EU: Climate Deniers are Linked to a Russian and Chinese Disinformation Attack

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrallski

Threats of criminal sanctions for facilitating the spread of climate denial?

European Parliament
2019-2024
P9_TA(2023)0219
TEXTS ADOPTED
Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation
European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (2022/2075(INI))
The European Parliament
having regard to its decision of 10 March 2022 on setting up a special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (INGE 2), and defining its responsibilities, numerical strength and term of offices1, and its decision of 14 February 2023 amending its aforementioned decision of 10 March, and adjusting its title and responsibilities2,
A.whereas Parliament adopted a resolution on 9 March 2022 laying down its recommendations based on the report of the first special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation; whereas among its recommendations, this report called for the adoption of a coordinated strategy against foreign interference; whereas the Commission produced a document following up on these recommendations, suggesting among other things that such a strategy de facto already exists in the form of various kinds of interinstitutional coordination;
B.whereas the European Parliament is the only directly elected body among the EU institutions and is at the forefront of EU political discussions on fighting foreign interference, information manipulation and hybrid threats in our democracies, including in the EU institutions; whereas recent events have highlighted that Parliament is a target of diverse and aggressive foreign interference campaigns;
C.whereas the President of the Commission announced in her September 2022 State of the Union address that a Defence of Democracy package would be presented by the Commission, scheduled for adoption in the second quarter of 2023; whereas this package would include a legislative proposal to protect democracies from third-country entities exercising activities in the EU that may affect public opinion and the democratic sphere, a review of actions under the European democracy action plan (EDAP) and measures to ensure secure and resilient elections, including, among others, cybersecurity measures in electoral processes;
I.whereas the aim of those interference campaigns in the Western Balkans is to negatively influence the growing euro-Atlantic orientation and stability of individual countries, and so change the orientation of the region as a whole; whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia in an attempt to destabilise and interfere in neighbouring sovereign states: in Bosnia via the Republika Srpska; in Montenegro via the country’s pro-Serbian sentiments as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church; and in Kosovo by exploiting and inflaming existing disputes in the North of Kosovo; whereas Russia therefore still has notable influence in the Western Balkans, with the power to interfere in regional attempts at reconciliation, integration and reform towards democratisation;
W.whereas China has invested almost EUR 3 billion in European media firms over the last 10 years, without an adequate response from the EU and its Member States; whereas China’s example could be followed by other states with similar authoritarian political ideologies, entailing considerable risks for the integrity of European democracies and interference by other countries in the EU’s domestic affairs; whereas a number of Chinese state-run Confucius Institutes, which spread propaganda and interfere in academic institutions, are still functioning in the EU; whereas Chinese broadcast media represent and disseminate the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideology; whereas Chinese bot accounts are increasingly active on social media and in social networking, serving the needs of the Chinese authorities;
38.Underlines that the increase in climate change denialism can be linked to a wider embrace of conspiracy theories in the public discourse that is based on the deliberate creation of a counter reality and the rejection of science, and which includes false ideas about everything from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to COVID-19 vaccines; emphasises the role of foreign actors in disseminating disinformation about climate change and EU climate policy, which is undermining public support and is also being used in the narratives of domestic actors who exploit climate disinformation for their own political ends;
39.Supports the call made by leading climate experts at the 27th Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 27) for tech companies to tackle the growing problem of disinformation, and in particular to accept a universal definition of climate mis- and disinformation that encompasses the misrepresentation of scientific evidence and the promotion of false solutions, to commit to the goal of not publishing any advertising that includes climate mis- and disinformation and greenwashing, and to share internal research on the spread of climate mis- and disinformation and greenwashing on their platforms;
40.Calls on platforms to take measures to enhance transparency and prevent and ban the placement of advertising promoting climate change denial and apply them to conspiracy theories and disinformation; recognises that there is an urgent need to demonetise the spread of the disinformation economy around climate change;
41.Notes with concern that many of the most high-traction amplifiers of climate change denial and attacks on climate action have ‘verified’ status on various social media platforms, including Twitter, allowing them to spread mis- and disinformation under this privileged status to millions of followers and that such amplifiers are often based outside of the European Union; calls on Twitter to implement stricter checks when selling its ‘blue check’ marks;
48.Denounces Twitter’s backward steps in the fight against disinformation since its change of ownership; deplores, in particular, the fact that Twitter has significantly reduced the number of staff responsible for disrupting disinformation, including those responsible for global content moderation, hate speech and online harassment; deplores the recent reinstatement of suspended accounts without a proper assessment and particularly the reinstatement of violent right-wing and openly fascists accounts, including those that deny the outcome of the US presidential elections in 2020; strongly repudiates Twitter’s decision to stop enforcing its policy against Defence of Democracy disinformation;
115.Reiterates the importance of the EU’s ability to defend itself from disinformation attacks and to counteract foreign interference; calls in that regard for sufficient funding and for possible investment and legislative gaps to be addressed; calls on the Members States to update, if necessary, their legal frameworks to introduce a legal basis on which to penalise foreign interference from high-risk countries; welcomes the introduction of such a legal basis into Belgium’s draft penal code, which will allow for the better protection of the European institutions on its territory;
116.Calls on Member States and the Commission to consider how to counter disinformation from individual actors inside the EU, such as influencers on social media or politicians promoting disinformation on behalf of high-risk states, etc.; highlights the potential need to develop a sanctions regime against perpetrators engaging in FIMI inside the EU;

Read more: European Parliament (backup copy here)

Just one question Euro-tyrants: If climate skeptics are funded by Russia and China, why is demonetisation of climate skeptics such a priority?

Surely if climate skeptics were funded by hostile foreign governments, demonetisation would have no impact on our activities.

The document claims China has invested almost €3 billion in EU media organisations over the last decade. Why would the recipients of such largesse care about whether they were demonetised by social media?

Demonetisation only impacts people who have to raise their own money – independent, democratic critics of catastrophic EU climate policy failures, such as the European war on agriculture, and the complete failure of EU sanctioned member state green energy programmes such as Energiewende to deliver affordable energy and energy security and independence.

In my opinion the EU’s bumbling incompetence, the EU’s inability to draft a coherent narrative, let alone a coherent policy document, their own words have revealed this tyrannical policy initiative for what it is – a clumsy, heavy handed attempt to shut down free speech and legitimate criticism of the European Union.


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