New York’s Climate Circus: Same Clowns, Emptier Promises

Every September the United Nations General Assembly’s high-level week coincides with what its promoters modestly call the world’s largest climate event – Climate Week NYC. The organisers insist the timing is no accident.

The 81st UNGA’s General Debate ran from September 22nd to 26th; Secretary-General António Guterres convened his “High-Level Meeting on Climate Action and the Just Transition” in the middle of it, on September 23rd; and Climate Week NYC filled the gaps around it from September 20th to 27th.

A satirical illustration depicting a circus theme in New York City for Climate Week, featuring clowns representing climate leaders making empty promises. In the foreground, concerned citizens hold bills and look worried about rising electricity costs, while other clowns celebrate financial gains. The background shows iconic NYC buildings, wind turbines, and the United Nations, highlighting the contrast between entertainment and serious climate issues.

From The Daily Sceptic

By Tilak Doshi

Aerial view of New York City skyline with skyscrapers, featuring text overlay that reads 'CLIMATE WEEK NYC' by Climate Group.

Every September the United Nations General Assembly’s high-level week coincides with what its promoters modestly call the world’s largest climate event – Climate Week NYC. The organisers insist the timing is no accident. With heads of state, ministers, bankers and the assembled apparatus of the climate-industrial complex already gathered for the General Assembly, running a parallel, thousand-event climate jamboree spares everyone a second transatlantic flight. This year the pattern held precisely to form.

The 81st UNGA’s General Debate ran from September 22nd to 26th; Secretary-General António Guterres convened his “High-Level Meeting on Climate Action and the Just Transition” in the middle of it, on September 23rd; and Climate Week NYC filled the gaps around it from September 20th to 27th. Research outfits such as Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy duly received star billing in the proceedings, as I noted last year when reviewing this event’s visible decline into irrelevance.

The two events are formally distinct – the General Assembly is the UN’s own sovereign-state machinery, while Climate Week is run by a private non-profit, the Climate Group, with no UN mandate at all – but the distinction is academic. The whole point of scheduling one alongside the other is that presidents, prime ministers, central bankers and NGO grandees are already in Manhattan for the diplomatic circuit, so a parallel programme of corporate pledges, academic research institutions and philanthropic panels can be organised at minimal extra travel cost. The result, year after year, is the same choreography: a sober-sounding UN track running alongside a carnival of announcements timed for maximum media pickup, with the same cast of characters drifting between the two rooms.

The Sermon from Turtle Bay

On September 23rd, Mr Guterres delivered his now-familiar green liturgy to the General Assembly: the world, he intoned, is crying out for “climate justice”; there is, naturally, “not a moment to lose”; and renewables, he assured delegates, are “the cheapest, fastest and most secure source of new electricity almost everywhere”, with clean energy having gone “from alternative to unstoppable”. As with every liturgy, doom is swiftly followed by salvation. He reassured the UN General Assembly that “fortunately, we have a way out”. It is the standard two-step of climate rhetoric: warn of Armageddon, then offer redemption.

The trouble is that the “cheapest electricity” claim collapses the moment it is measured honestly. The levelised-cost comparisons habitually cited strip out the cost of the backup capacity, transmission and storage that intermittent wind and solar require to keep a modern grid running. These are costs that, once included, erase the supposed savings of renewables. Nor did the Secretary-General pause to mention that electricity accounts for only around one-fifth of global final energy consumption. The other four-fifths – heating, transport, heavy industry – still runs overwhelmingly on hydrocarbons.

Compare the Secretary-General’s triumphalism with the observation by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright when he said that roughly $10 trillion in cumulative global spending on wind, solar and batteries over the past two decades has still not lifted their combined share of global primary energy past about 3%. Twenty years and 10 trillion dollars for a 3% penetration level in global energy use is not “unstoppable” growth of renewable energy. It is a tiny increase at spectacular cost.

None of this stops the UN statisticians from producing ever more flattering numbers. The technical reports that accompany these annual UN set pieces routinely cite figures from the International Renewable Energy Agency. IRENA claims solar costs falling by roughly 40% and offshore wind by over 50% relative to fossil generation, and “trillions of dollars a year” now flow into “clean energy investment” worldwide. No mention is made of the fact that these “trillions of dollars” are not private sector investments made with the prospect of profits. Rather, they are made up overwhelmingly of taxpayer-financed subsidies imposed by government policies.

Energy deprivation in the Empire State

The irony is that all this UN and Climate Week NYC triumphalism is staged in a state where energy reliability is failing. New York Governor Kathy Hochul’s climate policies – gas pipeline bans, ballooning offshore-wind cost overruns and a self-inflicted capacity crunch – have made New York a case study in engineered energy scarcity. Her policies leave households and businesses paying among the highest electricity prices in the country for a supposedly cheaper fuel mix.

As Francis Menton, writing in his Manhattan Contrarian blog, has documented exhaustively, New York state’s energy policy under Governor Kathy Hochul is anything but rational. Ms Hochul’s administration continues to pass the costs of its energy fantasies on to households and businesses least able to absorb them. New Yorkers, in short, are living the counter-experiment to Mr Guterres’s UNGA sermon in real time – only a few subway stops from where he delivered it. It is important to note just how perverse this juxtaposition is. The state that hosts the world’s premier climate jamboree is simultaneously demonstrating, in its own utility bills, precisely why the premise of that jamboree is utterly false.

Berlin’s fossil-fuelled sermon and UK’s ‘Mad Ed’ joins the choir

Not to be outdone, Germany’s Federal Environment Minister Carsten Schneider travelled to New York for Climate Week and the General Assembly to unveil his country’s “roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels”. This is the same Germany that, having shuttered its nuclear and coal fleet on ideological grounds, now pays among the highest household electricity and gas prices in Europe. It has been leaning ever more heavily on coal-fired power to keep its lights on. A German minister telling the UN that the world should leave fossil fuels, while his own system still leans on lignite, hard coal and gas every time the wind drops, is not merely ironic. It is the defining genre of this entire New York season – grand declarations issued in Manhattan, detached from the burden of electricity bills paid by working households.

Great Britain, of course, is on the same track as deindustrialising Germany. Ed Miliband – for four years the face of the UK’s own Net Zero crusade as Energy Secretary, and now, following a summer reshuffle, Foreign Secretary – addressed New York Climate Week’s opening ceremony on September 21st. He struck the now-mandatory note of triumphalism, boasting that 2026 would see $2.2 trillion flow into clean energy worldwide against $1.2 trillion into fossil fuels. He said that “I think that deserves a round of applause.”

Money spent on intermittent, weather-dependent renewables is not the same as actual energy delivered in kilowatt hours and undoes Mr Guterres’s arithmetic. Jaime Jessop has thoroughly dissected the Guardian‘s credulous amplification of Mr Miliband’s numbers. The Net Zero enthusiasms of “Mad Ed” have coincided with the UK recording the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world – 27% above Germany’s, and a multiple of America’s and China’s. Whitehall’s energy policy is not merely in the same fantasy land as Berlin’s; on the actual electricity bill, it is worse.

Money that does not exist

On climate finance, Mr Guterres called on developed countries to mobilise at least $300 billion a year for developing nations, rising to $1,300 billion a year by 2035. These figures are not new – they are the headline outputs of the New Collective Quantified Goal thrashed out at COP29 in Baku, later dressed up as the Baku to Belém Roadmap ahead of COP30 – but reciting them again at the UNGA does nothing to make them real. The unreality is glaring. The EU is running historic deficits, several member states are flirting with fiscal crisis and European governments are simultaneously being pressed to fund ever-larger military budgets in their campaign against Russia. And the UN chief Guterres himself has warned that the world body faces “imminent financial collapse” due to non-payment of dues by member nations.

Conjuring another trillion-plus dollars a year for “climate finance” out of treasuries that cannot balance their own books is merely wishful accounting. Developing countries were promised similarly grand sums before, most notably the still-unmet $100 billion pledge dating back to 2009. Every year the target grows larger and the political and fiscal capacity to meet it shrinks further. That gap between rhetoric and treasury encapsulates the entire story of the UN’s climate diplomacy since the UN Copenhagen climate summit in 2009.

The New York City setting of the September climate jamborees reveals the farce. This is a city carrying colossal municipal debt, some of the country’s heaviest taxation, an acute affordability and housing crisis and rising rents. It is now governed by socialist Mayor Zohran Mamdani. He took office on January 1st 2026 pledging to entrench the city’s sanctuary-city status and pursue rent freezes for the roughly two million New Yorkers living in rent-stabilised apartments. Add to that a surge in concern over antisemitism, strained public services, collapsing institutional trust and a political class seemingly convinced that weather-dependent wind, solar and batteries can run a modern metropolis, and one has the full backdrop against which the visiting dignitaries assure each other that the “just transition” and “climate justice” march on. The gap between what the elites gathered at Turtle Bay believe about energy and how ordinary city residents actually live is, for some reason, not evident to the luminaries assembled at the September climate fest.

The road to nowhere, via Ankara

This year’s proceedings are also a warm-up act for COP31, due to be held in Turkey. Readers who followed my assessments of previous UN climate summits (here and here) will recognise the pattern: grand communiqués, promises of “energy transition” and no discernible dent in the world’s actual fuel mix and carbon emissions. The developing world is, in fact, moving in precisely the opposite direction from the one prescribed in Manhattan. China and India – together home to nearly three billion people – are doubling down on coal-fired power generation, partly as insurance against the energy-security shock triggered by the Strait of Hormuz blockade earlier this year.

The most sober forecasting available is the recently published S&P Global’s Multidimensional Global Energy Pathways report, authored with the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, with a foreword by Daniel Yergin. It offers an analytically robust view of where fossil fuels are headed through 2060 without preaching the green narrative. Fossil fuels remain dominant and are still growing in absolute terms across large parts of Asia, whatever the UNGA choir may sing about “unstoppable” transitions. There is little reason to expect that COP31 in Turkey will produce anything different from COP28, COP29 or COP30 before it: another communiqué, another finance pledge, another round of applause for phrases such as “accelerate climate action” and “just transition” – whose vacuousness is obvious to any sceptical reader on first inspection – and another year in which the world’s actual energy mix moves only marginally, if at all, in the direction the UN insists is inevitable.

The circus moves on

What New York hosts every September is not serious, fact-based analysis or credible environmental and economic argument. It is a travelling circus that returns, on schedule, to a city groaning under precisely the kind of self-inflicted energy costs its visiting luminaries insist are cheap.

The largest energy consumers in Asia – China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam – are choosing coal over green communiqués. They understand energy security and the wellbeing of their citizens, unlike the assembled dignitaries and their academic advisors gathered in New York City this week. Energy reality does not bend to a General Assembly speech, however loudly it is applauded. Reliable, affordable energy is not a rhetorical achievement to be announced from a podium; it is an engineering and economic problem that has to be solved on the ground, one grid, one household bill and one industrial customer at a time.

Until the annual September pageant in New York grapples realistically with energy policy, the gap between the green liturgy and affordable, secure energy supply will keep widening. The clown show, sadly, will be back again next September in New York City.

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

No, Arctic Sea Ice Is Not Near a 20-Year High

The key Arctic section asserts that sea ice “has rebounded sharply from its summer minimum, with late-September extent now running near the top of the entire post- 2007 range” and is “close to the highest late-September level of the past 20 years,” citing a Sept 27 value near 5.7 million km².

According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), Arctic sea ice reached its likely annual minimum of 4.60 million square kilometers (1.78 million square miles) on September 12, 2026. This ties with 2008, 2010, and 2025 for tenth- lowest in the nearly 48- year satellite record (starting 1979). It sits well below the 1981- 2010 average minimum (by about 1.62 million km², roughly the size of Alaska) and is consistent with the post- 2007 pattern of persistently low extents.

Aerial view of Arctic sea ice with floating icebergs under a night sky illuminated by the northern lights, featuring text about Arctic sea ice levels and climate statistics.
AI generated by Grok

The key Arctic section asserts that sea ice “has rebounded sharply from its summer minimum, with late-September extent now running near the top of the entire post- 2007 range” and is “close to the highest late-September level of the past 20 years,” citing a Sept 27 value near 5.7 million km².

It contrasts this with Al Gore- era warnings and notes the 2026 minimum (4.60 million km²) was higher than 2007 and 2012.

What the actual data show

  • NSIDC (primary satellite record): The 2026 daily minimum was 4.60 million km² on Sept 12, tied for 10th- lowest in the nearly 48- year record (with 2008, 2010, and 2025). The last 20 years (2007- 2026) are the lowest 20 September minima on record. It remains ~1.62 million km² below the 1981-2010 average.
  • There has been little net decline in the September minimum since ~2007 (a well- documented plateau amid natural variability), but every year in that period is still far lower than pre- 2007 values. Calling late- September levels a “near 20-year high” within a period that itself contains only the lowest extents is rhetorical sleight- of- hand.
  • Seasonal freeze- up after the mid-September minimum is normal. Rapid early freeze does not erase the low starting point or the long-term loss of multi-year ice. Independent trackers (e.g., Zack Labe/JAXA) place late- September 2026 extent in the lower part of the recent distribution (roughly 13th-16th lowest for the date), still hundreds of thousands of km² below the 2000s mean and well below earlier decades.

Alternative products (OSI SAF, MASIE) can show modestly higher numbers due to different sensors or and processing, but they do not change the ranking relative to the modern low baseline.

Map showing Arctic sea ice extent on September 12, 2016, with highlighted modern ice extent area compared to historical data from 1981-2010.
This NASA Blue Marble image shows Arctic sea ice on September 12, 2026, when sea ice likely reached its minimum extent for the year. Sea ice extent for September 12 was 4.60 million square kilometers (1.78 million square miles)—ranked tenth lowest with 2008, 2010, and 2025 in the satellite record. — Credit: National Snow and Ice Data Center/ NASA Earth Observatory

Arctic sea ice extent in late September 2026 is among the lowest in the satellite record (tied for ~10th lowest minimum), not near a 20- year high.

According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), Arctic sea ice reached its likely annual minimum of 4.60 million square kilometers (1.78 million square miles) on September 12, 2026. This ties with 2008, 2010, and 2025 for tenth- lowest in the nearly 48- year satellite record (starting 1979). It sits well below the 1981- 2010 average minimum (by about 1.62 million km², roughly the size of Alaska) and is consistent with the post- 2007 pattern of persistently low extents.

Key points from NSIDC and related analyses:

  • The 20 lowest September minima in the satellite record all occurred in the last 20 years (2007- 2026).
  • The long- term trend (1979- 2026) shows a decline of about 11.8% per decade relative to the 1981-2010 average, or roughly 73,200 km² lost per year, though the September minimum has shown little net decline (a “plateau”) since around 2007 amid year- to- year variability.
  • This year’s value is still far lower than any pre- 2007 minimum and remains well below 1980s, early 2000s levels. Scientists note it reflects a fundamentally changed Arctic with thinner, younger ice, even if weather (e.g., cooler conditions or cloud cover in parts of recent summers) limited further losses this year.

Slight differences appear across datasets due to sensors, processing, and definitions (e.g., concentration thresholds or multi- day averaging).

The Met Office/OSI SAF index reported a minimum around 5.06 million km² (14th lowest), and some products like MASIE have shown modestly higher daily values in recent weeks, but these still rank low historically and do not approach mid- 2000s or earlier levels for the seasonal minimum period. By late September (after the minimum), ice is typically beginning its seasonal regrowth, but current extents remain in the low recent range.

Claims of a “near 20- year high” do not align with the primary observational records.

Authoritative sources such as NSIDC, NASA, and supporting analyses consistently describe 2026 as another low year in a long- term downward trend, with the recent period dominated by the lowest extents on record. Full monthly analyses are typically released in early October.

Map showing Arctic sea ice extent on 12th September 2026, highlighting the Beaufort Sea, Laptev Sea, and Greenland Sea with annotations. The white area indicates sea ice, while the surrounding blue represents ocean water.
Arctic sea ice extent on 12th September 2026, with 1981-2010 average extent indicated in orange, and the regions referred to in the text labelled. Data are from EUMETSAT OSI SAF (Baordo et al., 2023).
Briefing on Arctic sea ice minimum and Antarctic sea ice maximum report – September 2026 – Met Office

The last 20 years (2007- 2026) hold the 20 lowest Arctic September sea ice minima in the satellite record (since 1979), not the highest.

According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC Sea Ice Index), the 2026 daily minimum (5-day average) was 4.60 million km² on September 12, tying with 2008, 2010, and 2025 for 10th- lowest overall. All post- 2006 years remain lower than every pre- 2007 year. There has been little net trend (a “plateau”) in the September minimum since ~2007 amid year- to- year variability, but the levels stay far below those of the 1980s, early 2000s.

Lowest September daily minima (NSIDC, million km²)

Approximate values from NSIDC rankings and analyses (5-day averages; values within ~0.04 million km² are treated as tied):

Rank (lowest)Year(s)Minimum extent (million km²)Approximate date
120123.39Sept. 17
220203.82Sept. 16
3- 52007, 2016, 20194.16- 4.19Mid-to-late Sept.
6- 72024, 20234.25- 4.26Mid-to-late Sept.
820114.34Sept. 11
920154.43Sept. 9
10- 132008, 2025, 2026, 20104.59- 4.62Mid- to- late Sept.

The remaining years in 2007- 2026 (e.g., 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2021, 2022) fill out the rest of the lowest 20, generally in the ~4.6- 5.3 million km² range for their daily minima (still well below pre- 2007 values). September monthly average extents are typically a bit higher than the single-day (or 5- day) minimum.

For context:

  • 1981- 2010 average September minimum ≈ 6.22 million km².
  • Pre- 2007 minima were consistently higher (often 5.5- 7 and more million km²).
  • Long- term linear decline (1979- 2026): ~11.8% per decade relative to the 1981- 2010 average, or roughly 73,000 km² per year.

Data come primarily from NSIDC’s passive- microwave satellite record (Sea Ice Index). Minor differences exist across products (e.g., OSI SAF, JAXA, MASIE) due to sensors and processing, but the ranking of the last 20 years as the lowest is consistent.

Full monthly summaries and final confirmation of the 2026 minimum are typically released by NSIDC in early October. Interactive graphs and downloadable tables are available on the NSIDC Sea Ice Today / Charctic tools.

Doom Never Goes Out of Fashion: The Problem With PIK’s “Planetary Health Check”

On September 21st, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) released its 2026 Planetary Health Check, an annual report now authored, we are told, by more than 60 scientists.

The seven transgressed boundaries, PIK tells us, are climate change, biosphere integrity, land-system change, freshwater change, biogeochemical flows, novel entities and ocean acidification. Only stratospheric ozone and atmospheric aerosol loading remain, for now, within bounds.

The “planetary boundaries” framework, first proposed in 2009, holds that nine interlinked Earth-system processes must remain within defined “safe limits” to preserve planetary stability.

A satirical illustration featuring a woman in a dramatic black dress made of various alarming phrases, representing climate issues. She stands in front of an audience, with a humorous emphasis on catastrophic themes like 'Climate Breakdown' and 'Ecosystem Collapse'. In the background, a shopkeeper promotes the 'Doom Boutique' with customer reviews highlighting skepticism about data.

From Tilak´s Substack

By Tilak Doshi

A healthcare professional holds a small globe in both hands, symbolizing global health and care.

On September 21st, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) released its 2026 Planetary Health Check, an annual report now authored, we are told, by more than 60 scientists. The Guardian duly reported, as it always does, the verdict with the gravity the occasion apparently demanded: the planetary life-support systems on which humanity depends have deteriorated to their worst levels ever recorded, and seven of nine “planetary boundaries” are now breached at their “highest ever levels of transgression”.

The seven transgressed boundaries, PIK tells us, are climate change, biosphere integrity, land-system change, freshwater change, biogeochemical flows, novel entities and ocean acidification. Only stratospheric ozone and atmospheric aerosol loading remain, for now, within bounds. Having delivered this verdict, PIK’s sixty co-authors extend the traditional mercy of the apocalyptic genre: salvation remains possible, if only humanity accelerates action to “return to the safe operating space” and thereby secures “shared future prosperity”. It is a formula as old as the genre itself — diagnose civilisational catastrophe, then offer just enough hope to keep the reader turning the page, or better still, funding the institute.

These cycles of doom repeat themselves regularly (remember the Club of Rome’s 1972 report Limits to Growth anyone?) The PIK report is simply the latest instalment. It deserves to be read carefully, not because its science is compelling, but because its rhetorical machinery — the appeal to consensus, the confusion of value judgement with measurement and the use of pseudo-scientific “tipping points” is now so deeply embedded in Western policy discourse that it has driven trillions of dollars in investment and regulation.

Nine boundaries, one big assumption

The “planetary boundaries” framework, first proposed in 2009, holds that nine interlinked Earth-system processes must remain within defined “safe limits” to preserve planetary stability. It is a seductive idea: a single dashboard, nine dials, and a simple readout of humanity’s report card. The trouble is that these ‘dials’ have no scientific content. As the Breakthrough Institute noted in its detailed review of the concept’s scientific foundations, the great majority of the nine boundaries — land-system change, biosphere integrity, nitrogen and phosphorus flows, freshwater use, aerosol loading and novel entities — have no identified global biophysical “tipping point” at all.

Infographic illustrating the Planetary Boundaries framework, highlighting nine environmental thresholds: Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading, Ocean Acidification, Freshwater Change, Land System Change, Climate Change, Biogeochemical Flows, Novel Entities, and Biosphere Integrity, including indicators of safe operating space and increasing risks.

Climate change and ocean acidification are nominally the exceptions, in that both have genuinely global physical drivers — but a global driver is not the same thing as a well-quantified, catastrophic one. MIT’s Richard Lindzen has long argued that the roughly one degree Celsius of warming observed since the pre-industrial era is consistent with a climate sensitivity to doubled CO2. This is well below the range built into the models PIK and the IPCC rely on and sits comfortably within the bounds of natural climate variability.

Ocean acidification fares no better under scrutiny: the ocean’s average surface pH, still solidly alkaline at around 8.1, has fallen by roughly 0.1 units since industrialisation — a shift that, as shown by field studies of natural pH variability documented by Matt Ridley, is dwarfed by the swings that reef and open-ocean sites already experience within a single day or season. Neither of PIK’s two supposedly rigorous, globally-driven boundaries survives contact with the underlying data appreciably better than the other seven.

A single global number for a process that operates locally is not a scientific measurement. It is an arbitrary value judgement presented with the authority of a measured threshold. The entire framework, moreover, treats the Holocene — the roughly 12,000-year climatic interval since the last ice age — as the one true “safe operating space” for humanity, as though any departure from Holocene baselines were self-evidently catastrophic. Yet, as critics of the concept have long pointed out, many of the very changes PIK now labels “transgressions” — expanded fertiliser use, land conversion for agriculture, freshwater withdrawal, higher atmospheric CO2 — are precisely what enabled large-scale agriculture, mass nutrition and the extraordinary rise in human welfare over the past two centuries. There is remarkably little evidence that crossing any of PIK’s chosen numbers produces a sudden, planet-wide collapse in habitability.

Consider the report’s headline climate metric: the 350 parts-per-million CO2 boundary. This figure did not emerge from an IPCC consensus process. It originated with James Hansen’s 2008 paper, adopted wholesale into the planetary-boundaries architecture. What the “breach” framing omits is the geological record: for most of the past 500 million years, atmospheric CO2 has run at several multiples of today’s level, and life did not merely survive those eras but flourished in them.

NASA’s own satellite data confirm as much now: a landmark NASA-funded study attributes the bulk of the global greening observed since the 1980s — new leaf cover equivalent to twice the area of the continental United States — directly to rising CO2 fertilising plant growth. Princeton physicist William Happer, in written testimony to Germany’s Bundestag, has gone further, arguing that CO2 concentrations have in fact been dangerously low across most of the recent geological past, and that additional CO2 is a net benefit to agriculture, forestry and photosynthetic life generally. None of this fits the “massive and dangerous breach” framing.

The Limits to Growth, redux

None of this is new. PIK’s “planetary health check” stands squarely in the tradition of the Club of Rome’s 1972 report The Limits to Growth, which ran a computer model of five interacting global variables — population, agriculture, resources, industrial output, and pollution — and concluded that unchecked growth would collide with natural resource limits within a matter of decades. The model’s arbitrary assumptions produced arbitrary conclusions, dressed in the borrowed authority of systems science and computer modelling. Economists at the time savaged the exercise as an elaborate apparatus concealing unfalsifiable claims.

Malthusian gloom, in other words, never really goes out of fashion; it merely changes its wardrobe. Where the Club of Rome had mainframe computers and system dynamics diagrams, PIK has Earth-system modelling and a “Planetary Health Check” branded website. The underlying choice on offer, then as now, is the same: either humanity abandons industrial civilisation or it faces Armageddon. I have written before about how this framing has resurfaced in the contemporary ‘degrowth’ movement, which dresses the same anti-growth instinct in the more marketable language of ‘wellbeing economics’ and planetary limits. PIK’s report is simply the scientific-sounding scaffolding on which that political project is built.

Sixty scientists, zero falsifiability

There is an old, likely apocryphal, story about Albert Einstein. Confronted with a pamphlet titled 100 Authors Against Einstein which denounced the theory of relativity, he is said to have remarked that if he were wrong, one scientist with proof would have been enough. The anecdote endures because it captures something true about science: authority by headcount is not evidence. Sixty PIK co-authors signing a report is a demonstration of institutional consensus, not of a tested and falsifiable hypothesis. Science, as Karl Popper argued, proceeds by proposing hypotheses that can in principle be proven wrong and then rigorously trying to prove them wrong — not by assembling ever-larger committees of agreement. A plurality of scientists agreeing has, historically, been wrong before; the early 20th century’s favourable view of eugenics was also, in its day, a consensus position among credentialed experts.

Judged by that Popperian standard, PIK’s “planetary health check” fails at the very first hurdle. Its “tipping points” — the supposed thresholds beyond which Earth systems flip irreversibly into a new and debilitated state — are treated throughout as settled fact rather than contested hypothesis. Yet large, complex equilibrium systems generally do the opposite of what catastrophist framing assumes: when perturbed, they tend back towards equilibrium, as described by Le Chatelier’s principle. The “tipping point” is a scare quote with no scientific content.

The German science blog Klimanachrichten has made precisely this case against PIK directly, in an analysis summarised and translated by No Tricks Zone. Its central argument is that PIK researchers routinely interpret ordinary statistical noise in climate data — natural, historically unremarkable fluctuations — as evidence of a permanent, accelerating catastrophe. On this reading, the “accelerations” PIK reports are not statistically distinguishable from background variability. “Tipping points,” the critique continues, function for PIK less as a proven physical mechanism than as a psychological instrument: a way of instilling fear and shaping policy that borrows the vocabulary, but not the evidentiary discipline, of science.

This is hardly a new complaint against the doom-forecasting industry. The Competitive Enterprise Institute has catalogued more than 50 years of confidently declared environmental deadlines — mass starvation, resource exhaustion, the ‘end of oil’, ice-free summers by dates now long past — that have come and gone without incident. The predictions fail; the institutions and the Al Gores issuing them rarely pay a reputational price, and the doom-forecasting business simply issues an updated deadline. PIK’s 2026 report reads as this year’s instalment of a genre that has been wrong, repeatedly and specifically, for half a century, without noticeably updating its priors.

What is it about the Germans?

Ideology has a near-miraculous capacity to reshape how intellectual elites misperceive objective reality and impose their views by compliant mass media which amplify the ideology into received wisdom. Germany’s climate politics offer a case study. There is a peculiar metaphysical puzzle at the heart of all this well captured by Rupert Darwall’s book on the totalitarian roots of the climate industrial complex that deserves more attention than it gets. PIK is a German institution, and Germany today presents one of the odder spectacles in the industrialised world. Sixty German scientists confidently inform the world that industrial civilisation must be reined in after the country dismantled its own nuclear and coal capacity in moralistic fervour – deindustrialising its own economy, felling millennia-old Teutonic forest for wind turbines that cause habitat loss and kill birds of prey, and exporting, through institutions like PIK, an ‘end of the world’ mania to the rest of Europe and beyond. It is an industrial civilisation that appears, in its official climate discourse, to have turned against itself, sacrificing the welfare of its citizens at the altar of Gaia.

Adaptation, not apocalypse

The question that PIK-style reports systematically avoid is the William Nordhaus question: given real but modest and manageable warming, what is the economically optimal, gradual path of adaptation and carbon pricing, as opposed to the demand for immediate, sweeping transformation justified by worst-case unscientific “tipping-point” scenarios? Even the Nordhaus question is overstated. As William Happer and W. A. van Wijngaarden show, CO₂’s strong absorption bands are already largely saturated, so each extra increment of the gas traps far less heat than the last in a logarithmic function. The “planetary-boundaries” framework, dressed up annually as a “health check”, presents an essentially political judgement. The planet is not a medical patient, and it has no need for doctors prescribing a modern version of bloodletting as a cure.

A patient’s chart is only as good as the thresholds written on it. When those thresholds are arbitrary, unfalsifiable and renewed every September with the same verdict — worse than ever, but redeemable if only we act right now — readers would do well to ask not whether the planet is sick, but whether the diagnosis was ever really about the planet at all.

The 60 doctors at PIK are fake and doom-mongering never goes out of fashion; it only changes its letterhead.

This article was first published in the Daily Sceptic https://dailysceptic.org/2026/09/27/doom-never-goes-out-of-fashion-the-problem-with-the-planetary-health-check/

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

How Climate Shocks Helped End Europe’s First Advanced Civilization: The Minoans and the 3.2 ka Drought

The Minoans were a Bronze Age civilization centered on the island of Crete in the eastern Mediterranean, widely regarded as Europe’s first advanced civilization.

Climate played a significant role in the environment of Minoan Crete and is widely discussed as a contributing factor (alongside natural disasters like the Santorini (Thera) eruption, earthquakes, and Mycenaean influence) in the civilization’s gradual decline after its peak.

The date of the Minoan eruption of Santorini (Thera) remains one of the most debated topics in Bronze Age Mediterranean chronology. No single exact year has universal agreement, but scientific evidence (especially radiocarbon) has increasingly favored an earlier date than traditional archaeological estimates.

Ruins of Minoan civilization in a dry landscape, with an olive tree in the foreground and a volcanic eruption in the background, accompanied by the title about climate shocks and the 3.2 ka drought.
AI generated by Grok

The Minoans were a Bronze Age civilization centered on the island of Crete in the eastern Mediterranean, widely regarded as Europe’s first advanced civilization.

They flourished roughly from about 3000 BCE to around 1100 BCE (with their peak in the Middle and early Late Bronze Age, c. 2000- 1450 BCE). British archaeologist Sir Arthur Evans named them after the legendary King Minos of Greek myth (linked to the Minotaur and the labyrinth), based on his excavations at Knossos beginning in 1900.

They developed from Neolithic farming communities (settlers arriving around 7000 BCE, likely from Anatolia or nearby regions) into a sophisticated maritime society. Genetic evidence indicates they were largely local Europeans descended from earlier Neolithic inhabitants, related to later Mycenaeans, with no significant North African ancestry in key studies.

Key Features of Minoan Society

Palaces and urban centers: Monumental complexes at Knossos (the largest), Phaistos, Malia, Zakros, and others served as administrative, economic, ceremonial, and possibly religious hubs. This featured advanced architecture, including multi-story buildings, light wells, drainage systems, and vibrant frescoes depicting nature, marine life, processions, and activities like bull- leaping.

Economy and trade: They were skilled seafarers and traders, exchanging goods (including metals for bronze) across the Aegean, with Egypt, the Levant, Anatolia, and farther afield. Crete’s fertility supported agriculture, while their navy and networks made them a regional power without clear evidence of large-scale militarism or fortifications in earlier periods.

Art, culture, and writing: Distinctive pottery (e.g., Marine Style), figurines (such as the Snake Goddess), jewelry, and sports- like activities. They used undeciphered scripts: Cretan hieroglyphs and Linear A (administrative, still largely unread). Later, under Mycenaean influence, Linear B (an early form of Greek) appeared.

Religion and society: Evidence points to nature-focused practices, possible priestly or elite leadership centered on the palaces, and a relatively peaceful, prosperous society (though this view has been nuanced by later research). Chronology is often divided into Early, Middle, and Late Minoan periods, with “palatial” phases marked by palace construction and rebuilding after earthquakes.

Their culture influenced later Greek mythology and the Mycenaeans of mainland Greece.

What Happened to Them?

The Minoan civilization did not vanish overnight but declined through a combination of natural disasters, internal changes, and external takeover, transitioning into a Mycenaean- dominated phase on Crete before the broader Late Bronze Age collapse around 1200 BCE.

Natural disasters: Frequent earthquakes damaged or destroyed palaces (e.g., around 1700 BCE, leading to rebuilding). The massive volcanic eruption of Thera (modern Santorini), dated around 1600 BCE (or early 1500s BCE in some radiocarbon estimates), was a major event, one of the largest in human history. It generated tsunamis that hit Crete’s northern coast, ash fall that affected agriculture and water, and likely disrupted trade networks and food supplies. It did not immediately end the civilization (Minoan sites continued for generations), but it acted as a catalyst, causing economic stress, social disruption, and decentralization.

Destructions around 1450 BCE: Widespread fires and abandonment of many secondary sites and palaces (Knossos largely survived longer). These appear deliberate rather than purely natural, pointing to conflict, possibly internal upheaval, elite competition over resources, or invasion.

Mycenaean takeover: Weakened Minoans faced increasing influence and likely conquest by Mycenaeans from mainland Greece. By around 1450- 1400 BCE, Mycenaeans controlled key sites (especially Knossos), introduced Linear B administration, and blended cultures. Knossos was later destroyed (c. 1370- 1300 BCE). Remaining Minoan elements persisted in a “Postpalatial” period under Mycenaean or mixed rule, with some populations moving to more defensible inland sites.

Other contributing factors debated by scholars include climate shifts (e.g., possible droughts linked to ENSO patterns), trade disruptions, and social/political fragility. By the time of the wider Mediterranean Bronze Age collapse (c. 1200 BCE), distinct Minoan palace culture had long faded, absorbed into or succeeded by Mycenaean and later Greek developments. Their legacy endured in art, myth (e.g., Minos, the Labyrinth), and the foundations of Aegean civilization.

Exact details remain incomplete because Linear A is undeciphered and much relies on archaeology rather than written records. Ongoing research continues to refine dates and interpretations of the Thera eruption’s precise impact and the nature of the Mycenaean transition.

Ruins of the Palace of Knossos with a rising sun in the background, surrounded by greenery and dramatic clouds.
Throwback to the Bronze Age in Minoan and Mycenaean Crete | Elissos

Climate played a significant role in the environment of Minoan Crete and is widely discussed as a contributing factor (alongside natural disasters like the Santorini (Thera) eruption, earthquakes, and Mycenaean influence) in the civilization’s gradual decline after its peak.

Crete’s Mediterranean climate, mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers, supported agriculture (cereals, olives, vines) and maritime trade, but the island was vulnerable to shifts in precipitation, temperature, and extreme events.

Climatic Context During the Minoan Period

Paleoclimate records (pollen, speleothems/oxygen isotopes, marine cores, tree rings) show progressive mid- to- late Holocene drying across the Eastern Mediterranean, with fluctuations rather than steady conditions. Early and Middle Bronze Age phases (roughly before ~1700- 1600 BCE) included periods that were relatively wetter and cooler in places, supporting population growth and palace development. Later phases saw increased aridity stress.

Some researchers describe a possible “Minoan Little Ice Age” or cooler and wetter intervals in the second millennium BCE, which could have increased water availability in some ways but also brought more unpredictable or extreme precipitation patterns. Evidence from sites like Palaikastro wells and pollen records indicates sensitivity to drought even during otherwise favorable periods.

Key Climate Impacts Linked to Decline

ENSO (El Niño- Southern Oscillation) and drier conditions: A 2010 study in Climate of the Past argued that climate change, specifically intensified El Niño activity, contributed to the slow demise of the Minoans. Proxy data show El Niño events correlate with drier conditions over Crete. A shift in ENSO dynamics around 3000 BCE led to a series of unusually strong and frequent El Niño events beginning ~1450 BCE and lasting centuries. This would have reduced precipitation, stressed agriculture and water resources, and compounded other pressures during the period of palace destructions and Mycenaean takeover. Pollen analyses have been cited as supporting severe drought signals in relevant intervals.

Broader Eastern Mediterranean aridification and the 3.2 ka event: Progressive drying culminated in severe drought episodes around 1400- 900 BCE (overlapping the later Minoan and Mycenaean phases and the wider Late Bronze Age collapse). These arose from the alignment of natural climate cycles (Atlantic variability, orbital trends) amplifying dryness on an already aridifying background. Records from the Levant, Anatolia, Peloponnese, and Crete show reduced effective moisture, affecting agriculture-dependent societies. While the classic Minoan palace system had already transformed by ~1450- 1400 BCE, residual Minoan elements and the broader Aegean faced ongoing stress into the post- palatial period and Greek Dark Ages.

Thera (Santorini) eruption climatic effects (~1600 BCE or early- mid 16th century BCE, dates still debated): Beyond tsunamis and ash fall on Crete (which damaged coastal areas, salted fields, and disrupted agriculture temporarily), the eruption injected aerosols into the atmosphere. This could have caused short- term cooling, reduced sunlight, and anomalous weather (volcanic winter effects), leading to crop failures, famine risks, and trade disruptions for years. Ash layers and environmental proxies on Crete and nearby show impacts, though the eruption’s global climate forcing is now often ranked lower than some earlier estimates (other large eruptions, such as Aniakchak II ~1628 BCE, may account for stronger signals in ice cores and tree rings). It is generally seen as a catalyst that weakened the system rather than an immediate terminator, Minoan society continued for generations afterward.

How Climate Interacted with Society

Minoan agriculture and centralized palace economies depended on reliable harvests and water. Drought or climate instability could reduce yields, strain food distribution, heighten competition for resources, undermine elite authority, and encourage decentralization or conflict.

Combined with earthquakes, the Thera disaster’s economic and social shockwaves, and external pressures, these factors likely accelerated the shift from independent Minoan palace culture to Mycenaean administration and eventual broader collapse dynamics.

Climate is rarely presented as the sole cause.

Most scholars emphasize a multifactorial process: environmental stress made the society more vulnerable to other disruptions. High- resolution records continue to refine the picture, showing that Eastern Mediterranean hydroclimate was highly sensitive to Atlantic and other remote forcings, with extreme droughts emerging when multiple cycles aligned.

In summary, climate impacts, especially increasing aridity linked to Greek Dark Ages shifts and regional drying, plus eruption- related anomalies, added chronic stress to Minoan Crete from the mid- second millennium BCE onward, contributing to economic and social fragility during the civilization’s transformation and decline. Ongoing paleoclimate and archaeological work keep updating the precise timing and relative weight of these factors.

A solitary tree stands in front of ancient stone ruins, with a rocky path leading towards a partially restored structure in the background, under a partly cloudy sky.
The western façade of the Palace at Knossos. Like other palaces, it was built during the Middle Minoan era but continually renovated throughout its existence.
Minoan civilization – Wikipedia

The 3.2 ka event (also called the 3.2 ka BP event or ~1200 BCE climate anomaly) refers to a period of intensified aridity and cooler conditions across the Eastern Mediterranean and parts of Europe, centered around 3200 years before present (roughly 1250-1150 BCE, spanning or framing a longer ~300- year drought episode into the Early Iron Age).

It is documented in paleoclimate proxies such as speleothems (oxygen and carbon isotopes), pollen records, marine sediments, and lake levels, showing reduced precipitation, lower effective moisture, and stresses on dry- farming agriculture.

This event coincides with the Late Bronze Age (LBA) collapse (c. 1300- 900 BCE, with major disruptions around 1200 BCE), involving the fall or transformation of interconnected societies including the Mycenaeans, Hittites, and Levantine/Cypriot polities, alongside Egyptian decline and migrations (e.g., associated with the “Sea Peoples”).

Climate stress is widely viewed as a contributing “force multiplier”, worsening harvest failures, food shortages, economic disruption, and social instability, rather than the sole cause. Other factors included trade network breakdowns, internal conflicts, invasions, and systemic vulnerabilities.

By the time of the 3.2 ka event, the classic independent Minoan palace civilization on Crete had already largely ended or transformed.

Key earlier milestones include:

  • The Thera (Santorini) eruption in Late Minoan IA (c. 1600 BCE or early mid 16th century BCE).
  • Widespread destructions of secondary palaces and settlements around 1450 BCE (end of LM IB), followed by Mycenaean (mainland Greek) administrative control, use of Linear B (early Greek), and cultural blending at Knossos and elsewhere.
  • Later destruction of Knossos (c. 1370- 1300 BCE) and a shift to a post- palatial period.

In Late Minoan III (c. 1420- 1075 BCE, especially LM IIIB–IIIC around 1330- 1075 BCE), Crete was under strong Mycenaean influence or rule, with residual Minoan cultural elements. Around 1200 BCE (LM IIIC), coastal settlements were often abandoned in favor of more defensible inland or highland sites. This aligns with broader Aegean patterns of disruption during the LBA collapse.

Paleoclimate records indicate the progressive mid- to- late Holocene drying of the Eastern Mediterranean, culminating in the severe droughts of the 3.2 ka event (~1400- 900 BCE interval in some reconstructions), affected Crete as part of the region.

Reduced rainfall would have stressed agriculture (cereals, olives, vines) and water resources on an island already sensitive to precipitation variability. Combined with earlier shocks (Thera- related disruptions, Mycenaean takeover), this later aridification likely contributed to further population movements, ruralization, and the fading of remaining centralized or urban features on Crete during the transition to the Greek Dark Ages and Early Iron Age.

Evidence is regional rather than Crete- specific in many high-resolution records, and impacts varied spatially. Some studies note drier signals in the Aegean and Anatolia around 3.2- 3.1 ka BP, while emphasizing that climate was one interacting factor among many.

The main Minoan decline (palace destructions and Mycenaean absorption) predates the peak of the 3.2 ka event by a couple of centuries, so the event primarily affected the post- Minoan (Mycenaean- influenced) phase on Crete rather than the height of independent Minoan society.

In short, the 3.2 ka event represents a major climatic downturn that hit the Eastern Mediterranean during the final stages of Bronze Age societies, including the transformed, Mycenaean- dominated communities on Crete that carried forward elements of Minoan culture.

It helped frame the broader LBA collapse and the subsequent “Dark Ages,” reinforcing earlier environmental and political stresses on the island. Research continues to refine exact timings, regional variations, and the relative weight of climate versus human factors.

A digital illustration of a volcanic eruption occurring on an island, with lava and ash erupting into the atmosphere above the ocean.
Ancient Tree Rings Could Pin Down Date of Massive Thera Volcano Eruption

The date of the Minoan eruption of Santorini (Thera) remains one of the most debated topics in Bronze Age Mediterranean chronology.

No single exact year has universal agreement, but scientific evidence (especially radiocarbon) has increasingly favored an earlier date than traditional archaeological estimates.

Traditional Archaeological (“Low”) Chronology

Archaeologists long placed the eruption around 1500 BCE or in the mid- to- late 16th century BCE (sometimes as late as ~1525- 1500 BCE). This was based on pottery styles, stratigraphic sequences, and synchronisms with Egyptian history, linking it to the early New Kingdom (after the accession of Ahmose I, conventionally ~1550- 1540 BCE). This would put the eruption during or after the start of the 18th Dynasty.

Radiocarbon and Scientific (“High”) Chronology

Radiocarbon dating of short- lived samples (seeds, grains) from the volcanic destruction layer at Akrotiri, plus olive branches and shrubs buried by the eruption (on Santorini and Therasia), consistently points earlier.

Using the IntCal20 calibration curve and Bayesian modeling of sequences:

Common refined ranges include ~1609- 1560 BCE (95.4% probability) and a most probable interval of ~1606- 1589 BCE (68.3% probability).

Other analyses of olive material give broader possibilities such as 1610- 1510 BCE or 1602- 1502 BCE, with probability density often favoring the later 17th to mid- 16th century.

Recent 2025 radiocarbon work on Egyptian artifacts from the 17th- early 18th Dynasties (linked to Ahmose I and the transition from the Second Intermediate Period) supports the eruption predating Ahmose’s reign, placing it firmly in the Second Intermediate Period (SIP) rather than the New Kingdom. This reinforces a date around 1600 BCE.

Ice- core sulfate signals and tree- ring anomalies (previously linked to ~1628- 1627 BCE) are now often attributed to other large eruptions (e.g., Aniakchak II in Alaska), reducing their direct relevance to Thera.

Current Consensus and Implications

Most recent high- resolution radiocarbon and modeling work converges on the late 17th to early and mid-16th century BCE, centered near ~1600 BCE (often expressed as c. 1610- 1560 BCE or similar). This is earlier than the traditional archaeological low chronology by roughly 50- 100 and more years.

The exact calendar year is still not pinpointed due to a plateau in the radiocarbon calibration curve around 1620- 1540 BCE and ongoing debates over sample contexts, possible offsets, and full integration with Egyptian and Levantine sequences. However, the scientific data strongly exclude dates after ~1530 BCE in many models and support a SIP context.

This earlier dating has major implications: it places the eruption (and the height of Neopalatial Minoan Crete / Shaft Grave Mycenaean period) in a different geopolitical setting dominated by Canaanite-Levantine networks rather than the Egyptian New Kingdom, requiring revisions to cultural influence directions and historical synchronisms across the eastern Mediterranean.

In summary, while traditional archaeology favored ~1500 BCE, the weight of current radiocarbon evidence points to around 1600 BCE (late 17th- early 16th century BCE). Research continues to refine the precise year.

A Minoan fresco depicting a scene of bull-leaping, featuring a figure grasping the horns of a bull while another figure prepares to jump, with colorful and ornate borders surrounding the scene.
Bull-Leaping Fresco found at Knossos Minoan civilization – Wikipedia

Antarctic Radar Data Sharpens Forecasts of Southern Hemisphere Atmospheric Rivers

A study shows that assimilating high- temporal- resolution wind profile data from the PANSY radar at Japan’s Syowa Station in Antarctica improves reanalyzes and forecasts of atmospheric rivers (ARs) in the Southern Hemisphere.

Using a data assimilation system, the authors tested the impact of hourly wind profiles from the PANSY radar (Program of the Antarctic Syowa Mesosphere–Stratosphere–Troposphere/Incoherent Scatter radar) at Japan’s Syowa Station.

Infographic detailing how Antarctic radar data improves forecasts for Southern Hemisphere atmospheric rivers, highlighting moisture transport levels, challenges in forecasting, and the benefits of improved radar observations.
AI generated by Grok

A study shows that assimilating high- temporal- resolution wind profile data from the PANSY radar at Japan’s Syowa Station in Antarctica improves reanalyses and forecasts of atmospheric rivers (ARs) in the Southern Hemisphere.

The paper, “Impact of Antarctic radar on Southern Hemisphere atmospheric river reanalysis and forecast,” was published in Scientific Reports.

Observational sparsity over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean reduces forecast skill for Southern Hemisphere atmospheric circulation compared with the Northern Hemisphere. Conventional radiosondes help but are limited in frequency due to cost and logistics.

Observational sparsity over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean reduces forecast skill for Southern Hemisphere atmospheric circulation compared with the Northern Hemisphere. Conventional radiosondes help but are limited in frequency due to cost and logistics.

The study used a data assimilation system to test the impact of hourly horizontal wind profiles (roughly 1.5-20 km altitude) from the Program of the Antarctic Syowa Mesosphere- Stratosphere- Troposphere/Incoherent Scatter (PANSY) radar at Syowa Station (69°S, 39.6°E). Experiments covered periods including the 2022 Year of Polar Prediction in the Southern Hemisphere (YOPP- SH) extra radiosonde campaign.

They compared reanalyses and forecasts with vs. without the PANSY data (and relative to products like ERA5).

Main findings

  • Assimilating PANSY data changes initial atmospheric conditions for forecasts, even when extra YOPP-SH radiosondes are already included. These differences persist over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
  • The data improves the representation of the atmospheric basic state (wind speed, temperature, and geopotential height) at high latitudes.
  • It enhances prediction of atmospheric circulation and integrated water vapor (and related integrated vapor transport) associated with mid- latitude ARs in the Southern Hemisphere. In related analyses, including PANSY data reduced root- mean- square errors in forecasts of AR-related fields relative to ERA5 for multiple mid- latitude cases, and increased analyzed IVT in some East Antarctic interior regions where ARs occur.

ARs are long, narrow corridors of strong moisture transport that can deliver heavy precipitation and affect weather extremes. Better initial conditions over the data-sparse polar region help downstream forecasts because errors can propagate equatorward.

The results highlight the value of continuous, high- resolution radar wind observations from Antarctica for numerical weather prediction, beyond what infrequent radiosondes alone provide. The work was supported by Japan’s National Institute of Polar Research, JSPS grants, and the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition, with experiments run on the Earth Simulator at JAMSTEC.

For the full details, see the open- access paper on Nature’s site. Related earlier work has also shown PANSY data reducing errors in mid- latitude cyclone forecasts.

Infographic explaining the importance of Antarctic radar for improving weather forecasts in the Southern Hemisphere, highlighting the use of hourly PANSY radar observations and their impact on atmospheric river forecasting.
Sparse weather observations over Antarctica limit the accuracy of Southern Hemisphere weather forecasts. Now, researchers show that assimilating hourly wind observations from the Antarctic PANSY radar improves weather forecasts and atmospheric river prediction, demonstrating the value of Antarctic radar data for numerical weather prediction. Credit: Assistant Professor Kazutoshi Sato from the National Institute of Polar Research, Japan.

Southern Ocean weather patterns are among the most intense and continuous on Earth. This vast, nearly land- free expanse (roughly south of 30- 40°S, encircling Antarctica) features strong, persistent westerly winds, frequent extratropical cyclones, and major influences from large- scale climate modes. These patterns drive the powerful Antarctic Circumpolar Current (ACC), shape precipitation and sea ice, and play a critical role in global heat, moisture, and carbon transport.

Dominant Features

Strong westerly winds (“Roaring Forties,” “Furious Fifties,” and “Screaming Sixties”): Uninterrupted by major landmasses, these winds are the strongest mean surface winds on Earth. They drive the ACC (the world’s strongest ocean current) eastward and generate large waves and storminess.

Storm track and extratropical cyclones: A band of high storm activity lies roughly between 40°- 60°S. Cyclones form frequently due to the strong meridional temperature gradient and baroclinic instability associated with the subpolar jet. These systems bring high winds, clouds, and precipitation, and they modulate heat and moisture transport.

Circumpolar trough: A belt of low pressure surrounds Antarctica, with mean sea- level pressures often below 990 hPa. This feature shows a clear semiannual oscillation.

Precipitation patterns: Precipitation tends to increase poleward and decrease at lower latitudes in recent decades (consistent with climate change projections). Storms are producing more rain in some areas, for example, observations at Macquarie Island (in the storm track) show a ~28% rainfall increase since 1979, largely because individual storms drop more precipitation rather than because there are simply more storms.

Key Climate Modes Influencing Variability

Southern Annular Mode (SAM / Antarctic Oscillation): The leading mode of variability. In its positive phase, the westerly wind belt intensifies and contracts southward toward Antarctica (stronger high- latitude winds, often linked to reduced rainfall in parts of southern Australia and changes in Antarctic sea ice and ice- shelf melt via upwelling). In its negative phase, the belt shifts equatorward. Positive SAM has become more frequent in recent decades, partly due to ozone depletion and greenhouse- gas forcing.

El Niño- Southern Oscillation (ENSO): Influences the Southern Ocean via teleconnections (e.g., deepening or weakening of the Amundsen Sea Low). La Niña often enhances certain storm patterns and can interact with positive SAM.

Amundsen Sea Low: A persistent low-pressure feature in the South Pacific sector that strongly affects West Antarctic and Peninsula weather, sea ice, and temperatures.

Other influences include the Interdecadal Pacific Oscillation and blocking highs that can steer moisture toward Antarctica.

Atmospheric Rivers (ARs)

Narrow corridors of intense moisture transport frequently occur over the Southern Ocean (especially 40°- 60°S). They are often embedded ahead of extratropical cyclone cold fronts and can extend toward Antarctica, delivering heat, moisture, and heavy precipitation or snowfall.

ARs contribute significantly to extreme precipitation events and can influence Antarctic surface mass balance (snowfall vs. melt). Recent studies (including those using Antarctic radar data such as PANSY) show that better observations improve forecasts of these systems and related mid-latitude circulation.

AR frequency has shown poleward shifts and increases over the Southern Ocean in recent decades, modulated by both circulation changes (jet shifts) and rising atmospheric moisture.

Seasonal and Regional Aspects

Seasonality: Stronger storms and higher precipitation in winter (JJA) at mid- latitudes in many sectors; more complex patterns near Antarctica involving sea- ice interactions.

Regional differences: The Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Ocean sectors of the Southern Ocean show longitudinal variations due to the influence of South America, Africa, Australia, and the Antarctic Peninsula. Hotspots for marine heatwaves and cyclone activity exist in areas such as the western Pacific and North Ross Sea sectors.

Sea ice interactions: Expanding/contracting Antarctic sea ice strongly modulates surface fluxes, storm tracks, and cyclone intensity. Recent years have seen record- low sea- ice extents linked to atmospheric anomalies (e.g., deep Amundsen Sea Low).

Broader Climate Role and Changes

The Southern Ocean absorbs a large fraction of anthropogenic heat (~75%) and carbon (~35- 50%). Weather patterns (especially winds and storms) drive the meridional overturning circulation (upper and lower cells), upwelling of deep water, and formation of key water masses (e.g., Antarctic Bottom Water, Intermediate Water).

Observed trends include:

  • Strengthening and poleward shift of the westerlies (linked to positive SAM trends).
  • Increasing storm-related rainfall and freshwater input.
  • Rising marine heatwave activity in some regions.
  • Complex interactions with Antarctic ice-sheet mass balance via ARs, snowfall, and warm-water upwelling.

Data sparsity remains a challenge (few islands and stations), so reanalyses, satellite data, and special observing campaigns (e.g., YOPP- SH) plus Antarctic radar observations are especially valuable for improving forecasts of these patterns and associated extremes.

In short, Southern Ocean weather is characterized by relentless westerlies, frequent intense cyclones, moisture- laden atmospheric rivers, and strong modulation by the SAM and tropical teleconnections, making it both a driver of global climate and a sensitive indicator of change.

Aerial view of a snowy landscape with power lines and buildings scattered across the terrain. The scene features snow-covered ground and a clear sky.
The PANSY’s antenna cluster
, which boasts overwhelming scale even within Showa Air Base.
Photo: JARE65 Manami Yamaoka (August 16, 2024)
The Largest Large Atmospheric Radar in Antarctica – Observation Team Blog

Impact of Antarctic radar on Southern Hemisphere atmospheric river reanalysis and forecast

Observational sparsity over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean leads to lower forecast skill for Southern Hemisphere (SH) atmospheric circulation than in the Northern Hemisphere. Extra radiosonde observations help, but their frequency is limited by cost and logistics.

Using a data assimilation system, the authors tested the impact of hourly wind profiles from the PANSY radar (Program of the Antarctic Syowa Mesosphere–Stratosphere–Troposphere/Incoherent Scatter radar) at Japan’s Syowa Station. Assimilating these data changes the initial atmospheric conditions for weather forecasts, even when extra radiosonde data from the 2022 Year of Polar Prediction in the Southern Hemisphere (YOPP- SH) campaign are already included. The differences persist over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.

The high- temporal- resolution Antarctic radar data improves:

  • Reproducibility of the atmospheric basic state (wind speed, temperature, and geopotential height) at high latitudes.
  • Prediction of atmospheric circulation and integrated water vapor associated with atmospheric rivers (ARs) over mid- latitude regions of the SH.

Additional context from the paper

ARs are narrow, long corridors of intense water- vapor transport linked to severe weather (strong winds, heavy precipitation, flooding). They contribute substantially to extreme precipitation in parts of the SH, including New Zealand, Australia, Antarctic coastal regions, and South America, and can drive strong winds, surface melting, temperature rises, and heavy snowfall in Antarctica.

Previous work already showed benefits of PANSY wind data for mid- latitude cyclone forecasts. This study focuses on ARs during the 2022 austral winter YOPP- SH period (extra radiosondes at various SH stations).

Experiments used the ALEDAS3 ensemble data assimilation system. They compared a control reanalysis (CTL, using standard PREPBUFR observations) with one that also assimilated hourly PANSY winds (OSEP) for the period ~26 April- 5 September 2022.

Mean absolute differences in wind speed, geopotential height, and temperature (700- 200 hPa) between OSEP and CTL were notable over parts of the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. These differences could propagate and amplify downstream with the jet stream.

The authors examined AR frequency and integrated water vapor transport (IVT) reproducibility, finding impacts on both reanalysis and forecasts of mid- latitude ARs.

Funding & support: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science grants, National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) under MEXT, and the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE). Experiments used the Earth Simulator at JAMSTEC.

Corresponding author: Kazutoshi Sato (sato.kazutoshi@nipr.ac.jp)

Authors include Kazutoshi Sato, Jun Inoue, Akira Yamazaki, Yoshihiro Tomikawa (affiliated with the Polar Environment Data Science Center, Joint Support-Center for Data Science Research, Research Organization of Information and Systems), and Kaoru Sato.

The full PDF (accepted manuscript) is available via the Nature page. Supplementary material is also linked. Because this is still an article- in- press version, minor corrections may appear in the final published form.

Journal information: Scientific Reports (2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s41598-026-61250-x

Authors: Kazutoshi Sato,
Jun Inoue,
Akira Yamazaki,
Yoshihiro Tomikawa &
Kaoru Sato 

Abstract

Observational data sparsity in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean results in lower forecast skill for atmospheric circulation over the Southern Hemisphere (SH) than the Northern Hemisphere. Additional Antarctic radiosonde observations at existing observation stations can enhance accurate forecasting of severe events over the SH; however, the number of daily radiosonde observations is limited, owing to financial and operational limitations. Using a data assimilation system, this study investigates the impact of hourly wind profiles from the PANSY radar at the Japanese Antarctic Syowa Station. Assimilation of PANSY data leads to differences in the initial atmospheric conditions for weather forecasts, even including extra radiosonde observations from the Year of Polar Prediction in the Southern Hemisphere (YOPP-SH) campaign in 2022. These differences in initial atmospheric condition persist in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. We show that Antarctic radar data with relatively high temporal resolution has an impact on the reproducibility of atmospheric basic state (wind speed, temperature and geopotential height) over the high latitudes and the prediction of atmospheric circulation and integrated water vapor associated with atmospheric rivers over the mid latitude in SH.

Volcanic Crystals Act as Black Boxes, Revealing Hidden Magma Journeys Beneath La Palma

Volcanic crystals (especially clinopyroxene) act as “black boxes” because they preserve layered chemical records of magma conditions deep underground, much like flight data recorders or tree rings, allowing scientists to reconstruct the hidden pre- eruptive history of magma storage, rejuvenation, and ascent.

Clinopyroxene chemical zoning is one of the most powerful archives of magma history available in volcanic rocks. These black or dark- green crystals grow by adding concentric (or sometimes sector- or patchy) layers, each of which chemically “records” the temperature, pressure, and melt composition present at the moment of growth. Because diffusion of many elements in clinopyroxene is relatively slow, the original zoning is often preserved even after the crystal is carried to the surface.

Infographic illustrating volcanic crystals as black boxes, showcasing magma storage, transport, and evolution beneath La Palma, including features such as clinopyroxene crystals, the La Palma crust, and the crystal-rich magma mush reservoir.
AI generated by Grok

Volcanic crystals (especially clinopyroxene) act as “black boxes” because they preserve layered chemical records of magma conditions deep underground, much like flight data recorders or tree rings, allowing scientists to reconstruct the hidden pre- eruptive history of magma storage, rejuvenation, and ascent.

Magma beneath volcanoes is typically not pure molten liquid but a crystal- rich “magma mush” (often compared to a semi- frozen granita: solid crystals suspended in melt). In a recent study published in Nature Communications, researchers examined clinopyroxene crystals from lava samples of La Palma’s 1712, 1971, and 2021 (Tajogaite) eruptions in the Canary Islands. High- resolution chemical imaging of these crystals revealed consistent patterns spanning more than 300 years.

Clinopyroxene grows slowly in concentric layers (zones) as magma cools, incorporating chemical signatures of the surrounding temperature, pressure and depth, and composition at each stage:

  • Crystal cores record an ancient, cooler, crystal- packed mush reservoir at roughly 18- 25 km depth in the upper mantle. These older crystals sat largely undisturbed for long periods.
  • Intermediate zones capture a sudden change day to weeks before eruption: injection of hotter, more primitive magma from deeper in the mantle. This heats and partially melts the mush, alters outer crystal chemistry, and stirs the mixture, remobilizing older crystals.
  • Outermost rims record the final, relatively rapid ascent through the crust to the surface, where the

This is analogous to reading tree rings for climate history: the chemistry of successive growth zones preserves the sequence of events that prepared the volcano to erupt.

Standard volcano monitoring (seismicity, ground deformation, gas emissions) mainly detects shallower magma movement and is less sensitive to deep processes. The crystal records show that significant magma accumulation and eruption triggering at La Palma occur at great depth in the upper mantle, where unrest can be hard to detect.

Knowing this helps interpret monitoring signals more accurately, e.g., assessing how quickly an eruption might develop once signs appear, even if it does not provide exact forecasts of timing.

Similar chemical zonation patterns appear in clinopyroxene from other oceanic volcanic islands (Azores, Cape Verde, Galápagos, and other Canary Islands), suggesting that deep, long- lived crystal mushes that are periodically reactivated by fresh mantle magma are common, especially during the earlier, higher-magma- supply stages of island growth. As supply later declines, these mushes may cool and become less easily remobilized.

In short, these black crystals survive the journey from deep storage through mixing and ascent, carrying a durable archive of conditions that would otherwise be inaccessible. Analyzing them improves understanding of how volcanic systems prepare for eruption and supports better hazard assessment for places like La Palma and analogous island volcanoes.

Geological map of La Palma in the Canary Islands showing volcanic activity and lava flows from the years 1712, 1971, and 2021, including details on El Charco, Teneguía, and Tajogaite eruptions.
Geological map of La Palma and sample localities of studied eruptions. Credit: Nature Communications (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-77213-9

Clinopyroxene chemical zoning is one of the most powerful archives of magma history available in volcanic rocks. These black or dark- green crystals grow by adding concentric (or sometimes sector- or patchy) layers, each of which chemically “records” the temperature, pressure, and melt composition present at the moment of growth. Because diffusion of many elements in clinopyroxene is relatively slow, the original zoning is often preserved even after the crystal is carried to the surface.

How zoning forms and what it records

Clinopyroxene (most commonly diopside- augite in alkaline basalts) crystallizes over a wide depth range, from the upper mantle into the crust. As it grows:

  • Compatible elements (Cr, Ni, Sc, Mg) are preferentially incorporated from more primitive melts.
  • Incompatible elements (Zr, REE, Ti, Mn, Na) become enriched in more evolved melts.
  • Major- element ratios such as Mg#
  • (= 100 × Mg, (Mg and Fe)) track the degree of melt evolution or mixing.

Common zoning styles include:

  • Normal zoning: progressive decrease in Mg# and Cr outward (simple cooling and fractionation).
  • Reverse zoning: abrupt increase in Mg# and Cr (injection of hotter, more mafic magma).
  • Oscillatory or multiple reverse zones: repeated recharge events.
  • Patchy or sector zoning: complex growth or partial resorption in a crystal- rich mush.
  • Thin outer rims: final growth during ascent or eruption.

Because the crystal is a solid archive, the sequence of zones from core → inner rim → outer rim reconstructs the chronological order of events before eruption.

Zoning patterns revealed at La Palma (1712, 1971, 2021 eruptions)

In the Nature Communications study, high -resolution major- and trace- element mapping of clinopyroxene from the three historical Cumbre Vieja eruptions shows a remarkably consistent architecture:

Textural zoneTypical chemistryInterpretationDepth / Temperature
CoresBroad range: primitive (high Cr, Ni, Sc, Mg#) to highly evolved (low Cr, high Zr, Mn, enriched REE; often green in thin section). Patchy or sector- zoned.Antecrysts from a long-lived, cool (~1000- 1025 °C) phonolitic–tephriphonolitic crystal mushUpper mantle (~18- 25 km)
Inner rimsStrong reverse zoning: sharp rise in Cr (up to ~3500 ppm), Ni, Sc, Mg#; lower Zr. Often euhedral.Mafic (basanitic) recharge that remobilized and partially resorbed the mush. Minimum growth timescales ~4- 7 daysMostly upper mantle; possible brief crustal stalling (~5- 10 km)
Outer rims and microlitesLower Cr/Mg# relative to inner rims; compositions closer to the carrier meltFinal differentiation and or ascentShallower levels during final rise

Cluster analysis of the trace- element data isolates six compositional groups. The most evolved clusters occur almost exclusively in cores and represent crystallization from residual melts after 80- 90 % fractionation of a basanitic parent (producing phonolitic compositions). The most primitive clusters dominate the high- Cr inner rims and record the recharge magma itself.

Why the zoning is so informative

  • Cr is an especially sensitive tracer of mafic recharge because it is strongly compatible in clinopyroxene and its diffusion is slow; high- Cr zones therefore mark the arrival of primitive melt.
  • REE patterns help distinguish phonolitic mush- derived cores (often showing HREE enrichment characteristic of high- Na clinopyroxene) from the less- fractionated carrier melts.
  • Thermobarometry applied zone- by- zone (both clinopyroxene, liquid exchange and machine-learning clinopyroxene- only calibrations) confirms that the evolved mush resided in the upper mantle, consistent with deep seismicity observed before the 2021 eruption.
  • Matrix (groundmass) compositions remain relatively constant (~5 wt% MgO), showing that the carrier melts themselves did not change dramatically over 300 years; the main variation is in the recycled crystal cargo.

Broader significance

The same style of clinopyroxene zoning, cool, evolved upper- mantle mush cores overgrown by high- Cr recharge rims, appears in other ocean-island and alkaline volcanoes. It indicates that deep crystal mushes can persist for long periods and are periodically “unlocked” by hotter, primitive magma injections. Because these processes occur at depths that are difficult to image geophysically, the crystal record supplies information that monitoring networks alone cannot easily capture.

In short, clinopyroxene chemical zoning turns each crystal into a miniature stratigraphic log of the magma plumbing system, revealing storage conditions, recharge timing, mush recycling, and ascent pathways that would otherwise remain hidden.

Recurrent evacuation of mantle mush in ocean islands revealed by clinopyroxene from La Palma

Temporal variations in magma plumbing systems influence eruption priming and how we interpret volcanic unrest, but these are poorly constrained in low- flux ocean island volcanoes. The study examines clinopyroxene zoning from three historical eruptions at Cumbre Vieja on La Palma (Canary Islands): El Charco (1712), Teneguía (1971), and Tajogaite (2021).

Using quantitative trace- element mapping, thermobarometry, and cluster analysis, the authors show:

  • Preceding all three eruptions, an evolved phonolitic (to tephri- phonolitic) crystal mush resided in the upper mantle at ~18- 25 km depth under relatively cool conditions (~1000- 1025 °C).
  • At least one week before eruption, hotter basanitic recharge (~1100- 1150 °C) recycled/remobilized this mush and promoted magma ascent, potentially with brief stalling in the crust (~5- 10 km).
  • Mafic recharge was critical for unlocking the mush but may not have been the immediate eruption trigger (subsequent cooling, fractionation and pressurization likely played a role).
  • Upper-mantle evolved mushes appear common in ocean- island basalt (OIB) volcanoes; their presence is likely controlled by the island’s evolutionary stage and magma flux.

Methods and Data

  • Samples: Lavas from the three eruptions (early tephrites followed by later basanites).
  • Techniques: Petrography, major- element electron microprobe analysis (EMPA), laser- ablation ICP-MS for trace elements and quantitative mapping, clinopyroxene, liquid and machine- learning (ML) clinopyroxene- only thermobarometry, unsupervised cluster analysis of trace- element compositions, and comparison with matrix (carrier- melt) compositions.
  • Clinopyroxene textures show complex cores (often patchy and or sector- zoned), reverse-zoned inner rims (higher Mg#), and thinner outer rims.

Main Results

Carrier melts: Microcrystalline matrices are relatively homogeneous (~5 wt% MgO) across eruptions and follow a fractional- crystallization trend; only modest differences exist (e.g., slightly more evolved El Charco 1712 melts).

Clinopyroxene chemistry: Cores span primitive to highly evolved compositions. High-Cr, high- Mg# inner rims record mafic recharge. Trace- element maps highlight patchy evolved cores and consistent high- Cr inner rims (Cr up to ~3500 ppm).

Thermobarometry: Exchange- based methods place most crystallization in the upper mantle (~18- 25 km, consistent with deep pre- 2021 seismicity). Evolved cores are cooler (~1000- 1025 °C). ML-based barometry additionally suggests possible transient crustal crystallization of rims/microlites (~5-10 km or shallower).

Cluster analysis: Six geochemical clusters link to processes, highly evolved clusters (0-1) form antecrystic cores from the phonolitic mush; primitive clusters (especially 5, high- Cr) form recharge- related inner rims and phenocrysts.

Interpretation and Broader Implications

An upper- mantle crystal mush of evolved (phonolitic) composition persists and is repeatedly evacuated and or recycled by basanitic recharge before historical eruptions. Inner- rim thicknesses imply minimum timescales of ~4- 7 days for the final recharge-related growth.

Recharge unlocks the mush but is followed by some cooling/fractionation, so it is not necessarily the direct trigger; progressive pressurization (e.g., from volatile exsolution) likely leads to eruption.

The paper is open access. A PDF is available on the Nature page. This is the scientific study underlying the recent Conversation/UQ article on volcanic crystals as “black boxes.”

Journal information: Nature Communications 17, Article number: 9362 (2026) 

DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-77213-9

Provided: The Conversation

Authors: Alberto Caracciolo,
Teresa Ubide,
Mónica Ágreda-López,
Raquel Herrera,
Alvaro Marquez,
Diego González-García,
María José Huertas,
Eumenio Ancochea,
Nicolás Chicharro,
Juan Jesús Coello-Bravo &
Maurizio Petrelli 

Abstract

Temporal variations in magma plumbing influence eruption priming and the interpretation of unrest signals, yet remain poorly constrained in low-flux ocean island volcanoes. Here, we examine temporal changes in the active volcanic system beneath La Palma, Canary Islands, using clinopyroxene zoning from the 1712, 1971, and 2021 eruptions. Combining quantitative trace element mapping, thermobarometry, and cluster analysis, we show that preceding all eruptions, an evolved phonolitic crystal mush resided in the upper mantle (∼18–25 km depth) under relatively cool (1000–1025 °C) conditions. At least one week before eruption, basanitic recharge (1100–1150 °C) recycled this mush and promoted magma ascent, potentially with brief stalling in the crust (∼5–10 km). Mafic recharge was critical in unlocking the mush, yet may not represent the immediate eruption trigger. Globally, upper mantle evolved mushes may be common in ocean island basalt volcanoes, and their occurrence is likely controlled by the island evolutionary stage and magma flux.

Climate’s Past Performance Uncertain Predictor of Future

The predictions of climate doomsayers reveal an embarrassing ignorance of a capricious geological history shaped by natural forces too powerful for human control and too complex to allow for meaningful forecasts.

The relatively benign Holocene of nearly 12 millennia has been punctuated by intermittent temperature changes, including 10 warming periods, counting our current one. The most recent era of cold was the Little Ice Age from about 1250 to 1850.

An illustrated infographic depicting climate history over 11,700 years, contrasting past climate performance with future forecasts. It features a whimsical depiction of a 'certified climate expert' and a geologist, emphasizing natural factors affecting climate and stating that past performance doesn't guarantee reliable future forecasts.

From The CO2 Coalition

By Vijay Jayaraj

The predictions of climate doomsayers reveal an embarrassing ignorance of a capricious geological history shaped by natural forces too powerful for human control and too complex to allow for meaningful forecasts.

What can be said is that we are living in the warmth of an interglacial period known as the Holocene Epoch, which began about 11,700 years ago. It followed a frigid span of nearly 90,000 years, when thousands of feet of glacial ice covered Canada and northernmost parts of the region that would become the U.S. Temperatures were lower than the current average by 11 to 14 degrees Fahrenheit.

The relatively benign Holocene of nearly 12 millennia has been punctuated by intermittent temperature changes, including 10 warming periods, counting our current one. The most recent era of cold was the Little Ice Age from about 1250 to 1850.

Climate alarmists treat the “preindustrial” era before 1850 as their starting point for measuring modern temperature, without noting that the period falls within the last gasp of the Little Ice Age. Their hysteria and the climate policy they promote are based on a temperature record that begins during a period of unusual cold and on a subsequent warming of a modest 2.4 degrees Fahrenheit over the last 175 years.

If the temperature record were expanded to take in the warmest parts of the Holocene, the same planet would be seen as emerging from an intermediate deep freeze. Research published in Nature shows that marine sediment cores place peak warmth in the first half of the Holocene interglacial, between 10,000 and 6,000 years ago.

Biomarker records from sediment cores in the Chukchi and East Siberian Seas, published in the Journal of Quaternary Science, show minimal sea ice during the early Holocene, short-term fluctuations through the middle Holocene, and a marked expansion of ice over the past 4,500 years.

Chukchi Sea reconstruction and the broader Arctic picture both trace an ocean that carried far less ice when no factory existed anywhere on Earth. The ups and downs of modern Arctic ice are wobbles inside a range sustained for more than 11,000 years.

Two thousand years ago, Roman farmers grew grapes and grains at higher latitudes and altitudes that later generations had to abandon because of advancing cold. During the more recent Medieval Warm Period – about 1,000 years ago – Norse settlers lived in southwestern Greenland for close to five centuries, grazed livestock, harvested barley, and buried their dead in churchyard ground that later froze solid and stayed frozen. Tree stumps continue to appear from beneath retreating glaciers in the Alps and the Canadian Arctic, rooted in soil that carbon dating places in the warmth of the middle Holocene.

Then came the temperature decline that was accompanied by horrific consequences for humanity. The Little Ice Age closed Alpine passes, swallowed farms, killed harvests across northern Europe and emptied Greenland settlements. Rivers that had not frozen in human history became sites of ice fairs. Two independent temperature reconstructions, one drawn from Greenland ice and the other from ocean sediments off Indonesia, sit 9,500 miles apart and yet track each other closely in recording a fall of around 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit between the Holocene peak and the coldest of the Little Ice Age.

While broad historical climatic trends can be identified, predicting the future with confidence is tricky at best. Ocean oscillations in the Pacific and Atlantic redistribute heat on decadal and centennial clocks that nobody can predict from first principles. Solar output varies. Volcanoes intervene on no schedule. Cloud behavior, the single largest uncertainty in every atmospheric model, responds to all of it. These assemblages of water vapor and aerosols act both as insulators against the loss of nighttime heat and as reflectors sending sunlight back to outer space.

All are mighty forces, along with many others, that operate irrespective of human activity, whose effects are negligible on the grand scale of a climate system of practically infinite complexity.

In the end, what we know is that warmth is better than cold when it comes to human flourishing and that abundant, affordable energy is necessary to build and sustain prosperous societies. And in the meantime, the Holocene climate will keep doing what it has always done, and we will know what that is after it has happened.

Vijay Jayaraj is a Science and Research Associate at the CO2 Coalition, Fairfax, Virginia. He holds an M.S. in environmental sciences from the University of East Anglia and a postgraduate degree in energy management from Robert Gordon University, both in the U.K., and a bachelor’s in engineering from Anna University, India. He served as a research associate with the Changing Oceans Research Unit at University of British Columbia, Canada.

Originally published at Real Clear Energy, September 25, 2026.

Vijay Jayaraj is a Science and Research Associate at the CO2 Coalition, Fairfax, Virginia. He holds an M.S. in environmental sciences from the University of East Anglia and a postgraduate degree in energy management from Robert Gordon University, both in the U.K., and a bachelor’s in engineering from Anna University, India. He served as a research associate with the Changing Oceans Research Unit at University of British Columbia, Canada.

Argentina President Milei’s UN takedown — Read the transcript

Argentine President Javier Milei delivers a forceful address at the 81st United Nations General Assembly, sharply criticizing the UN and arguing that the organization has moved away from its founding principles.

Milei focuses on three major areas: what he says the UN has failed to accomplish, what he believes the organization should not have undertaken, and the impact of artificial intelligence on the future.

A major part of the speech centers on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands dispute with the United Kingdom. Milei criticizes the UN’s handling of the issue, rejects unilateral resource exploitation in the disputed area and calls for negotiations with the UK. Reuters reported that tensions over oil exploration around the Falkland Islands were a major backdrop to his UN address.

A speaker presenting at the United Nations General Assembly, standing at a podium with the UN emblem in front, against a backdrop of green stone panels.

From CFACT

By CFACT Ed

Mr. President, Heads of State, representatives of the peoples of the world.
Today I address you for the third time as President of all Argentines.

When we took office of a country in ruins, on the brink of the worst crisis in its history, one thing was clear to us from the outset: we had to confront our problems with absolute honesty.
Lying to ourselves in order to feel better was going to get us nowhere.
It’s always preferable to tell an uncomfortable truth than a comforting lie.
So believe me when I say that I know what I’m talking about when, in a constructive spirit, I point to the problems facing this organization which purports to guide states and arbitrate between them.

In that regard, I want to talk about three issues today.
First, what this body should have done and failed to do.
Second, what it should not have done but did anyway.
And third, its position in the face of the advent of artificial intelligence.

Seventy-eight years ago, this House declared that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights— noble words whose spirit I fully share.
To that end, it undertook to uphold international law, defend the sovereignty of nations, and provide a forum in which conflicts could be resolved through cooperation rather than immediately through the force of arms.
That was the original purpose, the contract that we all signed.
But today, regrettably, it is time to acknowledge that, in practice, that sacred covenant has been broken.

That’s to say, it’s become a useless organization whose only purpose is to sustain a cast of fatally arrogant parasites, masquerading as well-intentioned bureaucrats.
I would remind them of what Mises said: good people do not think about controlling the lives of their fellow human beings.
Those who were supposed to guarantee collective security and human rights failed in their task.
Instead, they allowed chaos, violence, and international terrorism to flourish.

The alleged defenders of human rights have sheltered bloodthirsty dictatorships and regimes that stone women in the streets.
They have systematically voted against Israel while remaining silent in the face of Islamic terrorism and the genocide of Christians in Africa.
And as if that were not enough, an organization established to defend the territorial sovereignty of its members decided to look the other way with regard to the situation of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands, South Sandwich Islands, and the surrounding maritime areas.
For us, the Malvinas are a national cause.

I repeat: the Malvinas for us are a national cause.
They are also a test of the gulf that can exist between the words of international institutions and the reality upon which they purport to act.
Fifty years ago, this very Assembly adopted Resolution 3149, which calls on parties to refrain from introducing unilateral modifications while the dispute remains unresolved.
Fifty years on, the situation has not changed, yet unilateral modifications continue.

Today, the Sea Lion Project is moving toward oil extraction on the Argentine continental shelf in the North Malvinas Basin, under British licenses that Argentina rejects as illegal and illegitimate.
Any such activity not authorized by the Argentine Republic in this regard constitutes an unlawful act under both international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Argentine domestic law.
That is why I wish to ask a question: what use is a resolution if, for decades, the other party can act in direct contravention of it, while that resolution remains intact in the archives but powerless in the face of reality?
There’s no shortage of words or resolutions.

What is lacking is consequences.
Because an institution that cannot ensure that its words carry weight in the real world loses the most important thing of all: its authority.
In these circumstances, those who follow the rules receive no reward for doing so, while those who break them suffer no repercussions whatsoever.
That’s why the Malvinas are not merely an issue between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

They also raise a question regarding the ability of this organization to enforce its own resolutions.
Argentina has taken note of that reality, and in the face of the unauthorized exploitation of our resources in the disputed area, we’ve acted.
We’ve submitted formal notes of protest.
We’ve availed ourselves of the legal remedies at our disposal.

We’ve imposed sanctions on the companies involved and their suppliers.
And we’ve submitted a national sovereignty defense bill to Congress.
For far too long, Argentine governments opted for a rhetorical defense.
We have chosen a peaceful, practical, and effective defense.

I repeat: we have chosen a peaceful, practical, and effective defense.
I also wish to reiterate our position regarding the population of the islands.
As this very Assembly has determined in numerous resolutions, the principle of self-determination does not apply in this case, since the population was implanted by the occupying power on a territory whose sovereignty is in dispute.
That principle exists to liberate colonized people, not to legitimize situations arising from colonization.

If the United Kingdom maintains a selective interpretation of the principle of self-determination with regard to the Malvinas Islands, it must also explain how it reconciles that position with the debates on self-determination taking place within its own territory.
Once again, we call on the United Kingdom to resume negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, as required by international law.
We also reiterate our invitation to proceed without delay to an exchange of views with a view to resolving the issue concerning the aforementioned dispute over the exploitation of our natural resources.
And I want to say something more to the global energy sector.

Waka Mwertha represents a historic opportunity, with the potential to become one of the major players in the energy sector in the decades ahead.
Come, invest, develop it with us.
But there’s a limit to this invitation.
We will not remain indifferent to those who exploit resources under illegal foreign occupation.

Argentina’s position is clear.
Today I have come to tell you that Argentina is not going to sit around waiting for the UN and the international community to live up to their own mandate.
We’re going to take matters into our own hands.
For far too long, Argentina managed its own decline.

We managed poverty.
We managed isolation.
We managed irrelevance.
We grew accustomed to debating how to divide up what remained, rather than asking ourselves how we could grow again, how we could rebuild what we had lost.

That’s over.
We’ve already lost too much.
We do not want to lose it again.
That’s why we’ve embraced free enterprise capitalism.

We’re opening our economy up to trade and investment.
We’re advancing in the development of our strategic resources.
We’ve embraced the technological revolution, and we are rebuilding our military capabilities after decades of neglect.
We’ve also made a geopolitical choice.

We have unequivocally aligned ourselves with the West, with the United States, and with Israel, countries with which we share a deep affinity of values and strategic complementarity.
That is why we condemn the attacks by the Iranian regime against the State of Israel.
We have designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization and continue to seek justice for the two terrorist attacks perpetrated on Argentine soil in 1992 and 1994.
We have decided to cooperate with the world, but to do so standing tall, in the understanding that only a nation that is politically relevant, economically influential, and militarily respected can truly be a master of its own destiny.

Mr. President, just as I have shown you how the UN failed to do what it was supposed to do, now I want to tell you how it has excelled at what no one asked it to do, and what it should never have been doing.
Because alongside that failure, they have built a bureaucratic leviathan devoted to deciding how the peoples of the world and their citizens should live.
This amounts to a curious mixture of anarchy and tyranny, impotence in the face of those who break the most basic rules, such as bloodthirsty dictatorships and terrorist organizations, coupled with Orwellian control and impositions on liberal democracies that abide by the rules.
We saw this with the Millennium Agenda.

We saw it with the 2030 Agenda, with economic regulation, gender agendas, environmental extremism, and unchecked immigration.
And every time they failed, rather than reviewing the model or apologizing, they doubled down, as they are already doing with the 2045 Agenda, which, I say now, will fail.
But perhaps the most serious example, the one that forever should shame this organization, is quite another.
That is how they managed the pandemic.

During the pandemic, bodies under the auspices of this House put themselves before scientific evidence and the sovereignty of nations and promoted forced lockdown policies throughout the world that ruined jobs, that ruined the education of entire generations of children, and cost the lives of millions of people who died alone without basic medical care.
Where some allege a public health policy error, we see a global experiment in social control disguised as science.
And when a state wearing public health blinkers deprives its population of the right to work, to receive an education, and to bid farewell to their dead, this results in millions of unavoidable deaths, there is a word for it: genocide.
That happens in many countries, including Argentina, which boasted of being the World Health Organization’s star pupil.

And that is why we decided to leave the World Health Organization.
Added to that is something more subtle but equally damaging: the psychological terror instilled by the state.
For years, citizens around the world were told that they should be afraid.
Afraid of their neighbors, of the air they breathe, of leaving their homes.

That fear wasn’t a mere side effect.
It was the chosen instrument of their government.
The problem is that emergencies eventually pass.
Fear passes.

Generations move on.
But the institutions and powers created on the pretext of those alleged emergencies remain.
And if for a moment we allow ourselves to believe that the lesson had been learned after so many failures, the arrival of artificial intelligence demonstrates quite something else.
The printing press, the steam engine, electricity, the internet— every great technological revolution has been accompanied by fears about what it would destroy, particularly jobs.

There is no doubt that this is one of the most effective ways of instilling fear in human beings, given the role of work as a means of subsistence.
Take the Industrial Revolution as an example.
When it began, the world was home to some 800 million human beings.
If, in keeping with the Luddites and the perennial pessimists, employment had at best remained constant, then, given that the world’s population has since increased more than tenfold, the global employment rate today would be at 90%.

That is absurd, something that few of us few seem to have stopped to consider, perhaps except perhaps those of us with a passion for reading Borges, who love his approach for testing an idea by taking it to its logical extreme.
Ultimately, these technological advances have not only failed to produce any of the catastrophes, but in addition, all of these ended up bringing an end to what human beings were able to do.
Today, we have built machines that are able to carry out tasks that only a few months ago seemed out of our reach.
Where we many see a threat, we see a new frontier: artificial intelligence, or superintelligence, as Donald Trump said, can double our productivity in a way that we do not yet comprehend.

To invoke Adam Smith, artificial intelligence will be the pin factory of the 21st century, and much more besides.
It can transform our economies, our medicine, our education, even the way we govern.
That calls for prudence, yes.
But prudence doesn’t mean fear.

Moreover, under no circumstances should fear automatically translate into obedience.
Indeed, the dystopian scenarios commonly invoked to instill fear and justify state control make no sense from an economic standpoint.
The answer lies with Adam Smith.
Artificial intelligence, like the division of labor in the case of the pin factory, is an accelerator of productivity growth.

Smith noted, however, that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.
Growth will therefore be constrained by its counterpart in genuine demand, without fiscal deficits or spurious money creation.
But that’s not all.
Those projects must also be financed, and that should be done with the resources of human beings.

That is, their initial endowments and level of wealth, which correspond to the side of the market.
Moreover, the purpose of producing more is to achieve a higher level of consumption.
Yet the satisfaction generated by consumption increases at a decreasing rate, while the loss of satisfaction involved in surrendering leisure in order to produce more rises disproportionately.
Consequently, the point at which the gain from greater consumption is equal to the loss of leisure brings the system to an equilibrium, leaving no room for dystopian terror.

That is why, when we hear that the state should control artificial intelligence, we should remember something basic.
The state is not an abstract creature.
It is made up of people, officials, and bureaucrats.
Granting it control over innovation means granting some people, in the best and most naive of cases, the power to limit what everyone else can create.

History gives us reason to scrutinize such power carefully.
For centuries, fear over tomorrow has been used as an argument for restricting freedoms today, always with the same promise: give us a part of your freedom and we will protect you from this new threat.
We will apply a different principle.
In the face of uncertainty, we propose determination.

In the face of fear, courage.
In the face of decline, ambition.
And in the face of resignation, we propose optimism.
That is why I tell you that when it comes to artificial intelligence, Argentina will stand at the forefront of freedom.

We have the critical minerals, the energy, the talent, and the capacity to compete at every link in that value chain.
And we want to become the most competitive place in the world in which to develop it, with a cutting-edge legal framework, a commitment not to regulate preemptively, a commitment not to regulate preemptively, limited liability for companies operating with AI agents, and tax incentives.
Because artificial intelligence is not geopolitically neutral.
The West must lead the development of this technology to ensure that it is consistent with our fundamental libertarian values, namely respect for life, liberty, private property, and the notion of human dignity.

In that regard, we fully share President Trump’s vision.
Mr. President, we are living through one of those strange moments in history when one world begins to disappear before the next has finished being born.
These are dangerous times, but they are also extraordinary times.
Because during long periods of stability, nations manage the world they have inherited.

During periods of transformation, some have the opportunity to build the world that is to come.
Argentina wants to be one of them.
We will continue to participate in multilateral fora in good faith, because some problems mean that we need to work together.
But we mustn’t confuse cooperation with subordination.

We believe in alliances, and above all, in nations.
Argentina speaks from the experience of a country that knows its own mistakes.
We know the cost of isolation.
We know the cost of destroying a currency.

We know the cost of turning the state into a permanent obstacle to human initiative.
For a century, we tried almost every conceivable way of preventing our own greatness, and we survived.
Not unscathed, but we survived.
Perhaps that is why today we understand something that other nations may forget: decline is not destiny.

It is the result of repeated decisions.
And if a course can be chosen, it can also be changed.
And that is what Argentina is trying to do.
We have the energy that the world will need.

We have food.
We have critical minerals.
We have human talent.
We have the South Atlantic, and we are a natural gateway to Antarctica.

And we have something that for far too long we lacked: the will to transform our potential international power.
We want an Argentina that is prosperous, influential, and powerful.
Not to subjugate others, but to be free.
Not to conquer others, but so that our destiny may be decided by Argentines themselves.

That is why I say to the free men and women of the world, to scientists, entrepreneurs, and creators, to those who have dreamed of a land where they can make a new beginning: look south.
There you will find a vast land of fertile fields, oil, minerals, and human talent.
A land that has welcomed millions who crossed oceans in the hope that their children would live better lives than they had, and who built one of the most prosperous nations on Earth.
We have a responsibility to live up to that legacy.

We do not know exactly what the world now being born will look like, but we do know what kind of nation we want to be when it arrives: a free nation, a prosperous nation, a sovereign one, a nation capable of defending what is its own and open to the world.
A nation unafraid, once again, to utter a word that for far too long seemed forbidden: greatness.
No nation is guaranteed a place in history.
It is built generation after generation, through work, through freedom, and through the determination of a people who refuse to accept that their best days are behind them.

We believe that Argentina still has a great story ahead of it.
And we have decided to go out and claim it.
May God bless all peoples of the world.
May God bless the Argentine Republic.

May the forces of heaven be with us.
And long live freedom, damn it.
On behalf of the Assembly, I wish to thank the President of the Argentine Republic.

Official UN auto-generated transcript.  May contain errors.

Greening Drylands Conceal a Rising Boom-and-Bust Crisis

A phys.org article (dated around late September 2026) appears to cover concerns about the rapid growth of satellite constellations and escalating risks to Earth’s orbital environment, based on recent reports and analyses.

Drylands play a disproportionately large role in the global carbon cycle, despite low average productivity. They cover roughly 40- 45% of Earth’s land surface (~66– 67 million km²), support over 2 billion people, and dominate both the long- term trend and interannual variability (IAV) of the terrestrial carbon sink.

A landscape split between lush green grass and dry, cracked earth under a cloudy sky, with mountains in the background.
AI generated by Grok

A phys.org article (dated around late September 2026) appears to cover concerns about the rapid growth of satellite constellations and escalating risks to Earth’s orbital environment, based on recent reports and analyses.

The exact page did not load successfully, but closely matching contemporary coverage, especially the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Space Environment Report 2026 (data through end of 2025, released mid- September 2026) and related discussions, points to this theme.

Key points from the ESA report and related coverage

Explosive growth in satellites: Commercial constellations continue expanding rapidly. In 2025 alone there were more than 300 launches putting over 4,000 new payloads into orbit. Around 10 new payloads are launched daily on average, while more than three intact satellites or rocket bodies reenter Earth’s atmosphere daily. Total active satellites are in the range of ~15,000- 17,000 (heavily driven by Starlink and similar systems), up sharply from a few thousand before the mega constellation era began around 2019.

Rising collision and debris risks: Not enough satellites are reliably leaving congested low- Earth orbits (LEO) at end- of- life. Projections show an unstable environment with collision rates potentially increasing exponentially under current trends (even assuming continued best- practice disposal rates). The “Kessler syndrome” risk, where collisions generate debris that triggers further collisions, is becoming visible earlier in models. ESA shortened its projection horizon from 200 to 100 years and still sees skyrocketing object numbers and collisions.

Space Environment Health Index worsened sharply: This single metric (comparing long- term effects against a sustainable 2014 benchmark) jumped roughly an order of magnitude (from ~4 to ~50) in one year, indicating current activities are far beyond sustainable levels for the orbital environment.

Other trends: Constellations are shifting altitudes more significantly year- to- year. A new metric tracks rising (still low absolute) on- ground casualty risk from surviving reentry fragments due to higher traffic. Fragmentation events and unidentified objects are adding complexity. Active debris removal is increasingly needed alongside better mitigation, as prevention alone is no longer sufficient.

Broader context from parallel reporting: Related analyses highlight threats to astronomy (trails and brighter night skies from large, proposed fleets, including potential million- satellite data- center constellations and mirror satellites), atmospheric pollution from launches/reentries, and the sheer scale of future filings (hundreds of thousands to over 1.7 million additional satellites proposed).

ESA emphasizes that mitigation adherence is improving in some areas (e.g., more controlled reentries, shorter disposal targets moving from 25 to 5 years), but efforts need to accelerate. The agency is pursuing “Zero Debris” goals by 2030, better tracking, design-for-demise technologies, and active removal demonstrations.

In short, the article highlights how the satellite “boom” is dynamically stressing orbital sustainability, with data showing the problem accelerating faster than mitigation is keeping pace. For the full original text or images, try the phys.org link directly or the ESA report PDF.

Line graph showing relative change (%) over years from 1980 to 2020 for different datasets such as GIMMS4g, GLOBMAP, and SNU.
Persistent greening yet increasing variability of annual growing season LAI across global drylands. Credit: Nature Climate Change (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41558-026-02733-7

Drylands play a disproportionately large role in the global carbon cycle, despite low average productivity. They cover roughly 40- 45% of Earth’s land surface (~66– 67 million km²), support over 2 billion people, and dominate both the long- term trend and interannual variability (IAV) of the terrestrial carbon sink.

Key Carbon Stocks

Vegetation (biomass): Drylands hold ~22- 30% of global above- and below- ground biomass carbon (rough estimates around 790 Pg above -ground and 614 Pg below- ground in some inventories).

Soil organic carbon (SOC): Approximately 32% of the global SOC pool, estimates include ~248 Pg (0- 30 cm), 420- 470 Pg (0- 1 m), and ~646 Pg (to 2 m).

Soil inorganic carbon (SIC): Even more dominant, drylands contain the large majority (~80%) of the global SIC pool (hundreds of Pg to 1- 2 m depth). Secondary carbonate formation can act as a long- term sink.

Total ecosystem carbon stocks are substantial at the global scale, though densities per unit area are lower than in humid forests.

Fluxes and Dynamics

Drylands contribute ~40% of global net primary production (NPP) in some estimates and are the largest source of IAV in the land carbon sink (often ~30- 40% or more of global terrestrial net carbon flux IAV). Semi- arid ecosystems (e.g., tropical and subtropical grasslands, savannas, and shrublands) are especially important.

Productivity (GPP/NPP): Strongly limited by water availability. Rainfall pulses trigger rapid growth and microbial activity, producing large CO₂ uptake events in wet years and respiration pulses. CO₂ fertilization has contributed to greening and higher light- use efficiency in many areas.

Respiration and turnover: Soil respiration can release both recent and old carbon (radiocarbon studies show mean ages of ~520 years for respired CO₂ and ~2100 years for bulk SOC in some drylands). Old carbon is more vulnerable than models often assume.

Abiotic processes: Photodegradation, thermal degradation, wind and water erosion, and inorganic carbon dynamics (including mineral adsorption and desorption of CO₂) are more important than in humid systems. Recent work has highlighted abiotic carbon fluxes into desert soils that can rival biological fluxes locally.

Observed Trends and Variability

Satellite records (LAI, GPP, NDVI) generally show persistent greening across much of the global drylands from the 1980s/2000s onward, driven by a combination of rising CO₂, climate variability, and (in many regions) human activities such as cropland expansion, irrigation, and fertilization.

However, a 2026 Nature Climate Change study found that these greening masks increasing interannual variability (covering ~82% of drylands). LAI maxima are rising while minima are declining, creating a stronger “boom- and- bust” pattern. Increasing rainfall sensitivity is the primary driver, with inter- and intra-annual rainfall variability as secondary factors. Dynamic global vegetation models (DGVMs, e.g., from TRENDY) under- estimate observed greening rates and fail to capture the rising variability.

This heightened variability may signal approaching state transitions, increasing carbon- cycle uncertainty and threatening ecosystem services (e.g., forage, soil stability, water regulation).

Other recent findings note possible slowdowns in dryland GPP growth in some periods due to rising vapour pressure deficit (atmospheric dryness), contrasting with continued gains in humid regions.

Model Performance and Uncertainties

DGVMs and land surface models often:

  • Capture spatial patterns of GPP reasonably well but struggle with trends, stocks, and IAV.
  • Over- attribute changes to CO₂ fertilization while under- representing water constraints, land management, nitrogen dynamics, and abiotic processes.
  • Project net carbon gains in dryland soils driven by CO₂ effects, but empirical evidence for multi-decadal soil sinks is limited.

Definitions of “dryland” (aridity indices, biome classifications) and sub-biome differences (e.g., Australian vs. southwestern US systems) strongly affect quantified contributions.

Climate Change, Land Use, and Future Outlook

Expansion: Drylands are projected to expand (though CO₂ effects on stomatal conductance and PET can moderate this). Expansion into formerly more productive areas may not increase global GPP.

Vulnerability: Higher temperatures, more extreme droughts or wet extremes, and desertification risks can release stored carbon (organic and potentially inorganic) and reduce sink strength.

Management potential: Sustainable practices (reduced tillage, cover crops, controlled grazing, restoration) can enhance SOC, though achievable rates in drylands are modest (tens of kg C ha⁻¹ yr⁻¹) and fall short of ambitious global targets. Avoiding degradation is critical for both carbon and livelihoods.

In summary, drylands are highly dynamic, water- limited systems whose carbon cycle exerts outsized influence on global atmospheric CO₂ variability and trends.

Observed greening is real but increasingly unstable; models lag observations; and both biotic (pulse-driven) and abiotic processes matter. Rising variability and potential state shifts heighten uncertainty for the future land carbon sink.

Improved observations (flux towers, radiocarbon, high- resolution remote sensing), better representation of dryland- specific processes in models, and adaptive land management are priorities.

Greening masks stability loss in drylands

Drylands are undergoing large- scale changes due to climate change, but understanding remains limited by observational gaps, conflicting satellite records, and model uncertainty. Using long- term trends and interannual variability in leaf area index (LAI) from multiple satellite products (1982- 2020), the study finds:

  • Persistent greening across global drylands, with rates higher than those simulated by current dynamic global vegetation models (DGVMs). This contradicts some earlier reports of a recent greening slowdown.
  • Increasing interannual variability in LAI that is spatially coherent and covers about 82% of global drylands. This is characterized by rising LAI maxima and declining minima.
  • The dominant driver of the rising variability is increasing rainfall sensitivity, with both inter- and intra-annual rainfall variability as secondary contributors.
  • The DGVMs examined (from the TRENDY ensemble) fail to reproduce the observed increase in variability and show divergent LAI trajectories compared with observations.

The authors note that rising variability may signal impending state transitions. These could increase uncertainty in the carbon cycle and disrupt important dryland ecosystem services.

Additional context from the paper

  • Analyses rely on multiple LAI datasets (GIMMS4g, GLOBMAP, SNU, and MODIS for the more recent period) plus climate data (precipitation, temperature, VPD, PET) and land- cover products.
  • Model comparisons use outputs from 13 DGVMs in TRENDYv13.
  • Supporting figures examine spatial patterns of greening or browning, decomposition of coefficient of variation (LAIcv) into standard deviation and mean, product- specific trends, and drivers of variability.
  • Data and code are publicly available via Zenodo repositories listed in the article.

Corresponding authors: Wen Zhang and William K. Smith (University of Arizona and collaborators from multiple institutions including Western University, NASA, USGS, and others).

The article is subscription and paywalled for the full text beyond the abstract and extended data summaries. Public datasets and code links are provided for reproducibility.

Journal information: Nature Climate Change

DOI: 10.1038/s41558-026-02733-7

Provided: University of Arizona

Authors: Wen Zhang,
David J. P. Moore,
Yang Li,
Natasha MacBean,
Andrew F. Feldman,
Christopher R. Schwalm,
Yanghui Kang,
Julia K. Green,
Benjamin Poulter,
Mostafa Javadian,
Russell L. Scott,
Zexi Shen,
Youngryel Ryu,
Sungchan Jeong,
Sasha C. Reed &
William K. Smith

Abstract

Drylands are already undergoing large-scale change due to climate change, yet understanding of this response remains limited by observational gaps, conflicting satellite records and substantial model uncertainty. Here, considering trends and interannual variability based on leaf area index (LAI), we show persistent (1982–2020) greening across global drylands and increasing interannual variability. Greening rates are higher than current dynamic global vegetation models and contradict reports of a recent greening slowdown. The interannual variability increase is spatially coherent, covering about 82% of global drylands, and is characterized by increasing LAI maxima and declining minima. Increasing rainfall sensitivity is the dominant driver of increasing variability with both inter- and intraannual rainfall variability acting as secondary drivers. The dynamic global vegetation models analysed cannot reproduce increasing variability and divergent LAI trajectories. Rising variability may indicate eminent state transitions that could intensify carbon cycle uncertainty and disrupt key dryland ecosystem services.

Al Gore: “The day is coming when our [Renewable Energy] momentum will overtake the resistance. We’re getting very close now”

Al Gore still stuck in green conspiracy land.

Obviously much of what Gore has claimed over the years simply hasn’t happened. Sea level rise has failed to accelerate. Disruption to food production hasn’t worsened – food production is soaring. And the polar ice has failed to melt away.

But his biggest claim, that “resistance” to renewables is impeding adoption, is complete nonsense. The real problem is renewables don’t work.

Cartoon depicting Al Gore riding a rocket labeled 'Renewable Momentum', symbolizing the shift towards renewable energy. The background features industrial power plants, wind turbines, and solar panels. Text elements discuss reliability, storage, and the future of renewable energy.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrall

Al Gore still stuck in green conspiracy land.

Twenty years after An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore still believes in the climate fight: ‘We are going to win this’

Former US vice-president still has optimism for climate advocacy two decades after groundbreaking documentary

Oliver Milman Thu 24 Sep 2026 07.43 AEST

…

At a New York event to mark the 20th anniversary of the release of the film and his subsequent climate advocacy work, Gore, now 78, joked: “I always say if it hadn’t been for me, we might have a big problem right now” when asked about the progress made over the past two decades.

“The scientists unfortunately have been proven to be absolutely correct,” Gore said on Wednesday. “In some important ways, they may have even understated what the damage is doing. The resistance has been more durable and sustained than I expected it to be.”

The fossil fuel industry has “captured control of too many governments” and even the UN’s top climate science apparatus “to a shocking degree”, Gore said, citing recent reporting by the Guardian that Saudi oil operatives were involved in crafting high-profile UN climate reports.

…

Gore said that while many developing countries still struggle to get adequate financing for renewables and battery projects, he is confident that the mass adoption of clean energy, now routinely cheaper than fossil fuels such as coal and gas, will take hold.

“The day is coming when our momentum will overtake the resistance. We’re getting very close now,” he said. “I think we are going to win this. The remaining question is whether we will win it in time to avoid those negative tipping points I talked about.”

…Read more: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/sep/23/al-gore-climate-crisis-an-inconvenient-truth

Obviously much of what Gore has claimed over the years simply hasn’t happened. Sea level rise has failed to accelerate. Disruption to food production hasn’t worsened – food production is soaring. And the polar ice has failed to melt away.

But his biggest claim, that “resistance” to renewables is impeding adoption, is complete nonsense. The real problem is renewables don’t work.

There is nobody preventing the purchase of renewable systems. Anyone who wants solar panels or batteries or even wind turbines can buy whatever they want, on any scale they want.

Want to power an entire neighbourhood with renewables? Raise the finance, buy a big patch of land, and plant the solar panels and batteries. Nobody will stop you.

Of course, you better be careful about what you actually promise to deliver.

I have a friend who has solar powered his whole house, after ordering components from China – 10s of thousands of watts of solar panel capacity. Apart from one unpleasant surprise, when a set of batteries he ordered from China turned out to be much smaller batteries with rocks in the case to make up the weight, he pretty much got what he wanted.

But even with all this my friend still has to switch on grid power from time to time, especially during air-conditioner season.

My friend will probably have the last laugh when the Aussie East Coast Aussie power grid collapses under the weight of bureaucratic stupidity – power some of the time is better than no power. Prepping for when government lets us down is more my friend’s thing than the fake climate crisis – a position I have some sympathy for. But you can’t run a civilisation on an energy source which keeps letting you down.

Al Gore might be able to persuade people and governments to try renewables, I’m not denying his powers of persuasion. What he cannot do is convince former enthusiasts to continue embracing renewables, when the economic reality of unreliable, expensive energy smacks them in the face, like what is happening right now in Germany.

Industry is Being Sacrificed to Net Zero Ideology, Says Siemens Energy Boss – Watts Up With That?

Industry is Being Sacrificed to Net Zero Ideology, Says Siemens Energy Boss
Industry is Being Sacrificed to Net Zero Ideology, Says Siemens Energy Boss
Industry is Being Sacrificed to Net Zero Ideology, Says Siemens Energy Boss