Fine in Theory: A Rejoinder to Richard Lyon

Lyon had responded to Doshi’s initial review on The Daily Sceptic. Doshi notes Lyon was generous in the exchange, conceding his claim that a $120 barrel is viable if the average is $60 was wrong, withdrawing “not real oil” as interview shorthand, and granting that “the arithmetic is already done” was too strong.

What remains is Lyon’s core: cheap oil is finite, price signals will come too late, so public money must build nuclear early.

Doshi’s reply: “Planning ahead of the market works beautifully in theory. Does it work in practice?”

Satirical illustration contrasting Hubbert peak oil theory with real-world oil projects, permits, protests, and environmental delays.
AI generated by Mata

Lyon had responded to Doshi’s initial review on The Daily Sceptic. Doshi notes Lyon was generous in the exchange, conceding his claim that a $120 barrel is viable if the average is $60 was wrong, withdrawing “not real oil” as interview shorthand, and granting that “the arithmetic is already done” was too strong.

What remains is Lyon’s core: cheap oil is finite, price signals will come too late, so public money must build nuclear early.

Doshi’s reply: “Planning ahead of the market works beautifully in theory. Does it work in practice?”

From Tilak´s Substack

Tilak Doshi

Fine in Theory: A Rejoinder to Richard Lyon

Richard Lyon makes a thoughtful case for preparing early for the end of cheap oil. But every obstacle he names is a government failure, not a market failure – and his remedy is more government.

By Tilak Doshi

Richard Lyon opens his reply to my review of The Energy Trap with the old joke about the senior economist who frowns at a proposal and asks whether something that works in practice also works in theory. It is a good joke, and a generous reply. Lyon concedes that his claim that a $120 barrel is viable if the average is $60 was wrong. He withdraws “not real oil” as interview shorthand. He grants that the book’s line that “the arithmetic is already done” is stronger than he needs. Few authors are so candid in what they are willing to reconsider, a standard that all authors would do well to emulate.

What remains is the heart of Lyon’s case. Cheap oil is running down; the price signal will arrive too late to act on; so governments must start building the replacement now, with public money, as “insurance”. Let me turn his joke around. Planning ahead of the market works beautifully in theory. Does it work in practice?

Physics With Degrees of Freedom

Lyon rests his case on physics. Oil is finite, so once the size of the resource is fixed, the rest is arithmetic. But the arithmetic is only as good as its inputs, and the input that matters most – how much oil will ultimately be recovered – is not a constant of nature. It depends on price, technology and access. A Hubbert curve has degrees of freedom: the assumed ultimate recovery, the shape of the curve, the number of peaks. Change any of them and the date moves, by decades even. Lyon himself concedes that forecasters who counted all oil got their dates wrong.

That uncertainty is where the real decisions are made. When do high prices signal that it is time to invest, and invest in what – deepwater, shale, enhanced recovery, coal conversion, nuclear? If nuclear, which emerging technology – SMRs, molten salt, etc.? These questions fall on those who commit capital: owners betting their own money, or managers with a fiduciary duty to the owners. Being wrong costs them or their shareholders. So they are, rightly, sceptical of anyone who confidently predicts the future from a model and asks them to act on it. Their caution is not myopia. It is the discipline that comes from bearing the cost of error – a discipline no planner faces.

The Far-Sighted Bureaucrat

Lyon’s argument is not new. In the 1980s it was made on behalf of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), whose patient, far-sighted planning was held up against myopic American investors fixated on quarterly results. Chalmers Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982) hailed Japan as the best example of a state-guided market system.

MITI’s actual record of picking winners is less flattering. In the early 1960s it sought to consolidate the car industry and restrict new entrants; Honda rushed into car-making before the door closed. Its Fifth-Generation Computer project, launched in 1982 to leapfrog the world in artificial intelligence, ended as a commercial failure. Beason and Weinstein found that Japanese industrial targeting between 1955 and 1990 flowed disproportionately to slow-growing sectors.

The problem was not that MITI’s officials were stupid. It was Hayek’s knowledge problem: no ministry can gather the dispersed information that prices convey, and no official bears the losses when the bet goes wrong. Lyon concedes the knowledge problem is real, but says his test is physical, not a planner’s preference: does an investment permanently reduce dependence on hydrocarbons? What does “permanently reduce dependence” actually mean in practice, in decisions made by investors in competing and divergent technologies? Yet somebody must apply that test – decide which projects pass, at what cost, how fast and with whose money. That somebody is a ministry. Public money to build reactors “early” is MITI’s far-sightedness with uranium in place of semiconductors.

Where Is the Market Failure?

A case for public money needs a market failure: a reason why private investors systematically misjudge the future. Lyon’s candidate is timing – a nuclear fleet takes 15 years, a price spike takes a month. But the people with the most to gain from anticipating scarcity are the owners of the oil. As Harold Hotelling showed in 1931, an owner who expects prices to rise faster than the rate of interest leaves oil in the ground. Expected scarcity is priced today, in reserves held back, in futures curves and in asset values. Owners of oil reserves are – or have to be — among the most far-sighted investors in the economy.

Nor is the 15 years a law of physics. Lyon himself agrees that regulation, not physics, explains much of the gap between Korea’s $2,200 per kilowatt and Vogtle’s roughly $10,000 or higher cost. When Washington changed the rules, things moved. Under the Department of Energy’s Reactor Pilot Program, set up by executive order in May 2025, four privately built test reactors had reached criticality by early July 2026, one of them about 150 days after its project began. These are small test units, not gigawatt plants, but the lesson stands: the timetable is set by the regulator. Lyon has identified a government failure, and the remedy for government failure is not more government.

We can all agree that nuclear power is among the most promising, energy-dense technologies we have. Agreeing on that does not settle how the investment should be made. Will owners and shareholders, weighing their own money against their own judgement of risk, decide the pace and character of nuclear investment – which designs by which companies, where, how fast? Or will planners, who allegedly know when oil and gas will run out, decide for them? A ministry that gets the date wrong loses nothing. Taxpayers and private investors do.

The Hospital and the Diamond

Lyon defends energy return on energy invested (EROI) through what he calls “biophysical economics”: energy contributes far more to output than its share of costs, just as fuel is a small line in a hospital’s budget, yet the hospital stops without it. But this is just another way stating that energy demand is inelastic and the consumer surplus large. The amount we spend on energy – its share of costs – measures energy at the margin. It does not measure how much we depend on it in toto. The gap between what we would pay for the next glass of water rather than go without water altogether – in other words, the diamond-water paradox again – is what economists call the consumer surplus. For an input with no ready substitute – like certain forms of energy – it is very large. A small cost share and a large dependence are entirely consistent. Mainstream economics has no need of a new school to see that. A large consumer surplus does not make energy the only scarce factor of production, which is what EROI implicitly assumes; an energy theory of value makes no more sense than Marx’s labour theory of value. As EROI falls, the price needed to justify a barrel rises, as Lyon notes. Precisely – and that price is what calls forth new supply, efficiency and substitutes.

Prices Damp, Quantities Adjust

Lyon corrects my use of Samuelson’s Le Chatelier principle, citing Milgrom and Roberts: long-run responses exceed short-run ones. That holds for quantities – long-run demand is more elastic than short-run demand. But it implies the opposite of what he needs. Because quantities adjust more over time, prices need adjust less. A supply shock produces a sharp price spike in the short run, which is then damped as producers and consumers respond over the medium and long term. That is dampening feedback, not a runaway spiral.

The hog cycle rests on farmers forecasting tomorrow’s price from today’s. It was in the hog market that John Muth, introducing rational expectations in 1961, showed that producers forecast far better than that. Oil has deep futures markets, and James Hamilton has said shale’s quick response should make future oil shocks smaller. His ten recessions out of eleven followed largely geopolitical disruptions, and other economists blame much of the damage on the Federal Reserve’s reaction. That is politics and monetary policy, not geology.

New Provinces, Old Policies

Lyon says the 1970s cures worked only once: the North Sea and Alaska are long past their peaks. How much of that is policy? Britain imposes a 78 per cent headline tax rate on North Sea producers, and the government has committed to issue no licences to explore new fields. Alaska’s Arctic coastal plain, which the US Geological Survey thinks may hold 4.25 to 11.8 billion barrels of recoverable oil, was only reopened to leasing in October 2025 in President Trump’s second term focused on “energy dominance”. A province shut by politicians tells us nothing about geology.

Meanwhile new reserves keep appearing. Guyana went from no oil in 2019 to over 900,000 barrels a day in 2026. Brazil’s pre-salt fields, hidden beneath thick salt until seismic imaging improved, now supply 82 per cent of Petrobras’s record output. The Permian Basin, once written off, surpassed its 1973 peak in 2017. Hubbert curves can have second peaks.

Consider, too, how little of the shale resource is being tapped. Shale drillers recover only an estimated 4 to 6 per cent of the oil in place, and the US Department of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory puts recovery from multi-fractured horizontal wells at under 10 per cent, typically nearer five. More than nine barrels in ten stay in the rock. That is roughly where conventional oil once stood. Primary production from a conventional reservoir typically recovers about 10 per cent of the oil in place; water and gas injection lift that to 20–40 per cent, and tertiary methods to 30–60 per cent or more.

Shale has barely begun that journey. Operators are already experimenting with cyclic gas injection – “huff and puff” – and one Eagle Ford lease showed a 35 per cent improvement in recovery over five cycles. Even modest gains on so large a base would add vast volumes. None of this shows up in a Hubbert curve drawn with today’s technology, because tomorrow’s technology is precisely what such curves leave out.

This puts Höök, Hirsch and Aleklett’s study of giant field declines in perspective. Their study covers individual giant fields, not world supply, and their own data show that decline rates diverged after 1985 because new technology revived giant fields in the Middle East and Russia. Their 2009 warning of a mounting supply challenge was followed by world supply rising to some 106 million barrels a day in 2025.

Nor are oil and gas the only hydrocarbons. It is true that oil cannot again be pushed out of power generation; it has already gone. But the world’s proved coal reserves would last well over a century at current output, and America’s recoverable reserves some four centuries. Coal can be liquefied and gasified to make much of what oil and gas now supply. Sasol’s Secunda complex makes up to 150,000 barrels a day of fuel from coal, and China converted some 276 million tons of coal into oil, gas and chemicals in 2024. Whether cheap nuclear heat or coal conversion or something not yet invented may one day make synthetic hydrocarbons competitive for ships, planes and heavy transport nuclear-made fuels wins is precisely the bet that should be made by those who carry its risk. Not planners with no skin in the game.

Hayek’s Cycle Cuts the Other Way

Lyon enlists Hayek’s theory of the business cycle against shale. But artificially cheap credit distorts investment towards long-gestation, capital-intensive projects. This refers to Hayek’s “roundabout” methods of production – whose value is most sensitive to the rate of interest. Shale is the opposite. A well is drilled and producing within months and, because output falls steeply in the first year, as Lyon himself notes, it yields most of its oil within a few years. A conventional field trapped in a reservoir structure is a different animal: years of exploration, appraisal and construction before first oil, then decades of production. Hamilton notes the very long lag between investment and output in deepwater. Interest rates affected conventional oil far more than unconventional oil.

The bankruptcies of 2020 transferred assets to new owners at a loss to creditors; the oil remained “real” despite the haircuts received by the original owners. Lyon now accepts that shale pays at around $65 a barrel. What best fits Hayek’s description of malinvestment? A 15-year, publicly financed reactor programme – the most interest-sensitive investment of all – justified as insurance against a date nobody can name.

Simon’s Master Resource

Lyon notes that 1980, the base year of the Simon Abundance Index, was a peak year for oil prices, and cites Kiel and colleagues, who found Ehrlich would have won most ten-year bets over the past century. Pooley and Tupy, using time prices and excluding war years, found Simon would have won about 70 per cent of the time. By Lyon’s own figures a barrel cost about five and a half hours of American work in 1980 and about two in 2025. If this is an “energy trap”, it is a comfortable one – as I argued some years ago about the brave new world of ample oil.

Julian Simon called energy the master resource, and Lyon says the condition – cheap energy – carries the whole argument. Agreed. Which is why the real threat to cheap energy is policy that makes it dear: punitive North Sea taxes, drilling bans and nuclear licensing that turns five-year projects into fifteen-year ones. Lyon invokes the Cambridge economic historian Sir Tony Wrigley who showed how coal offered England an escape from the limits of an organic economy of wood, muscle and harvest. But that escape was made by private miners, ironmasters and engineers responding to prices, not by a ministry planning a managed descent.

The Finitude

Lyon and I agree that oil is finite in some ultimate sense (taking technology and human ingenuity into account), that nuclear power deserves a far larger role, and that regulation, not physics, stands in its way. We part company on the remedy. His case for planning rests on a timetable that physics does not fix with certainty and on obstacles that governments created. His cure is to hand the same governments (or their appointed experts) the job of choosing the winners. The history of governments or their experts picking winners is a rather slim one, and Japan’s MITI showed how that tends to work in practice.

Lyon closes by hoping that “preparing early” works in theory as well as in practice. The question is who prepares and on whose behalf? If it means anyone apart from those putting their own or their shareholders’ capital at risk, then beware! Clear the regulatory path, let market prices do their work, let untrammelled investors invest — limited by the usual limits of common law like fraud or externalities — and the “energy trap” may prove, like peak oil before it, a date that keeps receding.

Southern Ocean’s Weakened Carbon Pump Helped Fuel Earth’s Hottest Climate in 65 Million Years

Around 50 million years ago, during the Early Eocene Climatic Optimum (roughly 53- 49 million years ago), Earth was in its warmest climate of the past 65 million years (since the dinosaur extinction).

Global temperatures were more than 10°C higher than today, and atmospheric CO₂ reached about 1,600 ppm.

The biological carbon pump is a key natural process in the ocean that transfers carbon from the surface waters (and ultimately the atmosphere) into the deep ocean, where it can remain sequestered for hundreds to thousands of years.

Illustration of a sunlit ocean with marine particles and microscopic organisms beneath a mountainous island, titled “Southern Ocean’s Weakened Carbon Pump Helped Fuel Earth’s Hottest Climate in 65 Million Years.”
AI generated by Grok

Around 50 million years ago, during the Early Eocene Climatic Optimum (roughly 53- 49 million years ago), Earth was in its warmest climate of the past 65 million years (since the dinosaur extinction).

Global temperatures were more than 10°C higher than today, and atmospheric CO₂ reached about 1,600 ppm. Volcanic sources alone do not fully explain the sustained high CO₂; an international team (led by the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry, with key contributions from Université libre de Bruxelles researchers including François Fripiat) identified a major role for the Southern Ocean.

Key Mechanism: Weakened Biological Carbon Pump

The biological carbon pump is the process by which phytoplankton (algae) take up CO₂ in surface waters as they grow. When they die, some of that carbon sinks into the deep ocean, where it can stay sequestered for centuries to millennia, helping keep atmospheric CO₂ lower.

Researchers analyzed nitrogen isotopes (δ¹⁵N) preserved in the organic matter inside fossil shells of foraminifera (tiny single- celled marine organisms) from Ocean Drilling Program sediment cores at four Southern Ocean sites.

These isotopes record how completely phytoplankton used available nutrients (especially nitrate) in surface waters. Higher surface nitrate (less complete utilization) signals a less efficient pump.⁠

At the peak of Eocene warmth, Southern Ocean phytoplankton used roughly 40% less of the available nutrients than in cooler periods before and after.

This made the biological pump less efficient, so less carbon was transferred to the deep ocean and more CO₂ could accumulate in (or be released to) the atmosphere.⁠

Impact on Atmospheric CO₂

Using a numerical ocean- atmosphere model, the team quantified the effect:

  • The 40% reduction in nutrient utilization alone raised CO₂ from ~700 ppm to ~900 ppm.
  • Including warming and seawater-chemistry feedback, levels rose to about 1,100 ppm.
  • This accounts for at least half of the roughly 800 ppm CO₂ increase during the period.⁠

Eocene seawater had lower buffering capacity (due to lower pH and higher calcium ion concentrations) than today’s ocean, so changes in the biological pump had a stronger effect on atmospheric CO₂.

Why the High CO₂ Persisted for Millions of Years

Earth’s natural “thermostat”– chemical weathering of silicate rocks that removes CO₂ from the atmosphere, was less effective.

Before major mountain ranges such as the Alps and Himalayas rose (mainly 50- 30 million years ago), continents were relatively flat and deeply weathered, offering less fresh rock for weathering.

With this slowdown, extra CO₂ released from the ocean could stay in the atmosphere much longer, allowing Southern Ocean processes to influence climate over millions of years (rather than just the millennial scales seen in ice-age cycles).

Broader Context and Implications

This Southern Ocean feedback (warming → reduced biological pump efficiency → more atmospheric CO₂ → further warming) also operated during Pleistocene interglacials. Its appearance under very different boundary conditions (a hot greenhouse world lasting millions of years) points to a robust mechanism.

Researchers are examining whether it played a similar role in other sustained warm periods.⁠

The study was published in Nature Geoscience (2026) under the title “Elevated early Eocene atmospheric CO₂ tied to reduced Southern Ocean biological pump efficiency” (DOI: 10.1038/s41561-026-02142-7).

The team included scientists from ULB, UC Santa Cruz, University of Ferrara, Utrecht University, and several other institutions.

Note on modern relevance: Today’s CO₂ rise is far faster (roughly 10- 100 times) and driven by human fossil- fuel emissions, unlike these slow natural geological processes.

Polar map showing Antarctica, the 30°S and 60°S latitude lines, a green boundary, and four labeled colored markers: 1263A, 690B, 738B/C, and 762C.
Locations of EECO sites investigated in this study on a palaeogeographic reconstruction. Credit: Nature Geoscience (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41561-026-02142-7

The biological carbon pump is a key natural process in the ocean that transfers carbon from the surface waters (and ultimately the atmosphere) into the deep ocean, where it can remain sequestered for hundreds to thousands of years.

How It Works (Step by Step)

  1. Uptake in Surface Waters (Photosynthesis)
    In the sunlit upper ocean (euphotic zone), phytoplankton (microscopic algae) use sunlight to convert dissolved carbon dioxide (CO₂) and nutrients (especially nitrate, phosphate, and iron) into organic matter through photosynthesis.
    Simplified reaction:CO2+H2O+nutrients→lightorganic matter+O2This lowers the concentration of dissolved CO₂ in surface waters, allowing more CO₂ from the atmosphere to dissolve into the ocean.
  2. Transfer Through the Food Web
    Some of the organic carbon is consumed by zooplankton and larger organisms. A portion is respired back to CO₂ in the surface layer, but another portion becomes particulate organic carbon (POC) in the form of dead cells, fecal pellets, and aggregates known as “marine snow.”
  3. Export to the Deep Ocean (Sinking)
    Gravity causes a fraction of this particulate organic carbon to sink out of the surface layer into the deep ocean. This downward flux is the core of the “pump.” Only a small percentage of the carbon fixed by photosynthesis typically reaches the deep sea; most is recycled in the upper ocean.
  4. Remineralization at Depth
    In the deep ocean, bacteria and other microbes break down (remineralize) the sinking organic matter, converting it back into dissolved inorganic carbon (CO₂ and related forms) and releasing the associated nutrients.
    Because deep waters are isolated from the atmosphere for long periods (centuries to millennia, depending on ocean circulation), this carbon remains sequestered until upwelling or deep mixing eventually returns it to the surface.

Soft- Tissue vs. Carbonate Pump

  • The main process described above is often called the soft- tissue pump (organic carbon).
  • There is also a carbonate pump, in which organisms that build calcium carbonate shells (e.g., some foraminifera and coccolithophores) remove alkalinity and can actually counteract some of the CO₂ drawdown, but the soft-tissue pump is the dominant carbon-sequestering mechanism.

Factors That Control Efficiency

The pump’s strength depends on:

  • How completely phytoplankton use available nutrients (nutrient utilization efficiency).
  • The fraction of organic matter that sinks rather than being recycled near the surface (export efficiency).
  • Ocean circulation, temperature, light, and nutrient supply (especially iron in high-nutrient, low- chlorophyll regions like the Southern Ocean).

A more efficient pump draws more CO₂ out of the atmosphere. A weaker pump leaves more CO₂ in surface waters (or allows more deep-ocean CO₂ to escape to the atmosphere), raising atmospheric levels.

Climate Relevance

Over glacial– interglacial cycles and longer timescales, changes in the biological carbon pump, particularly in the Southern Ocean, have significantly influenced atmospheric CO₂ concentrations.

In the Early Eocene Climatic Optimum study discussed previously, reduced nutrient utilization (about 40% lower) in the Southern Ocean weakened the pump and helped elevate atmospheric CO₂ by hundreds of parts per million, amplifying global warmth.

In short, the biological carbon pump acts as a biological “conveyor” that links surface productivity to long- term carbon storage in the deep ocean, playing a central role in regulating Earth’s climate.

_______________________________________________

Elevated early Eocene atmospheric CO2 tied to reduced Southern Ocean biological pump efficiency

This paper investigates why atmospheric CO₂ reached extremely high levels (~1,600 ppm) during the Early Eocene Climatic Optimum (EECO; ~53–49 million years ago), one of the warmest intervals of the past 66 million years. The authors show that a weakening of the Southern Ocean’s biological carbon pump played a major role.

The team measured foraminifera-bound nitrogen isotopes (FB-δ¹⁵N) in fossil shells from four Ocean Drilling Program (ODP) sites:

  • Southern Ocean, high- latitude: Sites 690 and 738
  • Mid- latitude: Sites 1263 (Atlantic) and 762 (Indian Ocean)

Nitrogen isotopes track how completely phytoplankton consumed nitrate (NO₃⁻) in surface waters. Phytoplankton preferentially take up the lighter isotope (¹⁴N), so incomplete nutrient use leaves residual nitrate enriched in ¹⁵N. By comparing the Southern Ocean FB- δ¹⁵N stack with the mid- latitude stack (which approximates the deep-ocean nitrate δ¹⁵N baseline), they calculated changes in the degree of nutrient consumption (Δf).

Key Findings

  • During peak EECO warmth, Southern Ocean phytoplankton used ~40% less of the available nutrients than before or after.
  • This indicates higher surface nitrate concentrations and a less efficient biological carbon pump.
  • Less carbon was sequestered in the deep ocean, allowing more CO₂ to accumulate in (or be released to) the atmosphere.
  • The effect was amplified by the low seawater buffering capacity of the Eocene ocean (lower pH and higher Ca²⁺ concentrations).
  • Modeling shows this change alone can raise CO₂ from ~700 ppm to ~900- 1,100 ppm (accounting for warming and chemistry feedback), explaining at least half of the observed ~800 ppm rise during the EECO.

Supporting evidence includes reduced vertical δ¹³C gradients (indicating weaker global biological pump efficiency), reduced density stratification in the Southern Ocean, and other paleoceanographic indicators of enhanced deep-ocean ventilation.

Broader Implications

The same Southern Ocean feedback (warming → reduced nutrient utilization → weaker biological pump → higher atmospheric CO₂ → further warming) operated during Pleistocene interglacials, but here it is shown to have functioned under very different (much warmer and longer- lasting) conditions.

Low silicate- rock weatherability during the Eocene likely weakened Earth’s long- term CO₂ “thermostat”, allowing the elevated CO₂ to persist for millions of years.

The paper is led by researchers including Simone Moretti and Alfredo Martínez- García (Max Planck Institute for Chemistry), with contributions from François Fripiat (Université libre de Bruxelles) and others.

Journal: Nature Geoscience, Open access

DOI: 10.1038/s41561-026-02142-7

Provided: Université libre de Bruxelles

Published: 06 November 2026

Authors: Simone Moretti,
François Fripiat,
Mathis P. Hain,
Valeria Luciani,
Lucas Lourens,
Paul Borucki,
Lukas Gerber,
Tobias Agterhuis,
Laura Haynes,
Giulia Filippi,
Ralf Schiebel,
Gerald H. Haug,
Daniel M. Sigman &
Alfredo Martínez-García

Abstract

The Early Eocene Climatic Optimum (53 to 49 million years ago) was an interval in Earth’s history when reconstructed temperatures and atmospheric CO2 concentrations were among the highest of the Cenozoic Era (that is, the last 66 million years). The causes of the high CO2 levels remain unclear. CO2 changes over recent ice age cycles appear to be largely controlled by the biologically mediated build-up and release of carbon from the Southern Ocean, a process that might have also played a role earlier in the Cenozoic. Here we test this possibility with foraminifera-bound nitrogen isotope measurements. Our data show higher surface nitrate concentrations in the Southern Ocean, and thus a more inefficient biological sequestration of carbon during peak Early Eocene Climatic Optimum. The associated transfer of CO2 from the deep ocean to the atmosphere would have been amplified by the low seawater buffering capacity of the Eocene, due to the lower pH and high Ca ion concentration. Previously proposed low silicate rock weatherability during the Eocene may have weakened the weathering thermostat, allowing the reconstructed change in biological pump efficiency in the Southern Ocean to explain at least half of the atmospheric CO2 increase observed during the Early Eocene Climatic Optimum.

‘Climate Refugees’ Are on Their Way

It’s extremely easy to get into Britain as an ‘asylum seeker’, says Laurie Wastell. You can pretend to be gay or a political dissident, and soon we can add to that list that you’re a ‘climate refugee’ fleeing the weather.

And yet now Lefty lawyers and climate activists are hoping to pry it open still further to potential billions of so-called “climate refugees”, on the grounds that standards of living and the weather aren’t always brilliant in places like Africa.

It’s potent, ambitious stuff. “The ICJ’s message is clear: climate obligations are not aspirational – they are legal, substantive and enforceable,” explains Climate Law, a Columbia Law School blog.

Humorous cartoon airport arrivals scene welcoming climate refugees, featuring sunglasses-wearing polar bears and penguins with luggage, ice-themed signs, and a cool-weather message.
AI generated by Meta

It’s extremely easy to get into Britain as an ‘asylum seeker’, says Laurie Wastell. You can pretend to be gay or a political dissident, and soon we can add to that list that you’re a ‘climate refugee’ fleeing the weather.

From The Daily Sceptic

By Laurie Wastell

It’s extremely easy to be allowed into Britain as a refugee or ‘asylum seeker’. You can pretend to be gay. You can claim to be a persecuted dissident for being a member of a political party you know next to nothing about. You can commit a sex crime in Britain and then claim you’ll be persecuted because of it if you’re sent back home. Just one in 100 asylum claims are “genuine”, according to a Home Office whistleblower. If British immigration and asylum law were a colander, it would be all holes and no metal.

And yet now Lefty lawyers and climate activists are hoping to pry it open still further to potential billions of so-called “climate refugees”, on the grounds that standards of living and the weather aren’t always brilliant in places like Africa.

Liberal hearts have long bled for plight of the Dark Continent, of course, but the catalyst for this new wave of legal activism is an extraordinary ruling last year by the International Court of Justice, the judicial arm of the climate-zealot United Nations.

In July 2025, its Advisory Opinion on “The Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change” sought to establish an overarching legal framework governing states’ “obligation” around greenhouse gas emissions and their alleged consequences.

It’s potent, ambitious stuff. “The ICJ’s message is clear: climate obligations are not aspirational – they are legal, substantive and enforceable,” explains Climate Law, a Columbia Law School blog. Writing in the Daily Sceptic earlier this year, former UN official and public policy professor Ramesh Thakur starkly warned: “The logic underpinning the advisory opinion prepares the ground for individual liability, speech restrictions and legal intimidation.”

Catnip, then, to Lefties the world over.

Amnesty International last year hailed the opinion as “a landmark moment for climate justice and accountability”, adding that “the ICJ recognised that it is scientifically possible to determine each state’s contribution to the climate crisis”. Because after all, we all know the gold standard of scientific enquiry is when an activist charity agrees with an activist court.

As a result, we are now seeing the fusion of climate activism with pro-migrant activism.

Take the UK-based Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), whose mission is to support migrants to “to have fulfilling lives in the UK”, but earlier this year backed a “three-day climate experience-sharing discussion” in the Tongogara Refugee Camp, Zimbabwe.

The conference seems to have involved gathering together various African subsistence farmers to complain about the weather. Problems expounded on included “excessive heat” (imagine!), “violent rainfall”, “damaged shelters” and “limited income opportunities” along with a lack of household electricity and the roads being poor – or to put it more bluntly, the unfortunate fact that they live in Africa. (The write-up neglects to mention that they’re in Zimbabwe, which less than half a century ago was fertile enough to be known as the ‘breadbasket of Africa’ when it was still Rhodesia, and which has a welter of non-climate related Afro-communist reasons for now being a basket case.)

Having started out lamenting the hardships of maintaining a poultry business or tussling with baboons over garden plants, by Day 3 participants have graduated to discussing such exalted topics as the Paris Agreement, the “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction” and the Rio Convention on Biological Diversity, which no doubt they all have very strong opinions about.

Not surprisingly, the recommendations to emerge from this Refugee Coalition for Climate Action talking shop aligned neatly with typical Lefty do-gooder talking points: more money, more refugee ‘inclusion’ and a Climate Resilience Action Plan are what’s sorely needed.

It’s easy to see how such propaganda efforts are designed to pull on Western heartstrings. Regardless of any of the obvious reasons for Africans’ low living standards, green zealot do-gooders now want to claim that every hungry mouth, scraped knee and overturned oxcart south of Gibraltar is somehow the fault of Westerners and their dastardly carbon emissions.

And now, thanks to the ICJ, a pseudo-legal avenue is emerging for the supposed victims of bad weather to seek recompense for their misfortune by being rehoused in the West. Last month, UK migrant charities including the JCWI, Earth Refuge and Refugee Legal Support published a “UK Toolkit on Climate, Disasters and Protection Claims”, which is “designed to help lawyers identify where climate change and disasters are already relevant to the cases in front of them, and to weave those factors into existing asylum, protection and human rights arguments”.

It seems this weaving will put the Bayeux Tapestry to shame. Earth Refugee Director Yumna Kamel warns practitioners that “the climate dimension [of refugees’ claims] is usually embedded within accounts of persecution and may be missed without deliberate questioning”.

The toolkit thus provides “triage questions on weather patterns” since “clients may not immediately disclose or identify these issues as relevant” and may need a little coaxing to “recognise invisible patterns”.

Everything can be down to the weather if you look closely enough, you see. Refugees out of Sudan, for instance, might be minded to focus on the bloody power struggle between government and paramilitary forces that has displaced an estimated 14 million people since 2023. But have they considered that their woes might really have been caused by one too many Surrey mums doing the school run in a Land Rover?

One question is whether this is legal activism via climate alarmism or really climate activism via the law. “As a practitioner,” Kamel notes, “it is important to remember that the terms ‘climate refugee’ or ‘disaster refugee’ carry no legal weight.” Climate change is not, as yet, a de facto reason a refugee claim must be accepted, even if these types are pushing for it to be, since under the 1951 Refugee Convention a refugee must be subject to persecution which requires human agency. Instead, climate issues are to be used as an additional factor to bolster existing claims.

Nevertheless, the toolkit also hopes to change the legal landscape by encouraging the use of climate attribution ‘science’ to dramatically widen the scope of potential claimants, by arguing that ‘natural disasters’ – not usually within the scope of refugee law – can be caused by humans.

“Where the immediate source of the feared harm is drought, flooding or another physical hazard, but attribution evidence demonstrates that anthropogenic climate change has materially contributed to its likelihood or severity, the rationale for treating that harm as ‘naturally occurring’ may require reconsideration.” The refugee claims thus also represent strategic litigation to develop “climate jurisprudence”, putting us on the path to a bonanza of lawsuits every time there’s a flood, hurricane or drought anywhere in the world, and a vastly inflated candidate pool for global refugees.

Lawyers are not scientists, but they needn’t worry, for no whit of empirical proof or scientific literacy is required for such claims to be made, a fact the activists freely admit. As another climate litigation toolkit from University of New South Wales puts it: “Cases concerning the impacts of climate change and disasters do not require a specialised understanding of climate science.” Earth Refuge et al., for its part, leans heavily on the opinion of the activist lawyers at the ICJ, which it says has “confirmed that climate change is unequivocally caused by human activity” – this apparently means case closed.

Yet while activist toolkits set great store by ‘attribution science’, the reality is that these are pseudo-scientific models which have no predictive value and cannot be falsified. After all, that’s precisely the point of them. “Weather attribution computer models”, writes the Daily Sceptic’s Chris Morrison, “were first designed to create useful press headlines and to stick it to oil and gas companies in the law courts.” It seems the green lawyers are now realising they’re onto a goldmine.

Seismic Imaging Reveals Double Slab Tears at Neo- Tethys Subduction-Collision Transition

Seismic evidence for double slab tears at the Neo- Tethyan subduction, collision transition (published in Nature Geoscience, 4 November 2026).

The Neo- Tethys Ocean (also called Neotethys) opened in the late Paleozoic–early Mesozoic and closed diachronously during the Cenozoic through progressive continental collisions between Gondwana- derived blocks (Africa- Arabia, India, Australia) and Eurasia.

Cross-sectional seismic illustration showing double slab tears at the Zagros–Makran subduction-collision transition beneath southeastern Iran.
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Seismic evidence for double slab tears at the Neo- Tethyan subduction, collision transition (published in Nature Geoscience, 4 November 2026).

An international team led by researchers from the Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (IGGCAS), including Haiqiang Lan, Ling Chen, and colleagues, with collaborators from Iran, France, and elsewhere, used seismic tomography to image two distinct tears in the subducting slab beneath the Zagros- Makran transition zone in southeastern Iran (near the Strait of Hormuz).

Key findings

  • In the Makran subduction zone (east), oceanic lithosphere of the Neo- Tethys continues to subduct continuously to depths of at least ~450 km. It shows a long (~300 km) low-angle segment in the forearc that steepens beneath the volcanic arc.⁠
  • In the Zagros collision zone (west), continental lithosphere of the Arabian Plate reaches only ~300 km depth. A remnant of ancient oceanic slab lies beneath it, separated by a gap of roughly 100 km.⁠

These contrasts indicate two slab tears with different mechanisms:

  1. Nearly horizontal (east- southward) tear and detachment under Zagros: Driven by buoyancy contrast. The denser oceanic portion continues sinking while the more buoyant continental portion resists, tearing along the ocean–continent transition and creating a slab window that separates the shallower continental slab from the deeper oceanic remnant.⁠
  2. Vertical tear near the junction of the Zagros- Makran transition boundary (associated with the Zendan– Minab– Palami fault system) and the Makran trench: Marked by a low- velocity anomaly separating oceanic and continental slabs. It is interpreted as having initiated at the trench- transform junction and propagated southward (~200 km so far), triggered by the continued northward advance of the Zagros collision front that lengthens the transition boundary (rather than classic trench- retreat models). It may have started ~8 Ma.⁠

The coexistence of these two modes offers a rare snapshot of the short- lived early stage of the transition from oceanic subduction to continental collision in the closing Neo- Tethys (part of the Wilson Cycle).

The tears are expected to eventually coalesce, potentially leading to rapid slab rollback. They may also influence regional tectonic deformation and magmatism (e.g., linked to volcanic rocks of varying ages and compositions in the area).

Methods

The team deployed a broadband seismic array (main and auxiliary lines) in the transition zone, recording data from March 2017 to September 2018.

They combined this with regional stations to obtain ~57,000 multi- frequency P- and S- wave travel-time residuals and applied finite- frequency travel- time tomography to build a 3D upper- mantle velocity model.⁠

This work provides direct seismic constraints on deep processes during the subduction- to- collision transition that are often hard to observe.

The evolutionary model (from ~25 Ma to present and a possible future stage) is illustrated in the paper and related press materials.

Four-panel geological diagram showing the evolution of Neo-Tethys slab subduction beneath the Arabian continent from approximately 25 million years ago to the future, including trench migration, tear initiation, slab rollback, and present-day fault locations.
Evolutionary model of double slab tearing during the Neo-Tethyan subduction–collision transition. Credit: Nature Geoscience (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41561-026-02129-4

The Neo- Tethys Ocean (also called Neotethys) opened in the late Paleozoic–early Mesozoic and closed diachronously during the Cenozoic through progressive continental collisions between Gondwana- derived blocks (Africa- Arabia, India, Australia) and Eurasia.

This formed the Alpine- Zagros- Himalayan orogenic belt. Closure was not simultaneous; it progressed from west to east in stages, with remnants of oceanic lithosphere still subducting in places like the Makran today.

Opening and Early Evolution

  • Early Permian (~290- 270 Ma): Rifting of Cimmerian microblocks (parts of present-day Turkey, Iran, Tibet, etc.) from the northern margin of Gondwana initiated the Neo- Tethys as an eastward- opening oceanic embayment between Laurasia (north) and Gondwana (south).⁠
  • Late Permian- Early and Middle Triassic (~260- 240 Ma): Seafloor spreading expanded the ocean. Opening of the Yarlung Zangbo segment (Tibet) is constrained to ~250- 243 Ma.⁠
  • Late Triassic (~230- 200 Ma): Most Cimmerian microblocks collided with the southern Eurasian margin, closing the older Paleo- Tethys. This initiated northward subduction of Neo- Tethys oceanic lithosphere beneath Eurasia (e.g., in the Zagros sector, Late Triassic- Early Jurassic).⁠

Subduction continued through the Jurassic- Cretaceous, producing arcs (e.g., Urumieh- Dokhtar in Iran, Gangdese in Tibet), ophiolite obduction (especially Late Cretaceous), and intra- oceanic arcs in some segments.

Cenozoic Closure Timeline (Diachronous)

Closure involved initial soft collision (continental margins meeting, often with ongoing oceanic subduction nearby), hard collision, slab break-off/tearing, and final marine regression.

Himalayan- Tibetan segment (India- Eurasia):

  • Initial collision: ~65- 59 Ma in the central Himalaya (possibly progressing to 55- 50 Ma westward/eastward).⁠
  • Commonly cited main collision and suturing: ~55- 50 Ma (or ~50- 40 Ma in some records). This closed the eastern Neo- Tethys along the Indus- Yarlung suture.⁠
  • Ongoing post- collisional convergence and deformation continue today.

Southeastern Zagros– Makran transition (focus of the recent seismic study):

  • Southeastern Zagros collision is one of the youngest: younger than ~25 Ma (Miocene), with some estimates of hard collision or major deformation in the last 10- 20 Ma.⁠
  • Oceanic lithosphere continues to subduct under the Makran (to ≥450 km depth).
  • The recent Nature Geoscience study (2026) images double slab tears here as a snapshot of the early subduction- to- collision transition: a near- horizontal tear (detachment under Zagros, linked to buoyancy contrast, within roughly the last 10 Ma) and a vertical tear (initiated ~8 Ma near the Zendan- Minab- Palami transform boundary, propagating southward ~200 km).
  • Marine- continental transition in eastern Zagros foreland is highly diachronous (as young as 8- 1 Ma in places).⁠

Final seaway closure (Tethyan Seaway connecting Indian Ocean to Mediterranean/Paratethys):

  • Stepwise: Partial restriction ~20- 19 Ma; further isolation ~15- 14 Ma or 13.8 Ma; permanent closure of the last marine connections by ~14- 12 Ma (middle-late Miocene), driven by Arabia- Eurasia convergence plus eustatic sea- level changes.⁠
  • Paratethys (isolated remnant) persisted longer and largely dried by the Pliocene (~5 Ma).

Broader Context and Ongoing Processes

  • Closure rates and styles varied: India- Eurasia involved faster, longer convergence (~50- 60 mm/yr post- 50 Ma, with 1,000- 2,000 km of under- thrusting); Arabia- Eurasia was slower (~20- 30 mm/yr) with less penetration (~150 km).⁠
  • Slab tearing, break- off, and rollback are key processes during the transition, influencing magmatism, uplift (e.g., Iranian and Tibetan plateaus), and deformation. The Zagros- Makran area uniquely preserves both oceanic subduction and young continental collision side- by- side.
  • Remnants: The Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and residual Makran subduction are modern leftovers.

Timings remain debated due to diachroneity, differing definitions of “initial collision” (soft vs. hard), and methods (sedimentary records, magmatism, paleomagnetism, tomography).

The 2026 seismic study provides new deep- earth constraints specifically for the young southeastern Iranian transition.

_______________________________________________

Seismic evidence for double slab tears at the Neo- Tethyan subduction–collision transition

The transition from oceanic subduction to continental collision is a critical stage in the Wilson Cycle, but deep processes (especially slab detachment) remain poorly observed. The authors present seismic tomographic images interpreted as evidence for two distinct slab tears beneath southeastern Iran, where the Neo- Tethys Ocean is still closing.

  • In the Makran subduction zone (east), oceanic lithosphere has continuously subducted to ≥450 km depth.
  • In the Zagros collision zone (west), continental lithosphere reaches no deeper than ~300 km, producing east- southward slab tearing and detachment.
  • A second (vertical) tear likely initiated at the junction of the Makran Trench and the transform boundary (Zendan- Minab- Palami fault system) and has propagated southward as the continental plate advances northward.

The coexistence of these two tearing modes provides a rare snapshot of the short- lived early transition from oceanic subduction to continental collision.

Key Figures (from page)

  • Fig. 1: Map of the study area showing major geological units, seismic stations, volcanoes, and plate motions.
  • Fig. 2: Tomographic P- wave velocity model.
  • Fig. 3: 3- D iso- surface plots of the Vp model with topography.
  • Fig. 4: Evolutionary model of the plates in the ocean– continent transition (OCT) zone (stages from ~25 Ma to present and a possible future stage involving fast slab rollback).

Data & Methods Notes

  • Data: Broadband seismic array (deployed ~2017- 2018) and regional stations → ~57,000 multi- frequency P- and S- wave travel- time residuals.
  • Method: Finite- frequency travel- time tomography for 3- D upper- mantle velocity structure.
  • Model availability: Mantle velocity model at https://doi.org/10.12197/2024GA017; travel- time data at https://doi.org/10.12197/2026GA028.
  • Code: Third- party finite- frequency tomography software (available on request from developer Shu- Huei Hung).

The full article is behind a paywall and subscription (Nature Portfolio). Free access is typically available via institutional login or purchase.

Press releases and secondary summaries (e.g., from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Phys.org, EurekAlert) expand on the two tears’ mechanisms (buoyancy- driven near- horizontal tear under Zagros vs. transform-boundary- driven vertical tear), timing estimates (~8 Ma onset for the vertical tear), and implications for regional deformation and magmatism.

Paper: Seismic evidence for double slab tears at the Neo- Tethyan subduction–collision transition

Journal: Nature Geoscience

DOI: 10.1038/s41561-026-02129-4

Provided: Chinese Academy of Sciences

Published: 4 November 2026

Authors: Haiqiang Lan,
Gaoshan Guo,
Ling Chen,
Morteza Talebian,
Lingkai Meng,
Xiaofeng Liang,
Bo Wan,
Yang Chu,
Yaguang Chen,
Sebastien Chevrot,
Jianfeng Yang,
Frederic Mouthereau,
Yifan Gao,
Zimu Wu,
Xu Wang,
Naeim Mousavi &
Jimin Sun

Abstract

The transition from oceanic subduction to continental collision is a key stage in the Wilson Cycle. Yet, key processes governing this transition remain unclear owing to sparse observations of structure at depth. One such process is detachment of the subducting slab, which influences both deformation and magmatism in the overriding plate. Here we present seismic tomographic images that we interpret as evidence for two slab tears beneath southeastern Iran, where the Neo-Tethys Ocean is closing. Specifically, we show that in the Makran subduction zone, the oceanic lithosphere has continuously subducted to depths of at least 450 km, whereas in the Zagros collision zone to the west, the continental lithosphere has subducted no deeper than 300 km, resulting in east–southward slab tearing and detachment. We further identify another slab tear that probably initiated at the junction between the Makran Trench and the transform boundary and has propagated southward as the continental plate advances northward. The coexistence of these two tearing modes provides a rare snapshot of the short-lived early transition from oceanic subduction to continental collision.

UN ‘biodiversity’ summit advances global control over land, money, & resources

Private property rights, free markets, access to resources, and national sovereignty suffered another series of blows at the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity’s 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17).

The Yerevan Pathway retains the push to eliminate, phase out, or reform incentives deemed “harmful to biodiversity,” despite opposition that softened some language. Under the broader UN framework, governments are supposed to reduce such incentives by at least $500 billion annually by 2030.

Satirical cartoon of a UN biodiversity summit promoting global control of land, resources, and funding, with officials surrounded by maps, money, and paperwork.
AI generated by Meta

From CFACT

By Alex Newman

Panel discussion at the UN Biodiversity Conference COP17 in Yerevan, Armenia, with five speakers seated on stage.

YEREVAN, ARMENIA — Private property rights, free markets, access to resources, and national sovereignty suffered another series of blows at the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity’s 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17). In Armenia’s capital, bureaucrats and tax-funded activists advanced an agenda extending far beyond protecting endangered species: expanding international influence over land, financial resources, and economic activity.

The headline outcome was the so-called “Yerevan Pathway,” a response to the first Global Review of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. Expressing “deep concern” that the UN’s 2030 targets are at risk, the agreement calls for accelerating implementation, reforming subsidies deemed harmful to nature, mobilizing additional funding, and aligning national economic decisions with biodiversity objectives.

In practice, the measures represent another step toward subordinating private property, free markets, and national sovereignty to UN-approved priorities.

Americans Join UN Push—Without US Ratification

COP17 President Hambardzum Matevosyan, Armenia’s environment minister, acknowledged the agenda’s sweeping implications. “Our work here in Yerevan can influence how natural resources are used, how goods are produced and consumed, and where public and private financial resources are directed,” he said. Biodiversity policy, he added, “should extend beyond the purview of environment ministries” into finance, agriculture, and economic development.

In an interview with CFACT, Matevosyan celebrated the participation of American officials, NGOs, and financial institutions, despite the United States never ratifying the underlying treaty. “We are pleased to see so many delegates from the United States,” he said.

Indeed, the UN’s controversial “30 by 30” agenda has already made significant inroads in America. In 2021, then-President Joe Biden signed Executive Order 14008, directing federal agencies to develop a strategy to conserve 30 percent of U.S. lands and waters by 2030. California adopted the same target under Democrat Gov. Gavin Newsom, later enshrining it in state law.

While UN biodiversity agreements do not bind America, their objectives can be advanced through domestic legislation, executive actions, and land-use restrictions. President Donald Trump revoked Biden’s order in 2025, but California’s program and other schemes across America continue to advance.

CBD Executive Secretary Astrid Schomaker told CFACT that a small federal delegation attended alongside roughly 70 participants from California. Expressing hope that Washington would eventually join the treaty, she said the UN was engaging with Americans “as much as we can.”

Money, Subsidies, and Central Planning

The Yerevan Pathway retains the push to eliminate, phase out, or reform incentives deemed “harmful to biodiversity,” despite opposition that softened some language. Under the broader UN framework, governments are supposed to reduce such incentives by at least $500 billion annually by 2030.

Critics warn that the definitions could encompass subsidies or incentives affecting conventional agriculture, fertilizer, fossil fuels, and other productive activities. The result would be greater government influence over where capital flows and which industries prosper.

Nearly $2 billion in funding pledges were announced at COP17, largely from governments and publicly funded institutions. But that represents only a fraction of the hundreds of billions the UN says will be required.

Another mechanism is the Cali Fund for Digital Sequence Information, established at COP16. The arrangement seeks financial contributions from companies commercially benefiting from genetic information derived from plants, animals, and other organisms, including applications involving synthetic biology. Those funds would then be distributed through a global slush fund.

Despite the marketing slogans, these arrangements represent an expanding system of global economic planning, with international bureaucracies exercising growing influence over private enterprise, capital allocation, and national budgets.

Indigenous Groups Gain Influence

The summit also advanced the formal role of indigenous organizations within the UN biodiversity apparatus. Under the Sevan Guidelines, a permanent committee will provide indigenous representatives an ongoing role in the process, including a co-chair nominated through an indigenous selection mechanism rather than by a national government.

The UN is also promoting greater reliance on “traditional knowledge”—much of it overtly pagan in nature—in conservation and management of genetic resources.

Religious elements were prominent at the summit. Prayers invoking river deities and forest gods could be heard, while one indigenous participant interviewed by CFACT described his tradition teaching that people originated from the sea.

The institutional implications extend beyond religious practices. Nongovernmental organizations representing indigenous interests are acquiring a more formal role in shaping international biodiversity policy, raising questions about representation, accountability, and national sovereignty.

Expanding Global Oversight

COP17 also strengthened mechanisms for monitoring governments’ progress toward UN biodiversity targets. A new expert group was established to support reporting and review, with the Global Environment Facility asked to finance related work.

The decisions further encourage governments to integrate biodiversity objectives into economic planning at every level, including state, provincial, municipal, and private-sector activities.

Negotiators also advanced work involving synthetic biology, invasive species, wildlife management, and the integration of biodiversity with climate policy through so-called “nature-based solutions.”

Together, these measures expand the international framework for influencing decisions traditionally made by national governments, local communities, and private property owners.

The Bigger Picture

The agenda has been advancing for decades. The UN’s 1976 Vancouver Declaration criticized private landownership as a contributor to wealth concentration and called for stronger public control over land use. Today’s biodiversity initiatives continue raising fundamental questions about who should control land and natural resources.

The immediate target remains conserving 30 percent of the planet’s land and waters by 2030. But the broader ambitions extend into agriculture, industry, finance, and virtually every sector of economic activity.

Not everything went according to plan in Yerevan. Negotiators softened some proposals, while the Cali Fund remains far short of its financial ambitions. Nevertheless, COP17 advanced additional mechanisms for international oversight, financial mobilization, and influence over domestic economic policy.

For Americans, the stakes are especially high. The United States never ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity, yet policies promoted under its auspices continue finding their way into American government programs.

Whether decisions about land, resources, and economic activity remain with free people, property owners, and their elected representatives—or increasingly fall under the influence of unelected international bureaucracies—is a question that cannot be ignored. Defending self-government begins with understanding the threat.

Featured image UN publicity photo

Giant Ancient Canyons, Carved by Sea-Level Swings, Preserved Earth’s Earliest Complex Life

Geologists from the University of Adelaide (led by Dr. Karol Faehnrich), with colleagues from the South Australian Museum, University of California, and Pomona College, found evidence that dramatic sea- level changes carved large submarine canyons in South Australia’s Flinders Ranges during the late Ediacaran Period (~635- 538.8 million years ago).

Illustration of the Ediacaran Canyon System, showing an ancient submarine canyon with rocky walls, microbial seafloor mats, and Ediacaran fossils.
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Geologists from the University of Adelaide (led by Dr. Karol Faehnrich), with colleagues from the South Australian Museum, University of California, and Pomona College, found evidence that dramatic sea- level changes carved large submarine canyons in South Australia’s Flinders Ranges during the late Ediacaran Period (~635- 538.8 million years ago).

These changes helped create the conditions that preserved some of the earliest complex (soft- bodied) life on Earth, the Ediacaran biota.

The study, published in Earth and Planetary Science Letters (DOI: 10.1016/j.epsl.2026.120285), mapped rock formations across the Flinders Ranges, including Nilpena Ediacara National Park. Researchers identified vast, southeast- oriented canyons up to 280 meters (919 feet) deep and more than 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) wide.

These were largely formed by underwater erosion during a significant sea- level fall (with some possible initial subaerial erosion before submergence). As sea levels later rose, the landscape flooded and sediments filled the canyons, depositing the fossil- rich Ediacara Member of the Rawnsley Quartzite.

This process created a “window of exceptional preservation” for delicate impressions of soft- bodied organisms that lived before the Cambrian explosion of animal diversity.

The canyons’ shapes, sediment fills, and comparison to modern submarine canyons support underwater erosion (via powerful flows) over purely river-driven processes, which would have required extreme sea- level drops or land uplift. The canyons generally widen and deepen southeastward.

Faehnrich noted that more than half a billion years ago the South Australian landscape looked very different, with these canyons cutting the continental shelf before rapid flooding enabled the rich fossil deposits.

Co- author Associate Professor Diego Garcia- Bellido emphasized that sea-level rise was key to the right environmental conditions for preserving these soft- bodied fossils.

This builds on the Flinders Ranges’ fame for Ediacaran fossils and clarifies the landscape and depositional history beneath them. The findings were released around November 9, 2026, by the University of Adelaide.

Annotated outcrop showing canyon edge and canyon infill in Bonney Sandstone, Nilpena
Field photographs of the Ediacara Member at Nilpena Ediacara National Park (NENP). Credit: Earth and Planetary Science Letters (2027). DOI: 10.1016/j.epsl.2026.120285

No precise absolute (eustatic) sea- level value, such as meters relative to modern sea level, is reported for the late Ediacaran interval in the Faehnrich et al. study or related public summaries.

Absolute global sea- level reconstructions from ~550- 560 million years ago are inherently uncertain because of limited proxies, tectonic overprints, and basin- specific effects.

What the research does establish is a clear relative sea- level history tied to the formation of the canyons and the Ediacara Member in South Australia’s Flinders Ranges:

  • A significant relative sea- level fall occurred first. This lowered base level enough for large, southeast-oriented canyons (up to ~280 m deep and >6 km wide) to be carved primarily by underwater (submarine) erosion across the continental shelf. Some limited initial subaerial erosion is possible in places before the features were fully submerged. A purely river- driven (fluvial) origin would have required an even larger relative fall or substantial tectonic uplift, which the authors consider less likely based on canyon morphology, sediment fills, and comparisons to modern submarine canyons.
  • This was followed by a relative sea- level rise (transgression and flooding). Seawater inundated the landscape, the canyons were filled with sediment, and the fossil- rich Ediacara Member of the Rawnsley Quartzite was deposited. This created the window of exceptional soft-bodied fossil preservation.

The ~280 m figure refers to the maximum observed depth and relief of the ancient canyons themselves, not the exact magnitude of the eustatic (global) sea-level change. Older studies of the same region have noted comparable scales of incision (hundreds of meters of relief) at the base of or within the Ediacara Member / Rawnsley Quartzite succession.

In short, sea level was fluctuating dramatically on a regional- to- basinal, scale, falling enough to drive major canyon incision, then rising to flood and fill those canyons, during the late Ediacaran (~635- 538.8 Ma, with the key fossil-bearing interval often placed around ~555 Ma by correlation). Global eustatic estimates for this time remain model- dependent and are not quantified in the new paper’s available summaries.

Geological map showing rock units, unconformities, faults, measured sections, fossil localities, and locations including Mount Michael and Mickey Ridge.
Geological map of the fossiliferous area of the Nilpena Ediacara National Park (NENP) with marked excavation sites and fossil localities. Credit: Earth and Planetary Science Letters (2027). DOI: 10.1016/j.epsl.2026.120285

Submarine canyons and sea- level fluctuations in the late Ediacaran: evidence from the Ediacara Member, South Australia

Geologists mapped rock formations in South Australia’s Flinders Ranges (including Nilpena Ediacara National Park). They documented vast, southeast-oriented submarine canyons cut into the continental shelf during the late Ediacaran Period (~635- 538.8 million years ago). These reach depths of up to ~280 m and widths >6 km.

Formation is attributed mainly to underwater (submarine) erosion during a significant sea- level fall, with possible limited initial subaerial erosion in places. Subsequent sea- level rise flooded the canyons; sediments then filled them and deposited the fossil- rich Ediacara Member of the Rawnsley Quartzite. This created favorable conditions for the exceptional preservation of soft- bodied Ediacaran biota (delicate impressions of some of Earth’s earliest complex life).

Canyon morphology, sediment fills (including evidence of powerful underwater flows, rip- up clasts, loading structures, etc.), and comparisons to modern submarine canyons support this interpretation over purely fluvial, river-incised models (which would require extreme relative sea- level falls or major tectonic uplift). Canyon size generally increases southeastward.

The work clarifies the paleo- landscape and depositional setting beneath one of the world’s richest Ediacaran fossil deposits and highlights the role of sea- level fluctuations in creating a “window of exceptional preservation.”⁠

The full text on ScienceDirect is typically behind a paywall/institutional access. Public summaries and the University of Adelaide / phys.org coverage provide the main results and context. Related figures in the press materials show field photos of canyon edges, facies (e.g., CSSB, FLS, ORS), rip- up clasts, and geological maps of Nilpena sites.

If you have access to the full PDF or specific sections (methods, figures, data), I can help analyze or discuss them in more detail.

Title: Submarine canyons and sea- level fluctuations in the late Ediacaran: evidence from the Ediacara Member, South Australia

Annotated outcrop showing wave-rippled sandstone and canyon infill in the Brachina area
Field photographs of the Ediacara Member in the central Flinders Ranges. Credit: Earth and Planetary Science Letters (2027). DOI: 10.1016/j.epsl.2026.120285

Journal: Earth and Planetary Science Letters, (2027)

Date: January 2027

Provided: University of Adelaide

Authors: Karol Faehnrich a, Diego C. García-Bellido ab, Mary L. Droser c, James G. Gehling b, Robert R. Gaines d

aCollege of Sciences, Adelaide University, North Terrace, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia

bEarth & Biological Sciences, South Australian Museum, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia

cDepartment of Earth & Planetary Sciences, University of California at Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA

dGeology Department, Pomona College, Claremont, CA, USA

Abstract

The rise and diversification of metazoans in the late Ediacaran have been linked to global sea-level changes. However, the regional record of these changes remains ambiguous. Here, we investigate the origin of an unconformity at the base of the Ediacara Member in South Australia that hosts one of the most diverse assemblages of the Ediacara Biota. The unconformity is traceable throughout the Flinders Ranges, creating deep southeast-oriented valleys reaching 280 m in depth and more than 6 km in width. The base of their infill is marked by rip-up clast breccias overlain by gravity-flow deposits interbedded with deep-water siltstone. The succession shallows upward and is capped by wave-reworked sediments that are correlative throughout the basin. We propose that this basal unconformity formed through the propagation of shelf-incising submarine canyons, potentially during a global low stand. A significant transgression led to their infill and deposition of the Ediacara Member, allowing preservation of the diverse assemblage of the Ediacara Biota.

Empty Quarter vs. Sahara vs. Sahel: How the World’s Greatest Drylands Compare

Rub’ al Khali (Arabic: ٱلرُّبْع ٱلْخَالِي, meaning “Empty Quarter”) is the world’s largest continuous sand desert (erg or sand sea). It forms the southern third of the Arabian Peninsula and is the largest portion of the broader Arabian Desert.

Comparison graphic showing the Empty Quarter's sand dunes, the Sahara's rocky desert and mountains, and the Sahel's dry savanna trees, titled "Empty Quarter vs. Sahara vs. Sahel."
AI generated by Grok

Rub’ al Khali (Arabic: ٱلرُّبْع ٱلْخَالِي, meaning “Empty Quarter”) is the world’s largest continuous sand desert (erg or sand sea). It forms the southern third of the Arabian Peninsula and is the largest portion of the broader Arabian Desert.

Key Facts

  • Area: Approximately 650,000 km² (250,000 sq mi), roughly the size of France or larger than Texas. Estimates range from about 560,000– 660,000 km² depending on boundary definitions.⁠
  • Dimensions: About 1,000 km (620 mi) long and up to 500 km (310 mi) wide.
  • Location: Primarily in southeastern Saudi Arabia (the bulk of it), with smaller portions in Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Approximate coordinates: 16.5°– 23.0°N, 44.5°– 56.5°E.⁠
  • Elevation: Ranges from around 800 m (2,600 ft) in the southwest to near sea level in the northeast.

The landscape consists mainly of vast ergs with sand dunes reaching up to 250 m (820 ft) high (some sources note higher peaks in places), interspersed with gravel plains, gypsum flats, and sabkhas (salt flats). The sand is typically reddish-orange due to feldspar.⁠

It is one of the driest (hyper- arid) regions on Earth, with annual rainfall generally under 35 mm (often near zero in parts). Daytime summer temperatures can exceed 50°C (122°F), while winter nights can drop near or below freezing.

The region was wetter during Pleistocene and Holocene “Green Arabia” phases, with temporary lakes and grasslands (evidence of lakes dating roughly 122,000– 67,000 years ago and more recent ones around 6,000– 5,000 and 3,000–2,000 years ago).

Recent research (including a 2023 survey published in Nature in 2026) found abundant ancient lake deposits but virtually no stone tools or other clear signs of sustained early human occupation in the interior, likely because suitable knappable stone for tools was scarce there, even when water was available. Occupation evidence is concentrated at the desert margins.⁠

It remained largely unexplored by outsiders until the 20th century. Notable crossings include those by Bertram Thomas and St John Philby (early 1930s) and Wilfred Thesiger (late 1940s, detailed in Arabian Sands). Modern expeditions continue, including scientific surveys and unsupported foot crossings. A road linking Oman and Saudi Arabia through the desert was completed in 2021.

Despite its emptiness, the desert holds major petroleum reserves. The giant Ghawar oil field (discovered 1948, the world’s largest conventional oil field) extends into its northern edges, and the Shaybah field (discovered 1968) lies in the southeast.⁠

It is virtually uninhabited year- round, though Bedouin tribes (such as the Al Murrah) have traditionally used its fringes. Biodiversity is limited but includes specialized desert species; protected areas like ‘Uruq Bani Ma’arid support oryx, gazelles, and other wildlife.

In short, Rub’ al Khali is a vast, extreme sand sea that has shaped human movement, trade (e.g., ancient frankincense routes), and modern energy resources on the Arabian Peninsula.

Map of the Arabian Peninsula showing a highlighted orange region across central and southern Saudi Arabia.
By Rub-al-Ĥalo.png: ThomasPuschCoasts & border: Natural Earth (EPSG: 4326)derivative work: rowanwindwhistler (talk) – Rub-al-Ĥalo.png, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=66419590

Green Arabia refers to recurrent humid (wet) climatic phases in the Arabian Peninsula’s past, when the now hyper- arid deserts, including the Rub’ al Khali (Empty Quarter), transformed into much greener, more hospitable landscapes with grasslands, savannahs, rivers, lakes, and wetlands.⁠

These episodes were driven primarily by intensified African and Indian Ocean monsoons, linked to orbital variations (e.g., peaks in northern hemisphere summer insolation) that shifted rainfall northward into the region. They occurred repeatedly over millions of years, interrupting long arid periods.

Timescale and Evidence

  • Long- term record: Speleothem (stalagmite/stalactite) studies from caves in central Saudi Arabia document multiple humid phases spanning the past ~8 million years (from the Late Miocene onward). These ranged from tens of thousands to over a million years in duration, with precipitation generally decreasing and becoming more variable over time.⁠
  • Pleistocene examples: Notable wetter intervals occurred around 480,000–10,000 years ago (with roughly 10 distinct phases in the last 500,000 years), including major ones near ~125,000 years ago (last interglacial), ~80,000, and others. Lake deposits in the Rub’ al Khali, for instance, date to approximately 122,000– 67,000 years ago.⁠
  • Holocene (more recent) phase: A well- documented wet period lasted roughly 11,000– 5,500 years ago (peaking around 9,000 years ago). This supported large lakes (one estimated at ~1,100 km² and up to 42 m deep in the Empty Quarter) and river systems; flooding from one lake carved a ~150 km- long valley. Aridity intensified after ~6,000– 5,500 years ago.⁠

Evidence includes paleolake sediments, river deposits, fossil remains (e.g., hippos, crocodiles, elephants, and other water-dependent fauna), pollen/vegetation traces, and archaeological sites with stone tools often associated with these wetter windows.

These phases turned Arabia into a “green corridor” or crossroads facilitating animal migrations and hominin (early human) dispersals out of Africa into Eurasia.

Hominin occupation pulses often align with wetter periods, though recent research notes that factors like the availability of suitable stone for tools also constrained settlement, even when water was present. Population models suggest substantially higher hominin densities during green phases compared to arid ones.⁠

In short, “Green Arabia” describes the episodic transformation of the Arabian deserts into productive savannah- like environments, fundamentally reshaping the region’s role in biogeography and human prehistory. The concept is supported by ongoing multidisciplinary work (geology, archaeology, paleoclimatology), including the Green Arabia Project.

Lone tree amid rippled orange desert dunes with rugged mountains in the background
Credit: Unsplash/CC0 Public Domain
Study reveals 8 million years of ‘Green Arabia’

Here’s a clear comparison of the Rub’ al Khali (Empty Quarter), the Sahara, and the Sahel.

Quick Overview Table

FeatureRub’ al KhaliSaharaSahel
TypeHyper- arid sand desert (erg and sand sea)Largest hot desert overallSemi- arid transitional zone (savanna, steppe)
Area~650,000 km²~9.2 million km²~3.05 million km²
LocationSouthern Arabian Peninsula (mainly Saudi Arabia and UAE, Oman, Yemen)North Africa (11 countries from Atlantic to Red Sea)Belt south of the Sahara (Atlantic to Red Sea)
TerrainAlmost continuous sand dunes (up to 250– 330 m high), gravel plains, salt flats (sabkhas)Only 15– 25% sand dunes; mostly rocky plateaus (hamada), gravel plains (reg), mountains, depressionsGrasslands, thorn shrublands, savanna; relatively flat
Climate and RainfallHyper- arid; usually <35 mm/year (often near zero)Hyper- arid to arid; often <25–100 mm/yearSemi- arid; 100–600 and more mm/year (short rainy season)
TemperaturesExtremely hot summers (often >50°C); cold nights possibleExtremely hot summers (can exceed 50°C); large day-night swingsHot year- round; less extreme than pure deserts
Human PresenceVirtually uninhabitedSparse (~2.5 million people, mostly in oases and nomadic)Relatively dense (tens of millions); pastoralism and farming
Vegetation and LifeVery sparse (specialized desert plants, rodents, scorpions, etc.)Sparse but more varied than Rub’ al Khali in placesGrass, acacias, baobabs; supports livestock and wildlife
Key ResourcesMajor oil & gas fields (e.g., Ghawar, Shaybah)Oil, minerals, some groundwater and oasesAgriculture, livestock; vulnerable to desertification
PaleoclimateExperienced “Green Arabia” wet phasesExperienced “Green Sahara” wet phasesExpanded and contracted with Sahara humidity changes

Key Differences

1. Scale and Continuity of Sand

  • The Sahara is by far the largest overall (roughly 14 times the size of Rub’ al Khali).
  • However, Rub’ al Khali is the world’s largest continuous sand sea (erg). The Sahara’s sand dunes are fragmented and cover only a minority of its surface. Most of the Sahara is rocky or gravelly.

2. Aridity and Harshness

  • Rub’ al Khali and the central Sahara are both hyper- arid extremes. The Empty Quarter is often described as one of the most uniformly empty and inhospitable places on Earth.
  • The Sahel is significantly wetter and more productive, it is the transitional “shore” (the Arabic meaning of Sahel) between true desert and the greener Sudanian savannas farther south.

3. Human Habitation and Use

  • Rub’ al Khali: Essentially empty of permanent settlement.
  • Sahara: Sparse populations concentrated around oases, trade routes, and mineral- and oil areas; traditional nomadic groups (e.g., Tuareg, Bedouin).
  • Sahel: Home to large populations who practice mixed farming and pastoralism. It is one of the regions most affected by drought, desertification, and climate variability.

4. Landscape Character

  • Rub’ al Khali feels like an endless ocean of dunes.
  • Sahara is far more diverse (dunes, mountains, vast rocky plains and the Nile corridor).
  • Sahel looks more like dry grassland or open wooded savanna rather than classic “desert.”

5. Paleoclimate Parallel

Both the Sahara and Rub’ al Khali experienced dramatic “green” phases (Green Sahara and Green Arabia) during wetter periods in the past, when lakes, rivers, and grasslands supported more life and human movement. The Sahel expanded and contracted in response to those same climatic shifts.


Summary

  • Sahara is the giant, varied hot desert of Africa.
  • Rub’ al Khali is the purest, largest continuous sea of sand on Earth (smaller but more uniformly sandy and empty).
  • Sahel is the semi- arid buffer zone south of the Sahara that supports far more human activity and vegetation.

In short: the Sahara wins on sheer size and diversity, the Rub’ al Khali on continuous sand emptiness, and the Sahel on relative habitability.

Climate Home Briefs COP31. Almost Certain Overshoot, a Climate Midterm and Turkey’s Electric Fog

COP31 opens Monday in Antalya, Turkey, and runs through November 20. Climate Home News has published its pre-summit briefing. The first two paragraphs set the frame.

Editorial cartoon about COP31 climate talks in Antalya, Turkey, featuring a global temperature overshoot monitor, climate midterm exam, and electric fog warning.
AI generated by Mata

From Watts Up With That?

By Charles Rotter

COP31 opens Monday in Antalya, Turkey, and runs through November 20. Climate Home News has published its pre-summit briefing. The first two paragraphs set the frame.

This is the first COP to be staring an almost certain overshoot of the 1.5C warming limit in the face, even as countries squabble over when the next UN science reports should be delivered.

The geopolitical mood ahead of the annual talks, from November 9-20, has been sweetened somewhat by Lula’s surprise re-election in Brazil and American voters delivering a thumbs down to climate change-sceptic Donald Trump in the US midterms this week.

COP31 Briefing: What to expect from the Antalya climate summit?

On the temperature claim, the Paris Agreement talks about a long-term global average, not a single warm year. Copernicus Climate Change Service puts the current global surface warming level at about 1.4°C above 1850–1900 by the end of 2025, and notes that one or two years above 1.5°C do not mean the Paris level has been breached. 2024 was the warmest year in their record, at about 1.55°C; 2025 came in at 1.47°C. The United Nations itself says the same thing: monthly and annual breaches are not a failure of the Paris temperature goal. What UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report 2025 actually says is that, on current policies and pledges, a higher exceedance of 1.5°C is “very likely within the next decade.” That is a scenario projection about national climate plans. Climate Home’s “almost certain” and “staring… in the face” treat that scenario projection as if it were already settled fact.

The midterms are thinner still. Democrats took the House and the Senate on Tuesday, a repudiation of President Trump with him still in the White House. The Associated Press named the drivers as high prices, the Iran war and concerns over government corruption. Climate Home upgrades that into “a thumbs down to climate change-sceptic Donald Trump.” Divided government may slow some of Trump’s energy rollbacks, but it is just not a climate referendum.

Close-up of intertwined fabric ribbons printed with the COP 27 climate conference logo and text
COP31 lanyards at the Antalya venue. Photo: UNFCCC / Kiara Worth, via Climate Home News.

The host’s flagship is electrification. Turkey wants governments to sign a voluntary pledge to raise electricity’s share of final energy consumption to 35% globally by 2035. Climate Home reports, correctly, that the text talks about “diverse and sustainable energy sources” and stops short of requiring that the new load be clean power. President Murat Kurum says wider electrification will “automatically” cut fossil use; campaigners disagree. Let’s take a close look at the country writing the pledge. Turkey’s own energy ministry says 2025 generation was 33.3% coal, 22.3% natural gas, 15.7% hydropower, 10.8% wind and 11.9% solar, with geothermal and other sources making up the rest. Ember puts fossil generation near 57% of the mix. The pledge is about more electricity without naming the fuel, from a host that still runs a third of its power on coal.

The rest of the briefing is the usual COP inventory: a voluntary fossil-fuel “roadmap” from Belém that Brazil says need not be negotiated; a mitigation work programme that barely functions because Saudi Arabia, Russia and others prefer it that way; an IPCC fight over when AR7 arrives for the 2028 Global Stocktake; adaptation finance that still has no agreed baseline for last year’s “triple by 2035” promise; China wanting to talk trade measures that get in the way of its cleantech exports. The EU, Climate Home notes, is “coming empty-handed” on new money. Leaders’ speaking slots look thin, with India and China not sending their top men. In Climate Home’s telling, Antalya is where 1.5°C is finally admitted lost, and an American cost-of-living election counts as a verdict on climate policy.

COP31 starts Monday. The pledges will be announced and the cover decision will be argued over, and the long-term temperature series will be updated the same way it always is, after the fact.

===== Source: Climate Home News, “COP31 Briefing: What to expect from the Antalya climate summit?”, 5 Nov 2026, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2026/11/05/cop31-briefing-what-to-expect-from-the-antalya-climate-summit/

Featured image: COP31 Antalya lanyards. Photo: UNFCCC / Kiara Worth, via Climate Home News; headline text added.

Tiny Crystals Reveal When Magma Is Ready to Erupt

University of Queensland researchers have identified a chemical signature in tiny plagioclase crystals that signals when magma is ready to erupt.

Magma crystallization is the process by which molten rock (magma) cools and solidifies into solid minerals (crystals), eventually forming igneous rock.

Researchers analysed thin sections of 28 representative rocks from seven volcanoes plus two ancient super- eruptions using microscopy and laser-based chemical mapping. Similar microcryst signatures appear more widely around the Ring of Fire, pointing to a common triggering process.

Infographic showing plagioclase crystals over an erupting volcano, with text explaining how tiny crystals reveal magma pressure, temperature, and melt composition before eruption.
AI generated by Grok

University of Queensland researchers have identified a chemical signature in tiny plagioclase crystals that signals when magma is ready to erupt.

PhD candidate Daniela Parra- Encalada (School of the Environment) and senior author Associate Professor Teresa Ubide led the work, published in Nature Communications.

They studied plagioclase, a common white mineral that grows in magma a few kilometres below the surface and responds to changes in temperature, water content, and composition, from Andean volcanoes in Chile and Argentina (across a ~230 km stretch) spanning different ages, eruptive styles, and activity levels.

⁠Key findings

  • The smallest, newest crystals (microcrysts, roughly the width of a human hair) that form in the final stages before eruption share a consistent chemical signature across the studied volcanoes and other Pacific Ring of Fire datasets.
  • Modelling links this signature to hot, deeper magma injecting into a shallower reservoir. This destabilises the volcanic plumbing system and can trigger eruption.
  • The team named the geochemical pattern the “plagioclase eruptibility field”.
  • Earlier-formed plagioclase with lower calcium content often records non-eruptible magma that is cooling and accumulating in the crust (relevant for metal enrichment, such as copper and gold, and only rarely involved in super-eruptions).⁠

Researchers analysed thin sections of 28 representative rocks from seven volcanoes plus two ancient super- eruptions using microscopy and laser-based chemical mapping. Similar microcryst signatures appear more widely around the Ring of Fire, pointing to a common triggering process.⁠

This crystal “fingerprint” could help identify volcanoes (including seemingly quiet ones) that merit closer monitoring because their magma systems show signs of eruptibility. Future work will test whether the pattern holds in oceanic volcanoes and explore links to critical-mineral accumulation.⁠

Plagioclase acts like a recorder of a volcano’s recent history because its composition and zoning (growth layers) change with magmatic conditions.

Focusing on the tiniest crystals isolates the final pre- eruption stage more clearly than bulk- rock chemistry.

Black terrazzo surface with colorful recycled glass and stone fragments
A thin section of volcanic rock under the microscope, showing the white plagioclase crystals of varying sizes. This rock is from Cerro Tuzgle, a dormant volcano in northwestern Argentina. Credit: The University of Queensland

Magma crystallization is the process by which molten rock (magma) cools and solidifies into solid minerals (crystals), eventually forming igneous rock.

1. What is magma?

Magma is a hot, mobile mixture of:

  • Liquid silicate melt (the dominant component)
  • Suspended crystals
  • Dissolved gases (mainly water vapor, CO₂, sulfur gases)
  • Sometimes solid rock fragments

Temperatures typically range from ~700 °C (rhyolitic, silicic magma) to >1200 °C (basaltic and mafic magma).

2. How crystallization begins

Crystallization starts when the temperature drops below the liquidus (the temperature at which the first crystals begin to form). As cooling continues, the magma moves toward the solidus (the temperature at which it becomes completely solid).

The process involves two main stages:

  • Nucleation: Tiny clusters of atoms arrange into stable crystal “seeds.”
  • Crystal growth: Atoms attach to these seeds, causing crystals to enlarge.

3. Sequence of crystallization (Bowen’s Reaction Series)

Minerals do not all form at once. They crystallize in a predictable order based on temperature and composition:

Discontinuous series (mafic minerals):
Olivine → Pyroxene → Amphibole → Biotite mica

Continuous series (plagioclase feldspar):
Calcium- rich plagioclase (high anorthite, An-rich) → progressively more sodium -rich plagioclase (lower An)

Later- forming minerals (lower temperature):
Potassium feldspar, muscovite mica, and quartz.

This is why volcanic rocks often contain a mix of early- formed (larger, sometimes resorbed) crystals and late- formed microcrysts.

4. Key factors that control crystallization

  • Cooling rate: Slow cooling (deep underground) produces large crystals (phaneritic texture, e.g., granite). Fast cooling (eruption at the surface) produces small crystals or glass (aphanitic or glassy texture, e.g., basalt or obsidian).
  • Composition: Higher silica content raises viscosity and lowers crystallization temperature.
  • Pressure: Higher pressure generally raises melting points; decompression can trigger crystallization.
  • Water and volatiles: Dissolved water lowers the melting temperature and can suppress or promote certain minerals (e.g., plagioclase stability expands as magma degasses near the surface).
  • Magma mixing and recharge: Injection of hotter, more mafic magma can dissolve existing crystals or cause new ones to grow with different compositions (producing zoning).

5. Crystal zoning and records of history

Crystals often grow in layers (like tree rings). Changes in temperature, pressure, water content, or melt composition produce compositional zoning.
In plagioclase, for example, the anorthite (Ca) content decreases as the melt evolves or increases when hotter mafic magma recharges the system. These zones preserve a detailed timeline of magma conditions, exactly the “crystal records” used in the recent research on eruptibility.

6. Final outcomes

  • If magma fully crystallizes underground → intrusive (plutonic) rock.
  • If it erupts before full crystallization → volcanic (extrusive) rock containing a mixture of phenocrysts (early crystals), microcrysts (late crystals formed during ascent), and groundmass (fine crystals or glass).

In short, magma crystallization is a progressive, temperature- and composition- driven process that turns liquid melt into a solid crystalline rock, while recording the physical and chemical history of the magma system in the crystals themselves.

Crystal records of erupted vs. trapped magma in volcanic arcs

Arc andesites form by mixing of mafic and silicic magmas. The silicic end-member is hard to constrain because it is underrepresented in erupted products.

Using textural, elemental, and isotopic records in plagioclase, the authors distinguish trapped crystal mush from erupted magma. They define the plagioclase eruptibility field, a narrow, recurrent anorthite range (An ≈ 61), that marks the melt that actually erupts across Central Andes volcanoes after mafic recharge.

Recycled plagioclase cargo is dominated by lower- An compositions (An ≈ 43), recording prolonged crystallisation and assimilation in silicic mushes.

The same pattern appears in continental and composite arcs globally, indicating strong eruptive filtering: most felsic and mafic mushes remain dormant and contribute to crustal growth, though felsic mushes can occasionally remobilise to produce super- eruptions.

Key findings

  • Samples: 28 fresh lava and tephra samples from a ~230 km transect in the Central Andes (main-arc and back-arc settings). Includes polygenetic stratovolcanoes (Lascar, Socompa, Tuzgle), monogenetic centres (El Negrillar, Cerro Overo, Back-Arc Monogenetic Volcanism fields), and older flare-up ignimbrites.
  • Plagioclase populations:
    • Microcrysts (small crystals formed from the final erupted melt during ascent/degassing) and phenocryst rims cluster tightly around An 61 ± 7 (labradorite). This is the “plagioclase eruptibility field.”
    • These crystals also show elevated Mg and Fe, consistent with rapid growth from relatively mafic, recharged melt.
    • The broader crystal cargo (cores, mantles, mush fragments, lithics) is dominated by lower-An plagioclase (average ~An 43- 45), recording silicic (rhyolitic) mushes that largely remain trapped.
  • Interpretation: Mafic recharge into shallow reservoirs homogenises and mobilises intermediate (andesitic) melt that can erupt. The eruptibility field is remarkably consistent across volcano ages, styles (effusive/explosive), and tectonic settings in the study area and appears in other arc datasets.
  • Trapped vs. erupted: Most of the crystal cargo records non-eruptible (or rarely eruptible) felsic mush that contributes to crustal growth and can host metal enrichment. Only under special conditions (e.g., flare-ups) do these mushes remobilise for large eruptions.
  • Supporting data include EPMA, LA -Q- ICP- MS elemental mapping, Sr- isotope analyses, and thermodynamic modelling of equilibrium melts.

Broader implications

The plagioclase eruptibility field offers a petrographic and geochemical indicator of magma that is primed for eruption. It helps explain the prevalence of andesites in arcs (selective filtering of intermediate compositions) and highlights the large volume of unerupted mush.

Future work may test the pattern in oceanic arcs and explore links to critical-metal accumulation in trapped mushes.

The full paper (open access) includes detailed figures of crystal textures, compositional distributions, elemental maps, and global comparisons. A PDF download is available on the Nature page.

Journal: Nature Communications, volume 17, Article number: 11203 (2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-78932-9

Provided: University of Queensland

Published: 09 November 2026

Authors: Daniela Parra-Encalada,
Teresa Ubide,
Gideon Rosenbaum,
Yujin Jegal,
Patricia Larrea,
Emilce Bustos &
Catharine Wang

Abstract

Arc andesites are hybrids generated by mixing of mafic and silicic magmas. The silicic endmember can contribute to crustal growth or trigger explosive eruptions, yet remains difficult to constrain due to limited representation in the erupted record. Here, we show that textural, elemental and isotopic records preserved in plagioclase can distinguish between trapped and erupted crystal mush, thus constraining conditions of magma storage vs. eruption in arc systems. We define the plagioclase eruptibility field, a narrow and recurrent anorthite range (An~61) that represents erupted melt across Central Andes volcanoes upon mafic recharge. The recycled plagioclase cargo is dominantly An~43, recording prolonged crystallisation and assimilation within silicic mushes. This pattern repeats in continental and composite arcs globally, indicating strong eruptive filtering of arc magmas and widespread occurrence of dormant felsic and mafic mushes that, in most cases, contribute to crustal growth; yet exceptionally, felsic mushes can rapidly remobilise to generate super-eruptions.

The Green new caucus goes to Washington

Since 2016 and the first Trump election, many on the left wore “resistance” like a merit badge. It was on yard signs, coffee mugs and cable news graphics.

Yet, after the results of the midterms, that brand has a problem. The “resistance” is headed to Washington.

Illuminated U.S. Capitol dome at sunset beneath dramatic purple clouds
Capitol building at sunset, Capitol Hill, Washington DC. American Congress.

From CFACT

By Larry Behrens

“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want and deserve to get it good and hard.”

— H.L. Mencken

Since 2016 and the first Trump election, many on the left wore “resistance” like a merit badge. It was on yard signs, coffee mugs and cable news graphics.

Yet, after the results of the midterms, that brand has a problem. The “resistance” is headed to Washington.

Line up the energy records of the new class and a pattern jumps off the page. Net-zero deadlines imposed by executive order. Pipelines voted down. Oil and gas dismissed as a relic. Hundreds of billions in taxpayer money steered toward the climate movement.

These are the people that will now write the bills and set the hearing schedule. And they’re all in on the Green Agenda…depending on when you asked.

Check the Résumé vs. Their Recent Rhetoric

That’s not a list of politicians auditioning for the moderate wing. They’re angling for a keynote at the next Sunrise Movement rally.

From Green New Deal to “All of the Above”

Then the campaigns started, and the positions changed. Correction: the stated position changed.

El-Sayed not only deleted his 2019 post “I believe in a Green New Deal,” he flip-flopped and said, “Look, I’m not going to defend the Green New Deal.”

In 2022, Talarico said, “Fossil fuels are destroying the planet.” By September, his campaign was assuring Texans he “knows how essential oil and gas is to Texas’s economy” and backs an “all-of-the-above” strategy. Talarico now says, “too many people in our party talk about eliminating oil and gas.”

South Carolina’s Annie Andrews ran with the League of Conservation Voters’ endorsement calling her “committed to bold climate action.” A week before the election, she said, “I’m an all-of-the-above approach.”

And Hamilton, the pastor who preached repentance over beef, campaigned on “all of the above energy production.”

A campaign slogan costs nothing. A Senate vote goes on the permanent record, and the American public pays the bill

Starting in January, these senators will vote on permits, pipelines, power plant rules and tax credits. Every roll call will show which version showed up for work: the candidate who sounded like a wildcatter in October, or the activist who was there all along.

Nobody Voted for The Green New Deal

The exit polls back that up. In NBC’s exit poll, the economy was the top issue at 39%, followed by the state of democracy and immigration. Climate didn’t make the top three.

The election isn’t a permission slip for green mandates that taxpayers will be paying off long after this Congress is gone. After all, North Carolina knows how that goes.

Under Governor Roy Cooper, state and local governments pledged more than $1.2 billion in incentives for an electric vehicle plant. The 7,500 promised jobs shrank to about 1,400 while the opening slid to 2028. Earlier this year, the state sued to take back the land. Lawmakers in both parties signed off, but taxpayers are the ones left holding an empty lot.

The Shoe Is on the Other Foot

For years, Democrats described standing up to the people in charge was the highest form of patriotism.

Every time this caucus pushes a rule that raises a power bill, they should hear about it. Every time a pipeline permit stalls, the Kansas rancher and the Texas trucker deserve to know whose desk it’s sitting on.

China isn’t waiting on Senate hearings. It’s building coal plants faster than any nation on earth, and every kilowatt America refuses to make is one Beijing is glad to supply.

Voters gave the keys to the Senate, not a blank check for the Green New Deal.

For years, these former outsiders spent all their time “resisting.” Now, they will get to see how they like being resisted.

This article originally appeared at Real Clear Energy