Climate- Science.press

Greening Drylands Conceal a Rising Boom-and-Bust Crisis

A phys.org article (dated around late September 2026) appears to cover concerns about the rapid growth of satellite constellations and escalating risks to Earth’s orbital environment, based on recent reports and analyses.

Drylands play a disproportionately large role in the global carbon cycle, despite low average productivity. They cover roughly 40- 45% of Earth’s land surface (~66– 67 million km²), support over 2 billion people, and dominate both the long- term trend and interannual variability (IAV) of the terrestrial carbon sink.

A landscape split between lush green grass and dry, cracked earth under a cloudy sky, with mountains in the background. — AI generated by Grok

The exact page did not load successfully, but closely matching contemporary coverage, especially the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Space Environment Report 2026 (data through end of 2025, released mid- September 2026) and related discussions, points to this theme.

Key points from the ESA report and related coverage

Explosive growth in satellites: Commercial constellations continue expanding rapidly. In 2025 alone there were more than 300 launches putting over 4,000 new payloads into orbit. Around 10 new payloads are launched daily on average, while more than three intact satellites or rocket bodies reenter Earth’s atmosphere daily. Total active satellites are in the range of ~15,000- 17,000 (heavily driven by Starlink and similar systems), up sharply from a few thousand before the mega constellation era began around 2019.

Rising collision and debris risks: Not enough satellites are reliably leaving congested low- Earth orbits (LEO) at end- of- life. Projections show an unstable environment with collision rates potentially increasing exponentially under current trends (even assuming continued best- practice disposal rates). The “Kessler syndrome” risk, where collisions generate debris that triggers further collisions, is becoming visible earlier in models. ESA shortened its projection horizon from 200 to 100 years and still sees skyrocketing object numbers and collisions.

Space Environment Health Index worsened sharply: This single metric (comparing long- term effects against a sustainable 2014 benchmark) jumped roughly an order of magnitude (from ~4 to ~50) in one year, indicating current activities are far beyond sustainable levels for the orbital environment.

Other trends: Constellations are shifting altitudes more significantly year- to- year. A new metric tracks rising (still low absolute) on- ground casualty risk from surviving reentry fragments due to higher traffic. Fragmentation events and unidentified objects are adding complexity. Active debris removal is increasingly needed alongside better mitigation, as prevention alone is no longer sufficient.

Broader context from parallel reporting: Related analyses highlight threats to astronomy (trails and brighter night skies from large, proposed fleets, including potential million- satellite data- center constellations and mirror satellites), atmospheric pollution from launches/reentries, and the sheer scale of future filings (hundreds of thousands to over 1.7 million additional satellites proposed).

ESA emphasizes that mitigation adherence is improving in some areas (e.g., more controlled reentries, shorter disposal targets moving from 25 to 5 years), but efforts need to accelerate. The agency is pursuing “Zero Debris” goals by 2030, better tracking, design-for-demise technologies, and active removal demonstrations.

In short, the article highlights how the satellite “boom” is dynamically stressing orbital sustainability, with data showing the problem accelerating faster than mitigation is keeping pace. For the full original text or images, try the phys.org link directly or the ESA report PDF.

Line graph showing relative change (%) over years from 1980 to 2020 for different datasets such as GIMMS4g, GLOBMAP, and SNU. — Persistent greening yet increasing variability of annual growing season LAI across global drylands. Credit: *Nature Climate Change* (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41558-026-02733-7

Drylands play a disproportionately large role in the global carbon cycle, despite low average productivity. They cover roughly 40- 45% of Earth’s land surface (~66– 67 million km²), support over 2 billion people, and dominate both the long- term trend and interannual variability (IAV) of the terrestrial carbon sink.

Key Carbon Stocks

Vegetation (biomass): Drylands hold ~22- 30% of global above- and below- ground biomass carbon (rough estimates around 790 Pg above -ground and 614 Pg below- ground in some inventories).

Soil organic carbon (SOC): Approximately 32% of the global SOC pool, estimates include ~248 Pg (0- 30 cm), 420- 470 Pg (0- 1 m), and ~646 Pg (to 2 m).

Soil inorganic carbon (SIC): Even more dominant, drylands contain the large majority (~80%) of the global SIC pool (hundreds of Pg to 1- 2 m depth). Secondary carbonate formation can act as a long- term sink.

Total ecosystem carbon stocks are substantial at the global scale, though densities per unit area are lower than in humid forests.

Fluxes and Dynamics

Drylands contribute ~40% of global net primary production (NPP) in some estimates and are the largest source of IAV in the land carbon sink (often ~30- 40% or more of global terrestrial net carbon flux IAV). Semi- arid ecosystems (e.g., tropical and subtropical grasslands, savannas, and shrublands) are especially important.

Productivity (GPP/NPP): Strongly limited by water availability. Rainfall pulses trigger rapid growth and microbial activity, producing large CO₂ uptake events in wet years and respiration pulses. CO₂ fertilization has contributed to greening and higher light- use efficiency in many areas.

Respiration and turnover: Soil respiration can release both recent and old carbon (radiocarbon studies show mean ages of ~520 years for respired CO₂ and ~2100 years for bulk SOC in some drylands). Old carbon is more vulnerable than models often assume.

Abiotic processes: Photodegradation, thermal degradation, wind and water erosion, and inorganic carbon dynamics (including mineral adsorption and desorption of CO₂) are more important than in humid systems. Recent work has highlighted abiotic carbon fluxes into desert soils that can rival biological fluxes locally.

Observed Trends and Variability

Satellite records (LAI, GPP, NDVI) generally show persistent greening across much of the global drylands from the 1980s/2000s onward, driven by a combination of rising CO₂, climate variability, and (in many regions) human activities such as cropland expansion, irrigation, and fertilization.

However, a 2026 Nature Climate Change study found that these greening masks increasing interannual variability (covering ~82% of drylands). LAI maxima are rising while minima are declining, creating a stronger “boom- and- bust” pattern. Increasing rainfall sensitivity is the primary driver, with inter- and intra-annual rainfall variability as secondary factors. Dynamic global vegetation models (DGVMs, e.g., from TRENDY) under- estimate observed greening rates and fail to capture the rising variability.

This heightened variability may signal approaching state transitions, increasing carbon- cycle uncertainty and threatening ecosystem services (e.g., forage, soil stability, water regulation).

Other recent findings note possible slowdowns in dryland GPP growth in some periods due to rising vapour pressure deficit (atmospheric dryness), contrasting with continued gains in humid regions.

Model Performance and Uncertainties

DGVMs and land surface models often:

Capture spatial patterns of GPP reasonably well but struggle with trends, stocks, and IAV.
Over- attribute changes to CO₂ fertilization while under- representing water constraints, land management, nitrogen dynamics, and abiotic processes.
Project net carbon gains in dryland soils driven by CO₂ effects, but empirical evidence for multi-decadal soil sinks is limited.

Definitions of “dryland” (aridity indices, biome classifications) and sub-biome differences (e.g., Australian vs. southwestern US systems) strongly affect quantified contributions.

Climate Change, Land Use, and Future Outlook

Expansion: Drylands are projected to expand (though CO₂ effects on stomatal conductance and PET can moderate this). Expansion into formerly more productive areas may not increase global GPP.

Vulnerability: Higher temperatures, more extreme droughts or wet extremes, and desertification risks can release stored carbon (organic and potentially inorganic) and reduce sink strength.

Management potential: Sustainable practices (reduced tillage, cover crops, controlled grazing, restoration) can enhance SOC, though achievable rates in drylands are modest (tens of kg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹) and fall short of ambitious global targets. Avoiding degradation is critical for both carbon and livelihoods.

In summary, drylands are highly dynamic, water- limited systems whose carbon cycle exerts outsized influence on global atmospheric CO₂ variability and trends.

Observed greening is real but increasingly unstable; models lag observations; and both biotic (pulse-driven) and abiotic processes matter. Rising variability and potential state shifts heighten uncertainty for the future land carbon sink.

Improved observations (flux towers, radiocarbon, high- resolution remote sensing), better representation of dryland- specific processes in models, and adaptive land management are priorities.

Greening masks stability loss in drylands

Drylands are undergoing large- scale changes due to climate change, but understanding remains limited by observational gaps, conflicting satellite records, and model uncertainty. Using long- term trends and interannual variability in leaf area index (LAI) from multiple satellite products (1982- 2020), the study finds:

Persistent greening across global drylands, with rates higher than those simulated by current dynamic global vegetation models (DGVMs). This contradicts some earlier reports of a recent greening slowdown.
Increasing interannual variability in LAI that is spatially coherent and covers about 82% of global drylands. This is characterized by rising LAI maxima and declining minima.
The dominant driver of the rising variability is increasing rainfall sensitivity, with both inter- and intra-annual rainfall variability as secondary contributors.
The DGVMs examined (from the TRENDY ensemble) fail to reproduce the observed increase in variability and show divergent LAI trajectories compared with observations.

The authors note that rising variability may signal impending state transitions. These could increase uncertainty in the carbon cycle and disrupt important dryland ecosystem services.

Additional context from the paper

Analyses rely on multiple LAI datasets (GIMMS4g, GLOBMAP, SNU, and MODIS for the more recent period) plus climate data (precipitation, temperature, VPD, PET) and land- cover products.
Model comparisons use outputs from 13 DGVMs in TRENDYv13.
Supporting figures examine spatial patterns of greening or browning, decomposition of coefficient of variation (LAIcv) into standard deviation and mean, product- specific trends, and drivers of variability.
Data and code are publicly available via Zenodo repositories listed in the article.

Corresponding authors: Wen Zhang and William K. Smith (University of Arizona and collaborators from multiple institutions including Western University, NASA, USGS, and others).

The article is subscription and paywalled for the full text beyond the abstract and extended data summaries. Public datasets and code links are provided for reproducibility.

Journal information: Nature Climate Change

DOI: 10.1038/s41558-026-02733-7

Provided: University of Arizona

Authors: Wen Zhang,
David J. P. Moore,
Yang Li,
Natasha MacBean,
Andrew F. Feldman,
Christopher R. Schwalm,
Yanghui Kang,
Julia K. Green,
Benjamin Poulter,
Mostafa Javadian,
Russell L. Scott,
Zexi Shen,
Youngryel Ryu,
Sungchan Jeong,
Sasha C. Reed &
William K. Smith

Abstract

Drylands are already undergoing large-scale change due to climate change, yet understanding of this response remains limited by observational gaps, conflicting satellite records and substantial model uncertainty. Here, considering trends and interannual variability based on leaf area index (LAI), we show persistent (1982–2020) greening across global drylands and increasing interannual variability. Greening rates are higher than current dynamic global vegetation models and contradict reports of a recent greening slowdown. The interannual variability increase is spatially coherent, covering about 82% of global drylands, and is characterized by increasing LAI maxima and declining minima. Increasing rainfall sensitivity is the dominant driver of increasing variability with both inter- and intraannual rainfall variability acting as secondary drivers. The dynamic global vegetation models analysed cannot reproduce increasing variability and divergent LAI trajectories. Rising variability may indicate eminent state transitions that could intensify carbon cycle uncertainty and disrupt key dryland ecosystem services.

Al Gore: “The day is coming when our [Renewable Energy] momentum will overtake the resistance. We’re getting very close now”

Al Gore still stuck in green conspiracy land.

Obviously much of what Gore has claimed over the years simply hasn’t happened. Sea level rise has failed to accelerate. Disruption to food production hasn’t worsened – food production is soaring. And the polar ice has failed to melt away.

But his biggest claim, that “resistance” to renewables is impeding adoption, is complete nonsense. The real problem is renewables don’t work.

Cartoon depicting Al Gore riding a rocket labeled 'Renewable Momentum', symbolizing the shift towards renewable energy. The background features industrial power plants, wind turbines, and solar panels. Text elements discuss reliability, storage, and the future of renewable energy.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrall

Al Gore still stuck in green conspiracy land.

Twenty years after An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore still believes in the climate fight: ‘We are going to win this’

Former US vice-president still has optimism for climate advocacy two decades after groundbreaking documentary

Oliver Milman Thu 24 Sep 2026 07.43 AEST

…

At a New York event to mark the 20th anniversary of the release of the film and his subsequent climate advocacy work, Gore, now 78, joked: “I always say if it hadn’t been for me, we might have a big problem right now” when asked about the progress made over the past two decades.

“The scientists unfortunately have been proven to be absolutely correct,” Gore said on Wednesday. “In some important ways, they may have even understated what the damage is doing. The resistance has been more durable and sustained than I expected it to be.”

The fossil fuel industry has “captured control of too many governments” and even the UN’s top climate science apparatus “to a shocking degree”, Gore said, citing recent reporting by the Guardian that Saudi oil operatives were involved in crafting high-profile UN climate reports.

…

Gore said that while many developing countries still struggle to get adequate financing for renewables and battery projects, he is confident that the mass adoption of clean energy, now routinely cheaper than fossil fuels such as coal and gas, will take hold.

“The day is coming when our momentum will overtake the resistance. We’re getting very close now,” he said. “I think we are going to win this. The remaining question is whether we will win it in time to avoid those negative tipping points I talked about.”

…Read more: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/sep/23/al-gore-climate-crisis-an-inconvenient-truth

But his biggest claim, that “resistance” to renewables is impeding adoption, is complete nonsense. The real problem is renewables don’t work.

There is nobody preventing the purchase of renewable systems. Anyone who wants solar panels or batteries or even wind turbines can buy whatever they want, on any scale they want.

Want to power an entire neighbourhood with renewables? Raise the finance, buy a big patch of land, and plant the solar panels and batteries. Nobody will stop you.

Of course, you better be careful about what you actually promise to deliver.

I have a friend who has solar powered his whole house, after ordering components from China – 10s of thousands of watts of solar panel capacity. Apart from one unpleasant surprise, when a set of batteries he ordered from China turned out to be much smaller batteries with rocks in the case to make up the weight, he pretty much got what he wanted.

But even with all this my friend still has to switch on grid power from time to time, especially during air-conditioner season.

My friend will probably have the last laugh when the Aussie East Coast Aussie power grid collapses under the weight of bureaucratic stupidity – power some of the time is better than no power. Prepping for when government lets us down is more my friend’s thing than the fake climate crisis – a position I have some sympathy for. But you can’t run a civilisation on an energy source which keeps letting you down.

Al Gore might be able to persuade people and governments to try renewables, I’m not denying his powers of persuasion. What he cannot do is convince former enthusiasts to continue embracing renewables, when the economic reality of unreliable, expensive energy smacks them in the face, like what is happening right now in Germany.

Industry is Being Sacrificed to Net Zero Ideology, Says Siemens Energy Boss – Watts Up With That?

Industry is Being Sacrificed to Net Zero Ideology, Says Siemens Energy Boss

Energy Affordability: An IQ Test For New Yorkers That They Will Very Likely Fail

Here in New York, our very-light-weight Governor Kathy Hochul is running for re-election. To her slight credit, she has noticed that New York is a high-cost state, not the least for cost of energy, and that New Yorkers are upset about that.

The Statue of Liberty in the foreground with the New York City skyline and wind turbines in the background.

From Manhattan Contrarian

By Francis Menton

New Yorkers are right to be upset about the cost of energy. According to this chart from the federal EIA containing most recent data for July 2026, the average price of electricity to the ultimate consumer in New York for that month was 29.9¢/kWh, compared to a national average of 18.31¢/kWh; and New York’s cost had increased more than 14% from 26.22¢/kWh in July 2025, versus a 4.9% increase in the national average over last year’s 17.45¢/kWh. New Yorkers are also right to be upset because the premium they pay for electricity is mostly to entirely the consequence of intentional government policies that drive up the cost.

What’s crazy is that Governor Hochul has decided to make “energy affordability” a theme of her campaign. The reason that is crazy is that at the same time that Hochul claims she favors more “affordability,” she also brags about maintaining and expanding the very policies that have caused the excess costs. The person most responsible for New York’s high energy cost is Kathy Hochul. But hey, this “energy affordability” theme seems to have worked in somewhat comparable circumstances for Abigail Spanberger and Mikie Sherrill, running respectively in Virginia and New Jersey last year. If the Virginia and New Jersey voters fell for it, maybe the New York voters will too.

On September 15, Hochul launched her latest “energy affordability” initiative with a big press release and a press conference. This latest initiative seeks to mask a portion of New York’s higher costs by distributing checks and discounts to the populace. From Hochul’s press release:

“As Washington Republicans keep driving up the cost of energy, gas and groceries, I’ll never stop working to help New Yorkers keep more money in their pockets,” Governor Hochul said. “That’s why I expanded access to our Energy Affordability Program – a move that will save residents across the state up to $500 annually on their energy bills. Right now, 2.5 million eligible New Yorkers are leaving money on the table and I’m on a mission to help keep the lights on and costs down by launching an all-of-government push to get them enrolled in this money saving program.”

As is usual for New York politicians, the playbook only extends as far as trying to bribe the people with some portion of their own money. So this becomes an IQ test for New Yorkers: Can we calculate whether ratepayers come out ahead or behind under Hochul’s proposal?

Again from the EIA, the average New York household uses about 8000 kWh of electricity per year. There is a difference of 11.59¢/kWh between the average New York electricity rate and the average rate in the rest of the country. That means the average New York household pays more than $900 per year for electricity in excess of what it would pay if our rates were equal to the national average. Now our very generous Governor comes along offering a discount of “up to” $500, to 2.5 million households (out of about 8 million households). Let’s see, have we come out ahead or behind? (Which is larger, $900 for each of 8 million households, or “up to” $500 for each of 2.5 million households?)

And then there is the issue of how New York’s rates came to be so much higher than the rates in other states. It can’t be geography — as an example, bordering Pennsylvania’s average rate for July was 21.72¢/kWh, fully 27% lower than our average rate. If you look at the EIA’s chart of average electricity rates by state, there is a remarkable (although not perfect) correlation between Republican-led states on the one hand (low rates) and Democrat-led states on the other (high rates).

And then consider some of the major New York energy policies that drive up rates. First there is the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act of 2019 (CLCPA). Provisions of this statute drive up consumer costs in multiple ways. First, the statute imposes a mandate that by 2030 70% of electricity must come from renewable sources. That provision makes it impossible to build new and more efficient natural gas power plants, or to re-power existing inefficient natural gas plants to use far less fuel to produce the same amount of electricity. Second, substantial amounts of new wind and solar generation have been built to try to comply with the 70% mandate, but since those only operate intermittently, all of the old natural gas plants must be retained, and we end up paying for two redundant generation systems instead of one. Third, the new wind and solar generators are also sited in remote locations, requiring substantial additional and expensive transmission, all of which gets paid for in electricity rates.

And then there’s the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or “RGGI.” RGGI is a compact among eleven Northeastern states to force greenhouse gas emitters (i.e., electric power plants) to purchase allowances for every ton of CO2 that they emit. The quantity of allowances shrinks every year, thus forcing the auction price to increase. The auction clearing price has gone from $2.53/ton in 2017 to $37.65/ton in the most recent auction this month. And the cost of the allowances ultimately gets added into the electricity rates. In short, this is a program whose main purpose is intentionally to drive up electricity rates.

The number of these “allowances” for FY 2026-27 is set at 25,356,513. At $37.65 each, that means that the State adds close to $1 billion per year to end-user electricity bills. Divide by the number of households, and it’s about $120/year each, which represents about 5% of the aggregate of consumer electric bills. And, unless the RGGI structure gets changed, this figure is almost certain to rise.

On August 5, two New York State agencies, the Department of Environmental Conservation and the Energy Research & Development Authority, finalized regulations relating to implementation of the RGGI compact in New York. In a press release of that date, the agencies claimed that New York had received $2 billion cumulatively from the auction receipts built into RGGI program to that time, but they said they were using the money to make “investments” that would return $12 billion, or six times as much:

The updated cap trajectory is designed to achieve affordable emissions reductions more quickly, while ensuring long-term availability of allowances under the program. Net savings are expected to reach nearly $12 billion (PDF) over the lifetime of the investments, providing a nearly 6-to-1 benefit based on investment of about $2 billion to date.

Note that the $2 billion of receipts and $12 billion of “benefits” are only as to receipts to date. Receipts going forward are projected to increase dramatically, to a cumulative total of $4.7 billion by FY 28/29.

So where do they come up with this $12 billion of supposed “benefits,” not now, but supposedly over the lifetime of the programs funded by the $2 billion spent so far. There is no real information available on that. In a document called the “New York’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Operating Plan Amendment for 2026,” the agencies have provided a long list of entities and programs that either have or will be getting large cash handouts from the program. (To access that document, go to my colleague Roger Caiazza’s blog here, and follow the link for “Operating Plan Amendment” in the first line of that post.) There are dozens of recipients and programs listed, many getting funding of tens to hundreds of millions of dollars cumulatively over multi-year periods. Here are some examples of larger items listed: “Green Jobs Green New York (Fund)” — $517 million; “Clean Transportation” — $450 million; “UPA Efficiency and RE” — $389 million; “Retrofit Challenges” — $464 million; “Clean Energy Communities” — $144 million. And these are just a few examples of some of the larger allocations. So what exact entities are getting these vast sums, and what exactly are they going to do with the money to provide the claimed benefits? There are no details offered beyond the brief descriptions quoted.

In other words, these have the total appearance of being enormous slush funds passed out to friendly but unnamed NGOs. The idea that there will be $12 billion of benefits to the ratepayers from the $2 billion disbursed so far is pure speculation with no backup of any kind. Are there any actual “green jobs” emerging from the $500+ million handed out to the “green jobs fund”? Go ahead and try to find any of them. What is the “clean transportation” that we are supposedly getting for $450 million? If anyone knows they are not saying.

Do New Yorkers have sufficient IQ to figure out that they are getting scammed with this “energy affordability” mantra from Governor Hochul. I guess we will find out in the upcoming election. But let’s face it — New York voters are very likely to fail this test.

Planetary Boundaries Health Check 2026

The annual report, authored by more than 60 scientists, assesses the nine Planetary Boundaries, interconnected Earth system processes that need to stay within safe limits for planetary stability and resilience.

The Planetary Boundaries framework defines a “safe operating space for humanity” based on nine critical biophysical processes that regulate the stability, resilience, and life-support functions of the Earth system.

Infographic titled 'Planetary Health Check 2026' displaying Earth's vital signs. It features a hexagonal diagram indicating various ecological metrics with color codes: green for within safe limits, yellow for zones of increasing risk, and red for transgressed limits. Metrics include Climate Change, Ocean Acidification, Stratospheric Ozone, Biosphere Integrity, Atmospheric Aerosols, Land-System Change, Freshwater Change, Biogeochemical Flows, and Novel Entities. — AI generated by Grok

Key findings

Seven of the nine boundaries are transgressed, all at their highest recorded levels of breach:
- Climate change
- Biosphere integrity
- Land- system change
- Freshwater change
- Biogeochemical flows (e.g., nitrogen and phosphorus)
- Novel entities (synthetic chemicals, plastics, pollutants, etc.)
- Ocean acidification (the most recent to cross its boundary, in 2025)
The two that have improved over the past decade are stratospheric ozone depletion and atmospheric aerosol loading. Authors note that global aerosol improvements may still hide unsafe regional levels.

Lead author Boris Sakschewski stated: “The diagnosis is unambiguous. Pressure is rising across every Planetary Boundary already outside the safe operating space. It means that the risk of large- scale, persistent and potentially irreversible change is increasing, while our margin for error in tackling these problems is shrinking.”

Johan Rockström (PIK director and co- author) emphasized that solutions exist, and accelerated action is needed to return to the safe operating space.

Context of recent extremes

The report follows a period of widespread extremes, including:

Pakistan’s 2025 monsoon floods (affecting >6.9 million people)
Record global ocean heat content in 2025, linked to rapid intensification of Hurricane Melissa (Category 5) striking Jamaica
The largest observed global coral bleaching event (bleaching- level heat stress on ~84.4% of reef area from January 2023- September 2025)
Record heat and drought in Western Europe (hottest June- July 2026), wildfires in Europe and Canada, and extreme heat in Japan, South Korea, and parts of the Middle East

Additional concerns

Natural carbon sinks (vegetation and soils) are under pressure from heat, drought, fire, and degradation. The report questions whether models may overestimate the resilience of the land carbon sink, noting that a functioning sink is essential for net- zero pathways.

The full report is available at planetaryhealthcheck.org. Similar coverage appears in outlets such as Scientific American and Mongabay.

Planetary Health Check 2026: A Scientific Assessment of the State of the Planet – Summary

Two cartoon vultures perched on a branch, one with a menacing expression and the other looking intently, set against a forest background.

It was first proposed in 2009 by a group of Earth system scientists led by Johan Rockström (then at the Stockholm Resilience Centre) and Will Steffen. The core idea is that the relatively stable Holocene epoch (the last ~11,700 years), during which human civilizations developed, provides the reference state for a habitable planet. Human activities in the Anthropocene are now the dominant force pushing the Earth system away from that state.

Transgressing these boundaries increases the risk of large- scale, abrupt, or irreversible environmental changes (including tipping points and cascading effects). The boundaries are interconnected, actions affecting one influence the others, so they must be considered together.

The nine Planetary Boundaries

Each is tracked with one or more control variables (quantifiable indicators). Boundaries are typically set with a “safe” level, a zone of increasing risk, and a high- risk zone. Climate change and biosphere integrity are often described as “core” boundaries because of their overarching influence.

Here is an overview (drawing on the 2009, 2015, and 2023 scientific updates, plus the annual Planetary Health Check assessments through 2026):

Climate change
Control variables: Atmospheric CO₂ concentration and radiative forcing.
Boundary example: ~350 ppm CO₂ (pre-industrial ~ 280 ppm). Current levels far exceed this (e.g., >420 ppm in recent assessments).
Drivers: Greenhouse gas emissions, primarily from fossil fuels.

Change in biosphere integrity (formerly biodiversity loss)
Control variables: Genetic diversity (extinction rate, e.g., extinctions per million species-years) and functional integrity (e.g., Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production / HANPP).
Reflects both species loss and disruption of ecosystem functions that support the Earth system.

Land- system change
Control variable: Typically, the area of remaining intact forests (or cropland conversion of ice- free land).
Focuses on deforestation, habitat conversion, and related changes that alter energy, water, and carbon cycles.

Freshwater change
Control variables: “Blue water” (surface and groundwater flows) and “green water” (soil moisture available to plants), measured by the extent of human- induced deviations from pre-industrial patterns.
Captures both overuse and disruption of the water cycle.

Biogeochemical flows (nitrogen and phosphorus cycles)
Control variables: Industrial and agricultural nitrogen fixation and phosphorus flows to oceans and soils (often with global and regional components).
Driven largely by fertilizer use, leading to eutrophication and dead zones.

Ocean acidification
Control variable: Surface Ocean aragonite saturation state (a measure of carbonate ion availability critical for shell- forming organisms).
Caused by CO₂ absorption by the oceans; crossed into the transgressed zone around 2025.

Introduction of novel entities
Control variable: Often the percentage of synthetic chemicals released without adequate safety testing, or the overall load of human- made substances (plastics, pesticides, industrial chemicals, radioactive materials, etc.).
Reflects pollution by substances that did not exist (or existed at negligible levels) in the Holocene.

Atmospheric aerosol loading
Control variable: Interhemispheric difference in aerosol optical depth (or related measures of particulate pollution).
Affects climate, monsoon systems, and health. Currently assessed as within the safe operating space globally (with regional concerns).

Stratospheric ozone depletion
Control variable: Stratospheric ozone concentration (in Dobson units).
Successfully addressed by the Montreal Protocol; remains within (or recovering toward) safe levels.

Evolution and current status

2009: Framework introduced; three boundaries assessed as transgressed.
2015: Update; four transgressed; climate change and biosphere integrity identified as core.
2023: First full quantification of all nine; six transgressed.
2025- 2026 (Planetary Health Check by the Planetary Boundaries Science Lab at PIK): Seven transgressed (ocean acidification newly crossed in 2025), with pressures rising on all seven. Only aerosol loading and ozone depletion remain within the safe space (though aerosols show regional issues).

The annual Planetary Health Check (produced since ~2023 and 2024 by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research’s Planetary Boundaries Science Lab, involving dozens of scientists) provides ongoing monitoring and updates, often visualized as a “blood test” or radar/spider diagram of Earth’s vital signs.

Influence and applications

The framework has moved beyond academia into policy (e.g., informing EU strategies and national assessments), business (e.g., World Business Council for Sustainable Development), and related concepts such as Doughnut Economics (Kate Raworth), planetary health, and Earth system boundaries (which add a justice dimension). It emphasizes that sustainable development requires operating within these biophysical limits while addressing equity.

Key sources for deeper exploration:

Original papers: Rockström et al. (2009, Nature / Ecology and Society); Steffen et al. (2015, Science); Richardson et al. (2023, Science Advances).
Official sites: stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries and planetaryhealthcheck.org.
Reviews: Rockström et al. (2024) in Nature Reviews Earth & Environment.

The framework is not a set of absolute “do not cross” lines with guaranteed catastrophe on the other side, but rather science- based guardrails that quantify rising risk as human pressures intensify. Returning processes toward the safe operating space is presented as essential for long- term planetary stability and human prosperity.

We Came to New York Looking for Climate Activists. We Found Communists Instead.

For days, CFACT searched the streets and buildings of New York City for the 100,000+ climate activists the media claimed were here.

We looked outside the United Nations. We walked around and inside the Javits Center. We checked Bryant Park, Times Square, and the streets of Manhattan.

On the steps of the NY Public Library, demonstrators gathered beneath a sea of communist-red banners before marching through Midtown.

A humorous illustration depicting a person in a fedora looking through binoculars at a gathering of protesters holding various signs related to climate activism and communism, with a prominent banner saying 'FOUND THE CLASS WAR.'

From CFACT

By Christina Norman

A diverse crowd of protesters holding various signs, including a banner that reads 'THERE IS NO CLIMATE CRISIS', while some attendees wave flags, including a Palestinian flag, during a demonstration on a city street.

For days, CFACT searched the streets and buildings of New York City for the 100,000+ climate activists the media claimed were here.

We looked outside the United Nations. We walked around and inside the Javits Center. We checked Bryant Park, Times Square, and the streets of Manhattan. We scoured social media posts and activist announcements, looking for the marches, banners and street demonstrations that have traditionally accompanied the annual gathering of the global climate movement.

They were shockingly hard to find.

As I wrote earlier this week, Climate Week itself certainly hasn’t disappeared. The conferences had attendees. Corporate executives, nonprofit leaders, politicians, and activists were meeting behind closed doors and inside expensive venues across Manhattan.

But out on the streets, something felt different… off even.

The climate movement that once prided itself on disruption, occupying public spaces, and confronting anyone who questioned its agenda was remarkably quiet.

So, on our final day in New York, we changed our strategy.

If we couldn’t find the climate activists, we decided to go looking for the Left ourselves.

We found them.

And they were carrying the red flags of communism.

From Climate Week to the Class War

On the steps of the NY Public Library, demonstrators gathered beneath a sea of communist-red banners before marching through Midtown.

At the front stood members of the Revolutionary Communists of America behind an enormous banner declaring:

“DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM — NO WAR BUT THE CLASS WAR.”

There was no ambiguity about who they were or what they believed.

The Revolutionary Communists of America openly describes itself as a communist organization seeking the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a workers’ government. Its own website says the organization is working to build a revolutionary party, and earlier this year it reported nearly 650 members attending its national congress from party cells in 42 cities.

The march we encountered was focused primarily on Israel, Gaza, war, and capitalism rather than climate change. But most of the larger climate organizations had members in the crowd- Extinction Rebellion, Sunrise Movement, CodePink were all there, front and center.

They were eager to talk.

One woman we interviewed told us she was disappointed in the lack of climate activity and said she was marching for climate despite the banners and flags around her. She aligned with the commies and quipped, “I hope I don’t get arrested again.”

Another young woman we spoke to actually was NOT a communist; instead, she said she was in fact a socialist.

We continued through the crowd, asking protesters what they believed, what they wanted to accomplish, what kind of political and economic system they hoped would replace the one they were protesting, and how climate change fit into it all.

Most said the same thing, climate change causes genocide, war contributes to climate change, and it’s all interlinked. Some did say they felt genocide was more important than climate, which did back up the polling that has been done where climate has taken a backseat to other political issues.

Then We Brought Climate Week to Them

After spending time interviewing protesters, it was our turn to deliver a message. Turnabout is fair play.

We unfolded a CFACT banner in the middle of the demonstration, which read: “THERE IS NO CLIMATE CRISIS.”

A woman smiling in the foreground holds a banner that reads 'THERE IS NO CLIMATE CRISIS' at a large protest with many people and signs in the background.

It was not exactly the message the crowd was expecting.

As marchers passed us carrying red flags, Palestinian flags and anti-capitalist signs, we held our banner high and called out:

“You have been lied to. There is no climate crisis. Politicians and greedy corporations have fabricated the climate scare.”

A woman shouted “shame on you” and others jeered similar sentiments. A man came up and told us that our banner was a lie. We told him he can get the facts right here at CFACT.org.

The juxtaposition was hard to miss.

Behind us were protesters condemning corporations and capitalism. In front of them was CFACT challenging a climate agenda that has been embraced and financed by some of the world’s largest corporations, financial institutions, and political organizations and somehow WE were the ones they thought were wrong.

For a few minutes, at least, Climate Week finally made it onto the streets, CFACT style.

Where Did the Climate Activists Go?

That remains the question I left New York asking.

Climate Week organizers certainly haven’t abandoned climate politics. Nor have the corporations, foundations, governments, and advocacy organizations participating in it. Do not feel like it’s over. The green agenda is alive and, unfortunately, well.

But the public face of the movement has changed.

Instead of the mass demonstrations and highly visible street activism that helped define the climate movement in previous years, much of what we encountered this week was institutional: conferences, panels, corporate events, networking sessions and carefully branded gatherings. Will we see it return? Or is this an intentional move to clean the movement up.

Perhaps that’s the real story of Climate Week 2026.

We came to New York prepared to debate climate radicals in the streets. For most of the week, we couldn’t find them.

So eventually we found some communists instead. And we brought the climate debate to them.

The 8.2 ka Cold Snap: How a Catastrophic Lake Drainage Weakened the AMOC and Cooled the Planet

The 8.2- kiloyear (ka) event (also called the 8.2 ka BP event or 8k event) was an abrupt global cooling episode around 8,200 years before present (BP; present ≈ 1950 CE), lasting roughly 150- 400 years (most precisely ~160 years in Greenland ice cores, with a ~60-70- year coldest central phase).

The 8.6- kiloyear (ka) interval is not a distinct, sharply defined abrupt climate event equivalent to the well-known 8.2 ka event. Instead, it marks the approximate onset of a broader, multi- centennial (centennial-scale) cooling anomaly in the early Holocene that lasted roughly from ~8.6- 8.5 ka to ~8.0 ka BP, within which the sharper ~8.2 ka cold event is superimposed.

Infographic illustrating the 8.2 ka Cold Snap events, highlighting the catastrophic drainage of Glacial Lake Agassiz and Ojibway, the effects on the AMOC, and global cooling impacts. — AI generated by Grok

It is the most prominent abrupt climate anomaly of the Holocene (the current interglacial epoch) and marks the start of the Northgrippian stage. It was milder than the preceding Younger Dryas but more severe than the later Little Ice Age.

Timing and Magnitude

Onset in central Greenland: ~8,175 BP, with rapid cooling of ~3.3 °C (decadal average) in under 20 years.
Full event duration in Greenland ice cores: ~160.5 years (central cold phase ~69 years); temperatures then recovered in steps.
Broader estimates: 100- 200 years near the North Atlantic, up to ~400 years for some tropical monsoon impacts.
Cooling estimates: 1- 5 °C regionally (strongest in the North Atlantic and Greenland; ~1- 1.5 °C over Europe); atmospheric methane dropped by ~80 ppb (~15% reduction), indicating hemispheric drying and cooling.

Evidence comes from Greenland ice cores (strongest signal), speleothems (caves across Eurasia, Mediterranean, South America, southern Africa), lake and ocean sediments, and other proxies, showing the event was globally synchronous or near synchronous.

Cause

The leading explanation is a massive freshwater pulse from the catastrophic drainage of proglacial Lakes Agassiz and Ojibway (formed by meltwater from the retreating Laurentide Ice Sheet in northeastern North America) into Hudson Bay and then the Labrador Sea/North Atlantic around ~8.47 ka BP.

This reduced the density of surface waters, weakening the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) by an estimated 55- 62%. Reduced northward heat transport led to North Atlantic cooling, expanded sea ice, and atmospheric teleconnections that propagated the signal globally. Some researchers note it may have been superimposed on a longer cooler interval lasting up to several centuries.

Associated sea- level rise from the meltwater pulse is estimated at ~0.4- 2.2 m (or higher in some delta records).

Global Impacts

Cooling: Strongest around the North Atlantic; milder elsewhere in the Northern Hemisphere.
Hydrology: Widespread drying in Northern Hemisphere tropics and monsoon regions (e.g., weakened Asian/Indian monsoons, droughts in parts of Southeast Asia, Near East, and Africa); some wetter conditions or shifts in the Southern Hemisphere consistent with a southward displacement of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (bipolar seesaw pattern). Impacts on monsoons sometimes lagged the North Atlantic cooling by ~100 years and lasted longer.
Other: Reduced snow accumulation in Greenland; possible increased storminess in places like coastal California; atmospheric circulation changes.
Human societies: Linked to stresses on early Neolithic farming communities in the Near East (e.g., changes at sites like Çatalhöyük), possible accelerated migrations, and shifts in settlement and food strategies.

The event serves as a key analogue for testing climate models’ sensitivity to North Atlantic freshwater forcing under near- interglacial conditions, relevant to potential future AMOC weakening from Greenland ice- sheet melt.

It is also known regionally as the Misox oscillation (Switzerland) or Finse event (Norway).

World map illustrating the regional distribution of meltwater release, with color-coded levels indicating varying amounts of meltwater across different regions. — The sea level rise of the 8.2 ka event simulated by the iCESM1.3 | Climate Dynamics | Springer Nature Link

Relationship to the 8.2 ka Event

Many paleoclimate records (ice cores, speleothems, marine sediments, and others) show climate anomalies spanning 400- 600 years that begin around 8.6- 8.5 ka. The rapid, high- amplitude cooling centered near 8.2 ka (lasting ~150-160 years in Greenland ice cores) appears as a sudden “spike” or intensification within this longer cooler interval.

Some studies explicitly refer to a cooling event spanning ~8.6- 8.2 ka, often linked to progressive freshwater inputs into the North Atlantic from the decaying Laurentide Ice Sheet.

Causes and Context

Freshwater forcing: Early meltwater pulses, including the collapse of the Hudson Bay Ice Saddle (around 8.6- 8.5 ka) and initial drainage phases of proglacial Lakes Agassiz and Ojibway, contributed to surface- water freshening. This preceded the larger catastrophic lake drainage timed closer to the peak 8.2 ka cooling. These inputs likely weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) over an extended period.

Other factors: Possible contributions from solar variability minima and volcanic activity (including a large sulphate peak near ~8.6 ka, potentially linked to Icelandic eruptions such as the Þjórsá lava flow). Freshwater routing and ice- margin dynamics were complex and evolving.

The broader anomaly is viewed by some as part of a repeating pattern of Holocene climate variability, rather than solely a response to a single flood.

Impacts and Evidence

Proxy records indicate cooler and often drier conditions across parts of the Northern Hemisphere during this interval, with regional hydroclimate shifts (e.g., monsoon weakening in some tropical areas). The signal is clearer and more coherent in North Atlantic and European records but appears more variable or muted farther afield. Sea- level data also show periods of rapid rise around this time related to ice- sheet melt.

In summary, references to “8.6 ka” typically point to the start of this longer cooling phase that frames the classic 8.2 ka event. The sharp 8.2 ka anomaly remains the most prominent and best- defined feature of the early Holocene in high- resolution records such as Greenland ice cores.

Diagram illustrating the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), showing ocean currents like the Gulf Stream and their impact on temperature regulation in the Northern Hemisphere. — Ocean currents: AMOC, the Atlantic Ocean’s conveyor belt.

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) is widely regarded as the primary oceanographic mechanism linking freshwater forcing from the Laurentide Ice Sheet region to the climate anomalies of the ~8.6- 8.0 ka interval and the sharper 8.2 ka event.

Background on AMOC

The AMOC is a major system of ocean currents that transports warm, salty surface water northward in the Atlantic and returns colder, denser deep water southward. It plays a key role in northward heat transport (contributing significantly to the relatively mild climate of northwest Europe and the North Atlantic region). Weakening reduces this heat transport, leading to cooling in the North Atlantic and associated atmospheric teleconnections.

Connection to the 8.6 ka / 8.2 ka Events

Broader ~8.6- 8.0 ka cooling: Proxy records and reconstructions indicate a multi-centennial period of generally cooler conditions starting around 8.6- 8.5 ka. This is linked to progressive meltwater inputs, including early drainage phases, the collapse of the Hudson Bay Ice Saddle (~8.6- 8.5 ka), and sustained freshwater fluxes from the retreating Laurentide Ice Sheet. These inputs freshened surface waters in the Labrador Sea and North Atlantic, reducing density and inhibiting deep-water formation, thereby weakening the AMOC over an extended interval.

Sharp 8.2 ka event: The most prominent Holocene cooling anomaly (onset ~8.25- 8.17 ka in Greenland ice cores, lasting ~150- 160 years overall with a colder central phase of ~60- 70 years) is strongly associated with the final catastrophic drainage of proglacial Lakes Agassiz and Ojibway into Hudson Bay and then the Labrador Sea and North Atlantic (dated around 8.47 ± 0.3 ka, with final stages closer to the cooling onset). This large freshwater pulse is thought to have caused a more abrupt AMOC slowdown.

Estimates of AMOC weakening during the 8.2 ka event vary:

Model simulations commonly show reductions of ~10- 50% (or more in some hosing experiments), with Wikipedia and related sources citing figures of 55- 62% in certain reconstructions or models.
Proxy-based estimates (e.g., from sediment cores tracking deep- water flow speed, chemistry, or $^{231}$ Pa/ $^{230}$ Th ratios) often indicate more modest changes, such as ~10- 15% or up to a few Sverdrups (Sv; 1 Sv = 10 $^6$ ^6 m $^3$ ) relative to pre- industrial strength, sometimes as part of a broader weakening between ~9.2- 8 ka.
The response typically involved reduced North Atlantic Deep Water (NADW) formation, possible shoaling of the overturning cell, and recovery over decades to a couple of centuries after the main freshwater pulse ended.

Climate Consequences of the AMOC Weakening

Reduced northward heat transport produced strong cooling around the North Atlantic (e.g., ~3.3 °C in central Greenland within decades; ~1- 1.5 °C or more in parts of Europe). Atmospheric teleconnections then propagated the signal globally: southward shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), weakened Northern Hemisphere monsoons (Asia, India, Africa), drier conditions in many tropical regions, and some opposing (wetter) signals in parts of the Southern Hemisphere. Methane concentrations also dropped, consistent with widespread cooling and drying.

The 8.2 ka event (and the surrounding 8.6- 8.0 ka interval) is considered a key natural analogue for testing AMOC sensitivity to freshwater forcing under near- interglacial boundary conditions, with relevance to potential future weakening from Greenland ice- sheet melt under anthropogenic warming.

In short, the AMOC acted as the critical intermediary: meltwater freshening → reduced overturning and heat transport → North Atlantic cooling → global climate anomalies. The broader 8.6 ka- onset cooling reflects more gradual or multi- pulse forcing, while the 8.2 ka peak reflects the most intense disruption.

Bangkok Declares Citywide Flood Disaster as Monsoon Rains Overwhelm Canals

Bangkok authorities declared a flood disaster across all 50 districts of the Thai capital on Saturday, September 26, 2026, after nearly 48 hours of continuous heavy rain left canals overflowing, major roads submerged, and residents wading through deep water.

Thailand has a tropical monsoon climate. The main rainy (southwest monsoon) season normally runs from mid- May to mid- October, with the heaviest rains usually in August- September.

A flooded city street with several people walking through murky water, a submerged car is visible in the foreground, while modern skyscrapers and a traditional building are seen in the background under overcast skies. — AI generated by Grok

Nearly 300 mm (about 12 inches) of rain fell in parts of the city since Thursday afternoon, overwhelming Bangkok’s canal network and drainage systems. The eastern areas and neighborhoods near canals were hit hardest. Floodwaters entered homes, shops, restaurants, and alleyways; at least 13 roads were reported flooded, with some cars partially submerged and traffic disrupted.

View this post on Instagram

Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt urged residents to stay home, move belongings to higher ground (especially those living near canals), and avoid unnecessary travel. He noted that “the canals are full” and that authorities were coordinating with nearby provinces to divert water. By mid- afternoon Saturday he said the situation had “stabilised,” estimating 2- 3 days to drain the water if no further heavy rain falls.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul cut short a trip to London to return and handle the crisis.

Temporary shelters and field kitchens were set up (including at schools); around 980 people were in shelters and dozens of bedridden residents were moved to hospitals. The army and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration are assisting. Free parking was offered at some MRT stations.

People described waist- or knee- high water. One vendor near a canal north of central Bangkok said, “The water keeps coming in… It’s like at my waist level now.” Some residents filled sandbags to protect homes and businesses.

Suvarnabhumi Airport was operating normally, though extra travel time was advised.

Bangkok, built on former marshland roughly 1.5 metres above sea level and sometimes called the “Venice of the East,” is particularly vulnerable. September is peak rainy season, and rainfall this year has been heavier than usual. The disaster declaration enables faster official response and assistance. More thunderstorms and rain were forecast over the weekend.

This follows earlier limited declarations for a few eastern districts on Friday. Broader flooding has also affected other parts of Thailand.

View this post on Instagram

Thailand has a tropical monsoon climate. The main rainy (southwest monsoon) season normally runs from mid- May to mid- October, with the heaviest rains usually in August- September.

What you’re seeing in Bangkok right now is classic late- monsoon weather, intensified:

Almost continuous heavy rain since Thursday (24 September) has dumped nearly 300 mm in parts of the city in ~48 hours.
Bangkok’s canals (khlongs) are full, drainage systems are overwhelmed, and many roads (especially in the east and near canals) are flooded.
This is why the entire city was declared a disaster zone on 26 September.

September is typically the peak or late- peak of the monsoon, so flooding is not unusual, but the intensity and duration this week have been higher than normal in the capital.

Quick monsoon overview for Bangkok

Period	Typical conditions	Flood risk
May- June	Start of rains, often afternoon storms	Moderate
July- August	Steady rain, increasing rainfall totals	High
September	Peak / late peak, heaviest rain possible	Very high
Mid- to- late October	Monsoon weakens, rains decrease	Decreasing
November- April	Cool & dry season (northeast monsoon)	Low

Bottom line: The current flooding is driven by the late monsoon rains. More thunderstorms and rain are still possible over the weekend, so conditions may stay difficult for another 1- 3 days even after the heaviest rain stops, while the water drains.

If you’re in Bangkok or travelling there, stick to higher- ground routes, allow extra time, and check real- time flood and traffic updates before moving around.

As of 26 September 2026, flooding or flooded roads have been reported in many parts of Bangkok. Areas that are particularly affected or require extra caution include:

Ekkamai / Sukhumvit 63
Ramkhamhaeng
Vibhavadi Road / Chatuchak area
Chaeng Watthana / Lak Si
Lat Krabang
Sena Nikhom
Phong Phet / Ngam Wong Wan area
and several other spots across the city.

Water is currently on the roads at numerous locations. Some streets have temporarily been classified as impassable for smaller vehicles.

View this post on Instagram

Politicians organize to drive up the cost of electricity

It is called the U.S. Climate Alliance, and while making electricity more costly may not be the goal, it is the certain outcome of their goal, which is to end fossil fuel use.

The 23 members of the Alliance are basically those states with Democrat governors. This is not quite true, as one member has a Republican governor and two states with Democrat governors are not members. It is close enough that we can think of it as the Democrat governors organized to end fossil fuel use.

A businessman reacts dramatically as a hand reaches for a plug connected to an electrical outlet, with a digital-themed background. — Businessman losing energy to work

From CFACT

By David Wojick

It is called the U.S. Climate Alliance, and while making electricity more costly may not be the goal, it is the certain outcome of their goal, which is to end fossil fuel use.

The fundamental goal is clearly stated on their home page:

“Alliance members are committed to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.”

What is deeply ironic is that the Democrats are widely running on a platform of affordable electricity which is often simply termed “affordability.” The reality is that the standard steps for reducing fossil fuel use all work to drive up the cost of electricity.

There are four different technologies involved in cutting fossil fuel use. Here is a quick look at how each drives up the cost of electricity.

First is intermittent wind and solar power. Here is problem is that grid reliability requires that reliable generation must always be available, all the way up to peak need. When wind and solar are producing energy this reliable generation stands idle which is very expensive. There may be fuel savings, but these are not the biggest cost, which is the mortgage payments.

Second is grid scale batteries which can reduce intermittency a little, but which are extremely expensive. Net zero would require trillions of dollars’ worth of huge batteries. See my “Constraining Renewables is a National Need” for details.

Third is electric vehicles which cut fossil fuel use in transportation. These greatly increase the need for electricity which means building a lot more reliable generation that will then be made inefficient and expensive with more intermittent wind and solar power. In addition, expensive upgrades to the local distribution system may be needed to supply adequate electricity for charging, even for a small number of EVs.

Fourth is utility funded energy efficiency projects which many Alliance States mandate. These supposedly reduce costs in the long run but are very expensive up front. For example, if a project pays for itself in 20 years, then it initially costs twenty times the annual savings. These costs are typically paid by the ratepayers.

The Climate Alliance states are heavily promoting all four of these very expensive technologies because this is how fossil fuel use is reduced in accordance with the Paris Agreement. All the member states have “Clean electricity standards” and 19 have “100% clean electricity goals.” Many have “energy storage goals” as well and massive efficiency programs.

The Alliance website even has a searchable “Policy Database” that contains numerous state laws and executive orders mandating the use of these expensive technologies to reduce fossil fuel use.

The Climate Alliance states are basically what are called the Blue States. Taken together these expensive policies may well explain a lot of the Blue State electricity cost increases which far exceed the Red State increases. See the “Blue States, High Rates” website for more information.

There have been a number of studies of the cost increases but I have not seen one that looks at all four of these big expense factors. Some will be hard to get good data on, so the cost impact is well hidden.

Jericho: 11,000 Years of Survival Against Climate Extremes

Jericho (specifically the archaeological site of Tell es- Sultan, Ancient Jericho, near the modern city in the West Bank) is widely recognized as one of the oldest continuously inhabited settlements in the world, with archaeological evidence of human presence dating back more than 11,000 years.

Ancient Jericho (Tell es- Sultan) in the Jordan Valley was profoundly shaped by climate and hydrology. Its long occupation history, spanning more than 11,000 years, owes much to the reliable perennial spring of Ein es- Sultan (Elisha’s Spring), which provided a stable water source in an otherwise arid, rain- shadow environment. Climate fluctuations, however, repeatedly influenced settlement size, continuity, agriculture, and periods of decline or abandonment.

Key points from the archaeological record:

The earliest evidence points to Natufian hunter- gatherer activity and the beginnings of permanent settlement between roughly 10,500- 9,000 BCE (around 12,500- 11,000 years ago), associated with the nearby perennial spring of ʿAin es- Sultan.

By the Pre- Pottery Neolithic A period (c. 8500- 7500 BCE), it had developed into a substantial fortified settlement with a stone wall, a ditch, and the well-known Tower of Jericho (about 8- 9 meters high), one of the earliest known monumental stone structures. Population estimates for this phase reach around 2,000-3,000 people.

Excavations (notably by Kathleen Kenyon in the 1950s and later Italian Palestinian teams) have revealed a long sequence of occupation layers, often described as more than 20 successive settlements, spanning the Neolithic, Bronze Age, and later periods, with the modern city continuing nearby.

In 2023, UNESCO inscribed Tell es- Sultan, the Ancient Jericho as a World Heritage Site under the title reflecting “a Testimony to Human Civilizations for 11,000 Years,” highlighting its continuous sequence of settlement layers and its role in the transition to sedentary life and early agriculture in the Fertile Crescent.

Caveats that appear in scholarly discussion include:

Definitions of “city,” “continuously inhabited,” and exact continuity can vary (there were periods of reduced occupation or possible short gaps, especially in later prehistory, though the overall sequence is exceptionally long).
Other places (such as Damascus or Byblos) are sometimes also claimed as among the oldest continuously inhabited cities, depending on the criteria used. history.

Overall, Jericho’s claim as one of the earliest and longest- occupied sites with urban characteristics is strongly supported by archaeology and widely accepted in both popular and academic contexts.

Aerial view of a rural landscape featuring a mix of fields, rocky outcrops, and a small village with numerous houses. — Tell es-Sultan Tell es-Sultan – Wikipedia

Pre- Pottery Neolithic (PPN) architecture marks a pivotal shift in human building practices in the Near East (primarily the Levant, Anatolia, and adjacent regions), spanning roughly 10,000- 6,500 BCE. It is divided into Pre- Pottery Neolithic A (PPNA, c. 10,000- 8,800 BCE) and Pre- Pottery Neolithic B (PPNB, c. 8,800-6,500 BCE), originally defined by Kathleen Kenyon at Jericho.

These periods saw the rise of permanent villages, early monumental constructions, and innovations in materials and form tied to increasing sedentism, plant cultivation, and social complexity, before the widespread use of pottery.

Key Characteristics by Phase

PPNA Architecture

Buildings were typically small, circular or oval, and often semi- subterranean.

They featured stone foundations with upper walls of sun- dried mudbrick (plano- convex in cross- section) or pisé (rammed earth), sometimes with wooden posts and beams supporting flat or slightly domed roofs of brush or reeds covered in mud.

Floors could include terrazzo- like surfaces or simple plaster; hearths were common, often cobbled; and storage bins of stone or mudbrick appeared frequently. Houses were generally 5- 6 m in diameter (or smaller, around 3- 5 m in some sites) and suited to nuclear families, with limited internal partitioning.

Communal and special structures stood out:

At Jericho (Tell es- Sultan), a massive stone wall (over 3.6 m high and 1.8 m thick at the base) enclosed a settlement of about 2.5- 4 hectares, with an associated conical stone tower ~8.5 m high, ~9 m diameter at the base tapering to ~7 m, and an internal staircase of 22 steps. Built around 8,300- 8,000 BCE of undressed stone, it is among the earliest known monumental stone architecture (estimated to require thousands of person- days of labor). Its purpose remains debated, possible flood control, defense, ritual/ceremonial use, or even astronomical alignment related to the summer solstice shadow from nearby mountains. Round mudbrick houses (c. 5 m across) with clay- and- straw bricks and mud- smeared brush roofs filled the interior.
Other sites like WF16 (southern Jordan) feature large communal semi- subterranean structures with benches (one ~22 × 19 m), workshops, and storage buildings with raised mud- plaster floors. Northern Levant sites (e.g., Jerf el- Ahmar, Mureybet) include larger round or multi- chambered communal buildings.

PPNB Architecture

A major transition occurred: dwellings shifted predominantly to rectangular (quadrilinear) plans, reflecting new spatial concepts, denser settlement, and more complex household organization. Houses became larger and more elaborate, often multi- roomed, sometimes two- storied, with thick lime- plaster floors (highly polished, produced by heating limestone to 800- 900°C) that were a hallmark of the period.

Walls used mudbrick (increasingly rectangular and molded) on stone foundations, double- wall techniques (two faces of large stones with rubble fill), or stone slab construction in some areas.

“Pier houses” or “corridor/megaron” plans, rectangular halls subdivided by perpendicular piers and buttresses, were common in the southern Levant (e.g., at ʿAin Ghazal, Beidha, Yiftahel, Jericho). These supported roofs and created distinct activity zones (living, storage, workshops).

Lime and gypsum plaster expanded dramatically for floors, walls, and even sculptures or vessels (White Ware). Settlements grew larger (up to several hectares), with denser clustering of buildings. Special and ritual structures included cult areas, temples, or podium features (e.g., at ʿAin Ghazal, Beidha, Kfar HaHoresh).

In southeastern Anatolia (e.g., Çayönü), plans evolved from “grill” buildings to more complex tripartite or cellular forms, sometimes multi- level.

Building Materials and Techniques

Earth- based: Mudbrick (hand- formed or later molded, often tempered with chaff and straw), pisé, and mud mortar. Experimental reconstructions confirm local sediments mixed with plant temper and water worked well for walls and floors.

Stone: Undressed or roughly worked for foundations, walls, towers, and pillars; more refined slabs for stairs or paving.

Plaster: Lime (labor- intensive pyro technology) and gypsum; often burnished and sometimes painted or pigmented. This technology had roots in earlier periods but flourished in PPNB.

Organic: Wooden posts, beams, reeds and brush for roofs; perishable upper structures are poorly preserved.

Construction required coordinated labor, especially for monumental works, implying emerging social organization. Roofs were typically flat and usable as working platforms

Notable Sites Beyond Jericho

Göbekli Tepe (southeastern Turkey): Iconic for monumental circular enclosures (10- 30 m diameter) with T-shaped limestone pillars (up to 5.5 m tall, some anthropomorphic with animal reliefs), arranged around central pairs and set into stone walls and benches. Dated mainly PPNA to early PPNB (c. 9,600- 8,000 BCE); later phases show smaller rectangular structures. Built by hunter- gatherer groups with sophisticated planning (possible geometric alignments); interpreted as ritual and communal centers rather than purely domestic.

Southern Levant examples: ʿAin Ghazal (complex rectangular houses and ritual buildings), Beidha (pier houses and cult areas), WF16, Shkārat Msaied, and Baʿja (well- preserved stone architecture with rebuilding sequences).

Northern sites: Mureybet, Jerf el- Ahmar (communal buildings), Çayönü, and others showing regional variation.

Broader Significance

PPN architecture reflects the Neolithic transition: from mobile or semi-sedentary Natufian circular and semi-subterranean dwellings to more permanent, planned, and socially differentiated built environments.

The circular- to- rectangular shift, use of plaster, and monumental projects (towers, walls, enclosures) signal changes in social organization, ritual practices (including plastered skulls under floors in some cases), and concepts of “home” and community space.

Continuity with earlier traditions existed, but innovations supported larger populations and more complex societies. Regional diversity was high, stone- heavy in some areas, mudbrick- dominant in others, and form was driven more by cultural choices than purely by available materials or environment.

This architecture laid foundations for later Neolithic and urban developments across the Fertile Crescent. Ongoing excavations and experimental archaeology continue to refine understandings of construction processes, functions, and social implications.

Ruins of ancient columns surrounded by stone structures in a historical archaeological site under a clear blue sky. — The Wonders of Jericho: Exploring the Oldest Continuously Inhabited City on Earth

Environmental Setting

Jericho sits deep in the Jordan Rift Valley (about 250- 260 m below modern sea level near the site), in a hot desert climate. Annual rainfall is low (around 200 mm today, concentrated in winter), and the area is shielded by the Judean Mountains. The Ein es- Sultan spring, fed by a large groundwater catchment in limestone aquifers, has historically discharged thousands of liters per minute and has remained relatively stable for millennia. This oasis enabled early sedentism, plant cultivation (emmer wheat, barley, pulses), and later irrigation- based farming even when regional conditions were harsh.

Flood risks from seasonal runoff off nearby slopes (e.g., Jebel Quruntul) were also a factor; some researchers interpret the early Neolithic wall and tower partly as protection against flash floods and mudslides, which would have been more intense under wetter conditions.

Key Climate Phases and Impacts

Paleoclimate records (especially Dead Sea lake- level fluctuations, a proxy for regional precipitation) show clear links between hydroclimatic shifts and cultural developments at Jericho and nearby sites:

Late Pleistocene to early Holocene transition (including Younger Dryas, ~12,900- 11,600 years ago): Cold, dry conditions disrupted earlier patterns, but the subsequent warming and increased moisture at the start of the Holocene (~11,700-10,000 BP / ~9,700- 8,000 BCE) supported the shift to sedentism. Natufian groups and early Pre- Pottery Neolithic A (PPNA) communities at Jericho benefited from expanded resources, fertile soils (partly from earlier dust deposition), and reliable spring flow. This coincided with the rise of permanent villages and the beginnings of agriculture across the southern Levant.

Early Holocene wet phase and PPNA/PPNB flourishing (~10,000- 8,600 cal BP): Wetter conditions (higher Dead Sea levels) favored larger settlements. Jericho grew into a substantial proto- urban community with monumental architecture (wall and tower ~8,300- 8,000 BCE). Agriculture expanded under relatively favorable moisture regimes.

Arid events around 8.6 and 8.2 ka (~6,600–6,200 BCE): Abrupt drying (linked to the global 8.2 ka cold event and regional aridification) correlated with settlement stress. Jericho’s PPNB phase saw degeneration from a larger settlement toward a smaller village, and some nearby sites were abandoned. Dead Sea levels dropped sharply. Overall, the later Pottery Neolithic and Chalcolithic (~8,600- 5,600 cal BP) were relatively inhospitable, with fewer and smaller settlements regionally.

Mid- to- late Holocene fluctuations: Wetter intervals (e.g., ~5,600- 3,500 cal BP) supported recovery and growth of farming communities. Drier episodes, including the ~4.2 ka event, aligned with broader Near Eastern cultural disruptions and temporary declines or abandonments. Jericho experienced occupational hiatuses or reduced occupation at various points (including after the Early Bronze Age and in later periods), sometimes linked to drought, earthquakes (common along the Dead Sea Transform fault), or a combination of factors. One proposed major earthquake contributed to a long rural decline around the end of the 5th to early 4th millennium BCE.

Resilience and Limitations

Jericho’s oasis setting conferred unusual resilience compared with rain- dependent sites. The spring buffered against short- term droughts, allowing continuity or rapid reoccupation when conditions improved. However, prolonged aridification reduced agricultural productivity, limited population size, and contributed to abandonments or shifts in settlement patterns (e.g., movement toward better-watered valleys or higher ground). Seismic activity, flooding, and human factors (conflict, resource management) interacted with climate stresses.

In summary, climate amelioration after the last Ice Age enabled Jericho’s early success as one of the world’s oldest permanent settlements, while later arid pulses repeatedly tested its resilience. The Ein es-Sultan spring remained the critical constant that allowed repeated recovery. Modern studies of the spring system note ongoing hydrogeological and climate- related pressures, underscoring the long- term sensitivity of this oasis environment.

Interior view of a historic site featuring tall, ancient stone columns arranged in a spacious area with intricate tiled flooring and a modern roof structure. — Khirbet al-Mafjar, Jericho Jericho – Wikipedia

The 4.2- kiloyear event (also called the 4.2 ka BP event) was a major aridification episode that began around 2200 BCE (approximately 4,200 years before present) and lasted for much of the 22nd century BCE. It ranks among the most severe climatic events of the Holocene and marks the start of the current Meghalayan age. It involved prolonged drought, reduced precipitation (estimates of 30- 50% drops in parts of the eastern Mediterranean and Near East), cooler conditions in some regions, and increased dust flux. Evidence comes from lake levels (including the Dead Sea), speleothems, marine cores, and other proxies across North Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian subcontinent, and beyond.

It has been linked to societal disruptions, including the collapse of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia, the end of Egypt’s Old Kingdom, and changes in the Indus Valley and elsewhere.

In the Levant, the event often appears as a “W- shaped” pattern of two dry phases separated by a wetter interval in the south- central region.

Connection to Ancient Jericho (Tell es- Sultan)

Jericho’s Early Bronze Age (EBA) urban phase (roughly the 3rd millennium BCE) saw the site develop into a fortified city with substantial walls, public buildings, and agricultural intensification around the Ein es-Sultan spring. Radiocarbon and stratigraphic evidence indicate continuous occupation from the Early Bronze Age into the early Middle Bronze Age, followed by destruction and abandonment around 2000/1950 BCE. The city was later rebuilt and reached a peak in the Middle Bronze Age (c. 1700-1550 BCE).

Direct causation by the 4.2 ka event is debated and not straightforward for Jericho or the southern Levant more broadly:

Broader Near Eastern narratives often group the end of Early Bronze III urban cultures in Palestine/the southern Levant with the 4.2 ka drought, alongside Mesopotamian and Egyptian collapses.
However, high- resolution radiocarbon dating from multiple southern Levantine sites indicates that de-urbanization and the decline of EBA urban centers began earlier, around the mid-3rd millennium BCE (closer to 2500 BCE or the late 29th- 25th centuries BCE in some cases), well before the main onset of the 4.2 ka aridity. By the time the climatic event intensified around 2200 BCE, much of the region’s first urban system had already fragmented into smaller, more rural Early Bronze IV/Intermediate Bronze settlements. researchgate.net
At Jericho specifically, the abandonment dated near 2000/1950 BCE falls slightly after the core of the event. Possible contributing factors include residual or prolonged drought effects, earthquakes (common along the Dead Sea Transform fault), conflict, or socio- economic stresses. The oasis spring provided a buffer that supported resilience and later reoccupation, unlike purely rain- fed sites.

In the wider Jordan Valley and southern Levant, the event contributed to settlement contraction, shifts toward more mobile or pastoral strategies in drier zones, and habitat tracking (populations moving to better-watered areas such as river banks or spring- fed locations). Dead Sea level drops and regional arid proxies align with these cultural changes, though local responses varied and continuity existed in some well-watered spots.

Overall, while the 4.2 ka event formed part of a challenging climatic backdrop for late 3rd- millennium societies across the Near East, Jericho’s trajectory reflects a more complex interplay of climate, seismicity, and human factors. The site’s long- term continuity was repeatedly enabled by the reliable Ein es-Sultan spring, allowing recovery even after arid pulses and destructions. Scholarly views continue to refine the precise timing and relative weight of climate versus other drivers through improved radiocarbon sequences and multi- proxy studies.

Wrong, Euronews: Climate Change Has Not Created a Food, Energy, and Economic “Meta-Crisis”

The data show global crop production and yields reaching record levels, deaths from extreme weather collapsing over the long term, and many of today’s energy and economic problems arising from political choices and geopolitical conflicts rather than changes in climate.

A cartoon depicting a news anchor expressing panic about a 'meta-crisis' involving food, energy, and economy, emphasizing that these issues are not caused by climate change. The image features graphs showing crop yields, decreased deaths from weather disasters, and illustrations of people working in various sectors like farming and logistics.

By ClimateRealism

By Anthony Watts

Dry, cracked land with tractors visible in the distance, illustrating the impacts of climate change on agriculture.

Euronews claims climate change has evolved into a “meta-crisis” threatening food security, energy supplies, economies, water resources, and international security. This is misleading because the article largely substitutes predictions and assertions for measurements of what is actually happening. The data show global crop production and yields reaching record levels, deaths from extreme weather collapsing over the long term, and many of today’s energy and economic problems arising from political choices and geopolitical conflicts rather than changes in climate.

Euronews builds its case primarily around an interview with Emmanuella Doussis, UNESCO Chair on Climate Diplomacy at the University of Athens. Doussis declares climate change an economic, social, political, and geopolitical problem, linking it to competition for resources, migration, water shortages, food insecurity, and the energy transition.

Those are sweeping claims. Curiously, Euronews provides remarkably little observational evidence demonstrating that climate change is actually causing the worldwide “meta-crisis” its headline announces.

Perhaps the most obvious contradiction concerns food.

Doussis predicts, “We will face a very large, serious problem with food security.” But predictions about what might happen cannot erase what is happening.

Climate at a Glance: Crop Production summarizes data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization showing that global crop production and yields have risen dramatically during the period of modern warming. Its latest summary reports that the 2023 and 2024 global crop years produced the two highest global crop yields per acre on record.

Climate Realism has documented the same trend repeatedly. Global production of staple crops has increased substantially, and yields have repeatedly set records during recent decades. Even where individual crops suffer poor regional seasons because of drought, floods, pests, or other causes, that is not evidence of a deteriorating global food supply.

There are good reasons for this improvement. Agricultural technology, irrigation, fertilizers, improved crop varieties, mechanization, and better pest control have transformed farming. Modest warming can also lengthen growing seasons and reduce damaging frost events in some regions, while additional atmospheric carbon dioxide generally stimulates plant growth and improves water-use efficiency.

None of this means weather cannot damage crops. It always has. It means that portraying climate change as presently creating a global food-security crisis conflicts with the direction of observed agricultural production.

The article’s treatment of energy is equally peculiar.

Euronews describes moving away from fossil fuels as part of the solution to its supposed climate “meta-crisis,” while simultaneously acknowledging that doing so creates “new dependencies” involving lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and other materials. It concedes that fossil-fuel-producing nations could be economically weakened and that entirely new geopolitical dependencies would emerge.

That sounds less like a crisis caused by climate change than economic disruption caused by policies adopted in response to climate change.

Europe provides an obvious example. Energy prices do not rise because a thermometer records a slightly higher average temperature. Prices respond to fuel availability, generating capacity, taxes, regulations, subsidies, transmission costs, geopolitical disruptions, and government decisions about which power plants may operate.

Climate Realism has repeatedly documented how wind and solar cost comparisons can omit the expense of backup generation, transmission, storage, subsidies, and other system costs necessary to accommodate intermittent generation.

There is an important distinction here that Euronews blurs: costs created by climate policy are not costs created by climate change.

The same problem occurs when the article moves from energy to economics. Weather can certainly cause economic losses. Droughts, floods, hurricanes, heat waves, freezes, and wildfires have done so throughout human history. But declaring climate change responsible for a generalized economic crisis requires evidence that those hazards are worsening in ways attributable to climate change.

Climate at a Glance: Extreme Weather summarizes observational records for floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, heat waves, and other events. The picture is considerably more complicated than the simple worsening-disaster narrative presented by much of the media.

More importantly, human vulnerability to weather has declined spectacularly.

Climate at a Glance: Deaths from Extreme Weather reports that global deaths from weather-related disasters have fallen by more than 99 percent during the past century, using international disaster data.

That is a remarkable accomplishment. Wealth, infrastructure, fossil-fueled transportation, modern agriculture, heating, air conditioning, weather forecasting, communications, engineering, and emergency management have made human beings vastly more resilient to nature.

Ironically, Doussis herself provides perhaps the most sensible sentence in the entire Euronews article: “Climate change is not always to blame.”

She acknowledges that some Greek disasters reflect chronic failures in planning, complicated regulations, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient protection of vulnerable areas.

Exactly. That caveat deserves far more attention than Euronews gives it.

A flood becomes catastrophic when people build in floodplains, drainage systems are inadequate, warning systems fail, or infrastructure is poorly maintained. Drought becomes a water crisis when reservoirs, irrigation systems, groundwater resources, and water policy are poorly managed. A heat wave becomes more dangerous when electricity is expensive or unreliable and vulnerable people cannot afford air conditioning.

Labeling all these interconnected problems a climate “meta-crisis” does not explain them. It can actually obscure their real causes.

The Euronews article commits an increasingly common journalistic error. It begins with climate change, attaches virtually every economic, geopolitical, agricultural, and social problem to it, and then presents the resulting web of associations as evidence that climate change caused the problems in the first place.

That is not how causation works.

Climate changes. Weather varies. Individual regions will experience damaging droughts, floods, fires, freezes, and heat waves, just as they always have. Sensible governments should prepare for them.

But the real-world record does not resemble the spiraling “meta-crisis” Euronews describes. Farmers are producing more food. Crop yields continue reaching records. Humanity has become dramatically less vulnerable to extreme weather. And some of Europe’s most painful energy problems have resulted from decisions about energy production rather than changes in the weather.

Euronews could have investigated those inconvenient facts. Instead, it took a collection of predictions about food, water, migration, geopolitics, and energy, wrapped them together under the fashionable label “meta-crisis,” and called it climate journalism.

That’s not evidence. It’s a narrative looking for a crisis.

Climate- Science.press

Greening Drylands Conceal a Rising Boom-and-Bust Crisis

Abstract

Like this:

Al Gore: “The day is coming when our [Renewable Energy] momentum will overtake the resistance. We’re getting very close now”

Twenty years after An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore still believes in the climate fight: ‘We are going to win this’

Like this:

Energy Affordability: An IQ Test For New Yorkers That They Will Very Likely Fail

Like this:

Planetary Boundaries Health Check 2026

Like this:

We Came to New York Looking for Climate Activists. We Found Communists Instead.

From Climate Week to the Class War

Then We Brought Climate Week to Them

Where Did the Climate Activists Go?

Like this:

The 8.2 ka Cold Snap: How a Catastrophic Lake Drainage Weakened the AMOC and Cooled the Planet

Like this:

Bangkok Declares Citywide Flood Disaster as Monsoon Rains Overwhelm Canals

Like this:

Politicians organize to drive up the cost of electricity

Like this:

Jericho: 11,000 Years of Survival Against Climate Extremes

Like this:

Wrong, Euronews: Climate Change Has Not Created a Food, Energy, and Economic “Meta-Crisis”

Like this: