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Major Blind Spots Persist in Climate Impact Evidence for Mediterranean Plant Communities

A systematic review by researchers from the University of Cape Town and the South African Environmental Observation Network finds major gaps and geographic biases in observational evidence of how plant communities in Mediterranean- type ecosystems (MTEs) are responding to climate change.

The Mediterranean Basin is by far the best- studied of the five Mediterranean- type ecosystems (MTEs) in the review, accounting for the large majority of the 128 observational studies (approximately 88).

A scenic landscape featuring a dry, cracked earth path leading into a mountainous area, with an olive tree on the left side, and a colorful sunrise or sunset in the background. The image contains the title text: 'Major Blind Spots Persist in Climate Impact Evidence for Mediterranean Plant Communities.' — AI generated by Grok

MTEs occur in five regions: the Mediterranean Basin, California, central Chile, southwestern Australia, and South Africa’s Cape (including the Cape Floristic Region).

These areas share a climate of hot, dry summers and cooler, wetter winters and are global biodiversity hotspots with high endemism. They face strong climate pressures, including extreme droughts reported by the IPCC across all five regions (notably severe in South Africa and California).

Much existing knowledge relies on models and experiments rather than direct field observations of natural plant communities.

Main findings

Researchers screened databases and identified only 128 qualifying observational studies. Just 9% were from the Global South, and southern-hemisphere studies overall made up only about 17%.
Geographic bias is pronounced: Mediterranean Basin (88 studies), California (18), southwestern Australia (10), central Chile (8), and South Africa’s Cape (only 4).
Only 11 of the 128 studies appeared in IPCC assessment reports; in the latest IPCC land-ecosystems chapter, less than 3% of cited literature concerned these regions.
Most frequently reported disturbances: climate variability, drought (dominant everywhere, 67-100% of reports by region), wildfire, frost, and pathogens/insect infestations. Wildfire was noted in most regions except Chile (despite frequent fires there); pathogen and insect studies were limited to the Northern Hemisphere; frost mainly in southwestern Australia.
Studies mostly focused on vegetation condition and growth; far fewer examined plant diversity, phenology, or physiology. Trees and shrubs were overrepresented relative to grasses and wildflowers (which contribute heavily to diversity and can influence fire). Some response types were missing entirely in particular regions.
Confidence was relatively high for links between climate- related disturbances and vegetation responses, but lower for attributing observed biological changes specifically to climate change (versus other drivers such as fire, land use, herbivory, invasive species, or natural variability). Few studies used modern causal-inference methods; only four included causal diagrams, and none scored highly on this.

Implications and recommendations

The geographic and topical imbalances make it hard to distinguish real ecological differences between regions from artifacts of research effort. Findings from well- studied areas (e.g., California or the Mediterranean Basin) may not apply to understudied ones like the Cape Floristic Region.

The authors call for coordinated research across all five MTEs that combines long- term monitoring, reanalysis of existing and historical datasets, remote sensing, experiments, and stronger causal- inference approaches. This would improve understanding of resilience mechanisms and better support conservation and adaptation in these biodiversity hotspots.

In short, while models and experiments provide projections, direct observational evidence of climate- driven changes in MTE plant communities remains sparse, unevenly distributed, and often insufficient to firmly attribute causes, creating significant blind spots for science and management.

World map highlighting regions affected by climate variability, drought, wildfire, frost, and pathogens/insects, with detailed observations and publications counts for California, Central Chile, Cape Floristic Region, Mediterranean Basin, and SW Australia. — Global occurrence of Mediterranean-type ecosystems, showing frequencies of reported disturbances (no. observations = 154) and the total number of publications per region included in the review (no. publications = 128). Credit: *Ecological Solutions and Evidence* (2026). DOI: 10.1002/2688-8319.70304

This gives it a relatively stronger evidence base than the other regions (especially the Global South ones), but the paper still identifies important implications, limitations, and opportunities specific to it.

Stronger observational evidence base, but incomplete

Drought, climate variability, wildfire, and (to a lesser extent) pathogens and insect infestations are well- documented disturbances affecting plant communities.
Most studies focus on vegetation condition and growth. Responses related to diversity, phenology, and physiology are less comprehensively covered than condition and growth (though better represented here than in some other MTEs, where certain categories are entirely absent).
Confidence scores for studies from the Mediterranean Basin (and California) span a wide range but often include high values for clear prior expectations and hypotheses, data quality, and statistical analyses. Scores tend to be higher for understanding relationships between disturbances and responses than for rigorously detecting climate -change-driven biological change itself.

Key limitations and risks of over- generalisation

Even with the largest number of studies, the evidence is not comprehensive enough for full causal attribution in many cases. Few studies overall (and none achieving the top causal- inference score in the review’s modified confidence index) used formal causal diagrams (e.g., directed acyclic graphs) or modern causal- inference methods to isolate climate change from confounders such as land use, fire management, invasive species, herbivory, or natural variability.

This means that while many observed changes coincide with climate trends, stronger proof that climate change is the primary driver is often lacking. Findings from the Mediterranean Basin cannot automatically be assumed to apply to the other four MTEs (or even uniformly across the Basin itself), because ecological differences, fire regimes, species pools, and research priorities vary.

Implications for science, management, and policy in the Mediterranean Basin

Scientific: The relatively rich observational record makes the Basin an important reference region. There is a clear opportunity to re- analyse existing long- term datasets with stronger causal methods, integrate them more systematically with remote sensing, experiments, and models, and expand underrepresented topics (especially diversity, phenology, physiology, and non- woody growth forms such as graminoids and forbs, which contribute heavily to diversity and can influence fire behaviour).
Cross- regional learning: Because the Basin dominates the literature, its findings currently shape much of the global narrative on MTE climate impacts. A collaborative programme across all five MTEs (emphasising shared resilience mechanisms) would help test which responses are truly general versus region- specific and improve transferability of insights.
Management and adaptation: Better causal understanding would support more targeted interventions for conservation, fire management, and climate adaptation in this biodiversity hotspot. The review stresses that identifying shared drivers of resilience and vulnerability across MTEs can strengthen management interventions, climate adaptation/mitigation efforts, and conservation action.
IPCC and global assessments: Only a small fraction of the observational studies (11 of 128 overall) fed into IPCC reports. Strengthening the observational evidence base and causal attribution from the Mediterranean Basin (and ensuring it is better represented) would improve the robustness of future assessments for this region and for MTEs more broadly.

In short, the Mediterranean Basin benefits from the densest observational evidence among MTEs, providing a solid foundation for understanding drought, variability, and fire impacts on vegetation condition and growth.

However, gaps in causal attribution, certain response types, and cross- regional comparability remain.

Addressing these through improved methods, long- term monitoring coordination, and collaborative research would enhance both local management and the ability to generalise (or appropriately differentiate) findings to the other MTEs.

Bar chart displaying the frequency of disturbance types (Drought, Fire, Frost, Pathogen/Insect, Climate variability) in various regions (California, Cape Floristic Region, Central Chile, Mediterranean Basin, SW Australia) across different categories (Condition, Growth, Physiology, Diversity, Phenology) with trends indicated as decreasing, non-linear, and increasing. — Trends in biological responses of plant communities in MTEs to climate change-related disturbances. Frequencies of decreasing, non-linear and increasing trends are plotted in stacked bar plots as proportions per disturbance.
A systematic review of observational studies reporting climate change impacts on plant communities in Mediterranean‐type ecosystems – Petersen – 2026 – Ecological Solutions and Evidence – Wiley Online Library

A systematic review of observational studies reporting climate change impacts on plant communities in Mediterranean-type ecosystems

Abstract summary

Mediterranean- type ecosystems (MTEs) are projected to be among the most vulnerable terrestrial ecosystems to climate change. While plant community responses have been extensively studied via experiments and models, observational studies remain relatively scarce.

This systematic review synthesises observed climate-change impacts on plant communities across the five global MTEs (Mediterranean Basin, California, central Chile, southwestern Australia, and the Cape Floristic Region of South Africa). It covers key disturbances and drivers of vegetation change, biological responses, geographic patterns, and confidence in the evidence.

Key findings:

Only 128 publications met the strict inclusion criteria (observational studies of climate- related disturbances affecting plant communities; experiments, pure modelling and projections, paleo-studies, agricultural systems, etc., were excluded).
Just 11 of these appeared in IPCC assessment reports.
Strong geographic bias: only 9% from the Global South. Disturbances and response types were unevenly reported across regions.
Most common disturbances: climate variability, drought, wildfire, frost, and pathogens and insect infestations, studied mainly in relation to vegetation condition and growth. Diversity, phenology, and physiology were less frequently examined (and sometimes absent in particular regions).
A confidence index (adapted from O’Connor et al. 2015, with additions for reporting quality and causal inference) showed relatively high scores for understanding links between disturbances and observed responses, but lower scores for confidently detecting climate- change- induced biological changes.
Few studies applied modern causal- inference methods. Differences among regions may partly reflect research effort and capacity rather than genuine ecological differences, limiting transferability of knowledge.
Opportunity exists to re-analyse existing long- term datasets with stronger causal approaches.

Policy implications: A collaborative, integrative research programme focused on shared resilience mechanisms across MTEs would improve understanding of causal relationships, support better- targeted management, climate adaptation and mitigation, and conservation in these biodiversity hotspots.

Additional context from the paper and related coverage

The authors searched Web of Science and Scopus (up to September 2024), supplemented by literature cited in recent IPCC WGII reports, and applied rigorous PECO- based eligibility criteria and multi- stage screening. They extracted detailed data on study design, systems, disturbances, and responses, and scored confidence on multiple axes (expectations and alternative causes, data quality, statistics, reporting, and causal inference).

Press summaries of the work (University of Cape Town and SAEON) provide the regional breakdown of the 128 studies:

Mediterranean Basin ≈ 88, California ≈ 18, southwestern Australia ≈ 10, central Chile ≈ 8, Cape Floristic Region ≈ 4. Drought and climate variability dominated reports in every region.

The full paper is available at the DOI link above (open access). Supporting information, data, and code are typically deposited with the journal or associated repositories (e.g., OSF registration of the review protocol exists from earlier stages of the project).

Published: Ecological Solutions and Evidence – Wiley Online, (2026), first published 4 August 2026

DOI: 10.1002/2688-8319.70304

Provided: University of Cape Town

Authors: Hana Petersen, Ryan Blanchard, Jasper Slingsby

Abstract

Context. Mediterranean-type ecosystems (MTEs) are projected to be among the most vulnerable terrestrial ecosystems to global climate change. Plant community responses in MTEs to climate change have been well researched using experimental and modelling approaches, yet observational studies are less common.
Approach. We present a systematic review of observed climate change impacts on plant communities across the five global MTEs, highlighting key disturbances and drivers of vegetation change, biological responses to these disturbances, and prevailing geographic trends.
Literature trends. A relatively small number of publications met our criteria (N_pub = 128), of which only 11 were reported in assessment reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The publications exhibited a large geographic bias, with only 9% from the Global South. Reported disturbances and responses were unevenly represented across MTEs.
Drivers and responses. Climate variability, drought, wildfire, frost, and pathogens/insect infestations were the most reported disturbances, largely studied in relation to vegetation condition and growth. Studies on diversity, phenology and physiology were less common, and absent in some MTEs.
Confidence assessment. An index assessing confidence in studies’ methods and findings revealed high scores for understanding relationships between climate change impacts and observed responses, and lower scores for detection of climate change-induced biological responses. The extent to which reported differences among regions reflect different effects of climate change and biological responses versus research focus and capacity remains unclear. While the included literature has improved our understanding of observed climate change impacts on plant communities in each MTE, the transferability of this knowledge across regions is limited by unequal reporting between regions. Since few studies applied causal inference methods for observational data, there is an opportunity to reanalyse existing datasets to improve our understanding of causal relationships.
Policy implications. Developing a collaborative, integrative research programme that considers common resilience mechanisms among MTEs will aid our understanding of causal relationships among climate change-induced disturbances and vegetation responses. By identifying shared drivers of resilience and vulnerability across MTEs, such research can support more targeted and effective management interventions, strengthen climate adaptation and mitigation efforts, and inform conservation action in these global biodiversity hotspots.

Beijing’s Useful Idiots: Germany, California and the Green Road to Chinese Supremacy

Mr Newsom says California has run on 100% clean electricity on nine days out of 10 this year. What the Nation never asks is whom this performance serves.

No wonder Professor Fritz Vahrenholt, a former Hamburg environment senator, told Apollo News this week that Germany’s Energiewende is “not a transition, but a retreat”.

An illustrated political cartoon titled 'The Green Road to Chinese Supremacy', featuring a green car labeled 'Net Zero' driving along a highway surrounded by wind turbines and factories, with caricatures of political figures including a smiling man in sunglasses and a woman holding a sign. The background depicts industrial scenes, shipping containers, and references to Chinese manufacturing and global supply chains. — AI generated by Grok

From Tikak´s Substack

By Tilak Doshi

A stylized illustration of a dragon amidst swirling clouds and waves, featuring intricate detailing and a watercolor effect in shades of brown and black. — *Cheng Rong Dragon, Southern Song Dynasy (1127-1279) https://animato.uk/blogs/news/masterpieces-of-chinese-art-5-breathtaking-dragons-from-chen-rong*

Satire has become redundant. The Nation, an old abolitionist publication founded in 1865 and now proudly the flagship of the Left, has just anointed Germany and California an “environmental superpower”. The author, Mark Hertsgaard, is the magazine’s Environment Correspondent and also Executive Director of Covering Climate Now, a foundation-funded media campaign that the Nation itself co-founded. His two showpiece claims are an interview that Gavin Newsom gave to Covering Climate Now and a poll-based crusade, the 89% Project, run by, naturally, Covering Climate Now and endorsed, in the AP story the piece cites, by an oat-milk company. A perfectly closed loop, which is more than can be said for the energy systems it celebrates.

Strip away the self-congratulation and the case is this. The world’s third- and fourth-largest economies have become a climate vanguard. Berlin has pledged, for the first time, to end fossil fuel use by 2045. It is not clear whether this is on a ‘Net Zero’ basis or if it actually means no fossil fuel use at all. Mr Newsom says California has run on 100% clean electricity on nine days out of 10 this year. What the Nation never asks is whom this performance serves.

Germany and California, it seems, are perfect complements to China. Beijing’s road to global supremacy in manufacturing and technology, artificial intelligence included, runs through cheap, dependable power and control of the supply chains. The two self-appointed climate leaders have made power dear, hobbled their own industries and handed the supply chains to Beijing. Lenin is said to have called such people useful idiots. Patricia Adams put the same point to Western greens in the Financial Post, and at greater length in her Global Warming Policy Foundation paper the Road from Paris. The pattern was already plain when Beijing was being cast as climate saviour: sign the green communiqué, collect the praise, keep building coal power plants as if there is no tomorrow.

In terms of realpolitik, in contrast to public posturing, China has little time for decarbonisation’s urgency. In this it is not alone. The US under Trump, India and Russia — representing over 40% of global emissions — reject the climate crisis narrative. These countries are intent on prioritising economic growth over climate alarmism and debilitating Net Zero policies. They share China’s pragmatism: aspirations for economic progress trumps unproven predictions of climate catastrophe. The first order imperative of Russia, China, India and their counterparts in the developing countries are regime and national security, dependent ultimately on improving the general welfare of their citizens.

A superpower that imports its energy

Germany has the highest household electricity prices in the EU, €0.38 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in the first half of 2025. A Verivox comparison for the second quarter of 2026 put the German household tariff at €0.36, more than five times the €0.07 paid in China. California’s residential price reached US$0.35 in April, against a national average of US$0.18 per kWh. Industrial users tell the same story. A steel mill in Germany can pay an order of magnitude more for power than a smelter in the Persian Gulf. More than 60% of the German household bill is taxes, levies and network charges – the cost of integrating weather-dependent generation and of paying for backup that must stand idle.

Germany sits on shale gas that its federal geological institute puts at 320 to 2,030 billion cubic metres of technically recoverable resource, far exceeding its conventional reserves, yet a 2016 ban keeps the frackers out while Berlin imported some 684 terawatt-hours of gas in 2025. That import dependence is a policy choice, and a bad one. Germany’s answer to the 2022 gas shock, after it sanctioned Russian gas imports to itself, was to lean harder on lignite while its last nuclear plants closed on schedule and were demolished with fanfare. Dunkelflaute, the cold, still, dark spells northern Europe undergoes, cannot be bridged by batteries at any price an economy could bear. Brussels, whose energy policy takes its cues from Berlin, is no better. Norway, outside the EU, ignores Brussels: it brought the Johan Castberg field onstream last year and its gas already covers about 30% of EU consumption. The Norwegians are not saving the planet; they are selling German’s heat.

California, once a great oil state, now sources 61% of its crude from abroad, led by Brazil and Iraq. The closure of Phillips 66’s Los Angeles refinery and Valero’s Benicia plant has stripped the state of 17% of its refining capacity and gasoline imports in 2025 exceeded the total for any year since at least 2004. Meanwhile, more than a quarter of its electricity arrives down the wires from other states. None of this is an accident of geology. The state’s oil industry association says new drilling permits are down 96%; Sacramento shuts the wells, shuts the refineries and then buys the barrels from Baghdad.

When I worked in a major American oil company headquartered in Los Angeles in the mid-1990s, there was an “all-hands” meeting on political risk for the corporate assets from Venezuela to Indonesia. A senior vice-president told the room not to forget the political risks of the “People’s Republic of California”. I never forgot it. The state is an energy island by choice, barely tied into the continental crude network, and it has spent two decades making its own hydrocarbons inaccessible.

Mr Newsom, expected to run for president in 2028, has every incentive to dress up the numbers and his “100%” boast deserves scrutiny. His office’s earlier version of the claim defined the feat as clean power “for at least some part of the day”, which in 2025 meant an average of seven hours daily, the equivalent of about 52 full days or nearly 30% of the year to that point. Nine days out of 10; 30% of the hours. Only a fully ordained member of the climate priesthood could present such statistics as a triumph and only a credulous press corps could print it. The US Department of Energy has put the point without ornament: about 15% of California’s primary energy comes from renewables and more than 75% from oil and natural gas. The California Policy Center has called the Governor’s clean-energy claims “transparently false”. He also says the “markets are moving his way” because the Iran war has made gasoline and diesel dearer. A state that imports most of its crude oil is, to put it kindly, an odd champion of that particular claim.

No wonder Professor Fritz Vahrenholt, a former Hamburg environment senator, told Apollo News this week that Germany’s Energiewende is “not a transition, but a retreat”. German chemical turnover is down about 22% from its 2022 peak. The DIHK energy-transition barometer finds industrial firms postponing core investment and shifting production abroad. Berlin’s answer is another subsidy – an admission that the Energiewende price is incompatible with manufacturing.

Lenin’s idiots, Beijing’s beneficiaries

Now to the beneficiary. The IEA reports that China’s share of every stage of solar panel manufacturing exceeds 80%, and that coal supplies more than 60% of the electricity used to make the world’s solar panels. Western virtue is manufactured in Chinese factories fired by Chinese coal. Beijing commissioned 78 gigawatts of new coal power in 2025, the most in a decade, with proposals for a further 161 gigawatts at a record. BloombergNEF finds mainland China holding over 70% of global capacity in every major clean-tech segment it tracks, and China has shipped on the order of a trillion dollars of batteries, solar equipment, electric vehicles and wind components since 2018. The panel on a German roof or the Baidu EV in the streets of Los Angeles is the clean end of a dirty chain.

China also processes some 90% of the world’s rare earth magnets and when it throttled exports in 2025 Germany’s auto lobby warned that car production could be halted. Professor Vahrenholt’s “retreat” has a human face: Volkswagen now plans to cut 50,000 German jobs by 2030, its profit at the lowest since 2016, as it struggles against Chinese competitors. Nor is the retreat confined to Wolfsburg. Last December the European Commission, bowing to the carmakers, dropped its hard 2035 cut-off for new combustion-engine cars – a tacit admission that an industry cannot be legislated into a technology that China has already cornered.

Then comes the prize. Artificial intelligence is, at bottom, a contest over electrons. China already generates more than twice the electricity of the United States, and BloombergNEF expects it to add more than six times as much generating capacity over the next five years. Where do you suppose the data-centre builders will go: to places that treat cheap, dependable power as a strategic asset, or to the two climate champions that treat it as a moral failing? Vahrenholt’s complaint is precisely that Germany shut its reactors while China and America race for AI leadership.

A version of this article was published in the Daily Sceptic https://dailysceptic.org/2026/10/05/beijings-useful-idiots-germany-california-and-the-green-road-to-chinese-supremacy/

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic’s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former (cancelled) contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

Scientists Map Sky Rivers Over South America — And They Work Just Like Rivers on the Ground

“Flying rivers” (also called aerial rivers) above South America form organized drainage networks that structurally resemble terrestrial river systems, according to a 2026 study led by a National Taiwan University (NTU) interdisciplinary team and published in Nature Communications.

Not the short- lived atmospheric rivers you hear about in weather reports. The team defines aerial rivers as long- term, climatological pathways of moisture transport, the net, statistical flow that integrates all the daily breezes, low- level jets, and transient atmospheric rivers over years.

Aerial view of South America showcasing rivers of clouds, known as 'sky rivers', flowing over the landscape, with mountainous regions and lush greenery visible beneath. — AI generated by Meta

These are long- term preferential pathways of atmospheric moisture transport, not short- lived atmospheric rivers. Moisture enters from the ocean, is often supplemented by forest transpiration (evapotranspiration), and is carried by winds across the continent, eventually falling as rain far downwind. Deforestation or land-use changes in upwind areas can therefore reduce rainfall hundreds or thousands of kilometers away, sometimes across national borders.

Key findings

Researchers analyzed long- term atmospheric moisture transport over South America and developed a mathematical method based on “moisture drainage curves”. These curves track how moisture contributions from upwind areas accumulate.

They identified objective turning points on the curves: beyond these points, additional land area contributes progressively less efficiently to rainfall in a target region. This defines critical upwind basins more rigorously than earlier fixed-percentage approaches. The location of these turning points varies substantially across the continent.

The continental aerial-river system shows four distinct hydrological regimes analogous to land-based river networks:

Headwater (G1): Entry points where ocean- enriched moisture first reaches the continent (not always strictly coastal; includes parts of the windward Amazon, Guiana Highlands, and areas of Chile/Patagonia).
Drainage (G2): Areas where atmospheric drainage can increase and some water vapor is lost inland (e.g., bands from Colombia across the mid- Amazon and northeastern Brazil).
Outfall (G3): Zones where aerial rivers slow abruptly, moisture content drops sharply, and regions rely more on continental evaporation; some lie upstream of major river basins and are particularly relevant for water management.
Plain (G4): Farther downwind regions.

Two major continental systems progress from upwind to downwind through the G1- G4 sequence (one tropical system originates from the northeast and extends toward Paraguay and southern Brazil).

Implications

The four types differ in their potential for atmospheric moisture management and susceptibility to ecological tipping points.

This supports more targeted forest conservation and challenges traditional water-resource governance, which often focuses only on surface watersheds or administrative boundaries.

A region’s water security can depend on distant upwind forests. Lead author Prof. Wei Weng (NTU Department of Geography) and co-authors from atmospheric sciences and civil engineering emphasize that the turning- point method makes the concept of aerial rivers more practical for management.

Illustration explaining aerial rivers, showing moisture advection, rainfall, runoff, and the concepts of downwind and upwind regions with farms and animals. — Conceptual diagram of aerial rivers. Credit: *Nature Communications* (2026). DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-76303-y

What are “flying rivers”?

Like a surface river, they are:

recharged by evapotranspiration in upwind regions
routed by wind patterns
discharged by precipitation downwind

Over South America, the Amazon acts like a giant pump, forest transpiration loads the trade winds, they hit the Andes like a wall and get diverted south, raining out over central and southern Brazil, Paraguay, La Plata.

The breakthrough: they have drainage networks like land rivers

Researchers analyzed moisture drainage curves for 724 grid cells across the continent, the relationship between how big an upwind area you include and how much of your rain comes from it.

Using a mathematical method to find the turning point where contribution intensity drops sharply, they found four major drainage types, G1 to G4, that behave like a fluvial system from headwaters to plains:

G1 – Continental headwater regions
Where aerial rivers first enter the continent from the ocean, e.g. windward Amazon, Guiana Highlands, Chile/Patagonia. The critical upwind basin dominates: 90- 95% of terrestrial- sourced rain comes from a relatively compact ∼930,000 km² area. Only ∼12% of total rain is terrestrial here, so management potential is low.

G2 – Atmospheric drainage expansion
A west- east band from Colombia to mid- Amazon and NE Brazil. Drainage expands, dominance falls. Critical basin ∼410,000 km² supplies 60- 75% of terrestrial rain, about 20- 25% of total rainfall. This is where aerial rivers carry the largest amount of terrestrial moisture across the continent.

G3 – Aerial river outfall
Southern Amazon, Brazilian Highlands, Pampas, parts of Andes. This is where rivers slow abruptly, resembling river outfall areas. Delivery intensity plummets compared to G2, critical basin shrinks to ∼260,000 km² and 40- 55% of terrestrial rain. But these areas are often upstream of major surface river basins, so conserving forests here amplifies both sky and land water.

G4 – Atmospheric plain
Chaco, central-west Brazil, La Plata Basin. Furthest downwind, least efficient delivery, lowest per-area contribution. Turning point at only 30-40%. Yet because G4 depends most heavily on continental moisture, that small critical basin (∼140,000 km²) actually contributes the largest share of total rainfall, 15- 20%, making it the most effective target for intervention. Santa Cruz de la Sierra is the textbook case.

Two giant systems

The four types of sequence G1 → G2 → G3 → G4 in two super- basins:

Tropical system: from the northeast coast down to Paraguay and southern Brazil
Temperate system: from Patagonia up to La Plata Basin

They align with the austral Hadley and Ferrel cells, with a sharp “fall” between G2 and G3 at 5°S- 13°S where moisture delivery intensity collapses. They ultimately converge in La Plata.

Why it matters for water management

Current water law stops at watershed and political borders. Aerial rivers don’t. The authors show that deforestation in upwind Peruvian Ucayali, for example, can cut downwind rainfall 5-13% and runoff 19- 50% via aerial rivers.

Their framework says: get the drainage curve for your city, identify its type from the map, find the turning point, and you know your critical upwind basin, the upwind forest or land that functions like a headwater to protect. For G3 and G4 regions, targeted conservation or reforestation can secure up to a fifth of total rainfall.

Map of South America illustrating continental aerial river drainage types, including categories such as Headwater, Drainage, Outfall, and Plain, defined by mathematical turning points of moisture drainage curves. — The hydrological structure of aerial rivers (flying rivers) can be classified into four types: headwater, drainage, outfall, and plain regions. Credit: National Taiwan University

Hydrological regimes and drainage systems of aerial rivers across South America

The team used 10 years of data (2006-2015), GPM rainfall, GLEAM evapotranspiration, ERA- Interim winds, in a moisture- tracking model (WAM- 2layers) to trace where the rain over 724 grid cells across South America actually came from.

Then they built moisture drainage curves, size of upwind area vs. % of terrestrial- sourced rain it provides and developed a math method to find the turning point where contribution intensity drops sharply. That’s how they define a critical upwind basin objectively, instead of using arbitrary 40% / 70% / 80% thresholds.

The 4 drainage types = a river system in the sky

They are geographic divisions shaped by long- term planetary transport, corresponding to fluvial positions: headwater, drainage, outfall, and plain.

G1 – headwater regions: entry points of moisture from ocean. Windward Amazon, Guiana Highlands, much of Chile/Patagonia. Turning point 90- 95%, critical basin avg 930,000 km², but only 12% of rain is terrestrial, so management potential ∼11%.

G2 – atmospheric drainage: west- east band Colombia to mid- Amazon and NE Brazil. Expanding drainage. Turning point 60- 75%, critical basin ∼410,000 km², receives the largest terrestrial moisture load, 20- 25% of total rain manageable.

G3 – outfall: southern Amazon, Brazilian Highlands, Pampas, Andes. “Occurs where aerial rivers slow abruptly, resembling river outfall areas”. Critical basin ∼260,000 km², 40- 55% contribution, but strategically in upstream areas of major surface basins, so interventions amplify through surface runoff.

G4 – atmospheric plain: Chaco, central- west Brazil, La Plata Basin. Furthest downwind, lowest delivery intensity across continent. Turning point 30- 40%, smallest critical basin ∼140,000 km², but highest dependence on continental moisture, so it actually contributes the largest share of total rainfall (15- 20%) for water- scarce cities like Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

From G1 to G4, basins decrease in both size and dominance, with a pronounced “fall” in delivery intensity at G2- G3 transition between 5°S and 13°S, interpreted as analogous to a river outfall.

Two continental systems

Tropical system: NE coast → Paraguay and southern Brazil (much larger)
Temperate system: SW origin Patagonia → La Plata Basin

They align with Hadley and Ferrel cells, plus low-level jets and terrain flows. They converge in La Plata.

Why “flying rivers” matter

Unlike surface rivers, aerial rivers are recharged by evapotranspiration. Deforestation in Peruvian Ucayali upwind can cut 5- 13% rainfall and 19- 50% runoff downwind via this link.

The paper argues water management must move beyond catchment borders. Protecting a critical upwind basin in G3 and G4 is like protecting a headwater, and because in Amazon the downstream region lies upwind of aerial rivers, power relations flip: downstream forest users control upwind rain.

Journal information: Nature Communications 17, Article number: 9341 (2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s41467-026-76303-y

Provided: National Taiwan University

Authors: Wei Weng,
Ping Fu,
Ho Tin Hung,
Kai-Chih Tseng,
Li-Pen Wang,
Yun-Man Hsu,
Min-Hui Lo,
Luís Costa &
Vincent Dubreuil

Abstract

Aerial rivers, long-term preferential pathways of atmospheric moisture flows, sustain ecosystems and regional hydrology. Maximizing their downwind discharge potential remains elusive without an objective way to identify critical upwind source regions. Here we analyze the drainage patterns of aerial rivers across South America and develop a mathematical method to identify turning points in moisture drainage curves, beyond which the intensity of upwind moisture contribution declines sharply. This provides a criterion for objectively delineating critical upwind basins and reveals pronounced continental variation in their spatial extent. These patterns reflect distinct regimes within the continental aerial river system, enabling its classification into four major drainage types: headwater, drainage, outfall, and plain areas. The four types differ in their potential for atmospheric moisture management and in their susceptibility to ecological tipping points, with implications for refining forest conservation priorities. Together, these findings support more effective land-water planning and moisture governance under a changing climate.

Wrong, Globe and Mail, Market Changes, Not Climate Changes, Are Hurting French Winemakers

An illustration depicting a debate on market changes versus climate changes in the wine industry, featuring graphs and characters discussing wine sales, unsold stock, tariffs, and market challenges amidst barrels of wine. — AI generated by ChatGPT

From ClimateRealism

By Linnea Lueken

A selection of Bordeaux wine bottles displayed in a wooden rack, featuring labels from various châteaux.

A recent article from The Globe and Mail (G&M), “In French wine country, climate change and dwindling demand are a recipe for trouble,” claims that French wine production is suffering because of the effects of climate change and, at a distant second, market changes. This is exactly reversed. While it is true that drought and heatwaves impact grape production and yield, wine itself has persisted through many changes in average global temperature over thousands of years. Market forces are actually the main driver force behind the French wine slump.

This summer’s heat and drought in Europe caused crop loss of grapes in wine regions of France, especially in Bordeaux, where wildfires also destroyed some vineyards. The G&M attributes this weather to climate change, although as Climate Realism contributor and meteorologist Anthony Watts has explained in “Wrong, Newsweek, Europe’s Heat Deaths Are a Policy Failure, Not a Climate Failure,” persistent and severe heatwaves are far from unprecedented in Europe. In addition, as discussed in a second Climate Realism post, recent wildfires are not historically unusual in France, with no data showing a sustained increase in acreage lost over time.

Wine is grown in regions that are hotter than Bordeaux, and colder. Temperature has an effect on the sugars and tannins in the fruit, this is true, but bad weather is something that winemakers have had to deal with as long as wine has been produced. Global climate change is not harming global grape production, according to United Nations data, and data does not indicate that the French climate is spiraling out of control. Only a long-term trend of persistently bad weather would suggest this year’s drought and heat was indicative of climate change, yet there is no such long-term trend. This year’s bad weather was just that, a year of bad weather, like French grape growers have experienced hundreds of times before over the centuries.

Just three years ago, French winemakers were upset because they were producing more wine than they could sell, and they lost hundreds of millions in destroying the excess. Obviously having more wine than patrons wish to imbibe is not a problem caused by climate change, and low production years aren’t either.

As G&M itself admits, France has steadily reduced the production of grapes since peaking in the 1970s. Production peaked in 1979, at a time when many scientists were worried about global cooling with some warning of a possible looming ice age.

Buried several paragraphs into the article, G&M makes the devastating admission that “consumption has fallen by 14 per cent since 2018, largely because of shifting social habits,” and “annual consumption has fallen from more than 100 litres per adult in 1960 to less than 20 litres today.”

These are very significant changes, changes that have been much more damaging to the wine industry overtime than occasional bad weather. Market forces working against them combined with a bad season, for smaller winemakers operating on slim margins, can be devastating.

Another economic issue only briefly mentioned by G&M is that “the cost of fuel and other farm supplies has doubled in the past couple of years.”

That problem would only be exacerbated if climate alarmists have their way regarding fossil fuel use. Food prices are impacted greatly by fuel costs, but especially wine. Wine requires energy for processing and storage. Packaging wine in bottles usually relies on fossil fuel powered machines. Glass and cork prices are impacted heavily by energy costs, so those supplies will become more expensive too.

At the consumer level, the costs add up even more because of shipping. Higher prices for wine that people are already drinking less of only exacerbates the issue, suppressing demand even further.

As one wise interviewee remarked: “You need to adapt to the climate. You need to adapt to the market.”

The wine market has significantly contracted over the past couple of decades. This is obviously bad for winemakers as well as wine drinkers, as lower production usually also means higher prices. Changing drinking habits among Americans and Europeans alike are driving the decline wine sales that G&M bemoans. By contrast, contrary to G&M’s claims, there is no evidence or data to suggest that climate change is to blame for that contraction, even if winemakers experience a poor producing year due to bad weather.

Antarctica’s Last Great Unknown Holds a 4-Metre Climate Threat

East Antarctica’s Wilkes Subglacial Basin (also called Antarctica’s “last great unknown”) holds enough ice to raise global sea levels by an estimated 3- 4 metres and is far less understood than other parts of the continent, prompting a major international call for urgent research.

There is no precise, well- constrained figure for total ice mass lost from the entire Wilkes Subglacial Basin (WSB) over the last ~50 years, because the region remains poorly observed.

Aerial view of a massive ice shelf with cracks, revealing dark water below, illuminated with golden reflections under a cloudy sky. — AI generated by Grok

A review paper led by Professor Matt King (University of Tasmania and Australian Centre for Excellence in Antarctic Science) and co- authored by researchers from 14 countries, published in Nature Reviews Earth & Environment (around late September 2026), synthesizes geology, oceanography, climate science, satellite data, and ice- sheet modelling. It highlights major observational gaps that prevent confident predictions of how quickly the region could change or what climate thresholds might trigger large- scale ice retreat.

Key points include:

The basin is roughly 1,400 km long by 400 km wide (about half the size of New South Wales, Australia). Much of its ice rests on bedrock deeper than 2,000 m below sea level in places, and the bed deepens inland, a geometry that can enable self- sustaining “runaway” retreat once ocean- driven melting begins at the margins.
Access is extremely difficult due to persistent sea ice. No ship has come within ~150 km of the front of the key Cook Glacier; there is little or no in-situ seafloor mapping or ocean- condition data near the ice edge. Few (if any) living scientists have visited core parts of the region.
Geological evidence indicates substantial retreat during past warmer periods (e.g., the mid- Pliocene, when CO₂ levels were roughly comparable to recent values). Sparse modern observations show increasing thinning of the Cook Glacier since the 1990s, with current ice discharge around 40 billion tonnes per year.
East Antarctica was long viewed as more stable than West Antarctica, but this region shares similar vulnerabilities. Melting here could also disrupt broader ocean circulation and the global climate system, though major collapse is not expected this century under current projections.

The authors urge a coordinated international campaign (not a single- nation effort) to map the bed and seafloor, improve ocean and ice observations, and refine models. Better understanding would reduce uncertainty for sea- level planning, especially for coastal communities in Australia, the Pacific, and elsewhere. The basin lies largely within the Australian Antarctic Territory.

In short, the “climate threat” is the combination of the basin’s large ice volume, its potentially unstable bed geometry, evidence of past sensitivity to warming, and the current near- total lack of critical local data needed for reliable future projections.

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The runaway (or self- sustaining) ice retreat mechanism is primarily the Marine Ice Sheet Instability (MISI). It occurs in marine-based ice sheets, those grounded on bedrock that lies below sea level, when the bed slopes downward (deepens) toward the interior of the ice sheet. This is called a retrograde or reverse-sloping bed.

This geometry is a key feature of the Wilkes Subglacial Basin (and parts of West Antarctica, such as the Thwaites Glacier region). Once triggered, the process can continue even if the original climate forcing stabilizes or weakens.

Step- by- step mechanism.

Grounding line and ice flux basics
The grounding line is the transition zone where grounded ice (resting on the bed) becomes thin enough to float and form an ice shelf. Ice flux (discharge into the ocean) across the grounding line increases strongly with ice thickness there. Thicker ice flows outward faster.

Initial trigger (usually ocean- driven)
Warmer ocean water reaches the ice- shelf base or grounding zone and increases basal melting. This thins the ice shelf, reducing its “buttressing” effect (the resistance that slows the outflow of grounded ice). The ice upstream accelerates, thins, and the grounding line begins to retreat inland.

Positive feedback on a retrograde bed
On a retrograde slope, as the grounding line moves inland it encounters progressively deeper bedrock. This means the ice at the new grounding-line position is thicker.

Thicker ice → higher discharge flux → faster mass loss.
Greater mass loss → further thinning and additional grounding-line retreat.
This is a self- reinforcing positive feedback loop. Theoretical analyses (e.g., Schoof 2007) show that, under these conditions, the grounding line is inherently unstable.

Self- sustaining (runaway) phase
Once the grounding line retreats past certain topographic “pinning points” (localized high points or ridges that temporarily stabilize it), the feedback can drive continued retreat for decades to millennia, even without further ocean warming. Model projections for the Wilkes Subglacial Basin indicate possible retreat rates of up to ~1 km per year in such phases, though exact timings remain highly uncertain due to sparse data.

Additional related processes

Ice- shelf weakening or collapse often initiates or accelerates the process by removing buttressing.
Buoyancy- driven effects can produce very rapid short- term pulses of grounding-line retreat (hundreds of metres per day in paleo- records) across especially flat beds, when the ice approaches full flotation.
A separate (and still debated) process, Marine Ice Cliff Instability (MICI), involves structural collapse of tall, exposed ice cliffs once ice shelves disappear; it can potentially amplify retreat but is not required for classic MISI.

Why it matters for Wilkes Subglacial Basin

Much of the basin’s bedrock lies well below sea level and deepens inland. Past warm periods (e.g., the mid- Pliocene) show evidence of substantial retreat, and current sparse observations already indicate some grounding- line retreat and ice- shelf thinning. Because of the retrograde geometry, crossing a threshold could commit the region to multi- metre sea- level contribution over longer timescales.

In short, the runaway character arises because the bed geometry turns a modest initial retreat into a self-amplifying cycle of thicker ice, faster discharge, and further retreat. Accurate predictions require better mapping of the bed, ocean conditions, and ice properties in these poorly observed regions.

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There is no precise, well- constrained figure for total ice mass lost from the entire Wilkes Subglacial Basin (WSB) over the last ~50 years, because the region remains poorly observed.

Available observations and estimates

Cook Glacier (the main outlet draining much of the WSB) currently discharges roughly 40- 41 Gt of ice per year. It has shown increasing thinning rates since the 1990s (one estimate: ~33 ± 12 cm/year over ~25 years) following major ice- shelf loss.
- Cook West lost most of its ice shelf between ~1973 and 1989 (roughly 1,200 km² of ice shelf), accompanied by a roughly doubling of velocity (from ~700 m/year to ~1,400 m/year). Cook East has accelerated more modestly (~20% since the 1990s).
- Rignot et al. (2019) report a small dynamic mass loss of ~2- 3 Gt/year averaged for the glaciers draining into the Cook Ice Shelf over 1979- 2017. One related analysis notes a combined increase in discharge of ~3 Gt/year for Cook East and West since 1979.
Broader Wilkes Land (which includes the WSB plus neighboring areas such as parts of the Aurora Subglacial Basin) has contributed significantly to East Antarctic mass loss. According to Rignot et al. (2019):
- Wilkes Land lost mass at rates that helped drive East Antarctica’s overall contribution of 4.4 ± 0.9 mm sea-level equivalent from 1979- 2017.
- In the most recent interval, they analyzed (2009- 2017), Wilkes Land mass loss averaged 51 ± 13 Gt/year.
Recent reviews of the WSB specifically note multidecadal grounding- line retreat, ice- shelf thinning, and some collapse of fringing ice shelves, but without clear large- scale upstream surface lowering of the grounded ice sheet. The basin as a whole still appears relatively close to balance compared with West Antarctica, with changes so far concentrated near the margins.

Context and limitations

Satellite records (altimetry, gravity, velocity) become denser after the 1990s- 2000s, so pre- 1990 estimates rely more heavily on sparse imagery and have larger uncertainties. Cumulative losses over a full 50- year period (roughly 1976- 2026) for the exact WSB catchment are therefore not reliably quantified in the literature and remain much smaller than the multi- metre sea- level potential stored in the basin.

In summary, measurable ice loss has occurred mainly through coastal outlets (especially Cook Glacier) via acceleration, thinning, and ice-shelf reduction since the 1970s- 1990s, on the order of a few Gt per year for the core WSB outlets, but the interior of the basin has not yet shown major widespread drawdown. This limited observational record is one reason scientists are calling for urgent targeted research.

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Wilkes Subglacial Basin (WSB, East Antarctica) vs. Thwaites Glacier (West Antarctica)

Both are marine- based systems grounded largely below sea level on beds that deepen inland (retrograde slopes). This geometry makes them susceptible to Marine Ice Sheet Instability (MISI), positive feedback in which grounding- line retreat can become self- sustaining. Beyond that shared vulnerability, they differ sharply in scale, current activity, data coverage, and near- term risk.

Size and Sea- Level Potential

Feature	Wilkes Subglacial Basin	Thwaites Glacier
Approximate area	~400 km wide × 1,400 km long inland	~192,000 km² (roughly Florida-sized)
Sea- level equivalent	3- 4 metres if fully lost	~65 cm if fully lost
Role in larger system	Major East Antarctic marine basin	Keystone of the Amundsen Sea sector; its collapse could unlock additional West Antarctic ice (>3 m total potential in some scenarios)

WSB holds far more ice. Thwaites is smaller but strategically important because it props up neighboring ice.

Current Observed Changes and Mass Loss

Thwaites: Highly active and rapidly changing. It currently loses roughly 50 Gt of ice per year more than it gains from snowfall (net imbalance). Ice discharge has increased substantially since the 1990s; grounding- line retreat has accelerated; the glacier contributes ~4% of current global sea-level rise. Net loss since ~2000 exceeds 1,000 Gt in the broader basin. Ocean- driven basal melting is intense.
WSB (mainly via Cook Glacier): Much quieter so far. Cook Glacier discharges ~40 Gt/year. There has been multidecadal grounding-line retreat, ice- shelf thinning and or collapse (notably Cook West ice shelf largely lost in the 1970s- 1980s), and increasing thinning rates since the 1990s, but no clear large- scale upstream surface lowering of the grounded ice sheet. Dynamic losses remain small (a few Gt/year for the main outlets). The basin as a whole still appears relatively close to balance compared with Thwaites.

Thwaites is already in a phase of rapid mass loss; WSB shows early warning signs but has not yet entered a comparable acceleration.

Vulnerability and Timescales

Both can undergo runaway retreat once the grounding line passes key pinning points.
Thwaites is already responding strongly to warm Circumpolar Deep Water intrusion. Recent modelling suggests it is unlikely to fully collapse this century but could still contribute several centimetres of sea-level rise by 2100; longer- term (centuries) risks remain high, and some loss may continue even if ocean melting is reduced because of past forcing.
WSB has the same geometric vulnerability. Paleorecords show substantial retreat during past warmer periods (e.g., Pliocene, some Pleistocene interglacials). Models indicate that once past thresholds, retreat rates could reach ~1 km/year, with possible multi- millennial commitment from decisions made this century. However, the timing of any large-scale response remains highly uncertain due to data gaps.

Exploration and Knowledge Gaps

Thwaites: One of the most intensively studied glaciers on Earth. The multi- year International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration has produced extensive fieldwork, oceanography, radar, modelling, and satellite analysis.
WSB: Described as Antarctica’s “last great unknown”. No ship has approached within ~150 km of the Cook Glacier front; seafloor mapping and in- situ ocean data near the ice edge are essentially absent. Few living scientists have visited core areas. This is why a recent international review called for urgent coordinated research.

Summary

Thwaites is the active, well- observed “Doomsday Glacier” already contributing significantly to sea- level rise and serving as a potential trigger for wider West Antarctic losses.

The Wilkes Subglacial Basin is a much larger reservoir of ice with the same fundamental instability mechanism, but it remains far less dynamic and far less studied. Its potential impact is several times greater than Thwaites alone, yet the lack of basic observational data means scientists cannot yet confidently predict when (or how rapidly) it might cross a tipping point.

In short: Thwaites is the present- day concern; WSB is a high- stakes future risk that is still poorly constrained.

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Dynamic instability of the Wilkes Subglacial Basin Ice Sheet, East Antarctica

The Wilkes Subglacial Basin (WSB) is a marine- based sector of the East Antarctic Ice Sheet that holds enough ice to raise global mean sea level by 3- 4 metres. Its bed geometry (deeply below sea level and deepening inland) makes it potentially vulnerable to unstable, self- sustaining retreat (Marine Ice Sheet Instability).

The review synthesises:

Paleo evidence: Substantial retreat occurred during the Pliocene and other past warm periods, although exact temperature thresholds remain uncertain.
Modern observations: Multidecadal grounding- line retreat, plus thinning and collapse of key fringing ice shelves, but without clear upstream surface lowering of the grounded ice sheet.
Future projections: Models show the potential for rapid retreat (up to ~1 km per year) once the grounding line passes bedrock pinning points. Timings are highly uncertain, and decisions this century could commit the basin to multi-millennial change.

The authors conclude that the potential consequences (sea- level rise, disruption of ocean circulation, carbon cycling, and marine ecosystems) are severe enough to warrant an urgent, coordinated, multi-national and multi- year programme of fieldwork and modelling to close the large observational gaps.

This is the scientific paper that prompted the recent press coverage describing the WSB as “Antarctica’s last great unknown.”

The full text is behind a Nature paywall and institutional access, but the abstract and the associated University of Tasmania / ACEAS press materials provide the core findings that have been discussed in our prior exchanges.

Journal information: Nature Reviews Earth & Environment (published 30 September 2026)

DOI: 10.1038/s43017-026-00827-6

Provided: University of Tasmania

Authors: Matt A. King,
Nancy A. N. Bertler,
Sridhar Anandakrishnan,
Guilhem Barruol,
Michael J. Bentley,
Xavier Crosta,
Poul Christoffersen,
Florence Colleoni,
Laura De Santis,
Carlota Escutia,
Johan Etourneau,
Dimitris Evangelinos,
Fausto Ferraccioli,
Nicholas R. Golledge,
Matt Harris,
Petra Heil,
Nicole A. Hill,
Indi Hodgson-Johnston,
Coen Hofstede,
Xiaoxia Huang,
Richard Jones,
Serena Lagorio,
Won Sang Lee (이원상),
Andrew Mackintosh,
Felicity S. McCormack,
Robert M. McKay,
Maxence Menthon,
Taryn Noble,
Marilyn N. Raphael,
Stephen Rintoul,
Martin Siegert,
Craig Stevens,
Craig Stewart,
Chris Stokes,
Yusuke Suganuma,
Fiorenza Torricella,
Yu Wang,
Trevor Williams &
Chen Zhao (赵晨)

Abstract

The Wilkes Subglacial Basin (WSB), a marine-based sector of the East Antarctic Ice Sheet, contains enough ice to increase the global-mean sea level by 3–4 m. The geometry of the WSB makes its ice sheet potentially vulnerable to unstable retreat, which could lead to rapidly increasing sea levels as well as meltwater production that could potentially disrupt ocean circulation, carbon cycling and marine ecosystems. This Review explores the climate vulnerability of the WSB in the context of future global warming. Paleo marine-sedimentary and model evidence suggests that substantial WSB ice-sheet retreat occurred during Pliocene and other past warm periods, albeit with uncertain temperature thresholds. Observations show unattributed multidecadal retreat of the grounding line and thinning and collapse of key fringing ice shelves but without clear upstream surface lowering. Projections of ice-sheet extent under future emissions scenarios indicate rapid retreat (up to ~1 km yr⁻¹) beyond bedrock pinning points, but with uncertain timings and the possibility of commitment to multimillennial change during this century. Given the potentially severe consequences of WSB ice-sheet change, a multinational and multiyear fieldwork and modelling programme is essential to reduce projection uncertainty.

Rediscovering Thomas Jefferson’s revolutionary charge against abusive taxation

Thomas Jefferson would not be a fan of the energy tax plan his gubernatorial successor has coerced into place this year at the expense of ratepayers and without public input.

A historical depiction of Thomas Jefferson looking shocked at a tax bill titled 'Virginia Electricity Bill', featuring details about energy charges and a significant increase in carbon allowance pricing. — AI generated by ChatGPT

From CFACT

By Kevin Mooney

Virginia ratepayers smacked with 153 percent increase in auction prices used to determine carbon tax.

Thomas Jefferson would not be a fan of the energy tax plan his gubernatorial successor has coerced into place this year at the expense of ratepayers and without public input.

The second governor of Virginia and third president of the United States argued that small farmers who lived off their own land should pay little or no federal taxes. Jefferson also opposed the Excise Whiskey Tax of 1791 because, in his view, the tax provided the federal government with too much power. Moreover, this founding father, along with his fellow Virginians, took on the Stamp Act of 1765 that led to the American Revolution.

By contrast, Gov. Abigail Spanberger (D), who assumed office this past January, has implemented what some policy analysts aptly describe as a “backdoor carbon tax” that could add $1 billion in electricity costs over the next year. That process began this past summer when Spanberger had Virginia rejoin the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, widely known as RGGI, a multistate climate change plan advertised as a “cap and trade” regulatory scheme. Spanberger bypassed the traditional public comment period along the way toward cementing the climate initiative back into place. She also did not allow for a vote from the state’s Air Pollution Board, which would be the normal procedure.

The 153 Percent Increase in Auction Prices

Power generators in RGGI states must purchase an allowance for every ton of carbon dioxide their plants emit from using coal, oil, or natural gas. They then pass the cost of that allowance on to consumers in their electricity bills. That’s where the carbon tax comes into play.

RGGI holds quarterly auctions to determine what the allowance costs will be. The latest round came in with an enormous price hike, meaning Virginia ratepayers will need to hold onto their wallets. The September 9 auction came in at $37.65 per allowance in comparison to $14.88 in December 2023, which was the last auction Virginia participated in before Republican Gov. Glenn Youngkin exited RGGI. That’s a 153 percent increase.

A carbon tax is a tax on every human activity imaginable since it ties a fee to greenhouse gas emissions that flow out of fuel production and consumption. Even the most mundane activities would involve carbon taxes. Anyone going out to the store to buy groceries, deliver mail, or pick up the kids at school will be paying carbon taxes. This is what Spanberger has unleashed in a state where Jeffersonian antipathy toward intrusive government policies once held sway, and she’s not done yet.

In September, the governor signed an executive order that could pull hundreds of artificial intelligence data centers into RGGI. If Spanberger succeeds, these data centers could soon be competing with Dominion Energy Virginia and other retail electricity producers in RGGI’s quarterly auctions. This added layer of participation would only serve to put upward pressure on consumer electricity bills.

But what should most unsettle Virginia ratepayers is the fact that the specter of higher costs associated with RGGI was evident even before the September auction. Back in June, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Chairman Mark Cristie noted that a filing from Dominion with the Virginia State Corporation Commission for the purpose of recovering RGGI costs tells a sobering story. The typical residential consumer is projected to pay $13 more per month, which adds up to $156 per year. Ouch!! That’s bad enough, but keep in mind this filing was made before the higher prices kicked in with the September auction.

Dominion's new filing to recover RGGI costs indicates that it will cost the typical residential consumer an additional $13 per month ($156 per year). Filing linked below. Business and industrial customers will see increased bills as well.https://t.co/lBjuD4yFAK
— Mark C. Christie (@ChristieFERC) June 10, 2026

The new clearing price of $37.65 per ton of carbon emissions RGGI announced on September 11 is 8 percent higher than the price set in June and 69 percent higher than it was a year ago in September 2025.

Where is All This Money Going?

Stephen Haner, an energy and environmental policy analyst for the Jefferson Forum, has some answers. Virginia’s new sale of carbon allowances is expected to pull in $259 million from electricity producers along with allowance market speculators. As a matter of law, more than half of this amount is to be used for energy conservation projects benefiting low-income households. Some of the money may go into flood mitigation efforts.

In June, the Virginia General Assembly voted to create a refund for residential consumers, small businesses, and churches paying the carbon tax. Only about 45 percent of the tax is expected to go back into rebates.

Dominion’s largest customers (think in terms of large industrial centers, retailers, and possibly data centers) will not receive any rebates. So, who are the real winners in the RGGI scheme? It would seem government officials looking to pull in more tax dollars, alongside a few well-connected special interests, come out on top.

Haner told Restoration News that a genuine “cap and trade” system is not at work in Virginia and utilities can have incentives to hold onto their allowances rather than selling them. He said,

RGGI is not about carbon reduction. It is about revenue enhancement. The allowances are granted to the states, not to the utilities. The states sell the allowances either to a utility or a secondary investor. There is a cap, and that cap does go down with every contract year. There is trading, and, in theory, if a utility had a surplus of allowances, it could sell them on the secondary market, but it makes more sense to hold them and buy fewer next time. If you bought it at $25, the one you don’t have to buy might be $35, so better to hold it. But in the true cap-and-trade model, the allowance would have been issued to the utility based on its initial need, and then the shrinking cap would be giving it fewer and fewer allowances to use, forcing it to go bid to buy from someone else.

Virginia ratepayers appear to be stuck with carbon taxes for the time being. But it’s possible that demand from data centers could push RGGI to the breaking point. Spanberger’s ploy to avoid public comments could also lead to legal challenges. Other RGGI states might also balk at the rising prices coming out of Virginia. There’s also the possibility that these other states could exit the program. In Delaware, there’s a bill to do exactly that. The other problem Spanberger and crew have is that the one large energy-producing state that had briefly been in RGGI has already pulled out. That would be Pennsylvania, which never participated in any auctions to begin with because of legal complications. Gov. Josh Shapiro (D) pulled Pennsylvania out of RGGI last November. Apparently, it had become clear to the governor that the coalition of industry and labor groups opposed to the plan had the upper hand in court.

Another cautionary tale for Virginia comes from the Institute for Energy Research (IER), which has released an updated version of its report “Blue States, High Rates.” IER points to RGGI participation as one of the key factors behind rising energy prices in certain states.

Virginia had a reprieve from carbon taxes under Youngkin, whose resistance to RGGI offers a sharp Jeffersonian contrast to Spanberger. The good news is that it may not be too late for the state to turn back. The Virginia governor cannot run for consecutive terms, and the carbon tax plan could become very unpopular very fast.

As president, Jefferson eliminated the excise tax on whiskey in 1802. By then, the country had ripened toward his message. Jefferson believed the phrase “to provide for the general welfare” was meant as a strict limit, so taxation was constrained to funding enumerated constitutional powers.

That’s not what the carbon tax is about since it provides government officials with wide latitude to put a price on productive activity. Virginia residents who find they can’t move more than two inches without paying the carbon tax will hopefully come to understand the unfortunate reality they now face and vote to restore their earlier, prouder Jeffersonian traditions.

This article originally appeared at Restoration News

Moon & Sun’s Tiny Tugs Can Trigger Slow Earthquakes Through Fault Resonance

Tidal stresses from the Moon and Sun, tiny gravitational forces that flex Earth’s crust, can trigger slow earthquakes through a resonance effect, according to recent modeling published in JGR Solid Earth (Zhou et al., 2026).

The spring- block model (also called the slider- block or spring- slider model) is a simple but powerful mechanical idealization used in earthquake science, especially for studying rate- and- state friction and the conditions under which faults stick, slip, or produce slow earthquakes.

Diagram illustrating how the gravitational pulls of the Moon and Sun can trigger slow earthquakes through fault resonance, featuring Earth and its crust with visual representations of tidal forces and fault mechanics. — AI generated by Grok

Slow earthquakes (or slow- slip events) release energy over hours to months rather than seconds. They are usually imperceptible at the surface but occur on some plate-boundary faults and can precede or relate to larger conventional quakes.

Solid- Earth tides (distinct from ocean tides) produce stresses of only a few kilopascals, comparable to a gentle hand press, yet observations show they can modulate or trigger these slow events on certain faults (for example, in southwest Japan and the Cascadia subduction zone, where activity often peaks at ~12- and 24- hour tidal intervals).

How the mechanism works

Researchers used a simplified spring- block model of a single fault patch combined with rate- and- state friction laws (friction that depends on slip speed and the evolving “state” of the contact surface).

Key findings include:

Faults that are already sliding stably can be nudged out of that state by weak periodic tidal forcing.
When the period of the tidal stress matches the fault’s natural response timescale (the time needed for friction and other interface properties to adjust), resonance amplifies the effect, analogous to pushing a swing at the right rhythm or rubbing a wet finger around a wine-glass rim. Even small amplitudes can then produce accelerated slip.
Outcomes depend on both amplitude and period:
- Low- amplitude forcing may leave the fault sliding quietly.
- Above a threshold amplitude, and with a matching period, the fault can produce slow slip events (or, under some conditions, faster events).
Triggering can align with peak tidal stress, the peak rate of stress change, or more complex/chaotic patterns, depending on the specific fault properties and the phase of the tidal cycle. sciencealert.com

The model reproduces observed tidal modulation of slow earthquakes and low- frequency earthquakes. Because tidal forcing is predictable, matching observed seismic patterns to tidal cycles can help constrain fault properties (such as frictional strength and critical slip distance).

Caveats and context

The simulation treats an isolated fault patch and is therefore best suited to repeated local low- frequency events rather than large- scale tremor involving many patches.

Real sensitivity also depends on local geology (fluid pressure, rock type, etc.). Tidal stresses are far too weak to trigger large “fast” earthquakes on their own in most cases; any influence on major quakes remains subtle and is not useful for deterministic prediction.

Overall, the work supplies a physical framework explaining why such minute, continuous tidal stresses can still matter for slow slip, and it may ultimately improve understanding of stress buildup and release on subduction zones that host megathrust earthquakes. The Phys.org piece by Paul Arnold reports on this same body of research.

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The spring- block model (also called the slider- block or spring- slider model) is a simple but powerful mechanical idealization used in earthquake science, especially for studying rate- and- state friction and the conditions under which faults stick, slip, or produce slow earthquakes.

Basic setup

Imagine a block (representing a patch of a fault) sitting on a rough surface (the opposing side of the fault).

The block is attached to a spring.
The other end of the spring is pulled at a constant slow speed (this represents the long- term tectonic loading or plate motion).
Friction acts between the block and the surface, resisting motion.

As the far end of the spring is pulled, the spring stretches and stores elastic energy. When the force in the spring exceeds the frictional resistance, the block slips forward. After slipping, the spring relaxes, friction may heal, and the cycle can repeat.This captures the essential competition between:

Elastic loading (the spring), and
Frictional resistance on the fault surface.

Rate- and- state friction (the key ingredient in the paper)

In modern versions of the model (including the one used by Zhou et al. 2026), friction is not a fixed number. It depends on:

Slip velocity (the “rate” part): how fast the surfaces are sliding relative to each other.
State variable $\theta$ : a measure of the “quality” of the contact (how well the microscopic asperities are interlocking or how much time has passed since the last slip). The state evolves with time and slip according to an evolution law (commonly the aging or slip law).

Two important frictional parameters appear:

(a): controls the direct (instantaneous) velocity dependence of friction.
(b): controls how much friction evolves (weakens or strengthens) with the state variable.

The difference $a – b$ (or the ratio $a/b$ ) determines the overall behavior:

If $a – b < 0$ (velocity- weakening), the fault can become unstable.
If $a – b > 0$ (velocity- strengthening), sliding tends to be stable.

Critical stiffness $k_{c}$

The spring has a stiffness (k) (force per unit stretch). There is a critical value $k_c$ that depends on the frictional parameters, normal stress, and the characteristic slip distance $d_c$ :

$k_c \propto \frac{(b – a)\sigma}{d_c}$

When $k < k_c$ the system is unstable → classic stick-slip (regular earthquakes).
When $k > k_c$ the system is stable → continuous stable sliding (creep).
When (k) is only slightly larger than $k_c$ k_c (the regime studied in the paper), the fault is stable but marginally so. Small external perturbations can push it into large slip-velocity amplifications via resonance.

How the paper uses the model

Zhou et al. (2026) focus exactly on this near-critical, velocity- weakening, stably sliding regime. They add periodic (tidal- like) stress perturbations, either changes in normal stress or shear stress, and show that:

When the period of the tidal forcing is close to the natural frictional response time of the fault, resonance occurs.
Even tiny perturbations (a few kPa) can then produce bursts of accelerated slip (slow earthquakes or even faster events).

The model is deliberately simplified (a single block = a single fault patch), which makes the mathematics tractable and allows clear identification of the controlling dimensionless parameters (normalized period and amplitude).

Real faults are more complex (many interacting patches, fluids, etc.), but the spring- block model isolates the essential frictional dynamics that can explain why some faults are so sensitive to the tiny stresses from the Moon and Sun.

In short: the spring- block model turns the complicated physics of a tectonic fault into a manageable mechanical system whose behavior is governed by the competition between spring stiffness and rate- and-state friction, exactly the tool needed to understand tidal triggering of slow earthquakes.

Earth’s crust really does experience continuous, tiny stress changes caused by the gravitational pull of the Moon and the Sun. These are called tidal stresses (or solid- Earth tides).

Why they exist

Just as the Moon and Sun raise ocean tides by pulling on the water, they also slightly deform the solid rock of the Earth itself. The solid Earth is elastic, so it bulges by a few tens of centimeters. That deformation produces stresses throughout the crust and upper mantle.

How large are they?

Typical amplitudes are only a few kilopascals (kPa), often 1-10 kPa, sometimes up to ~100 kPa when both solid- Earth tides and ocean loading are combined.
For comparison: atmospheric pressure is about 100 kPa, and the pressure under a gentle hand press is a few kPa. Lithostatic stresses at depth are measured in megapascals (MPa) to hundreds of MPa, so tidal stresses are extremely small relative to the background forces acting on faults.

Why they still matter

Even though the stresses are tiny, they are:

Continuous and perfectly periodic (mainly ~12- hour and ~24- hour cycles, plus longer fortnightly and monthly variations).
Applied globally and predictably.

On most faults these stresses are negligible. But on certain faults that are already close to failure and have the right frictional properties (especially the near-critically stable, velocity- weakening patches studied in the spring- block model), the periodic tidal stresses can be amplified through resonance.

When the tidal period matches the fault’s natural response timescale, even a few-kilopascal “nudge” can trigger measurable slip, the slow earthquakes (tremor, low- frequency earthquakes, slow- slip events) that are observed to correlate with the tides in places such as Cascadia and southwest Japan.

In short: the gravitational forces of the Moon and Sun really do continuously stress Earth’s crust by tiny amounts, and under the right conditions those tiny stresses can trigger slow earthquakes.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Theoretical Constraints on Tidal Triggering of Slow Earthquakes

Even very small tidal stresses (a few kilopascals, comparable to the pressure of a gentle hand press) caused by the Moon and Sun can trigger slow earthquakes on certain faults through a resonance mechanism. When the period of the tidal stress matches the fault’s natural response timescale, the effect is amplified, much like pushing a swing at the right rhythm.

The authors use a classic spring -block model with rate- and- state friction focused on velocity-weakening faults that are stably sliding (stiffness slightly above the critical value).

They first apply idealized step and finite- duration (“boxcar”) normal- stress perturbations to demonstrate resonance- like amplification of slip velocity for specific durations. They then examine realistic harmonic (tidal- like) perturbations and identify the controlling dimensionless parameters through nondimensional analysis and numerical simulations.

Key controlling parameters

Triggering is governed mainly by two normalized quantities:

Normalized perturbation period ( $P_T$ )
Normalized perturbation amplitude ( $P_\sigma$ )
Increasing the normalized period shifts the timing of slip events from the peak of tidal stress toward the peak of the stress rate.
Increasing the normalized amplitude promotes a transition from slow to faster slip events.

Even small perturbations can produce both periodic and temporally complex slip events on otherwise stable sliding faults.

Implications for fault properties

The parameter space that allows triggering implies:

The instantaneous frictional strength parameter $a\sigma$ is typically only tens to hundreds of kilopascals (much lower than typical lithostatic values).
The characteristic slip distance for frictional weakening ( $d_c$ ) is likely on the order of micrometers.

Matching observed tidal correlations (e.g., the common 12- and 24- hour peaks of tremor in Cascadia and southwest Japan) with the model predictions can therefore help constrain these frictional properties of the plate interface.

Broader context

Slow earthquakes (including low-frequency earthquakes, tremor, and slow-slip events) are widely observed around the Pacific Rim, often updip or downdip of megathrust seismogenic zones.

Because they are sensitive to tiny stress changes, they provide useful information about stress accumulation and the potential size and extent of future large earthquakes.

The resonance framework offers a physically grounded explanation for why some faults respond strongly to tidal forcing and supplies a practical way to interpret those observations.

Plain- language takeaway: Tiny, continuous gravitational tugs from the Moon and Sun can set off slow, imperceptible earthquakes when their timing matches a fault’s natural “rhythm”. The study maps the conditions under which this happens and shows how those conditions can be used to learn about the mechanical properties of real faults.

Journal information: Journal of Geophysical Research: Solid Earth (2026)

Doi: 10.1029/2026jb033983 (also available as arXiv:2602.06703)

Authors: Yishuo Zhou, Ankit Gupta , Hideo Aochi, Alexandre Schubnel, Satoshi Ide, Pierpaolo Dubernet, Harsha S. Bhat

Abstract

Tidal stress is a globally acting perturbation driven primarily by the gravitational forces of the Moon and the Sun. Understanding how tidal stresses can trigger seismic events is essential for constraining tectonic environments that are sensitive to small stress perturbations. Here, employing a spring–block model with rate-and-state friction, we investigate tidal triggering on velocity-weakening stable sliding faults with stiffness slightly exceeding the critical stiffness. We first apply a step and a boxcar with finite duration normal stress perturbation to demonstrate a resonance-like amplification of slip velocity for specific boxcar durations. Next, we perform nondimensional analyses and numerical simulations with harmonic perturbations to identify the key parameters controlling tidal triggering and their admissible ranges. Triggered slip events are further characterized using physically observable quantities, including radiation efficiency and tidal phase. Our results show that even small stress perturbations can trigger periodic as well as temporally complex slip events on stable sliding faults. The triggering behavior is primarily controlled by the normalized perturbation period and the normalized perturbation amplitude. An increase in the normalized period shifts event timing from the peak of tidal stress toward the peak of stress rate, whereas increasing the normalized amplitude promotes a transition from slow to fast events. This framework helps explain the period-dependent sensitivity and the observed phase preference between tidal stress and maximum slip velocity. Comparison between observed and model-predicted tidal correlation patterns may therefore help constrain the instantaneous frictional strength of the interface, as well as the characteristic slip distance for frictional weakening.

Modern Humans Wouldn’t Last a Night in Pleistocene Australia

Not “most of us wouldn’t last the night” in every scenario.

A fit person who can find water, avoid the dumbest mistakes, and improvise basic shelter has a better- than- zero chance of surviving the first 24- 48 hours in many regions.

During the Pleistocene (roughly 2.6 million to 11,700 years ago), Australia was part of a much larger landmass called Sahul.

The oldest human skeletal remains in Australia (Lake Mungo) date to around 40,000 years ago.

A modern human stands facing three prehistoric creatures, including a massive lion, a large marsupial, and a gigantic monitor lizard, under a full moon in a rugged Australian landscape, with dramatic mountains in the background. — AI generated by Grok

Drop an average city- dweller naked into Pleistocene Australia with zero prior knowledge, skills, or gear and the survival odds collapse fast. The environment was genuinely hostile in ways that modern life completely insulates us from.

The actual threats

Megafauna predators and competitors: Marsupial lion (Thylacoleo), giant monitor lizards, large terrestrial crocodiles, and packs of thylacines were real. These were not abstract “wild animals”; several were specialized hunters adapted to Australian conditions. A soft, unarmed human is easy calories.
Climate and landscape: Extreme heat, sudden cold snaps in the south, seasonal drought, flash floods, and vast stretches with little reliable surface water. Navigation without landmarks or maps is trivial to get wrong.
Food and water acquisition: Edible plants, roots, and animals exist, but most are either seasonal, toxic without processing, or require specific knowledge to find and catch. Trial-and-error foraging in an unfamiliar ecosystem is a fast way to starve or poison yourself.
Zero margin: No antibiotics, no sterile water, no shelter materials you already know how to use, no fire-making skill. One infected cut, one bad night of exposure, or one missed water source ends it.

Aboriginal Australians (and their ancestors) demonstrably survived and thrived for tens of thousands of years precisely because they possessed deep local knowledge, sophisticated toolkits, fire management, social networks, and cultural transmission of survival information. That is not the same as an untrained modern individual dropped in cold.

Where the claim overreaches

Not “most of us wouldn’t last the night” in every scenario.

A fit person who can find water, avoid the dumbest mistakes, and improvise basic shelter has a better- than- zero chance of surviving the first 24- 48 hours in many regions.

The real filter is the following weeks: cumulative calorie deficit, injury, infection, or simply getting lost. Modern soft living removes exactly the practical competence and risk tolerance that made long- term survival possible.

In short: prehistoric Australia was lethal to the unprepared. Most contemporary people are extremely unprepared. The ones who lasted were the ones who weren’t.

A depiction of Australian wildlife featuring a wombat, kangaroos, a thylacine, and a goanna in a natural setting with trees and a sunset in the background. — AI generated by Meta

During the Pleistocene (roughly 2.6 million to 11,700 years ago), Australia was part of a much larger landmass called Sahul.

Lower sea levels joined modern- day mainland Australia, Tasmania, and New Guinea into one continuous continent. This created different coastlines, exposed shelves, and connected habitats that no longer exist today.

When humans arrived

Modern humans (Homo sapiens) first reached Sahul sometime between about 50,000 and 65,000 years ago. The exact timing remains debated:

Archaeological evidence from the Madjedbebe rock shelter in Arnhem Land (Northern Territory) points to occupation as early as ~65,000 years ago, based on optically stimulated luminescence dating of sediments associated with stone tools, grinding stones, ochre, and other artefacts. Some researchers accept this “long chronology”; others question the site’s stratigraphic integrity (possible disturbance by termites or other processes) and prefer dates closer to 50,000- 55,000 years.
Recent genetic studies (mitochondrial DNA from nearly 2,500 Indigenous Australian, New Guinean, and Oceanian individuals) support arrival around 60,000 years ago via two routes: a northern path (through the Philippines and Sulawesi toward New Guinea) and a southern path (through the Sunda region and Timor toward northern Australia). These lineages diverged from a common ancestral population that left Africa earlier.
Other genetic and archaeological syntheses favor a “short chronology” of roughly 45,000- 50,000 years ago.

By ~40,000- 45,000 years ago, people had spread widely across Sahul, including into the arid interior and Tasmania (then connected by land).

The oldest human skeletal remains in Australia (Lake Mungo) date to around 40,000 years ago.

How they got there

Reaching Sahul required deliberate water crossings across Wallacea (the island region between the Asian Sunda shelf and Sahul). There was never a continuous land bridge.

People used watercraft, likely simple rafts or canoes, and made multiple open- water voyages, some approaching 100 km. Modelling suggests intentional, planned migration rather than accidental drifting, with a viable founding population probably numbering in the hundreds to over a thousand individuals (or successive smaller groups).

Life in Pleistocene Australia

These early Sahul populations were fully modern humans with sophisticated technology and knowledge systems. Evidence from early sites includes:

Ground- edge stone axes and hatchets (among the earliest known anywhere)
Grinding stones for processing seeds and plants
Ochre use (including reflective pigments)
Shellfish gathering, hunting, and plant processing

They lived as mobile hunter -gatherers adapted to diverse environments, tropical north, arid center, temperate south, and coastal zones.

Fire was used for landscape management.

They coexisted with Australia’s Pleistocene megafauna (giant marsupials such as Diprotodon, Thylacoleo the marsupial lion, giant kangaroos, and large reptiles) for thousands of years, estimates of overlap range from a few thousand to potentially 15,000 and more years in some regions, depending on the dating.

The causes of megafaunal extinctions (hunting pressure, climate change, or both) remain actively debated.

Continuity

These Pleistocene arrivals are the direct ancestors of today’s Aboriginal Australian and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Their cultures represent one of the world’s longest continuous human occupations of a continent.

Rising sea levels after the Last Glacial Maximum (~18,000- 10,000 years ago) eventually separated New Guinea, Tasmania, and mainland Australia, reshaping the geography but not ending the human presence.

In short, Pleistocene Australia was not an empty wilderness waiting for humans, it was a dynamic continent that people successfully colonized, adapted to, and continuously occupied for tens of thousands of years with deep local knowledge and technology.

Map of the Sahul supercontinent during the Pleistocene era, approximately 20,000 years ago, showing Australia, New Guinea, and Tasmania connected by land bridges. — AI generated by Meta

Pleistocene Australia experienced repeated glacial, interglacial cycles that profoundly shaped its climate, landscapes, ecosystems, and human occupation.

These were driven by orbital variations (Milankovitch cycles), changes in atmospheric CO₂, ice- sheet dynamics, and ocean circulation (including the Indonesian Throughflow). Sea levels fluctuated by over 100 m, repeatedly joining or separating Australia, New Guinea, and Tasmania into the single continent of Sahul.

Overall climate patterns

Australia’s climate shifted from relatively warmer and wetter conditions in the Early Pleistocene toward progressive aridification over the last few million years, especially after ~3.3- 2.4 million years ago. The modern winter- dominated rainfall regime in the south and the strong seasonal monsoon in the north developed gradually.

In the Late Pleistocene (the period of human presence, roughly the last 65,000- 50,000 years):

Glacial periods were cooler and often more arid or variable.
Interglacials were warmer and wetter in many regions.
The Australian monsoon waxed and waned, influenced by the position of the Intertropical Convergence Zone, heat lows over the continent, and sea- surface temperatures.

Last Glacial Maximum (LGM, ~24,000- 18,000 years ago)

This was the coldest phase of the last glacial cycle in the Australian region:

Temperatures were typically 4- 11 °C cooler than present (greatest cooling in southern and highland areas; more moderate in the tropics). Sea- surface temperatures offshore could drop by up to ~9 °C in places.
Traditional views held that the Indo- Australian monsoon largely collapsed and the continent became extremely arid, forcing human populations into refugia. Newer modelling and proxy data challenge the most extreme interpretations: moisture balance (precipitation minus evaporation) often remained similar to or only modestly reduced from present levels in many regions, the monsoon did not fully collapse, and some inland water sources persisted.
Vegetation shifted dramatically: forests retreated, grasslands and shrublands expanded, and open, sparsely wooded landscapes dominated large areas (including the Bassian land bridge between mainland Australia and Tasmania). Lower atmospheric CO₂ also stressed plants.
Expanded deserts and active dune fields occurred in the interior but not everywhere was uniformly hyper- arid.

Cooler conditions began intensifying around 28- 29 ka in many records and persisted until roughly 18–17 ka, after which progressive warming and rising CO₂ drove reforestation and environmental recovery into the terminal Pleistocene and Holocene.

Sea- level and landscape impacts

During glacial maxima, sea levels dropped ~120- 130 m below present, exposing vast continental shelves. Sahul reached its maximum extent (~9.8 million km² for the Australian portion alone at the LGM).

The northwest shelf (connecting Kimberley and Arnhem Land) formed extensive archipelagos or fully exposed plains with lakes, inland seas, gorges, and resource- rich zones that could support substantial human populations (modelled carrying capacity estimates range from tens of thousands to potentially hundreds of thousands at times).

Rapid post- LGM sea- level rise (especially Meltwater Pulse 1A ~14.5- 14.1 ka and later phases to ~9- 8 ka) inundated ~20% or more of the continental area, drowning coastal plains and forcing population retreats inland. This is visible in archaeological site- intensity peaks.

Impacts on ecosystems and megafauna

Climate drove vegetation turnover, fire regimes, and water availability. Progressive aridification and variability stressed habitats.

Megafaunal extinctions (most large- bodied species gone by ~40- 45 ka in many areas) occurred against this backdrop.

Debates continue: some studies find extinctions largely independent of climate and timed closely with human arrival (suggesting hunting or landscape modification as primary); others show regionally staggered extinctions coinciding with hydroclimatic deterioration and argue for combined climate, human effects, especially where people and animals concentrated around shrinking water sources.

Impacts on humans

Early Aboriginal populations successfully occupied Sahul through these fluctuations.

During the LGM, people remained present across most regions (archaeological and genetic evidence indicates relative demographic stability rather than wholesale collapse or mass abandonment), though spatial use contracted in some areas and they relied on reliable water and resource refugia.

Post- glacial sea -level rise and environmental shifts drove cultural and demographic adjustments, including intensified occupation of certain inland sites as coastal lands were lost.

In summary, Pleistocene climate in Australia was highly dynamic, cooler and often more challenging during glacials, with major landscape reconfiguration via sea- level change.

These conditions shaped vegetation, fauna, and human settlement patterns, but people adapted and persisted for tens of thousands of years.

The LGM was harsh but not uniformly catastrophic, and the interplay of climate with human activity remains central to understanding both megafaunal extinctions and long-t erm Aboriginal continuity.

Africa’s Poorest Countries Need Energy, Not Empathy

The mainstream media and policy analysts have been slower than sloths in displaying an understanding of how the United States’ dismantling greenhouse gas limits for power plants is a profound turning point for global energy policy. Moreover, while Washington reclaims industrial common sense, the promise of energy reformation languishes in Africa, especially in nations that sit at or near the bottom of national income.

From The CO2 Coalition

By Vijay Jayaraj

Begin with numbers published by the World Bank. In Mozambique, 81% of people live below the line of extreme poverty, $2.15 a day. In Burundi the figure stands at 74%, and in the Central African Republic close to 72%. Malawi sits alongside them with some of the highest poverty rates on the continent, and its economy entered 2026 with inflation nearly 30% and public debt approaching 91% of gross domestic product.

South Sudan posts the lowest score on the U.N.’s Human Development Index. In 2019, more than 97% of people in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi cooked with smoky wood, charcoal, dung, and crop waste.

The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation found that household smoke kills Burundians at high rates, and women and girls spend four hours daily gathering fuel. In Egypt where cooking gas is widely used, such hardships are hardly known.

Energy Access and Poverty
One of the primary reasons for these levels of poverty is lack of access to energy, especially electricity. And some of the statistics could come from societies of dark pre-industrial eras.

The Central African Republic’s electricity network runs on the hydroelectric power of one waterway. The Boali complex on the Mbali River – three units totaling less than 39 megawatts – produces far less than a single modern coal-fired plant, which typically generates 1,000 megawatts or more. Of the country’s 5 million people, 4.3 million do not have electricity.

Burundi’s entire national grid produced less than 167 megawatts in 2025, even with a recent addition of nearly 50 megawatts. The national access to electricity sits below 12%. Burundi’s 14 million people depend on a system that is barely enough for a single American shopping mall.

South Sudan’s installed capacity reached roughly 214 megawatts by 2023, of which about half worked.

Why does so little firm power exist in places that need it most? Follow the finance. The World Bank stopped financing coal more than a decade ago. It then would end upstream oil and gas lending after 2019.

In September 2019, African Development Bank President Akinwumi Adesina told the U.N. Climate Action Summit that coal belonged to the past and his bank was getting out of it, a pledge the bank never formally wrote into policy but has applied in practice.

Vijaya Ramachandran of the Breakthrough Institute says blanket bans on financing hydrocarbon projects entrench poverty. Addressing climate change and ignoring poverty is “completely immoral,” she says. “The average Ethiopian consumes only 130 kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, about the amount the average person in the United States consumes in four days.”

Ms. Ramachandran is not a climate “skeptic” but rather an economist who knows what happens at a clinic that has insufficient electricity to refrigerate its drugs.

NJ Ayuk of the African Energy Chamber makes the engineering case. Ending energy poverty, he says, requires every available resource, with coal and oil among the assets that “each have a role to play.” Telling Africans to make do with wind and solar while wealthy countries restart their own coal plants is “not just unfair (and) unjust, it is dishonest,” he says.

African governments should demand that the African Development Bank and World Bank restore financing for fossil fuel plants and for the infrastructure to connect them to consumers. This is the bare minimum needed for the continent’s most desperate to escape poverty.

Originally published at PJ Media, September 30, 2026.

Vijay Jayaraj is a Science and Research Associate at the CO2 Coalition, Fairfax, Virginia. He holds an M.S. in environmental sciences from the University of East Anglia and a postgraduate degree in energy management from Robert Gordon University, both in the U.K., and a bachelor’s in engineering from Anna University, India. He served as a research associate with the Changing Oceans Research Unit at University of British Columbia, Canada.

Legacy Media Weep as Trump Axes Biden’s Fuel Economy Diktat

Start with an irony that the NYT buries in its own reporting. The paper conceded that Congress had already scrapped the fines for automakers that miss the mileage targets, leaving Monday’s rollback more symbolic than substantive. That penalty repeal, part of last year’s One Big Beautiful Bill, is what mattered.

A satirical illustration depicting a protest scene with dramatic expressions of fear and despair from various characters in response to a fuel economy mandate being axed. Prominent figures in the image include a smiling man resembling a political figure holding signs with fuel economy statistics, while the background features newspapers and messages about climate change and car affordability. — AI generated by ChatGPT

From Tilak´s Substack

By Tilak Doshi

An electric vehicle (EV) charging station with a silver pickup truck parked at one of the charging spots, marked 'EV CHARGING ONLY'. The area is surrounded by greenery in a parking lot.

On Saturday, President Trump announced that he had approved new vehicle fuel economy standards, and on Monday the Transportation Department made the final rule official. Within hours, the legacy media covered the rollback of Biden’s vehicle mandates with shrill criticisms. The New York Times told readers that the administration was gutting a signature federal effort to speed the shift to electric vehicles. Politico judged the revision “one more nail in the coffin” for Biden-era EV policy. Bloomberg’s headline announced that the US “guts” auto mileage rules, while the Washington Post ran its own story under the banner “Analysts are doubtful”, reporting that “experts” scoffed at the administration’s claim of a $1,300 cut in new-car prices.

The final rule requires a fleetwide average of 34.9 miles per gallon by model year 2031, in place of the roughly 50 mpg demanded by Biden’s standards. To the assembled commentariat, this is climate vandalism, a betrayal of drivers and a gift to Beijing. Every one of these claims is false or badly misleading. And the missing context – what the Biden mandates cost, who paid, and what they actually bought – is the story the legacy press coverage never reveals.

A funeral for a rule already dead

Start with an irony that the NYT buries in its own reporting. The paper conceded that Congress had already scrapped the fines for automakers that miss the mileage targets, leaving Monday’s rollback more symbolic than substantive. That penalty repeal, part of last year’s One Big Beautiful Bill, is what mattered. Politico’s own expert, Joshua Linn of the University of Maryland, explained that without penalties CAFE (corporate average fuel economy) had become little more than a polite request: Detroit is asked nicely to add technology, with no consequence for declining. Neither outlet drew the obvious conclusion. If the standards were toothless, the handwringing over their formal retirement is theatre. If they still bit, they were a mandate – precisely what the Times insists Trump falsely accuses Biden of imposing. The coverage wants it both ways.

As for the Post’s doubtful analysts, Stephanie Brinley of Mobility Global and Jessica Caldwell of Edmunds argue that savings will not reach buyers when the average new vehicle already costs around $50,000, and that any saving would first be absorbed by tariffs. In fact, NHTSA itself cautions that its estimated $1,289 reduction in average vehicle cost by model year 2031 materialises only if manufacturers pass it on. But whether a cost saving shows up at the dealership is irrelevant to what the vehicle efficiency mandates cost in the first place, and who paid.

The hidden tax on every showroom floor

The answer is not hard to find, though it requires reading beyond the Beltway press. The Heritage Foundation’s Diana Furchtgott-Roth and Andrew Weiss showed that Biden-level CAFE targets exceeded what gasoline-powered cars can plausibly achieve, converting fuel economy regulation into a backdoor EV mandate. The Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Marlo Lewis argues that this ran afoul of the statute’s own limits.

To comply, legacy manufacturers had to raise the EV share of their fleets, selling the extra EVs at a loss, and then recoup the loss by charging more for gasoline models or by buying regulatory credits from Tesla – a compliance tax according to the Competitive Enterprise Institute. The gasoline-car buyer subsidised the EV buyer, one sticker price at a time.

The Texas Public Policy Foundation and the American Energy Institute quantified this cross-subsidy in 2025. On its estimates, each model-year 2023 EV imposes between $94,121 and $152,695 in hidden 10-year social costs, borne by gasoline-car buyers, taxpayers and electricity ratepayers, while CAFE, EPA greenhouse-gas and state ZEV credits can be worth $46,000 to $115,000 per EV to the manufacturer.

The academic literature points the same way. UC San Diego’s Mark Jacobsen, cited in a January public comment by the American Consumer Institute, finds CAFE three to four times costlier than an equivalent gas tax, with each additional mile per gallon costing consumers $11.2 billion in the first year and $24.1 billion after 10. Cato Institute’s Peter Van Doren puts CAFE’s cost at no less than six times that of a carbon tax, and the Mackinac Center cites Jacobsen’s figure of $222 per ton of CO₂ abated. CEI reckons the reset spares buyers about $900 on the average new car. These studies measure different things, but they converge on one conclusion: the mandate was expensive, and the expense was hidden.

The bill came due in Detroit. Ford took a $19.5 billion write-down in December as it cancelled EV programmes, including the electric F-150 Lightning, and GM followed in January with a $6 billion charge. These are the balance sheets of firms that built what regulators demanded rather than what buyers wanted. The Times frets that the rollback may encourage bigger pickups and SUVs, yet Van Doren’s point is that footprint-based standards already penalise small, cheap cars and subsidise big trucks and SUVs.

CAFE doesn’t set one mileage target for every car. The target for each vehicle depends on its ‘footprint’, which is approximately the area between its four wheels. The larger the footprint, the lower (easier) the mpg target. A small hatchback must hit a demanding number, while a full-size pickup gets a lenient one.

Reuters reports that under the Trump rollback, lifetime fuel costs rise by more than $1,600 per vehicle higher through 2050 than under the Biden rules. The Biden rules added roughly $1,289 efficiency technology costs to a car’s price in exchange for that $1,600 in fuel savings. But if a buyer could recoup $1,600 at the pump for $1,289 of technology, why would a mandate be needed in the first place?

Non sequiturs and the China bogeyman

Critics offer three further objections. The first is that tariffs and dearer fuel – gasoline at $4.48 a gallon since the US-Israeli attacks on Iran began in February – will swamp any regulatory saving. True, and irrelevant. Tariffs and Gulf-driven pump prices exist whether or not CAFE mandates are loosened. Keeping the mandate would not abolish them; it would merely stack another cost on top. To argue that because one burden is heavy, one should insist on carrying a second, is a non sequitur.

A second criticism in the mainstream media coverage is that the rest of the world is ‘racing toward EVs’ and America will be left behind. Dan Becker of the Center for Biological Diversity warns that Detroit is being told it may be competed into oblivion by Chinese EV exports. But the evidence suggests that EV sales are disappointing everywhere outside China.

In March 2024, CNBC published a widely cited article entitled ‘EV euphoria is dead. Automakers are scaling back or delaying their electric vehicle plans’. The outlet’s automotive industry reporter Michael Wayland wrote:

For years, the automotive industry has been in a state of EV euphoria. Automakers trotted out optimistic sales forecasts for electric models and announced ambitious targets for EV growth… Now the hype is dwindling, and companies are again cheering consumer choice. Automakers from Ford Motor and General Motors to Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Jaguar Land Rover and Aston Martin are scaling back or delaying their electric vehicle plans.

NPR reported that EVs have held 5-6% of new US car sales into 2026, and even the second quarter ‘rebound’ left sales down 20.5% on a year earlier. Detroit is not failing for want of a mandate, it is writing off billions on EVs that it cannot sell.

I wrote in these pages last year on the false promise of EVs. The EV story is overwhelmingly a China-focused one. Europe bought 1.6 million more electric cars in in the first half of 2025 relative to the same period last year, or 27% more. North Americans bought only 0.7 million more, or 3%. The ‘rest of the world’ bought 0.6 million more EVs or 36% from a very small base. China alone accounted for 4.4 million new EV units, logging a growth of 33%. To call what is essentially a China-dominated story a global EV success story is a sleight of hand.

News reports in China are opaque and dominated by CCP interests, like so much else of life in that country. There have been reports of vast ‘graveyards’ of unsold EVs in various cities. A Bloomberg article in 2023 reported that “a subsidy-fuelled boom helped build China into an electric-car giant but left weed-infested lots across the nation brimming with unwanted battery-powered cars”.

The third criticism of the Trump CAFE rollback is that this is ceding EV and battery leadership to China. That also rests on a false premise. Chinese dominance is built on coal-fired power and on control of the dirty, energy-intensive global upstream supply chain of mining, refining and processing of rare earths and minerals. Western consumers who believe their EVs are ‘clean’ never see the dirty secrets of EVs. China commissioned 78 gigawatts of new coal power in 2025, the most in a decade, and accounting for four-fifths of all coal capacity brought online worldwide, while developers submitted a record 161 gigawatts of new or reactivated proposals. Celebrating China’s EV penetration while ignoring its coal build-out is like admiring the showroom and ignoring the boiler room out of sight behind.

Tailpipes, power stations and philosopher kings

The final refuge is pollution and climate. The NYT reminds readers that transportation is the country’s largest source of greenhouse gases, and the Sierra Club, which has promised to challenge the rule in court, says families will be handed the bill at the pump and with their health. But cutting tailpipe emissions is not cutting emissions. It relocates them to power stations, mines and smelters, out of sight of the showroom. And on the pollutants that actually damage health, the internal combustion engine has an extraordinary record that the coverage never mentions. The EPA says new cars, SUVs and pickups are roughly 99% cleaner than 1970 models for hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and particulates, and that total emissions of the six principal air pollutants fell 79% between 1970 and 2024 even as vehicle miles travelled rose 195%.

Table showing percent change in emissions of various pollutants from 1980 to 2024, including Carbon Monoxide, Lead, Nitrogen Oxides, Volatile Organic Compounds, Direct PM10, Direct PM2.5, and Sulfur Dioxide, with specific values for comparisons to 1990, 2000, and 2010. — *Source: https://www.epa.gov/air-trends/air-quality-national-summary*

Fuel economy mandates were never about those pollutants. They were about carbon dioxide, which is not a pollutant at all. As the physicist William Happer of the CO₂ Coalition has testified, the real pollutants are fly ash, carbon monoxide, oxides of sulphur and nitrogen, heavy metals and volatile organic compounds, while CO2 and water vapour, the dominant products of combustion, are not among them.

The larger context is the belief that bureaucrats know better than households how to spend money on energy. In Plato’s Republic the philosopher king rules and the plebs obey; if energy efficiency were the bargain its promoters claim, we would not need experts at the IEA, the EPA or McKinsey to tell us so. Households and businesses, and motorists for that matter, do not need to be told how to save money that energy efficiency would bring. One Mercatus study found that much efficiency policy analysis assumes people never make sound choices. Mandated standards are the philosopher king’s favourite tool precisely because, unlike explicit subsidies, they conceal their costs, which land first on manufacturers and reach consumers untraced. If buyers are poorly informed, the remedy is better information, not a mandate.

The Sierra Club will see Trump in court, and the litigation will be dutifully chronicled. But the real news of the week is not that Washington retired a rule it had already defanged. It is that a mandate born of the 1975 oil embargo has been recognised, at last, as an expensive way of making people buy what they were reluctant to buy. In the same fortnight that New York hosted its annual climate circus, the American car buyer got something rarer than another pledge: a little of his own freedom back.

The strangulation of the regulatory state is to be welcomed, and one should never mourn the end of intrusive mandates – for motorists as for others – designed by bureaucrats and know-it-all philosopher kings. As Friedrich von Hayek taught us many years ago, “the curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design”.

This article was first published in the Daily Sceptic https://dailysceptic.org/2026/10/01/legacy-media-weep-as-trump-axes-bidens-fuel-economy-diktat/

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

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