat finally began in the mid-1850s (Zumbühl & Nussbaumer, 2018).

As we can see in table 2, 20-40% of the loss from that maximum occurred by 1900, the end of the temperature baseline period. Thus, it is hard to relate radiative forcing change, as seen in glacial records, since 1750 to temperature changes in 1850-1900. Another complication is that the last of five consecutive grand solar minima was in 1680 and the beginning of the longest grand solar maxima in 600 years was in about 1930 (Usoskin, 2017).

Summary

From this discussion, it should be clear that the Little Ice Age is not a good climatic baseline from the standpoint of humans or human civilization. It was a time of war, famine, drought, plague, and misery in Europe, North America, the Middle East, Japan, China, and probably elsewhere (Parker G. , 2012). The climate of the Little Ice Age is not a climate any sane person would want to return to. This baseline was chosen by the IPCC out of scientific convenience because it had the best available data and not for any meaningful purpose. It is madness to imply that the “pre-industrial” or the Little Ice Age is an ideal climate.

So, what is the optimal global temperature for humankind? This period must be a time when agriculture was productive, civilizations expanded, ecosystems were stable, extreme cold was rare, and glaciers were not advancing into farmland and villages. Historically, when were these times? Refer to figure 3 and here and we see the best times for humans were the Holocene Climatic Optimum (~8000BC to 4200BC), the Medieval Warm Period (~800AD to 1250AD), and the Modern Warm Period (~1905 to present). These were the times that civilizations grew and prospered. Table 2 lists the average temperature in these periods from all three curves in figure 3. The average shown for the Modern Warm Period is mostly from the Pages2K instrumental data after it was moved to the same reference period used for the proxies.

A table comparing climate data across different warm periods for the reference years 1961-1990 and 1850-1900. The table includes columns for Warm Period, Rosenthal, Vinther, Dome C, and Average values. — Table 2. Warm Period Anomalies for the Holocene Climatic Optimum (HCO), the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), and the Modern Warm Period using a 1961-1990 and a pre-industrial (1850-1900) reference.

The values in table 2 are the change in temperature, during the Holocene Climatic Optimum (HCO), the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), and the Modern Warm Period relative to a 1961-1990 mean (top table) and the “pre-industrial” (1850-1900). In both tables, the Modern Warm Period falls in between the MWP and the HCO.

The values in table 2 are very rough (perhaps ± 0.2° to 0.3°C or so), but directionally correct. The MWP was probably about the same temperature as the late 20^th century, and the HCO was probably warmer than today. This is important because humans and human civilization thrived during these warm periods and suffered during the Little Ice Age or pre-industrial period, see here and here for a discussion and comparison. The best human-centric climate baseline is not the Little Ice Age, it is the climate seen in the HCO, MWP, and today.

Download the bibliography here.

Climate- Science.press

The 4.2 ka Mega-Drought That Brought Down the Harappan Civilization

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Ancient 400-Mile Volcano Chain Buried Beneath China Reveals Secrets of Supercontinent Rodinia

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Climate change: Cuadrilla ordered to plug and abandon shale gas fracking wells in Lancashire

Britain ‘faces deindustrialisation’ without relief from high energy prices, survey warns

UK pays highest borrowing cost since 1998 at gilt sale

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Satellites Reveal: Greenland and Antarctica Lost Over 11 Trillion Tons of Ice Since the 1970s — 84% Driven by Speeding Glaciers

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Drought and Decline: How the 4.2 ka Climate Event Helped End Malta’s Temple Builders

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Trump’s EPA Ends America’s War on CO2

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If Every Volcano on Earth Erupted at Once, Humanity Wouldn’t Stand a Chance

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Claim: Capitalists and their “Intellectual Enablers” are Responsible for the Climate Crisis

Climate Change for Capitalists

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What is the Best Human-Centric Climatic Baseline?

Evidence for Solar Forcing

Is TSI an adequate measure of the Sun’s climatic effect?

The Little Ice Age

The Little Ice Age Glacial Maximum

Summary

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