Global warming, climate change, all these things are just a dream come true for politicians. I deal with evidence and not with frightening computer models because the seeker after truth does not put his faith in any consensus. The road to the truth is long and hard, but this is the road we must follow. People who describe the unprecedented comfort and ease of modern life as a climate disaster, in my opinion have no idea what a real problem is.
Euronews claims climate change has evolved into a “meta-crisis” threatening food security, energy supplies, economies, water resources, and international security. This is misleading because the article largely substitutes predictions and assertions for measurements of what is actually happening.
The data show global crop production and yields reaching record levels, deaths from extreme weather collapsing over the long term, and many of today’s energy and economic problems arising from political choices and geopolitical conflicts rather than changes in climate.
Euronews claims climate change has evolved into a “meta-crisis” threatening food security, energy supplies, economies, water resources, and international security. This is misleading because the article largely substitutes predictions and assertions for measurements of what is actually happening. The data show global crop production and yields reaching record levels, deaths from extreme weather collapsing over the long term, and many of today’s energy and economic problems arising from political choices and geopolitical conflicts rather than changes in climate.
Euronews builds its case primarily around an interview with Emmanuella Doussis, UNESCO Chair on Climate Diplomacy at the University of Athens. Doussis declares climate change an economic, social, political, and geopolitical problem, linking it to competition for resources, migration, water shortages, food insecurity, and the energy transition.
Those are sweeping claims. Curiously, Euronews provides remarkably little observational evidence demonstrating that climate change is actually causing the worldwide “meta-crisis” its headline announces.
Perhaps the most obvious contradiction concerns food.
Doussis predicts, “We will face a very large, serious problem with food security.” But predictions about what might happen cannot erase what is happening.
Climate at a Glance: Crop Production summarizes data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization showing that global crop production and yields have risen dramatically during the period of modern warming. Its latest summary reports that the 2023 and 2024 global crop years produced the two highest global crop yields per acre on record.
Climate Realism has documented the same trend repeatedly. Global production of staple crops has increased substantially, and yields have repeatedly set records during recent decades. Even where individual crops suffer poor regional seasons because of drought, floods, pests, or other causes, that is not evidence of a deteriorating global food supply.
None of this means weather cannot damage crops. It always has. It means that portraying climate change as presently creating a global food-security crisis conflicts with the direction of observed agricultural production.
The article’s treatment of energy is equally peculiar.
Euronews describes moving away from fossil fuels as part of the solution to its supposed climate “meta-crisis,” while simultaneously acknowledging that doing so creates “new dependencies” involving lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and other materials. It concedes that fossil-fuel-producing nations could be economically weakened and that entirely new geopolitical dependencies would emerge.
That sounds less like a crisis caused by climate change than economic disruption caused by policies adopted in response to climate change.
Europe provides an obvious example. Energy prices do not rise because a thermometer records a slightly higher average temperature. Prices respond to fuel availability, generating capacity, taxes, regulations, subsidies, transmission costs, geopolitical disruptions, and government decisions about which power plants may operate.
Climate Realism has repeatedly documented how wind and solar cost comparisons can omit the expense of backup generation, transmission, storage, subsidies, and other system costs necessary to accommodate intermittent generation.
There is an important distinction here that Euronews blurs: costs created by climate policy are not costs created by climate change.
The same problem occurs when the article moves from energy to economics. Weather can certainly cause economic losses. Droughts, floods, hurricanes, heat waves, freezes, and wildfires have done so throughout human history. But declaring climate change responsible for a generalized economic crisis requires evidence that those hazards are worsening in ways attributable to climate change.
Climate at a Glance: Extreme Weather summarizes observational records for floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, heat waves, and other events. The picture is considerably more complicated than the simple worsening-disaster narrative presented by much of the media.
More importantly, human vulnerability to weather has declined spectacularly.
Climate at a Glance: Deaths from Extreme Weather reports that global deaths from weather-related disasters have fallen by more than 99 percent during the past century, using international disaster data.
That is a remarkable accomplishment. Wealth, infrastructure, fossil-fueled transportation, modern agriculture, heating, air conditioning, weather forecasting, communications, engineering, and emergency management have made human beings vastly more resilient to nature.
Ironically, Doussis herself provides perhaps the most sensible sentence in the entire Euronews article: “Climate change is not always to blame.”
She acknowledges that some Greek disasters reflect chronic failures in planning, complicated regulations, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient protection of vulnerable areas.
Exactly. That caveat deserves far more attention than Euronews gives it.
A flood becomes catastrophic when people build in floodplains, drainage systems are inadequate, warning systems fail, or infrastructure is poorly maintained. Drought becomes a water crisis when reservoirs, irrigation systems, groundwater resources, and water policy are poorly managed. A heat wave becomes more dangerous when electricity is expensive or unreliable and vulnerable people cannot afford air conditioning.
Labeling all these interconnected problems a climate “meta-crisis” does not explain them. It can actually obscure their real causes.
The Euronews article commits an increasingly common journalistic error. It begins with climate change, attaches virtually every economic, geopolitical, agricultural, and social problem to it, and then presents the resulting web of associations as evidence that climate change caused the problems in the first place.
That is not how causation works.
Climate changes. Weather varies. Individual regions will experience damaging droughts, floods, fires, freezes, and heat waves, just as they always have. Sensible governments should prepare for them.
But the real-world record does not resemble the spiraling “meta-crisis” Euronews describes. Farmers are producing more food. Crop yields continue reaching records. Humanity has become dramatically less vulnerable to extreme weather. And some of Europe’s most painful energy problems have resulted from decisions about energy production rather than changes in the weather.
Euronews could have investigated those inconvenient facts. Instead, it took a collection of predictions about food, water, migration, geopolitics, and energy, wrapped them together under the fashionable label “meta-crisis,” and called it climate journalism.
That’s not evidence. It’s a narrative looking for a crisis.
Astronomers led by University of Chicago graduate student Brandon Park Coy report evidence of an atmosphere on the rocky super -Earth HD 3167 b, located about 154 light- years away in the constellation Pisces. It is the coolest “lava world” found so far with such evidence.
This paper presents JWST/MIRI Low Resolution Spectrometer (LRS) secondary- eclipse observations of the ultra- short- period (USP) lava- world super- Earth HD 3167 b. The results provide strong evidence that the planet has a thick and/or highly reflective atmosphere, making it the least irradiated USP super- Earth with such evidence to date.
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Astronomers led by University of Chicago graduate student Brandon Park Coy report evidence of an atmosphere on the rocky super -Earth HD 3167 b, located about 154 light- years away in the constellation Pisces. It is the coolest “lava world” found so far with such evidence.
Key details
Planet properties: HD 3167 b is a rocky super- Earth that orbits its K- type host star in just one Earth Day. Its star- facing side is expected to be molten rock (hence “lava world”).
Why it’s notable: Close- in rocky planets are bombarded by stellar wind and high- energy radiation, making atmospheres hard to retain. Yet several ultra- lava worlds appear to keep them. This one is cooler than the previous examples, helping map the temperature range where atmospheres can persist.
Detection method: The team used the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) to observe a secondary eclipse (when the planet passes behind its star). By measuring the mid- infrared light from the planet’s dayside, they found it is cooler than the theoretical maximum for a bare- rock surface. An atmosphere can redistribute heat to the night side or host reflective clouds, both of which lower the observed dayside temperature.
Possible atmosphere composition: The surface is likely silicate- rich (similar to Earth’s mantle). Earlier expectations pointed to vaporized- rock atmospheres, but data are beginning to suggest possible heavier gases such as CO₂, CO, or water. The exact makeup of HD 3167 b’s atmosphere remains uncertain and is a target for future observations.
Broader significance: Studying these extreme worlds provides a window into the early Solar System. Earth itself is thought to have gone through a magma- ocean stage shortly after formation, when planetesimal collisions left it extremely hot with a fully molten surface. Lava worlds therefore offer analogs for the conditions that shaped terrestrial planets in their first few million years.
The closer a rocky planet orbits its star, the more intense the environment becomes for any atmosphere:
Stellar wind (a stream of charged particles) is denser and stronger at smaller orbital distances. It can directly strip atmospheric gas through interactions with the planet’s magnetic field (or lack thereof) and upper atmosphere.
High- energy radiation (extreme ultraviolet and X-rays) increases dramatically closer in. This radiation heats the upper atmosphere, causing it to expand and making it easier for molecules to reach escape velocity (photoevaporation or hydrodynamic escape).
The planet also receives far more total energy, which raises surface temperatures and can drive stronger atmospheric circulation or loss processes.
For ultra- short- period (USP) planets like HD 3167 b (orbital period ~0.96 days), these effects are extreme. Theory (including the “cosmic shoreline” concept) predicts that such worlds should struggle to retain significant atmospheres over long timescales.
Yet multiple lava worlds, including HD 3167 b, the coolest one found so far with atmospheric evidence, show dayside temperatures cooler than expected for bare rock. This is interpreted as a signature of an atmosphere that either redistributes heat to the nightside or reflects incoming starlight (high albedo). Possible reasons these atmospheres persist include:
Continuous replenishment from a molten surface (vaporized rock or outgassed volatiles)
High mean- molecular- weight gases that are harder to strip
Reflective clouds or hazes that reduce heating
Proximity should make atmospheres harder to keep, which is precisely why the growing sample of atmosphere- bearing lava worlds is scientifically interesting.
The result comes from a JWST program (led by Megan Weiner Mansfield) surveying about 10 ultra- hot lava worlds to search for a critical temperature transition between planets with and without atmospheres. The paper is published in The Astrophysical Journal Letters.
In short, HD 3167 b expands the sample of atmosphere- bearing rocky worlds into a slightly cooler regime and strengthens the case that many lava planets retain atmospheres, while also shedding light on the possible early history of Earth- like planets.
Evidence for an Atmosphere on the Ultra-short-period Super-Earth HD 3167 b
This paper presents JWST/MIRI Low Resolution Spectrometer (LRS) secondary- eclipse observations of the ultra- short- period (USP) lava- world super- Earth HD 3167 b. The results provide strong evidence that the planet has a thick and/or highly reflective atmosphere, making it the least irradiated USP super- Earth with such evidence to date.
Planet properties (refined in this work)
Radius ≈ 1.60
Mass ≈ 4.84
Orbital period ≈ 0.96 days
Equilibrium temperature ≈ 1786 K
Irradiation temperature ∼ 2500 K (substellar temperature of a perfect blackbody)
Bulk density lower than expected for a pure Earth- like rocky composition (compatible with either a reduced iron core or a significant atmosphere)
Key observational result
A single secondary eclipse was observed on 25 June 2025 as part of JWST GO Program 4818 (“LAVA LAMPS”).
This is more than 5σ lower than the depth expected for a dark, maximally hot bare-rock surface (like the Moon or Mercury).
The corresponding dayside brightness temperature is significantly cooler than the theoretical maximum. This is best explained by an atmosphere that:
Reflects a substantial fraction of incoming starlight (high Bond/effective albedo), and/or
Efficiently redistributes heat to the nightside.
Even assuming perfect heat redistribution, a high effective albedo (, comparable to Venus) is still required. The data are inconsistent with a thin Mars- like atmosphere at ∼4σ and most consistent with a thick, highly reflective atmosphere.
The dayside emission spectrum itself is not precise enough to constrain atmospheric composition (silicate vapor vs. heavier gases such as CO₂, CO, or H₂O). Follow- up spectroscopy with JWST/NIRSpec is recommended.
Broader context
Lava worlds (rocky planets hot enough that their daysides are molten) show an apparent dichotomy: the hottest ones often have cooler- than- expected daysides (suggesting atmospheres), while cooler ones appear as bare rock. HD 3167 b helps pin down the possible transition region to roughly 2000 K ≲≲ 2500 K.
These findings challenge simple expectations from the “cosmic shoreline” (extreme irradiation should strip atmospheres) and provide an analog for the magma- ocean stage of early Earth.
The team also refined system parameters for the multi- planet HD 3167 system using the new eclipse data combined with existing photometry and radial velocities.
Lead author: Brandon Park Coy (University of Chicago). Co- authors include researchers from UChicago, University of Maryland, Harvard & Smithsonian, Carnegie, and others.
Abstract
“Lava worlds”, Earth-sized planets hot enough (Teq ≳ 1100 K) to melt their dayside silicate surfaces, have emerged as promising candidates for atmospheric detection and characterization. Thermal emission observations show an apparent dichotomy: The hottest lava worlds have colder daysides than the temperature of a maximally emitting bare rock, indicating the likely presence of thick and/or reflective atmospheres, while the coldest ones do not. However, where in instellation flux this potential bifurcation occurs is uncertain. We present a JWST/MIRI Low Resolution Spectrometer eclipse of the ultra-short-period (USP) lava world HD 3167 b (Teq = 1786 K, R = 1.6 R⊕, P = 0.96 day) that helps bridge this gap. We measure the white-light eclipse depth to be 38 ± 11 ppm, more than 5σ lower than the expected eclipse depth of a dark, maximally hot bare rock. We use this to derive a dayside brightness temperature that is best explained by the presence of an atmosphere that cools the dayside by reflecting incoming starlight and/or efficiently redistributing heat to the planet’s nightside. An atmosphere is further compatible with the planet’s slight underdensity compared to an Earth-like composition. The corresponding dayside emission spectrum is not precise enough to constrain atmospheric composition, motivating follow-up spectroscopic observations with JWST/NIRSpec. Lastly, we use our observation and existing data to refine key planetary parameters of the HD 3167 system. HD 3167 b is currently the least irradiated USP super-Earth with evidence for an atmosphere.
Five months after the IPCC ruled that the infamous RCP8.5 computer scenario responsible for most mainstream climate doomsday copy over the last 15 years was “implausible”, what news can I bring you of the Met Office’s UK Climate Projection 2018 report (UKCP18) that based its predictions on the now cancelled modelling nonsense?
On June 23rd, the Met Office produced a weather forecast for 2055 showing how the summer temperature in England under a “plausible” computer model scenario could hit 45°C along with nine consecutive days where 40°C was recorded somewhere in the country.
Five months after the IPCC ruled that the infamous RCP8.5 doomsday climate scenario was “implausible”, the Met Office is still whipping up unjustified Net-Zero convenient fear, says Chris Morrison.
Five months after the IPCC ruled that the infamous RCP8.5 computer scenario responsible for most mainstream climate doomsday copy over the last 15 years was “implausible”, what news can I bring you of the Met Office’s UK Climate Projection 2018 report (UKCP18) that based its predictions on the now cancelled modelling nonsense? Good news: the Met Office immediately withdrew UKCP18 with a fulsome apology for all the harm caused. Everything from the compromised geography A level syllabus to numerous Net Zero rules and regulations that relied on its claims have been withdrawn pending future alteration. Sorry, I must have dropped off for a moment and started dreaming. Of course, the report has not been withdrawn; of course, no apology has been forthcoming, and of course, UKCP18 is still up to all its old tricks.
On June 23rd, the Met Office produced a weather forecast for 2055 showing how the summer temperature in England under a “plausible” computer model scenario could hit 45°C along with nine consecutive days where 40°C was recorded somewhere in the country. Not bad going in 30 years, given that the UK temperature ’record’ of 40.3°C produced on July 19th 2022 by the runway at RAF Coningsby was somewhat challenged in its veracity by the fact that Typhoon jets were attempting to land at the time. The claimed record was a 60-second 0.6°C spike and over a five-minute average – recommended by the World Meteorological Organisation to reduce ‘noise’ – the temperature fell below the magic, headline-grabbing 40°C.
The Met Office did not specifically identify which “plausible” scenario it used but the figures were remarkably similar – in fact slightly hotter – than claims in UKCP18 that summer temperatures could rise by 5.1°C by 2070. Furthermore, Chief Scientist Professor Stephen Belcher, who called the illustration “scientifically plausible”, noted: “By using data from Met Office projections, we can glimpse into what an event like the 1976 summer would look like in the 2050s. It is a stark realisation to see the maximum temperature reach 45°C.”
The ‘maximum invented temperature’ would have been a more accurate statement, but such a reasonable scientific qualification was not made by Belcher, who is on record as stating that Net Zero will “stabilise” the climate.
The less charitable might suggest that the Met Office used implausible forecasts to whip up BS climate fearmongering during a glorious summer (albeit a tad inconvenient at times for those without the joys of air conditioning) in its relentless political drive to boost climate psychosis in the general population and promote the Net Zero fantasy.
Now take a look at this pack of panic-inducing poppycock published last June by Comic Cuts, or as it is sometimes called, the Guardian.
The Guardian story was based on a report from the British Geological Survey (BGS), which is designed to help town planners, property developers and financial companies assess future climate risks. Maps of the UK are produced using geological information with the highest-resolution climate change data from the UK Centre for Ecology and Hydrology, “which is derived from and builds upon Met Office UKCP18 climate projections”. By 2070, the BGS noted that over four million homes could be affected by subsidence under the high-emission scenario RCP8.5. This pathway was the only one used by the Met Office in UKCP18 and its findings are highlighted in bold type in the report. Due to computer cost considerations, other lower emission scenarios were said to be statistically derived from RCP8.5.
Oh dear, the BGS published alarming subsidence conclusions in June using fanciful Met Office projection that had been stinking up the science joint since April’s ‘Implausible Day’. Did nobody see fit to tell the BGS before it published its geological garbage? Was Comic Cuts unaware that its story about housing foundations being dragged down beneath the soil was a load of climate-catastrophising conkers? Nevertheless, we must have sympathy and understanding for the Guardian at a difficult time. The Greenland ice sheet is in net balance this year so the newspaper cannot run its regular and ever popular ‘London houses beneath the waves’ routine.
Subsidence has always been a problem in the London area where old brick buildings sit on a heavy clay soil that shrinks and expands as water levels change. The BGS is supposed to give future guidance to help mitigate this problem. It might be better off in future making realistic projections based on accumulated evidence and observations, rather than raising fear based on duff computer modelled climate guesses.
Chris Morrison is the Daily Sceptic’s Environment Editor. Followhim on X.
OCTOBER PUBLICATION: new book by Chris Morrison with a foreword by Toby Young: IMPLAUSIBLE: How scientists, activist politicians and journalists invented a climate crisis, weaponised junk computer model findings and claimed a fake consensus to promote the collectivist Net Zero fantasy.
Ollantaytambo (Quechua: Ullantaytampu) is both a living town and a major Inca archaeological site in Peru’s Sacred Valley, about 72 km (45 mi) by road northwest of Cusco, at an elevation of roughly 2,792 m (9,160 ft).
Inca stone masonry is renowned for its precision dry-stone (mortarless) construction, especially in elite and ceremonial buildings. Stones fit so tightly that a knife blade or piece of paper often cannot pass between them.
Inca (Inka) civilization and climate impacts encompass both historical influences on the empire’s rise and adaptations, and modern climate- change threats to surviving archaeological sites like Machu Picchu and Ollantaytambo.
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Ollantaytambo (Quechua: Ullantaytampu) is both a living town and a major Inca archaeological site in Peru’s Sacred Valley, about 72 km (45 mi) by road northwest of Cusco, at an elevation of roughly 2,792 m (9,160 ft).
Inca history: In the mid-15th century, Emperor Pachacuti conquered the area, razed an earlier settlement, and developed it as a royal estate. He oversaw construction of the planned town, extensive agricultural terraces (andenes), irrigation systems, and a ceremonial complex. The site later became a stronghold for Manco Inca Yupanqui during the Spanish conquest. In 1537, Inca forces under Manco defeated a Spanish expedition led by Hernando Pizarro near Ollantaytambo (the Battle of Ollantaytambo) by using high terraces and flooding the plain, one of the few clear Inca military successes against the conquistadors. Manco later withdrew to Vilcabamba.
The archaeological site (“Temple Hill” / “Fortress”): The hillside complex features massive stone terraces (Pumatallis), the unfinished Temple of the Sun with its famous Wall of the Six Monoliths (large, precisely fitted rose rhyolite blocks), fountains, and other structures. Construction appears to have been interrupted (likely by the Spanish conquest or earlier internal conflicts), leaving unfinished walls and scattered “tired stones.” Nearby are storehouses (qullqas) on the hillsides and the Kachiqhata quarries across the river, connected by roads and ramps.
The town itself: It retains much of its original Inca orthogonal street grid and some of the oldest continuously occupied dwellings in South America. Canals and many buildings from the Inca period are still in everyday use.
Modern context: It is a popular tourist stop in the Sacred Valley, a common overnight base or departure point for trains to Machu Picchu and Aguas Calientes, and near the start of the classic Inca Trail trek. The surrounding terraces and landscape remain agriculturally productive.
The site combines urban planning, sophisticated stonework, agricultural engineering, and military history in one place, making it one of the most complete and accessible examples of Inca architecture still partly inhabited.
Inca stone masonry is renowned for its precision dry- stone (mortarless) construction, especially in elite and ceremonial buildings.
Most everyday structures used fieldstone, adobe, or roughly worked stone with mortar, but the finest work, seen at sites like Sacsayhuamán, Cusco’s Coricancha, Machu Picchu, and Ollantaytambo, employed highly skilled ashlar and polygonal techniques.
Archaeologist John H. Rowe and later classifications distinguish two primary fine styles, with subtypes:
Coursed (or sedimentary/ashlar) masonry: Rectangular or near- rectangular blocks laid in roughly horizontal courses. Preferred for the most sacred or elite structures (e.g., Coricancha). More unforgiving of errors, as broken corners cannot easily be reshaped.
Polygonal masonry: Irregularly shaped, multi-sided blocks that interlock like a jigsaw puzzle. Includes cellular (smaller stones) and cyclopean/ashlar polygonal (very large stones, as at Sacsayhuamán). Often features beveled edges that create shadow lines and slightly convex “pillowed” faces.
Walls frequently incline slightly inward, with rounded corners, enhancing stability.
The Incas lacked iron tools and the wheel for transport. They relied on:
Hammerstones: Hard river cobbles (often quartzite or similar) of varying sizes. Larger ones for roughing out, progressively smaller ones for finer pecking and dressing. Impact marks are visible on many unfinished or less-refined stones; waste chips appear in excavations. Jean- Pierre Protzen’s experiments at Ollantaytambo successfully replicated tight fits using only hammerstones.
Bronze or copper tools, stone wedges, and pry bars for splitting along natural fracture planes or rows of drilled/pecked holes.
Ropes of ichu grass, leather, or fiber for hauling and lifting; wooden levers and beams; earthen ramps.
Some researchers have proposed limited chemical etching (e.g., plant- based mixtures or mineral slurries) for edge smoothing, based on chronicles and folklore, but the primary method was mechanical pecking and grinding. Claims of widespread “stone softening” or unknown advanced technology lack strong archaeological support.
Construction Process
Quarrying: Stones (andesite, granite, limestone, rhyolite, etc.) were extracted near sites when possible (e.g., Kachiqhata quarries near Ollantaytambo for the Temple Hill monoliths). Workers followed natural cracks or created them with wedges and hammering.
Transport: Massive blocks (some at Sacsayhuamán estimated at 100 and more tons) were moved by large teams under the mit’a labor tax system, thousands of workers using thick ropes, rollers or log skids, and ramps. Spanish chroniclers describe this process; “tired stones” abandoned in transit remain visible at places like Ollantaytambo.
Shaping and fitting: Stones were roughly shaped at the quarry, then refined on site. The key to tight joints was iterative trial- and- error:
A stone was placed against its neighbors.
High points were marked (sometimes with dust or by observation).
It was removed, pecked down with hammerstones, and tested again, repeatedly.
Protzen demonstrated that this produces precise, complex curved or multi- planar interfaces without templates or advanced measuring tools.
Lifting bosses (small protruding knobs left on the lower outer faces) allowed ropes or levers to position heavy blocks; many were later removed or left in place.
Assembly: Dry-fitted. Joints are often tightest on the visible outer face, with slight gaps or packing farther in. Some walls incorporate natural bedrock outcrops, blending architecture with the landscape (caninacukpirca technique). Foundations were carefully prepared, often on bedrock for stability.
Unfinished sections and scattered blocks at sites like Ollantaytambo’s Temple Hill illustrate the process mid- stream, interrupted by the Spanish conquest or earlier events.
Inca walls excel in earthquake-prone regions. Interlocking polygonal shapes allow stones to shift slightly (“dance”) during shaking and resettle without collapse. Inward- leaning walls, rounded corners, absence of weak mortar planes, and integration with bedrock reduce stress concentrations and resonant frequencies. Modern observations and analyses confirm their resilience compared to many rigid mortared structures.
Precision work required enormous organized labor via the mit’a system and specialized master masons. Chroniclers report tens of thousands involved in major projects such as the rebuilding of Cusco or Sacsayhuamán under Pachacuti and his successors. Skills appear to have drawn partial inspiration from earlier Andean traditions (e.g., Tiwanaku), adapted and refined by the Incas.
In short, Inca masonry achieved its extraordinary precision through skilled observation, iterative hand- fitting with simple but effective stone tools, massive, coordinated labor, and deep practical knowledge of local materials and geology, rather than lost high technology. The results remain among the finest dry- stone achievements in world architecture.
Inca (Inka) civilization and climate impacts encompass both historical influences on the empire’s rise and adaptations, and modern climate- change threats to surviving archaeological sites like Machu Picchu and Ollantaytambo.
Historical Climate Context and Inca Adaptations
Paleoclimate records (including lake sediments near Ollantaytambo at Marcacocha) show a shift toward warmer and relatively more favorable conditions in the Andes starting around AD 1100- 1150, following earlier arid phases.
This warming enabled expansion of agriculture to higher altitudes through extensive terracing (andenes), glacial- fed irrigation, and agroforestry.
These innovations supported increased crop productivity (maize, potatoes, quinoa, etc.) and helped fuel the rapid growth of the Inca Empire from the Cusco region in the 15th century.
The Incas were highly adaptive to Andean climate variability, including El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) effects (which can bring heavy rains/floods to the coast and droughts to the southern highlands) and frost risks at elevation:
Terraces and microclimates: Stepped agricultural terraces created warmer, more stable growing conditions, reduced erosion, and managed water. Sites like Moray experimented with different ecological zones.
Irrigation and water management: Sophisticated canals, reservoirs, and systems that captured glacial melt and rainfall.
Storage and resilience: Large qullqa storehouses for surplus food; freeze- drying techniques (e.g., chuño potatoes); diversified crops and vertical control of multiple ecological zones (“vertical archipelago”).
Landscape engineering integrated with natural topography for stability against landslides and seismic activity.
Climate was one enabling factor among many (social organization, military, labor systems like mit’a); it was not the sole driver of imperial expansion or later challenges. Spanish conquest, disease, and internal conflicts were decisive in the empire’s end, though climate stresses may have played secondary roles in earlier Andean societies.
Modern Climate Impacts on Inca Sites
Today, anthropogenic climate change poses growing risks to Inca archaeological sites in the Sacred Valley and beyond:
Increased extreme weather: Heavier rains, more intense El Niño events, and shifting precipitation patterns raise landslide, flooding, and erosion risks on steep slopes. Machu Picchu has experienced threats from heavy rains triggering slides and mudflows; glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) in the broader region (linked to rapid glacier retreat) have caused nearby disasters.
Erosion and structural threats: Intense rainfall and foot traffic accelerate wear on terraces, pathways, and stonework. Combined with seismic activity, this challenges the dry- stone masonry’s long- term integrity.
Biodiversity and ecosystem shifts: Changes in temperature and moisture affect the cloud- forest environment surrounding Machu Picchu, impacting vegetation that helps stabilize slopes.
Tourism and management pressures: High visitor numbers compound climate stresses through soil compaction and path erosion. Authorities have responded with timed- entry circuits, capacity limits, and conservation measures.
Sites like Machu Picchu (a UNESCO World Heritage Site) and Ollantaytambo face ongoing monitoring and adaptive management. Conservation efforts draw lessons from Inca techniques, such as terrace restoration and watershed management, while addressing modern threats through improved drainage, visitor controls, and research into resilient practices.
In summary, favorable climatic shifts and sophisticated environmental engineering helped the Incas thrive in a challenging mountain environment.
Today, accelerating climate change threatens the physical integrity of their monuments through intensified extremes, glacier loss, and erosion, underscoring the need for continued preservation informed by both ancient knowledge and modern science. Official site management and scientific monitoring continue to evolve in response.
Modern Andean Climate Data (focusing on the Peruvian Andes, including the Cusco- Sacred Valley- Machu Picchu region)
Temperature Trends
The tropical and central Andes have warmed significantly. Typical rates are 0.15- 0.25 °C per decade over recent decades (higher at elevations above 4,000 m).
In the Vilcanota- Urubamba basin (which includes the Sacred Valley and approaches to Machu Picchu), air temperature rose by approximately 0.018 °C per year (≈ 0.18 °C/decade) from 1980-2018.
National Peruvian data show the 2024 annual mean temperature reached a record high, about +1.18 °C above the long- term historical average.
High- elevation sites often warm faster than the global average (“elevation- dependent warming”).
Precipitation Patterns
Trends are more variable and spatially heterogeneous than temperature.
Some basins (e.g., parts of the Rio Santa / Cordillera Blanca) show modest increases; others, including parts of the southern Peruvian Andes, show mixed or weaker signals.
A clear shift toward more extreme events: projections indicate substantial increases in heavy precipitation days (very wet days) alongside intensified droughts due to higher evaporation.
Seasonal pattern remains strong: wet season roughly November- March/April; dry season May-September (classic for Cusco/Machu Picchu tourism).
Glacier Retreat (One of the Clearest Signals)Tropical Andean glaciers are among the fastest-retreating in the world:
Southern Peruvian Andes (Cordilleras Vilcanota, Vilcabamba, Urubamba): glacier area losses of 54-64% since the 1970s (to 2020).
Broader tropical Andes: roughly 40- 42% area loss between 1990 and 2020.
Peru overall: glacier surface area fell from ~2,349 km² in the early 1960s to ~1,049 km² by 2020 (≈ 55% loss); volume losses are comparable.
Ongoing mass- balance losses continue at high rates (negative geodetic balances of several tenths of a meter water equivalent per year in recent decades).
Future Projections (Late 21st Century)
Under high- emissions scenarios (e.g., RCP8.5 / SSP5- 8.5):
Temperature increases of roughly 3.5- 4.5 °C in key Peruvian Andean basins relative to late-20th/early- 21st- century baselines.
Precipitation totals may rise modestly (around 10-12% in some projections), but with much larger increases in extreme wet- day precipitation and greater drought intensity from higher evaporative demand.
Further dramatic reduction in solid precipitation (snow/ice) and continued rapid glacier loss, affecting dry- season water availability.
Key Implications for the Region
Rising temperatures, glacier melt, and more extreme rainfall and drought cycles increase risks of landslides, flooding, erosion of agricultural terraces and archaeological sites, and seasonal water stress, directly relevant to the Sacred Valley, Ollantaytambo, and Machu Picchu.
Sources include peer- reviewed studies using station data, reanalysis, satellite observations, and climate models (e.g., work on Vilcanota- Urubamba and Rio Santa basins, tropical Andean glacier inventories, and SENAMHI/Peruvian national assessments). Data continue to be updated; the strongest, most consistent signal remains the rapid warming and glacier decline.
Back in reality the world is flourishing, with greening deserts and soaring crop yields.
I only have one message for the Planetary Guardians. I refuse to take the Planetary Guardians seriously unless they can produce authentic accreditation from the United Federation of Planets.
‘Planetary boundaries’ necessary for flourishing of life have been massively breached, scientists warn
New report shows key indicators of Earth’s health are ‘outside the safe operating space’ as climate disaster looms
The planetary life support systems relied upon by humans have deteriorated to their worst levels ever recorded amid ongoing pollution and habitat destruction, according to a key yet grim annual update by scientists.
Of the nine “planetary boundaries” that help determine whether life can flourish on Earth, seven are being breached at their highest ever levels of transgression, according to the latest planetary health check, a process that was established in 2009.
The seven key indicators in the danger zone include climate change, change in biosphere integrity, land system change, freshwater change, modification of biogeochemical flows, introduction of novel entities and, for the first time last year, ocean acidification.
…
“The diagnosis is unambiguous – pressure is rising across every planetary boundary already outside the safe operating space,” said Boris Sakschewski, lead author of the report. “It means that the risk of large-scale, persistent and potentially irreversible change is increasing, while our margin for error in tackling these problems is shrinking.”
…
“These are not separate emergencies; the planet is telling us, in every region at once, that it is out of balance,” said Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, chair of Planetary Guardians, a coalition of scientists, business leaders and activists.
I’m struggling to get past the “Planetary Guardians” reference. Could you imagine introducing yourself to someone as a member of the “Planetary Guardians” with a straight face?
Are they required at all times to carry a spandex suit with underwear on the outside? Or is it more of a Men in Green thing? Dark sunglasses, very dark green suits, and serious expressions?
Just imagine – there was a time voters took these people seriously.
The Old Babylonian Empire (also called the First Babylonian Empire or First Dynasty of Babylon) lasted roughly from c. 1894 to 1595 BC (middle chronology). It was a major Bronze Age power in Mesopotamia centered on the city of Babylon, which rose from a minor city- state to dominate much of southern Mesopotamia and beyond under its most famous ruler, Hammurabi.
The 4.2- kiloyear event (also called the 4.2 ka BP event or Bond event 3) was a major aridification and cooling episode centered around 2200 BC (roughly 4,200 years before present).
AI generated by Grok
The Old Babylonian Empire (also called the First Babylonian Empire or First Dynasty of Babylon) lasted roughly from c. 1894 to 1595 BC (middle chronology). It was a major Bronze Age power in Mesopotamia centered on the city of Babylon, which rose from a minor city- state to dominate much of southern Mesopotamia and beyond under its most famous ruler, Hammurabi.
Background and Rise
After the collapse of the Sumerian Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III) around 2004 BC and the subsequent Isin-Larsa period of competing city- states, Amorite (West Semitic “westerner”) groups gained control of various centers, including Babylon. Sumu- abum (c. 1894- 1881 BC), an Amorite, is traditionally listed as the first king of the dynasty; he and his early successors expanded local control over nearby towns such as Dilbat, Kish, Sippar, and Borsippa.
Babylon remained relatively modest until the reign of its sixth king, Hammurabi (c. 1792- 1750 BC). Through a mix of diplomacy, shifting alliances, and decisive military campaigns, he conquered key rivals (including Larsa under Rim- Sin, Eshnunna, Mari, and others), uniting most of southern Mesopotamia.
At its height, the empire stretched across the alluvial plain of the Tigris and Euphrates (the region thereafter often called Babylonia), extending influence northward toward Assyria and westward toward Mari and beyond. The southern half of Mesopotamia became known as Babylonia, with Babylon as its political, cultural, and religious center; the god Marduk rose in prominence as the empire’s chief deity.
Key Achievements
Code of Hammurabi: The best- known legacy is the collection of laws (roughly 282 provisions) inscribed on a large diorite stele (now in the Louvre). It covers economic matters, family law, crime, property, and more, often applying the principle of lex talionis (“an eye for an eye”) with penalties scaled by social status. It is one of the most complete and famous early legal texts from the ancient Near East, though earlier Sumerian law collections existed.
Administration, irrigation, temple building, and infrastructure improvements helped consolidate control.
Cultural developments included the flourishing of the Old Babylonian dialect of Akkadian (which became a reference form of the language), continued use of Sumerian for literary and religious purposes, and advances in literature, scholarship, and architecture.
Languages included Akkadian (official and administrative), Sumerian (literary and religious), and Amorite elements. Religion was the traditional Mesopotamian pantheon centered increasingly on Marduk.
Decline and End
After Hammurabi’s death, his successors (notably Samsu- iluna) struggled to hold the expanded territories; southern regions and other areas broke away or faced pressure. The dynasty continued for about another 150- 200 years under declining power. It ended around 1595 BC when a Hittite raid under Mursili I sacked Babylon. This created an opening for the Kassites (from the east) to take control, ushering in the Kassite (or Middle Babylonian) period.
Legacy
The Old Babylonian period made Babylon the enduring heart of southern Mesopotamia. Hammurabi’s code and the elevation of Babylon and Marduk had long- term cultural and political influence. The empire is distinct from the much later Neo- Babylonian (Chaldean) Empire of the 7th-6th centuries BC (Nebuchadnezzar II and others).
Chronology relies on the “middle chronology” commonly used by scholars; absolute dates can shift slightly depending on the system. Primary sources include royal inscriptions, administrative documents, letters (especially the rich Mari archives), and the law code stele itself.
The Old Babylonian Empire (c. 1894- 1595 BC, peaking under Hammurabi c. 1792- 1750 BC) developed in the aftermath of major climate stress and operated under generally warmer, drier conditions than today in southern Mesopotamia, with ongoing challenges from reduced water availability and soil salinization.
Climate was one contributing factor among political, social, and economic ones; it influenced migrations, agriculture, and resilience but did not solely determine the empire’s rise or fall.
Preceding Climate Crisis: The 4.2 ka Event
A significant aridification event around 2200- 1900 BC (the “4.2 ka event” or Bond event 3) affected the Near East. Proxy records (marine sediments from the Gulf of Oman showing increased Mesopotamian dust, speleothems, corals indicating prolonged winter dust storms, shamals and climate models) point to reduced precipitation (potentially 30% in some areas), lower Tigris- Euphrates River flows (a Holocene low around 2000 BC), cooler conditions in some phases, and increased aridity and dust.
This coincided with the collapse of the Akkadian Empire and pressures on the subsequent Ur III dynasty. Northern rain- fed agriculture was especially hard- hit, prompting population movements (including Amorite groups) southward into the irrigated alluvial plains. A brief wetter interval may have occurred during parts of Ur III, but overall conditions trended drier into the early second millennium BC. These disruptions helped create the fragmented Isin- Larsa landscape from which Babylon rose.
Climate During the Old Babylonian Period
Climate models of the Tigris- Euphrates basin indicate precipitation reached a minimum near 2000 BC, followed by a recovery and increase (roughly 14% in one simulation) toward 1750 BC. Textual and proxy interpretations suggest the interval ~1800- 1650 BC was warmer and drier than the modern climate, with harvests beginning 10- 20 days earlier. Conditions may have dried further around 1600- 1500 BC.
Southern Mesopotamia (the core of the empire) relied primarily on irrigation rather than rainfall. This provided greater resilience to rainfall declines than the north, but it created vulnerabilities:
Reduced river discharge limited water for canals.
Intensive irrigation in an arid setting raised water tables and caused progressive soil salinization (salts accumulating via evaporation and capillary action). This problem had begun earlier (late Sumerian and early Akkadian times) and continued; wheat yields declined and cultivation shifted heavily toward more salt- tolerant barley. By later periods, wheat was largely abandoned in some areas.
Hammurabi’s administration invested heavily in canal digging, maintenance, and water management, reflecting both expansion needs and adaptation to water scarcity. Agricultural productivity supported urban centers and the state, but salinization and variable floods remained long- term constraints.
Impacts on the Empire
Rise and resilience: Climate- driven migrations of Amorites contributed to the demographic and political shifts that enabled Babylon’s ascent. Centralized irrigation infrastructure and administration under Hammurabi helped buffer southern agriculture against the drier conditions that had destabilized the north.
Stresses: Salinization reduced long- term land productivity. Warmer and drier conditions increased the risk of crop shortfalls in drought years. Later drying around the mid- second millennium BC aligned with political fragmentation after Hammurabi, the Hittite sack of Babylon (c. 1595 BC), and the transition to Kassite rule, though military and internal factors were also decisive.
Broader context: Climate influenced settlement patterns, nomadic pressures, and economic strategies across the region, but societies adapted through technology (canals), crop choices, and political organization. Deterministic “climate collapse” models oversimplify; resilience and human agency were significant.
Evidence comes from paleoclimate proxies (sediments, corals, speleothems, models), archaeological settlement data, and cuneiform references to water works, yields, and occasional famines.
Absolute dating and regional variability introduce uncertainties, and the 4.2 ka event itself remains debated in its exact severity and global coherence.
Overall, the Old Babylonian Empire illustrates both vulnerability to aridification in a semi- arid riverine environment and successful adaptation via irrigation and state institutions.
The 4.2- kiloyear event (also called the 4.2 ka BP event or Bond event 3) was a major aridification and cooling episode centered around 2200 BC (roughly 4,200 years before present).
It is widely linked to societal disruptions across the Near East and beyond, but its direct connection to the Old Babylonian Empire (c. 1894-1595 BC) is indirect: the event primarily destabilized earlier states and helped create the political and demographic conditions that enabled Babylon’s rise.
Timing and Nature of the Event
The event is generally dated to beginning around 2200 BC and lasting through much of the 22nd century BC, with some high-resolution records (e.g., Iranian speleothems) placing a major arid phase from about 4.26 to 3.97 ka BP (roughly 2260-1970 BC).
It involved reduced precipitation (estimates of 30- 50% declines in parts of the region), increased dust storms (shamals), lower river flows in the Tigris- Euphrates system, and cooler conditions in some areas. Proxy evidence includes dust layers in Gulf of Oman sediments, soil changes at sites like Tell Leilan in northern Mesopotamia, coral records from Oman showing prolonged winter dust seasons, and speleothem data.
It marks the formal start of the Meghalayan stage of the Holocene in the geological timescale and is associated with collapses or major transformations in multiple regions, including the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia, the Egyptian Old Kingdom, and aspects of the Indus Valley civilization.
Impact on Mesopotamia and Path to the Old Babylonian Empire
In Mesopotamia, the event strongly affected the Akkadian Empire (which had expanded into northern rain-fed zones). Northern settlements experienced widespread abandonment due to failed dry- farming agriculture. Populations migrated southward toward the more resilient irrigated alluvial plains of southern Mesopotamia. Contemporary texts refer to a “Repeller of the Amorites” wall built to manage or block these movements of western/Amorite pastoralist groups.
This contributed to the Akkadian collapse (around 2150 BC or slightly earlier), followed by the short Gutian interregnum and the rise and eventual fall of the Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III, c. 2112- 2004 BC). A brief wetter interval may have occurred during parts of Ur III, but overall arid conditions persisted into the early second millennium BC. The resulting political fragmentation (the Isin-Larsa period) featured competing Amorite- led city- states.
The First Dynasty of Babylon (Old Babylonian Empire) emerged from this landscape. Its founder Sumu-abum (c. 1894 BC) and successors were of Amorite origin, the same groups whose southward movements were accelerated by the drought’s effects on northern and western pastoral zones. Within a few generations of the event’s peak impacts, Amorite rulers consolidated power in Babylon.
The empire’s later expansion under Hammurabi (c. 1792- 1750 BC) occurred after the most severe phase of the 4.2 ka aridification, during a period of relative recovery or adaptation in the south, supported by intensive irrigation systems.
Southern Mesopotamia’s reliance on river irrigation (rather than rain- fed farming) provided greater resilience than the north, though long- term issues such as soil salinization from irrigation in arid conditions continued.
Scholarly Context and Caveats
Many researchers (notably Harvey Weiss and collaborators) argue the megadrought was a key driver of northern abandonment, refugee flows, and imperial collapse. Others emphasize multi- causal explanations, including over- extension of the Akkadian state, internal politics, invasions (e.g., Gutians), and pre- existing environmental stresses, and note that some isotopic or settlement data show continuity or less dramatic subsistence shifts than a total “megadrought collapse” model implies. The event’s global coherence and exact magnitude remain debated, with regional variability.
In short, the 4.2 kiloyear event did not strike during the height of the Old Babylonian Empire. Instead, it reshaped the preceding political order through drought, migration, and collapse, paving the way for Amorite dynasties, including the one that made Babylon the center of a new Mesopotamian power.
For more than four decades, Americans have been subjected to a relentless drumbeat of environmental doom. They have been terrified by warnings of acid rain, the ozone hole, melting ice caps, drowned coastal cities, superstorms and mass extinctions. Then came Al Gore and increasingly apocalyptic warnings about global warming, which has since been rebranded as “climate change.”
Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller, “The Population Bomb,” promised mass starvation in the 1970s. Instead, Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution fed a billion more people. Being wrong has never slowed down the doomsayers.
For more than four decades, Americans have been subjected to a relentless drumbeat of environmental doom. They have been terrified by warnings of acid rain, the ozone hole, melting ice caps, drowned coastal cities, superstorms and mass extinctions. Then came Al Gore and increasingly apocalyptic warnings about global warming, which has since been rebranded as “climate change.”
Today, we can see the consequences. Two generations of young people have been taught not to respect the environment, but rather to fear the future.
The numbers are disturbing. A Lancet Planetary Health survey of 15,793 Americans ages 16 to 25 found that 85 percent were at least moderately worried about climate change, including 58 percent who were very or extremely worried. More than half said climate change made them hesitant to have children.
Other research points the same way. A review of multiple studies found that stronger climate worry lines up with wanting fewer children or none at all.
Think about that. We have convinced millions of young people that the future is so bleak that they should reconsider having children.
Yet the picture of a dying planet bears little resemblance to the measurable world around us.
The Earth is getting greener. NASA reported that 25 to 50 percent of the world’s vegetated land greened significantly between 1982 and 2015 — an increase in leaf area roughly twice the size of the continental U.S. Researchers attributed about 70 percent of that greening to rising carbon dioxide.
So carbon dioxide is not merely an emission — it is plant food.
Agriculture tells the same story. The world now grows nearly three times as much grain on the same acre as it did in 1961. The cropland saved is close to the area of the U.S. and India combined. Credit better seeds, machinery, irrigation, modern farming, fossil fuel-derived fertilizer, and that carbon dioxide boost.
Our air is cleaner, too. EPA reports that emissions of the six main air pollutants fell 79 percent between 1970 and 2024, even as the economy grew 338 percent, Americans drove 195 percent more miles, and the population grew by two-thirds.
Prosperity has surged as well. The number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide fell from roughly 2.3 billion in 1990 to about 800 million today, even as the world population grew by nearly three billion. Life expectancy, literacy, and living standards are at record highs.
We have heard the doom and gloom predictions before. Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller, “The Population Bomb,” promised mass starvation in the 1970s. Instead, Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution fed a billion more people. Being wrong has never slowed down the doomsayers.
None of this means environmental problems are imaginary. It means they are problems to solve and not reasons to surrender.
Previous generations built dams, cured diseases, split the atom, crossed oceans, and landed men on the Moon. They faced world wars, depressions, and nuclear standoffs, real existential dangers. Their answer was not to stop having children. It was to build a better world for them.
Even Elon Musk, who believes strongly that man-made carbon dioxide threatens the climate, preaches innovation and expansion — not retreat and despair. That is the mindset young people need.
So teach the real problems we can do something about — not false climate doom. Teach the triumphs, not just the panic. Teach how human ingenuity cleaned our air and rivers, tripled crop yields, cut extreme poverty by two-thirds, and greened a massive share of the planet.
Parents, this one is on us. Ask your school district what your children are being taught about climate, and what they are not. Ask to see the curriculum. Ask whether a single one of these numbers appears in it. Then say so out loud at the next school board meeting.
Two generations have been taught to fear the future. Let’s teach the next one to build it.
Yeah, a full collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) would produce severe, far- reaching climate disruptions that scientists widely describe as catastrophic for large regions, especially northwestern Europe, the U.S. East Coast, and monsoon-dependent areas in Africa, Asia, and South America.
The AMOC has switched states in the past, that is well- supported by paleoclimate records.
During the last glacial period (roughly 115,000- 11,700 years ago), the climate system exhibited repeated abrupt shifts closely linked to changes in the strength of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). The two most prominent examples are Dansgaard-Oeschger (D-O) events and Heinrich events.
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Yeah, a full collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) would produce severe, far- reaching climate disruptions that scientists widely describe as catastrophic for large regions, especially northwestern Europe, the U.S. East Coast, and monsoon-dependent areas in Africa, Asia, and South America.
The AMOC is a major system of ocean currents (part of the broader thermohaline “conveyor belt”) that transports enormous amounts of heat northward in the Atlantic, on the order of 1 petawatt, far exceeding total human energy use. It helps keep northwestern Europe milder than other regions at similar latitudes. A collapse (or very strong weakening into a near-shutdown state) would sharply reduce this heat transport.
Main projected impacts
Cooling and weather extremes in Europe: Models show rapid cooling of several degrees to 5- 15°C (or locally more) in northwestern Europe over decades, with particularly harsh winters. Sea ice could expand southward (in some simulations toward the UK or Netherlands coasts). Summers might remain relatively warm due to ongoing greenhouse forcing, but year-round drier conditions, intensified droughts (especially in southern Europe), stronger winter storms, and wild temperature swings would severely damage agriculture, for example, one estimate reduces UK arable land from ~32% to ~7%.
Sea- level rise along the U.S. East Coast: Dynamic effects from the circulation change would add tens of centimeters to over half a meter (or more in places) of regional sea- level rise on top of global thermal expansion and ice melt, increasing coastal flooding risk.
Tropical and monsoon disruptions: A southward shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) would reduce rainfall in West Africa (potentially ~30%) and parts of India (~20%), disrupt Amazon seasonality (dry and wet seasons flipping in some models), and alter precipitation across other tropical regions. This threatens food systems for hundreds of millions of people.
Broader effects: Changes in storm tracks, marine ecosystems and fisheries (via altered nutrient upwelling and temperatures), Arctic sea- ice expansion, possible modest additional atmospheric CO₂ release from ocean carbon changes (with small net global warming after regional cooling offsets), and potential cascading stresses on other systems. Northern Hemisphere cooling would contrast with some Southern Hemisphere warming (a bipolar seesaw pattern seen in paleoclimate records).
These changes would unfold over decades to about a century once a tipping threshold is crossed, abrupt on human and societal timescales, though not instantaneous. Paleoclimate evidence (e.g., Dansgaard-Oeschger and Heinrich events) shows the AMOC has switched states in the past with major global repercussions, including large shifts in tropical rainfall.
Likelihood and uncertainty
A full collapse is not certain this century.
The IPCC AR6 assessed medium confidence that an abrupt collapse would not occur before 2100, while projecting overall weakening.
More recent studies are mixed: some identify early- warning signals (increasing variance/autocorrelation, freshwater- transport indicators, or “cold blob” patterns) suggesting the system is losing stability and could approach a tipping point this century under continued high emissions; constrained model ensembles project stronger weakening (~40- 50% by 2100 in some analyses) than the multi- model mean; other work finds resilience due to Southern Ocean upwelling, with collapse unlikely this century or reversible if forcing is reduced.
The risk is commonly framed as low- to-medium probability but very high impact. Weakening is already observed or inferred in various datasets, and continued high greenhouse- gas emissions plus Greenland meltwater increase the chance of further decline or eventual tipping. Reducing emissions lowers the risk.
In short, the statement is consistent with the scientific literature: a collapse would not freeze the planet as in fiction, but it would impose abrupt, multi- decadal regional climate shifts severe enough to strain agriculture, infrastructure, ecosystems, and societies across the North Atlantic sector and beyond. Monitoring improved early- warning systems, and mitigation remain the practical responses.
The AMOC has switched states in the past, that is well- supported by paleoclimate records.
During the last glacial period (roughly 115,000- 11,700 years ago), the climate system exhibited repeated abrupt shifts closely linked to changes in the strength of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). The two most prominent examples are Dansgaard- Oeschger (D- O) events and Heinrich events.
Dansgaard- Oeschger events
These were rapid warmings recorded in Greenland ice cores, with temperature increases of about 5-16°C occurring over decades (sometimes as little as a decade), followed by more gradual cooling over centuries. They occurred repeatedly during marine isotope stages 2- 4 under intermediate glacial conditions.
Proxy evidence (including Pa/Th ratios and benthic δ¹³C in ocean sediments, plus ice- core isotopes) indicates that the warm phases (interstadials) corresponded to a relatively strong AMOC, with active deep-water formation in the Nordic Seas, while the cold phases (stadials) featured a weaker AMOC.
The shifts involved reorganization of atmospheric circulation, including northward movements of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and associated rainfall belts during the warmings. Global effects appear in speleothem records (e.g., Asian and South American monsoons), European fluvial systems, and other archives, though the amplitude of change generally decreases with distance from the North Atlantic.
Heinrich events
These involved massive discharges of icebergs (primarily from the Laurentide Ice Sheet) into the North Atlantic, marked by distinct layers of ice- rafted debris (IRD) in sediment cores. They typically occurred during some of the longer, colder stadials that preceded certain D- O warmings.
The large freshwater input from melting icebergs is widely interpreted as having caused strong weakening or near- collapse of the AMOC by reducing surface density and suppressing deep convection. Consequences included:
Pronounced cooling across the North Atlantic and adjacent continents.
A bipolar “seesaw” pattern, with gradual warming in the Southern Hemisphere (visible in Antarctic ice cores).
Southward displacement of the ITCZ and rainfall belts, producing severe droughts or major hydroclimate anomalies across large parts of the northern tropics and subtropics (including Afro- Asian monsoon regions), while some southern tropical areas became wetter.
These tropical rainfall shifts are documented in a wide range of continental and marine proxies and occurred close in time (within dating uncertainties of hundreds of years) to the North Atlantic IRD layers. Similar AMOC reductions and associated climate impacts are also inferred for events such as Heinrich Stadial 1 and the Younger Dryas during the last deglaciation.
Overall significance
Together, these records demonstrate that the AMOC has existed in multiple states and can transition relatively rapidly between them, producing large regional- to- global climate repercussions, especially in heat transport, sea ice, and the position of tropical rain belts.
The glacial boundary conditions (large ice sheets, lower CO₂, different freshwater budgets) differ from today, so the exact thresholds and rates are not identical to modern projections. Nonetheless, the paleoclimate evidence establishes that AMOC state changes are a real mechanism capable of driving abrupt, widespread climate shifts, including major alterations in tropical rainfall patterns that affected monsoon systems on which large human populations now depend.
This past behavior is one reason climate scientists treat potential future AMOC weakening or collapse as a high- impact risk, even while the precise likelihood and timing under current anthropogenic forcing remain subjects of active research.
There is no such thing as a free lunch, as Milton Friedman never tired of pointing out. A local authority that pretends otherwise is not practising environmental stewardship.
It is practising virtue signalling at other people’s expense. Let’s take the £720 first.
It is not a recycling saving at all. It is a Love Food Hate Waste talking point about buying less food in the first place, describing what the average family could save by throwing away less edible food. That is a saving from wasting less, not from recycling more.
On Thursday I found a parcel waiting at the front door of my Wandsworth flat: a ‘free’ food waste caddy, a starter roll of compostable liners and a note from the council that deserves a place in the annals of municipal self-congratulation. Recycling my food waste, it explained, could save me “as much as £720 every year”. My leftovers would become “a sustainable power source and liquid fertiliser”. And because it is “much cheaper” for the council to recycle scraps than to bin them with the rubbish, the whole exercise “helps keep your Council Tax low”. Each of these claims turns out to be false, an evasion or a subsidy in disguise.
There is no such thing as a free lunch, as Milton Friedman never tired of pointing out. A local authority that pretends otherwise is not practising environmental stewardship. It is practising virtue signalling at other people’s expense. Let’s take the £720 first. It is not a recycling saving at all. It is a Love Food Hate Waste talking point about buying less food in the first place, describing what the average family could save by throwing away less edible food. That is a saving from wasting less, not from recycling more. WRAP, the climate NGO behind the campaign, now puts the annual cost of edible food binned by a family of four at £1,000. But the money is lost by typical household behaviour, not because food waste remains uncollected by the local council.
Separately collected food waste can indeed go to anaerobic digestion, which produces biogas and a digestate fertiliser. But biomethane from digestion is also eligible for the Government’s Green Gas Support Scheme, a tariff subsidy. A “sustainable power source” propped up by a tariff is not a free lunch; it is merely moved from domestic bills to general taxpayers. The household is thus drafted as an unpaid recycler, subject to the good Wandsworth council members that claim to be saving its constituents their own money.
Nor, to be fair to the council’s worthies, is the caddy entirely their idea. Wandsworth’s own website states that all households in the borough must have weekly food waste collections from March 31st 2026, a duty that traces to the Environment Act 2021. This was passed under a Conservative government and is now being delivered under the label of Simpler Recycling. Whitehall wrote the script; Wandsworth Council merely turned up in appropriate costume and supplied the marketing angle.
Social costs and benefits
Had anyone on the Wandsworth Waste Project Team taken the trouble to have a cursory acquaintance of the available analysis, they would have found a remarkably consistent verdict. Thomas Kinnaman of Bucknell University, having reviewed two decades of American recycling experience in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, argued for replacing several state recycling mandates with a moderate landfill tax. A study of a random national sample of municipalities by Robert Bohm, Kinnaman and two co-authors found that both average and marginal costs of recycling exceed those of simple collection and disposal at a landfill. Daniel Benjamin of the Property and Environment Research Center calculated that, even after crediting the resale of recovered materials, curb side programmes in 2009 cost on average $199 a ton against $119 for landfill and concluded that mandatory programmes leave society worse off. It argues that U.S. municipal curb side recycling programmes waste resources and probably do little, if anything, to benefit the environment.
In an article entitled ‘Recycling Is Garbage’ in 1996, New York Times journalist John Tierney concluded that mandatory recycling did not make economic or environmental sense. It legendarily provoked the most hate mail ever delivered to the Times. He returned in 2015 to report that it was still typically more expensive to recycle household waste than to landfill it. He likened the zeal of the faithful to a penance for the sin of affluence.
Food waste, Wandsworth Council’s new enthusiasm, fares worse still. A 2025 study by Jackson Somers of the University of Connecticut, published in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, found that a curb side organics collection programme cost per household was nine times the social benefit of the avoided methane. Across the United States, the median expansion would cost $478 per tonne of CO2-equivalent avoided, against an assumed social cost of carbon of $51. It should be noted here that the concept of the social cost of carbon itself is highly disputed, and it could well be negative if the greening benefits of higher atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are fully taken into account.
Wandsworth’s operation is far from frugal: the council has explained that separate vehicles now collect rubbish, recycling, food waste and small electricals, each at its own time. One more fleet, one more caddy, one more cost on the beleaguered taxpayer. None of this is an argument against recycling as such. Recycled aluminium needs about 95% less energy than metal smelted from bauxite, so scrap commands a price, and a price is all a collector needs. Nobody requires a council leaflet to persuade a scrap dealer to fetch a can. Even Defra concedes that for some plastics the value on secondary markets does not outweigh the cost of collection. Free markets sort winners from losers objectively; policy mandates, however dressed up as virtuous signals, are a net cost to the taxpayer.
The Government’s own arithmetic
The council’s claim that food waste recycling keeps Council Tax low collides with Whitehall’s own paperwork. Defra’s final impact assessment in December 2024 for “Simpler Recycling” models the preferred option with English councils bearing £722 million in transition costs and £567 million in higher ongoing costs in present-value terms. The headline saving to councils of £188 million appears only after crediting about £1 billion of additional garden-waste charges on households and £474 million of deposit-return savings. Remove those and the ratepayer is left holding the caddy.
The department’s £5.9 billion “net benefit to society” for the whole package tells a similar tale. It rests on £10.5 billion of “carbon savings”; remove that single line and the package is some £4.5 billion in the red. The Defra claim rests entirely on how carbon is valued. Everything else in the model (collection costs, transition costs, sorting and the rest) nets out negative once the carbon credit is removed. Defra conveniently chose a carbon price that makes the sum positive. The UK values carbon by the marginal abatement cost, meaning the cost of cutting a tonne needed to hit legally binding carbon budgets. The circularity of Defra carbon accounting, driven by Net Zero ideologues, is astounding.
Household time, meanwhile, is treated as a rounding error: familiarisation and inconvenience costs to householders are not accounted for because Defra does not expect them to be significant. The time value of the person rinsing the caddy is evidently free. Tellingly, the same document abandons the plan for free garden-waste collections because the cost was disproportionate to the “carbon benefits”.
And the “free” in “free caddy” rests on the Government’s promise to fund councils’ net additional costs, the so-called new burdens doctrine. The Wandsworth Council leaflet says food waste recycling “helps keep your Council Tax low”. But council tax may well stay low locally only because the Treasury is covering the extra cost, not because recycling is cheap. So the cost of the new service has merely moved from the council’s books to the national taxpayer.
Milton Friedman’s dictum that there is no such thing as a free lunch has apparently not reached Wandsworth; one does not expect a copy of Free To Choose (1980) in the council library. But the deeper problem is the familiar mixture of luxury beliefs and other people’s money. Economists call the satisfaction of doing good a warm glow, and it is a preference, not a resource saving. When a state compels the ‘environmental’ ritual and raises the tax rates, the glow is enjoyed by officials and the chill by ordinary taxpayers.
It is the pattern I described in Ed Miliband’s carbon-capture crusade: policy as moral theatre, financed by somebody else. And it flourishes where the ordinary business of local government is neglected. ‘Woke’ councils seem to have far more time for planning environmental salvation than for potholes, or for easing the fines heaped on hated motorists in Sadiq Khan’s London. As my Daily Sceptic colleague Ben Pile reported last week, recycling centres across the country have been turning away old fridges and freezers, which are now piling up in laybys. Recycling is in trouble where it counts, and officialdom’s answer is another caddy.
The propensity to truck, barter and exchange
What would a rational policy look like? Britain already taxes the tip. The standard rate of landfill tax rose on April 1st to £130.75 a tonne. This tax is not an objective measure of real costs faced by society in getting rid of its rubbish. It is yet another ‘nudge’ by the nanny state to encourage producers to switch to ‘more sustainable alternatives’. ‘Sustainability’ is one of the great weasel words of the modern age, fully in keeping with those who would force taxpayers to ‘save the planet’.
Wandsworth Council should stick to its knitting. Council leaflets should tell residents the truth: that food recycling is a statutory compliance cost, not a saving, and that somebody is paying for it. Let voluntary, price-driven recycling of aluminium, cardboard and scrap metal, like other economic activity, take place by mutually consenting adults freely contracting with each other. Adam Smith argued that the “propensity to truck, barter and exchange” was inherent in human nature and gave rise to the division of labour. Hayek called the belief that a few well-meaning officials can know better than prices what is worth saving the fatal conceit. Wandsworth Council worthies should serve the local public good and let moralising behaviour be the free choice of its constituents.
Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.
Ancient Maya water management systems, particularly at cities like Tikal, represent sophisticated engineering that enabled large populations to thrive in a seasonally dry tropical environment with limited permanent surface water.
Maya filtration techniques centered on a sophisticated zeolite- and- quartz system at Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, the oldest known zeolite- based water purification method in the world and the earliest documented example in the Western Hemisphere.
Maya filtration techniques centered on a sophisticated zeolite-and-quartz system at Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, the oldest known zeolite-based water purification method in the world and the earliest documented example in the Western Hemisphere.
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Ancient Maya water management systems, particularly at cities like Tikal, represent sophisticated engineering that enabled large populations to thrive in a seasonally dry tropical environment with limited permanent surface water.
By the Classic Period (roughly 250- 900 CE), Tikal in present- day Guatemala supported an estimated 60,000- 100,000 people in its urban core (with broader regional estimates often cited around 60,000- 80,000 or higher depending on the source and method), sustained by intensive water capture, storage, filtration, and distribution amid porous karst limestone terrain and a pronounced dry season lasting several months.
Environmental Challenges and Core Solutions
The Maya Lowlands receive substantial annual rainfall (often ~1,500 mm), concentrated in a wet season, but much of it rapidly percolates through the limestone bedrock into inaccessible aquifers. Surface water is scarce, and natural springs or permanent lakes and rivers were limited or distant from major inland centers like Tikal. Early settlement at Tikal was attracted to natural springs in a ravine; over time, these were modified as population and monumental construction grew.
Key adaptations included:
Catchment surfaces from architecture: Plastered plazas, courtyards, and pavements around temples and palaces were deliberately graded (slightly canted) to seal the porous ground and direct runoff into reservoirs. Central precinct catchments alone could potentially collect hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of water annually.
Reservoirs (aguadas and engineered tanks): Natural depressions and ravines were enlarged, lined with clay, plaster, or stones, and dammed. At Tikal, central reservoirs (e.g., Temple, Palace, and Hidden) formed a descending chain. The Palace Reservoir was among the largest, with capacity estimates around 74,000 m³; overall central and related systems could store 100,000- 250,000 and more m³ (with broader estimates for the site exceeding 900,000 m³ of potential collection under full rainfall). Bajo-margin (wetland- edge) and residential reservoirs supplemented these.
Dams, canals, and control features: The Palace Dam (also functioning as a causeway) is the largest known in the Maya area, roughly 80 m long, up to 10 m high, built of cut stone, rubble, and earth, holding tens of millions of gallons. Other features included cofferdams for dredging/maintenance, rock- cut canals (some of the deepest in the Maya Lowlands), sluice gates or spillways under causeways for controlled release, switching stations for seasonal flow diversion, and berms.
Advanced Filtration and Maintenance
Archaeological evidence reveals intentional water purification. At the Corriental reservoir, researchers identified imported quartz sand and zeolite (a crystalline mineral acting as a natural molecular sieve), transported from tens of kilometers away. These materials filtered microbes, heavy metals (including mercury), nitrogen compounds, and toxins, making this one of the earliest known sophisticated filtration systems in the Western Hemisphere, predating comparable European techniques by about two millennia. Reservoirs required ongoing maintenance: dredging sediments, repairing liners, and managing algal growth or contamination risks from nearby activities.
Water infrastructure was inseparable from monumental architecture and political power. Rulers’ construction projects simultaneously created catchment surfaces and storage, reinforcing authority through control of a critical resource during dry seasons. Some reservoirs supported irrigation of nearby fields (e.g., periodic flooding below certain tanks for crops), while others prioritized potable water. The systems proved resilient for centuries, adapting to population growth and environmental pressures, though later droughts, sedimentation, contamination (e.g., from cyanobacteria or mercury in some cores), and possible overexploitation contributed to challenges in the Terminal Classic.
Similar principles appear at other Maya centers (reservoirs, canals, wetland modifications), but Tikal’s convex micro-watershed design, turning the landscape into engineered catchments centered on elevated precincts, stands out for its scale and documentation through mapping, excavation, sediment coring, and radiocarbon dating.
These systems demonstrate practical hydraulic engineering attuned to local hydrology, long- term landscape modification, and social organization. They allowed dense urban living far from permanent rivers and offer insights relevant to modern sustainable water management in seasonal tropics. Research continues through interdisciplinary work combining archaeology, geoarchaeology, paleoecology, and remote sensing.
The ancient Maya city of Tikal flourished between the fifth and ninth centuries before the city eventually was abandoned. Credit: Jimmy Baum/Wikimedia Commons Ancient Maya built sophisticated water filters
Maya filtration techniques centered on a sophisticated zeolite- and- quartz system at Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, the oldest known zeolite- based water purification method in the world and the earliest documented example in the Western Hemisphere.
This system operated from roughly the Late Preclassic into the Late Classic periods (approximately 2185- 965 calibrated years before present or starting around the 2nd century BCE and continuing for over a millennium). It purified drinking water for one of Tikal’s major reservoirs in a tropical environment prone to seasonal droughts, heavy rains, cyclones, and contamination risks.
The Tikal filtration system used quartz and zeolite to remove both heavy metals and biological contaminants. Kenneth Barnett Tankersley / University of Cincinnati
Key Materials and How They Worked
The filter combined two non- local minerals deliberately transported about 30 km (roughly 18 miles) northeast of Tikal from volcanic tuff deposits around the Bajo de Azúcar:
Zeolite (primarily clinoptilolite and mordenite): A porous, crystalline hydrated aluminosilicate formed from volcanic ash reacting with alkaline water. Its three- dimensional microcrystalline pore structure (about 3- 4 Å) acts as a natural molecular sieve. It adsorbs and ion- exchanges harmful microbes, nitrogen- rich compounds, heavy metals (including mercury), and other soluble and insoluble toxins. Zeolites remain widely used in modern water treatment for the same reasons.
Coarse, sand- sized crystalline (euhedral) quartz: Provided mechanical clarification by trapping fine particulates, sediments, and organic debris. Alone it would clarify water visually but would not remove microbes or chemical toxins; zeolite supplied the critical purification.
Together they created an effective dual-action filter. Researchers identified these minerals via X- ray diffraction (XRD) analysis of reservoir sediments, with multiple radiocarbon dates confirming the timeline. The materials matched the distant source closely, and the source area itself produced naturally clear, sweet- tasting water that modern workers still preferred.
No intact filter structure survives, so the reconstruction is based on sediment layers, stratigraphy, mineral distribution, and hydraulic logic. The system was likely positioned at the upstream inlets (ingresses) of the Corriental reservoir:
Dry-l aid stone walls or permeable limestone barriers held the filter media.
Zeolite and quartz sand were constrained by woven petate (reed or palm- fiber matting) or similar perishable porous material.
Incoming stormwater and runoff passed through these layers before entering the main reservoir body.
Four distinct layers of the quartz- zeolite mixture in the sediments suggest the filter was periodically washed out by flash floods or tropical cyclones and then rebuilt.
This setup would have handled large volumes of water while reducing contamination. Notably, Corriental sediments show no traces of mercury (likely from cinnabar pigment used in elite architecture, art, and burials that washed into other reservoirs) or toxin- producing cyanobacteria found elsewhere at Tikal. Pottery evidence suggests Corriental water was specifically used for drinking.
Broader Context and Significance
The Maya developed this in a karst landscape where rain rapidly disappears underground and surface water was scarce for much of the year. Reservoirs collected runoff from plastered plazas and architecture, but still-water storage risked stagnation, algal blooms, and pollution from urban activities (including latrines and gardens). Filtration addressed quality as well as quantity.
While other ancient cultures (e.g., in Egypt, South Asia, and Greece) used boiling, cloth strainers, porous ceramics, or simple sand sieves earlier or contemporaneously, the Maya zeolite system was more advanced at removing invisible chemical and microbial contaminants. It predates documented European zeolite applications by nearly two millennia.
Evidence is currently unique to Corriental among investigated Maya reservoirs (fewer than 50 of thousands have been excavated or cored in detail). Other sites used sand filtration more generally, and broader water management included clay and plaster liners, dams, canals, and settling features, but the zeolite innovation stands out for its specificity and effectiveness. It reflects empirical observation- recognizing clean water associated with certain deposits, and organized labor to transport materials without draft animals.
This technique highlights Maya ingenuity in resource management and remains relevant: the same minerals are still effective in contemporary filters. Ongoing research continues to test other reservoirs for similar evidence.
Ancient Maya water management systems were sophisticated adaptations to a seasonally dry tropical climate, enabling large populations to thrive for centuries, but they faced severe challenges from multiyear droughts and reduced rainfall predictability that contributed to the Terminal Classic decline (roughly 800-950 CE).
The Maya Lowlands experience a pronounced wet season (roughly late June to January) and a 4- 5- month dry season, with high interannual variability, tropical storms, and occasional hurricanes. Much of the region sits on porous karst limestone, so rainwater quickly infiltrates and permanent surface water is scarce away from rivers, lakes, or cenotes. Major inland cities like Tikal depended almost entirely on rainfall capture.
Core Water Management Strategies
Maya systems focused on collecting, storing, purifying, and distributing rainwater while also managing excess during wet periods and supporting agriculture:
Reservoirs (aguadas) and dams: Natural depressions and ravines were enlarged, lined (with clay, plaster, or stone), and dammed. At Tikal, central precinct reservoirs (e.g., Temple, Palace, Hidden) formed interconnected systems fed by graded plastered plazas and architecture that acted as catchments. Capacities reached hundreds of thousands of cubic meters; broader estimates for the site exceed 900,000 m³ under average rainfall. Bajo- margin and residential reservoirs supplemented these.
Canals, channels, sluices, and switching stations: These controlled flow, diverted excess to prevent flooding/erosion, and released stored water in the dry season. Some features doubled as causeways.
Filtration and quality control: At Tikal’s Corriental reservoir, imported zeolite and quartz sand created a molecular sieve that removed microbes, heavy metals (including mercury), and toxins, the oldest known zeolite filtration system. Other practices included aquatic plants and settling features. Some reservoirs may have functioned similarly to modern constructed wetlands.
Agricultural integration: Raised fields, canals in wetlands, terracing, irrigation from reservoirs, and drought- resistant crops (e.g., manioc/cassava) spread risk. Household cisterns (chultunes) were common in drier northern areas like the Puuc.
Political and social dimensions: Large centralized systems often linked to elite control and ritual authority, providing dry- season water and reinforcing power.
These systems proved resilient for over a millennium, supporting peak populations (tens of thousands at major centers) through annual dry seasons and earlier climate fluctuations. Construction of major features often intensified during drier intervals (e.g., Late Preclassic to Terminal Preclassic drying).
Earlier drying: Substantial drying occurred in the southern lowlands ~200- 500 CE (Terminal Preclassic/Early Classic), coinciding with agricultural intensification (shift toward more water- conserving maize practices) and the growth of reservoir systems. Societies adapted successfully in many areas.
Terminal Classic droughts: Multiple severe multiyear droughts (at least eight lasting 3- 18 years between ~800- 930 CE) struck the region. Precipitation dropped 36- 56% in some reconstructions. Recent high-resolution stalagmite data from the Yucatán show eight wet-season droughts of at least three years between 871-1021 CE, including one extreme 13- year megadrought, the longest in the region in ~2,000 years. Reduced seasonal predictability (year- to- year rainfall variability) between ~700- 800 CE further destabilized systems. Natural internal climate oscillations (multi- centennial to interannual) may have produced or amplified these events without needing external triggers.
Compounding factors: Droughts reduced reservoir recharge. Lower water levels concentrated pollutants (e.g., mercury from cinnabar pigments in elite contexts, phosphates leading to toxic cyanobacteria blooms in some Tikal reservoirs). Deforestation and intensive land use may have locally exacerbated drying by reducing humidity and rainfall recycling. Floods or intense storms could damage infrastructure.
Differential Impacts and Responses
Water systems buffered short-term scarcity effectively, but prolonged droughts exceeded thresholds:
Southern lowlands (e.g., Tikal): More intense drying and heavier reliance on rain-fed reservoirs correlated with earlier and more persistent decline. At Tikal, systems operating near carrying capacity failed under 9th- century droughts; the last dated monument is from 869 CE. Centralized reservoirs became political liabilities when water quality/quantity declined, eroding elite authority.
Northern lowlands (e.g., Puuc, Chichén Itzá): Drier baseline but different timing of impacts. Sites used extensive chultunes and aguadas. Political activity and monument construction paused at different times relative to specific droughts; some recovery occurred during wetter intervals.
Resilience examples: Sites with access to permanent water (e.g., Lamanai near a lagoon) or diversified wetland agriculture showed greater continuity. Farmers adapted via crop diversification (drought- resistant plants), migration, and less hierarchical organization; “divine kings” and large urban centers were more vulnerable. Overall population decline and abandonment of many southern centers occurred, but Maya societies persisted and reorganized.
Models suggest even modest rainfall reductions, interacting with high population density and crop sensitivity, could cause large population drops; reservoirs reduced drought frequency but amplified impacts if they ran dry.
Lessons and Nuance
Climate stress was a major contributor, not the sole cause, of Terminal Classic changes. It interacted with overexploitation of resources, warfare, political dynamics, and demographic pressures. Water management demonstrates both remarkable ingenuity and the limits of highly engineered, rainfall- dependent systems under extreme, prolonged, or unpredictable climate stress.
These cases remain relevant for modern tropical regions facing similar seasonal variability and anthropogenic climate change, underscoring the value of diversified storage, quality management, and adaptive agricultural strategies. Research continues to refine the precise timing, severity, and human responses through integrated paleoclimate and archaeological data.
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