โ€˜The Future of CCS Can No Longer Be Assumedโ€™ (a supporter rethinks โ€ฆ)

Martin Jagger, a climate activist specializing in carbon capture & storage, recently wrote a sobering post on the progress of this technology in addressing the assumed-to-be climate crisis. This problematic approach is another example of the tears-in-the-ocean choices of climate mitigation policy.

โ€œToday, global operating nameplate capture capacity is approximately 60 million tonnes a year. If fully utilised, that would represent gross capture equivalent to roughly 14-15 hours of annual global energy and industrial emissions. Actual verified net storage is lower.โ€

An illustration depicting a construction site with pipes and industrial equipment, featuring a worried worker in a hard hat. The scene is marked by signs about carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects, discussing budget overruns and uncertain future. Text includes phrases like 'Reality Check', 'The Future of CCS?', and 'CCS Project Uncertain'.

From Master Resource

By Robert Bradley Jr.

โ€œToday, global operating nameplate capture capacity is approximately 60 million tonnes a year. If fully utilised, that would represent gross capture equivalent to roughly 14-15 hours of annual global energy and industrial emissions. Actual verified net storage is lower.โ€ (- Martin Jagger, below)

Martin Jagger, a climate activist specializing in carbon capture & storage, recently wrote a sobering post on the progress of this technology in addressing the assumed-to-be climate crisis. This problematic approach is another example of the tears-in-the-ocean choices of climate mitigation policy.

โ€œFor twenty years,โ€ he begins, โ€œI have argued that CCS has an important role to play in managing emissions from industries where practical alternatives remain limited.โ€ The progress to date has been small, and the effect on global emissions minuscule. He explains:

Today, global operating nameplate capture capacity is approximately 60 million tonnes a year. If fully utilised, that would represent gross capture equivalent to roughly 14-15 hours of annual global energy and industrial emissions. Actual verified net storage is lowerโ€ฆ. Closing even the gap between todayโ€™s operating capacity and the announced [EIA estimated 2030 pipeline would require an extraordinary acceleration in permitting, financing, construction, commissioning and sustained operating performance.

The interest and potential investment are there, he believes, but โ€œdeliveryโ€ is small and problematic.

โ€ฆ announcements are not delivery, storage resources are not injection capacity, and nameplate capacity is not independently verified climate impact. The next phase of CCS must therefore be more demanding than the last. By 2030, success should no longer be measured primarily by the number of projects announced, memoranda signed, licences awarded or billions committed. It should be measured by verified net tonnes securely stored, year after year. That requires a tougher delivery model.

He alludes to the problem of getting from hyperbole to practice.

We have largely solved the problem of attracting interest and announcing investment. We have not yet solved the delivery problem. That distinction matters because CCS cannot indefinitely be judged by its potential. Nor should every delay be explained by saying that the industry simply needs more policy support or more public money. After two decades, the burden of proof must begin to shift.

Continuing:

That shift also requires greater honesty about how progress is reported. Too many of the institutions responsible for advocacy and industry leadership still present CCS largely as a good-news story. New projects, funding awards and headline capacity are publicised; delays, cancellations, operating shortfalls and the absence of verified storage receive much less attention.

Final Comment

Government incentives to carbon capture and storage, formalized in the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (Section 45Q tax credit), should be terminated, an end to please many environmentalists and the free market community. [2] The whole initiative is inconsequential to global or regional climate, and projects have been opposed by local residents in the U.S. and elsewhere. [3]


[1] Martin Jaggerโ€™s bio reads:

I am an Executive Consultant in Energy Transition Strategy and Decarbonisation Delivery with a track record of bringing operator discipline to CCS policy and projects. I established Shellโ€™s Carbon Capture and Storage Centre of Excellence in 2007 and helped shape international frameworks for long-term COโ‚‚ storage that informed UNFCCC CDM mechanisms and regulatory guidance.

I currently advise sovereigns, regulators and innovators on areas where policy realism, technical feasibility and capital must align. My work tests the credibility of targets, the true scaling pathways for CCS and low-carbon fuels, and the structural barriers that stall momentum โ€“ especially FID drag, subsidy distortion, infrastructure mis-sequencing and the policy-performance gap.

[2] The tax credits since 2022 are $85 per ton of COโ‚‚ stored for dedicated geologic storage projects and $60 per ton for COโ‚‚ utilization projects with associated storage, increased from $50 and $35 subsidies (2018) and $20 and $10 (2008). A summary of federal largess from Taxpayers for Common Sense reads:

For decades, the federal government has provided billions of dollars in both direct and indirect subsidies to support CCS technology and projects. These subsidies have included research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) funding, loan guarantees, and tax credits.

Over the past few decades some of these subsidies have gone to projects that have been repeatedly started and stopped, only to eventually collapse due to various economic issues and controversies (e.g., FutureGen, Kemper). Additionally, the 45Q tax credit, which has grown significantly in both size and scope, has been mired in fraud and waste. To date, the federal government has spent tens of billions of taxpayer dollars on CCS through research and development funding and tax credits, yet the technology is still struggling with widescale deployment issues due to high costsโ€ฆ.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congress provided roughly $9 billion (in nominal dollars) in annual appropriations for DOEโ€™s FECM from FY2010 to FY2023, with over $2.8 billion specifically directed towards CCS line itemsโ€ฆ. Congress appropriated $12 billion more to the technology through the infrastructure law (Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, P.L. 117-58) and greatly expanded the already lucrative tax credit in the Inflation Reduction Act (Public Law 117-169).

[3] There are currently 15 operating CCS facilities in the U.S. and another 120 projects under development. The top ten projects are (verbatim):

1. Stratos Direct Air Capture (DAC) Project

Companies: Occidental Petroleum (through its subsidiary 1 Point Five) and Origis Energy
Capacity: 500, 000 metric tons of COโ‚‚ annually
Application: Direct Air Capture powered by a dedicated solar portfolio
Source: Origis Energy Commissions 500 MWdc Swift Air Solar Projects in โ€ฆ

2. Calpine Baytown Energy Center CCS Project

Companies: Calpine Corporation and Exxon Mobil
Capacity: Approximately 2 million metric tons of COโ‚‚ annually
Application: Low-carbon power generation from a new natural gas plant
Source: Calpine, Exxon Mobil sign CO 2 transportation and storage โ€ฆ

3. CF Industries Donaldsonville CCS Facility

Companies: CF Industries and Exxon Mobil
Capacity: A key component of Exxon Mobilโ€™s contracted ~9 million metric tons per annum (MTA) portfolio
Application: Decarbonization of ammonia production
Source: Hereโ€™s How XOM Is Scaling Up Its CCS Footprint to Reduce Emissions

4. Google-Backed Gas Power Plant with CCS

Companies: Google and Mitsubishi Power
Capacity: Designed to capture 90% of COโ‚‚ emissions
Application: Firm, low-carbon power for data centers
Source: Google Commits to First U.S. Gas-Fired Power Plant with Integrated โ€ฆ

5. California Resources Corporation (CRC) Carbon Terra Vault I (CTV I)

Company: California Resources Corporation
Capacity: Not specified; designed as a dedicated COโ‚‚ storage facility
Application: COโ‚‚ injection and permanent geologic storage
Source: California Resources Corporation Breaks Ground on Californiaโ€™s โ€ฆ

6. Sweetwater Carbon Storage Hub (SCS Hub)

Companies: Frontier Infrastructure and Baker Hughes
Capacity: Positioned to be one of the largest U.S. COโ‚‚ sequestration assets (specific tonnage not provided)
Application: Multi-user COโ‚‚ sequestration hub for industrial emitters
Source: Baker Hughes, Frontier Infrastructure Partner on Carbon Capture โ€ฆ

7. ADM Decatur CCS Facility

Company: Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM)
Capacity: Averages nearly 0.5 Mtpa (based on 4.5 million metric tons sequestered over a decade)
Application: Long-term industrial CCS for ethanol production
Source: ADM and Carbon Capture and Storage

8. Lake Charles Power Station Integrated COโ‚‚ Capture Project

Company: Project supported by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
Capacity: Not specified; large-scale pilot
Application: Advancing capture technologies for power generation
Source: [XLS] Sheet 1 โ€“ Climate Program Portal

9. Illinois COโ‚‚ Injection Project

Company: Unnamed Texas-based developer
Capacity: Not specified; early-stage regulatory filing
Application: New COโ‚‚ injection and storage project
Source: CP Daily Newsletter: Wednesday February 18, 2026 โ€“ Carbon Pulse

10. Bantam DAC Facility

Company: Climeworks
Capacity: Over 5, 000 tons of COโ‚‚ annually
Application: Direct Air Capture, noted as the largest operational DAC in the U.S. as of October 2025
Source: Facilities โ€“ CO 2 RE โ€“ Global CCS Institute

The Climate Catastrophe That Toppled the Worldโ€™s First Empire

The Akkadian Empire (c. 2334- 2154 BCE, Middle Chronology) was the worldโ€™s first known multi-ethnic empire.

The 4.2- kiloyear event (also called the 4.2 ka BP event or 4.2 ka megadrought) was a major aridification episode that began around 2200 BCE and lasted roughly 100- 300 years.

Before the empire, Mesopotamia consisted of competing city- states (Early Dynastic period). Sargon of Akkad (also Sharru- kin, โ€œtrue/legitimate kingโ€; r. c. 2334- 2279 BCE) founded the empire.

A desolate landscape featuring a ruined city on a hill, surrounded by barren terrain and dramatic, stormy skies. The scene is illuminated by a golden sunset.
AI generated by Grok

The Akkadian Empire (c. 2334- 2154 BCE, Middle Chronology) was the worldโ€™s first known multi-ethnic empire.

It unified the independent Sumerian city-states of southern Mesopotamia with the Akkadian (Semitic-speaking) regions of the north under a centralized government centered on the city of Akkad (Agade; exact location still unknown, likely near the Euphrates between Sippar and Kish). Its influence extended from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, parts of Anatolia, and western Iran.

Before the empire, Mesopotamia consisted of competing city- states (Early Dynastic period). Sargon of Akkad (also Sharru- kin, โ€œtrue/legitimate kingโ€; r. c. 2334- 2279 BCE) founded the empire.

According to later traditions and inscriptions, he rose from humble origins (possibly a cupbearer to the king of Kish), seized power, defeated Lugal- zage- si of Uruk (who had briefly unified much of Sumer), and conquered the southern city- states (Ur, Lagash, Umma, and others). He โ€œwashed his weapons in the Lower Seaโ€ (Persian Gulf) and campaigned northward and westward to Mari, Ebla, the โ€œCedar Forest,โ€ and the โ€œSilver Mountains.โ€

Sargon created a standing professional army, installed Akkadian governors (ensi), promoted the Akkadian language (while retaining Sumerian for liturgy and literature), developed a postal system, standardized administration, and fostered trade and cultural integration. His sons Rimush (c. 2279- 2270 BCE) and Manishtushu (c. 2270- 2255 BCE) suppressed revolts and continued expansion (including into Elam and the Zagros), though both faced challenges and may have died violently.

The empire reached its height under Sargonโ€™s grandson Naram- Sin (c. 2254- 2218 BCE). He adopted the title โ€œKing of the Four Quartersโ€, declared himself a living god (depicted with a horned helmet on his famous Victory Stele), and conducted campaigns into northern Syria, western Iran, and beyond. The period saw administrative reforms, agricultural surpluses supported by irrigation, artistic achievements, and cultural flourishing that blended Sumerian and Akkadian traditions.

The empire lasted roughly 150โ€“180 years and began declining after Naram-Sin. His son Shar- kali- sharri (c. 2218- 2193 BCE) faced continuous warfare against Elamites, Amorites, and Gutians. A period of anarchy followed (โ€œWho was king? Who was not king?โ€ in the Sumerian King List), with short- lived rulers (including Dudu and the last king, Shu- turul, c. 2168- 2154 BCE). By c. 2154 BCE the empire had collapsed, leading to a โ€œDark Ageโ€ of fragmented city- states until the rise of the Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III) around 2112 BCE.

Causes were multifactorial (no single explanation is universally accepted):

Climate change / the 4.2- kiloyear event: A major aridification episode around 2200 BCE brought prolonged drought, reduced rainfall (especially in rain- fed northern areas), increased dust storms (shamals), and lower river flows in the Tigris- Euphrates system. This caused agricultural failure, famine, settlement abandonment (e.g., at Tell Leilan in northern Syria), and economic stress. Evidence comes from soil layers, marine cores (Gulf of Oman dust spikes), stalagmites, and coral records. Some studies emphasize this as a primary driver; others note resilience in certain sites and argue it was contributory rather than sole cause.

Internal instability: Revolts, succession crises, over-extension, and possible administrative strain after the strong early rulers.

External pressures: Invasions and infiltration by Gutians (from the Zagros Mountains; traditionally blamed in texts like the Curse of Akkad), Amorites, and Elamites. The Gutians are often credited with the final overthrow, though they may have exploited an already weakened state. Traditional Mesopotamian accounts attributed the fall to divine punishment for Naram- Sinโ€™s hubris (plundering Enlilโ€™s temple at Nippur).

The Akkadian Empire set the template for later Near Eastern empires (centralized rule, professional armies, imperial ideology, and cultural synthesis).

Akkadian became a major lingua franca, and its administrative and artistic models influenced successors including the Ur III dynasty, Old Babylonian, and Assyrian states.

Dates remain approximate due to chronological debates (Middle vs. Short Chronology), and the capital Akkad has never been definitively located.

A vibrant and lush depiction of an ancient, terraced city with grand structures, flowing waterfalls, and intricate gardens along a serene waterway, featuring boats and rich vegetation.
The Akkadian Empire | History

The 4.2- kiloyear event (also called the 4.2 ka BP event or 4.2 ka megadrought) was a major aridification episode that began around 2200 BCE and lasted roughly 100- 300 years.

It marks the start of the Meghalayan Age (the current stage of the Holocene epoch) and is considered one of the most severe climatic shifts of the Holocene.

It involved reduced precipitation, cooler conditions in some regions, weakened monsoons, and increased dust activity across parts of the Northern Hemisphere, particularly the Middle East, Mediterranean, North Africa, and South Asia.

The Akkadian Empire (c. 2334- 2154 BCE) expanded into and heavily relied on the rain- fed (dry- farming) agricultural plains of northern Mesopotamia (especially the Khabur Plains in what is now northeastern Syria). These northern areas supplied grain that supported the empireโ€™s core in southern Mesopotamia, which depended more on irrigation from the Tigris and Euphrates.

Around 2200- 2150 BCE, the empire experienced rapid decline and collapse: widespread abandonment of northern settlements, political fragmentation, anarchy after the reign of Shar- kali- sharri, and eventual loss of central authority (with the last kings ruling a diminished realm before the Gutian period). Many scholars, led by archaeologist Harvey Weiss (based on excavations at Tell Leilan), argue that the 4.2 ka event was a key or primary driver of this collapse.

Proposed mechanism: A sharp drop in winter rainfall (estimates of 30- 50% reduction in some models) and prolonged drought caused agricultural failure in the rain- dependent north. This led to crop shortfalls, famine, economic stress, population movements (refugees moving south), social unrest, and vulnerability to external groups (Gutians, Amorites, Elamites). Southern irrigation agriculture was somewhat more resilient but still affected by reduced river flows. Dust storms (shamals) further degraded soils and may have caused salinization of fields.

Key Supporting Evidence

  • Archaeological: Abrupt abandonment of urban and rural sites on the Khabur Plains (e.g., Tell Leilan shows a thick sterile dust layer with no earthworm activity around 2200 BCE). Settled area in surveyed regions dropped dramatically (up to 87% in some transects); many sites remained unoccupied for ~300 years until resettlement around 1900 BCE.
  • Paleoclimate proxies:
    • Gulf of Oman sediment cores: Sharp increase in Mesopotamian-sourced dust at ~4.1 ka.
    • Iranian stalagmites (e.g., Gol- e- Zard Cave): Abrupt rises in Mg/Ca ratios (indicating dust) and ฮดยนโธO (drying) from ~4.26- 3.97 ka, timed closely with northern settlement abandonments (~4.19 ka).
    • Fossil corals from Oman: Evidence of prolonged winter shamal (dust storm) seasons and colder conditions around 4.1 ka, linked to agricultural failure.
    • Soil morphology, pollen, and lake records showing aridification.
    • Climate models (e.g., HadCM3): Indicate minima in precipitation and Tigris- Euphrates flow around 2200- 2000 BCE, driven partly by changes in Western Disturbances (Mediterranean-sourced winter rains).

The event is also linked to disruptions elsewhere, including the end of Egyptโ€™s Old Kingdom and changes in the Indus Valley, suggesting a broader regional or hemispheric phenomenon possibly related to North Atlantic cooling (Bond event 3).

The climate- collapse link is influential but not universally accepted as the sole or decisive cause:

Some isotopic studies of human remain from northern Syrian sites (e.g., Tell Brak, Tell Barri, Tell Arbid) show continuity in diet and subsistence with no clear signature of major drought- induced change, suggesting local resilience or that political and economic factors were more important.

Collapse may have resulted from a combination of factors: climate stress amplifying pre- existing issues such as over- expansion into marginal lands, overpopulation and urban overshoot, internal revolts, succession crises, and external invasions.

Chronology uncertainties, regional variability in the climate signal, and the empireโ€™s southern irrigation base complicate a purely climatic explanation. Some view the โ€œcollapseโ€ more as reorganization than total societal failure.

In summary, the 4.2- kiloyear event provides strong evidence of severe aridification that closely coincided with, and likely significantly contributed to the Akkadian Empireโ€™s decline by undermining its northern agricultural base. While climate was probably a major stressor, most researchers now see the fall as multifactorial, with environmental change interacting with social, political, and economic vulnerabilities.

UN Panic: What if President Trump Vetoes all the Globalist Climate Warrior Secretary General Candidates?

Apparently, UN favoured candidates are not impressing Team Trump. But there is another potential candidate who might tick everyoneโ€™s box.

Obviously a new kind of candidate is needed โ€“ someone who fulfils President Trumpโ€™s wishes for a less influential United Nations, yet who also fulfils the UN requirement for a dedicated globalist climate warrior.

A humorous cartoon depicting a scene at the UN where various delegates look shocked and panicked as a man resembling Donald Trump enters the room holding a large 'VETO' stamp, while the others hold signs related to climate agendas and secretary-general candidacies.

From Watts Up With That?

Essay by Eric Worrall

Apparently, UN favoured candidates are not impressing Team Trump. But there is another potential candidate who might tick everyoneโ€™s box.


In a world of wars and climate crisis, a new leader could save the UN. But would Trump allow it?

Steve Bloomfield
Sun 20 Sep 2026 23.38 AEST

As the organisation meets this week, it remains the best hope for restoring order. But it relies on goodwill from the US president โ€“ and that is lacking

If all goes to plan, at some stage in the coming weeks 15 diplomats will emerge from a small sound-proofed room deep in the bowels of the United Nations headquarters in New York and announce the organisationโ€™s next secretary-general.

The person they choose will face a combination of challenges unlike any that their predecessors have had to deal with. Two of the security councilโ€™s permanent members, the US and Russia, are engaged in wars of choice that have no end in sight. A UN commission of inquiry has accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, but the UN has effectively been reduced to the role of bystander, pushed out by Donald Trumpโ€™s Board of Peace. The climate crisis is creating a cascade of new humanitarian disasters, while every day now seems to bring a new security threat caused by the unregulated rise of AI.

All of this is happening in a world in which the very principles of the UN โ€“ multilateralism, a rules-based order and international law โ€“ are under threat.

โ€ฆ

It is not easy to argue you are best placed to save the UN when the man you need to persuade would rather it fails.

โ€ฆRead more: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/sep/20/un-new-leader-wars-climate-crisis-donald-trump

Obviously a new kind of candidate is needed โ€“ someone who fulfils President Trumpโ€™s wishes for a less influential United Nations, yet who also fulfils the UN requirement for a dedicated globalist climate warrior.

I once again present former Australian PM and former Aussie ambassador to the USA, Kevin Rudd.

The following video is Kevin Ruddโ€™s unique diplomatic talent on display. Shortly before his appointment as Australiaโ€™s ambassador to the USA, Rudd frantically deleted a whole bunch of disparaging public comments about President Trump, but to Ruddโ€™s surprise, the President got to hear about his disparaging comments anyway.

Rudd in my opinion has a long track record of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. In the words of former political colleague and Midnight Oil singer Peter Garrett, from last time Kevin Rudd was in the running as UN Secretary General;

โ€ฆ

In an extract from the memoir, read out by interviewer Melissa Doyle, Garrett wrote supporting Kevin Rudd was โ€œcertainly the biggestโ€ mistake he made in his political career.

He didnโ€™t back down from that position in the interview.

โ€œIโ€™ve been particularly strong in this book about leadership and Ruddโ€™s leadership and I think it needed to be said,โ€ Garrett said.

โ€œIโ€™m critical of him, thatโ€™s true, very critical, but I think for good reason.โ€

Another of his criticisms is that Mr Rudd jeopardised the safety of Australia.

โ€œItโ€™s a big call, but I stand by it,โ€ Garrett said. He added Mr Rudd treated people with โ€œan enormous amount of contemptโ€ and made โ€œthe business of the country almost ungovernableโ€.

When pushed on what danger he feared Mr Rudd posed, Garrett said the former PM was โ€œunpredictableโ€ and he didnโ€™t know what he โ€œcould or would doโ€.

โ€ฆRead more: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/peter-garrett-says-kevin-rudd-was-a-danger-to-australia-in-tv-interview-20151011-gk6i04.html

Other political figures are also scathing โ€“ though Rudd draws some surprising support;

โ€ฆ

Some conservative MPs and ministers are opposed to Mr Rudd being nominated.

โ€œThis guy did his best to ruin our country,โ€ South Australian MP Tony Pasin said in April. โ€œThat we would think about imposing him on the rest of the world beggars belief.โ€

But he has received public endorsements from prominent figures including UK economist Lord Nicholas Stern and former East Timor president and Nobel prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta.

โ€ฆRead more: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/kevin-rudd-seeks-australian-government-support-for-un-secretary-general-candidacy-20160717-gq7sfw.html

Another endorsement, this time from the leftist Sydney Morning Herald;

You cannot be serious: Kevin Rudd would be a disaster as UN chief

Nicholas Stuart
July 22, 2016 โ€” 5:02pm

Thereโ€™s no need to explain why Kevin Rudd would be a disaster for the UN: thatโ€™s a given.

The functioning human being vanished long ago, consumed by hatred. Back then he worked, unrelentingly, to destroy Julia Gillard, even if it meant pulling Laborโ€™s house down around him. When reinstalled in office he suffered one of the most precipitate declines in polling ever recorded by a PM. Then his disastrous re-election campaign ran off the road. It remained bogged, spinning out ever-wilder ideas in a desperate attempt to cut through. He promised heโ€™d set things to rights, but that was always the critical failing of the Rudd project โ€“ it relied completely on him. There was never any room for anyone else. In those final days in office he was travelling around the country in a bubble of his own imagination, utterly detached from reality.

Today the fantasy continues. At first he genuinely thought he might have a role here as an elder statesman. His colleagues urged him to go and he shuffled off overseas. Amazingly, and by all accounts, he does appear to have reinvented himself. But thatโ€™s a long way from being a viable contender for Secretary General of the UN.

He hasnโ€™t really managed to convince anybody other than himself that heโ€™s actually got a chance at achieving the top job. Itโ€™s ludicrously wishful thinking. To believe he has any chance of heading the world body is stunningly, breathtakingly naive. The scenario heโ€™s peddling has all the obvious contenders fighting one another to a standstill allowing Rudd to glide, untouched and seemingly unassailable, through the middle. It wonโ€™t happen.

โ€ฆRead more: https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/you-cannot-be-serious-kevin-rudd-would-be-a-disaster-as-un-chief-20160722-gqbbwx.html

Despite everything, Rudd ticks all the boxes for his globalist and climate beliefs. He apparently even speaks fluent Mandarin.

My only reservation about advocating Kevin Rudd is the remote possibility he might start World War Three. But the manโ€™s ability to alienate his strongest supporters, to cause disunity where formerly there was harmony, to offend, to divide, to break the unbreakable, is a gift to the world. The damage such a person would do to the UN in my opinion would likely be irreparable.

If you know someone who has the ear of the President, please suggest Kevin Rudd. Rudd has repeatedly demonstrated an uncanny ability to win enough support to secure important diplomatic posts, yet has a near unbroken track record of making a complete mess of whatever post he wins, until he is finally ejected in a flurry of embarrassment and damage control.

Yellowstone Supereruption Would Trigger Years-Long Volcanic Winter and Global Crop Failures

A full- scale supereruption at Yellowstone (Volcanic Explosivity Index 8, similar to the one ~631,000 years ago that formed the current caldera) would be a global catastrophe, but it would not end humanity.

A Yellowstone supereruption would almost certainly trigger a volcanic winter, a period of global cooling caused by massive injections of sulfur dioxide (SOโ‚‚) and ash into the stratosphere.

A dramatic volcanic eruption with a massive plume of ash and smoke rising into a stormy sky, set against a sunset over snow-covered mountains.
AI generated by Grok

A full- scale super-eruption at Yellowstone (Volcanic Explosivity Index 8, similar to the one ~631,000 years ago that formed the current caldera) would be a global catastrophe, but it would not end humanity.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) emphasizes that the odds of such an event in the next few thousand years are extremely low, on the order of one in a million annually or less. Yellowstoneโ€™s more probable near- term hazards are smaller lava flows, hydrothermal explosions, or earthquakes.

Hereโ€™s what a worst- case caldera- forming super-eruption would likely involve, based on USGS assessments, ash- dispersion models, and scientific reconstructions:

Immediate local effects (hours to days)

Massive explosive blasts and pyroclastic flows (superheated clouds of gas, ash, and rock racing at high speed) would devastate Yellowstone National Park and surrounding areas in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho, potentially within tens of kilometers of the vents.

Anyone remaining in the immediate zone would face near-certain death from heat, blast, or asphyxiation. Immediate fatalities could number in the hundreds to low thousands if evacuation were incomplete.

An eruption column could rise 30- 50 km into the stratosphere. The ground surface would collapse as magma is expelled, reshaping or enlarging the caldera.

Regional effects across North America (days to weeks)

Volcanic ash would blanket large parts of the western and central United States. Near the park, deposits could reach meters thick; farther away (e.g., Midwest or even parts of the East), centimeters to tens of centimeters.

Ash would collapse roofs, clog engines and air filters, contaminate water supplies, short electrical systems, shut down airports, highways, and rail, and destroy crops and livestock over vast areas.

Power, communications, sewage, and supply chains would fail across multiple states. Agriculture in the breadbasket regions would be severely damaged.

Air quality would become hazardous over much of the continent, straining hospitals with respiratory problems.

Global effects (months to years or decades)

Sulfur- rich gases injected into the stratosphere would form aerosols that reflect sunlight, causing a โ€œvolcanic winterโ€. Global temperatures could drop several degrees Celsius for years to a decade or more, disrupting weather patterns and rainfall.

Worldwide crop failures, food shortages, and soaring prices would follow. Indirect deaths from famine, disease, and economic collapse could reach hundreds of millions in severe scenarios (some recent analyses have estimated 0.7- 1.3 billion premature deaths in extreme modeling, though these are upper-bound thought experiments).

International trade, aviation, and economies would face prolonged disruption. Regions in the Southern Hemisphere and far from major ash fallout would fare better but still feel climate and supply- chain impacts.

Humanity would survive. Populations outside the worst- affected zones, with stored food, technology, and adaptive capacity, would persist, though civilization would face severe stress for years to decades.

Important context from USGS

Most of Yellowstoneโ€™s eruptions in the past 70,000 and more years have been relatively quiet lava flows confined to the caldera, not explosive super- eruptions.

The volcano is closely monitored (seismometers, GPS, gas chemistry, etc.). Clear warning signs- intense earthquake swarms, rapid ground uplift, hydrothermal changes- would precede any major event by weeks to months, allowing evacuations.

A super-eruption is not โ€œoverdue.โ€ Volcanoes do not erupt on fixed schedules.

In short: a true Yellowstone super-eruption today would rank among the worst natural disasters in human history, with devastating regional destruction and multi- year global climate and food- system shocks. It would reshape modern society but would not wipe out the human species. The far more realistic near-term risks from the Yellowstone system remain localized hydrothermal explosions and earthquakes.

A barren landscape with dead vegetation and a gray sky, featuring a sun partly obscured by clouds and smoke billowing from mountains in the background, creating an apocalyptic atmosphere.
AI generated by Grok

A Yellowstone supereruption would almost certainly trigger a volcanic winter, a period of global cooling caused by massive injections of sulfur dioxide (SOโ‚‚) and ash into the stratosphere.

How a volcanic winter forms

In a large explosive eruption (VEI 8, like Yellowstoneโ€™s last caldera-forming event ~631,000 years ago):

  • The eruption column reaches the stratosphere (30- 50 km high).
  • Sulfur dioxide reacts with water vapor to form sulfate aerosols.
  • These tiny particles reflect incoming sunlight back to space and absorb some outgoing heat.
  • The result is reduced solar radiation reaching Earthโ€™s surface โ†’ cooling that lasts years to decades until the aerosols gradually settle out.

Ash itself contributes less to long- term cooling (it falls out faster), but a thick continental ash blanket can also raise surface albedo (reflectivity) and add regional cooling for years.

Expected climate impacts of a Yellowstone- scale event

Scientific modeling and comparisons with past eruptions (and smaller modern ones like Pinatubo 1991) suggest:

Global average temperature drop: Roughly 1- 4ยฐC (2- 7ยฐF) for several years, with some studies pointing toward the lower end (~1-1.5ยฐC global average) while regional effects are stronger. Land areas, especially central North America, could see drops of 5- 10ยฐC or more in the first years.

Duration: Peak cooling in the first 1- 3 years; noticeable effects lasting a decade or longer before gradual recovery. Full return to pre- eruption temperatures could take 10- 20 and more years.

Regional extremes: Stronger cooling over continents than oceans. Disturbed weather patterns (changes to precipitation, jet stream, monsoons, El Niรฑo/Southern Oscillation). Increased sea ice at the poles.

Historical parallel: The 1815 Tambora eruption (much smaller) produced the โ€œYear Without a Summerโ€ (global cooling of ~0.4- 0.7ยฐC). Yellowstone would be far larger. Past Yellowstone events themselves caused ocean cooling of ~3ยฐC lasting roughly a century in some records.

Consequences of the volcanic winter

  • Widespread crop failures and reduced agricultural yields for multiple years, especially in the Northern Hemisphere.
  • Food shortages, soaring prices, and potential famine on a massive scale.
  • Economic disruption, supply- chain collapse, and secondary effects (disease, social unrest).
  • Ecosystems stressed by cooler temperatures, altered rainfall, and reduced sunlight.

The USGS states that a large Yellowstone eruption โ€œwould probably alter global weather patterns and have enormous impacts on human activity (especially agricultural production) for many years,โ€ though exact magnitude and duration cannot be predicted precisely.

Important caveats

  • A full supereruption is extremely unlikely in the near future.
  • Not all Yellowstone eruptions would produce this level of climate forcing, most past activity consisted of smaller lava flows with minimal global impact.
  • Humanity would survive, but modern society would face severe, multi- year stress.

In short, a Yellowstone super-eruptionโ€™s most far- reaching danger beyond the immediate blast and ash fall would be the resulting volcanic winter and its cascading effects on global food systems and climate.

100% of Green Climate Fund โ€œadaptationโ€ projects are not about adaptation

The Green Climate Fund is not funding climate change adaptation.

It is extremely unlikely that there is a bias in project goals based on the spelling of each countryโ€™s name, so taking all of the first few adaptation projects listed gives us a random sample of all such projects.

If the countries donating to the GCF think they are contributing to climate change adaptation, they should think again. It is just ordinary foreign aid which they would be better off doing themselves.

A gloved hand reaches out from a laptop, holding a dollar bill while green smoke swirls around, symbolizing digital crime or hacking.
A hand grips a dollar amid a laptop spewing green digital streams and vapor, illustrating cyber theft and virtual financial security breaches.

From CFACT

By David Wojick

In a previous article, I gave three examples of Green Climate Fund (GCF) projects that clearly met immediate needs, so they were not funding adaptation to climate change. See โ€œThe Green Climate Fund is greenwashing normal foreign aid.โ€

Commenters correctly pointed out that this three-project selection was not sufficient to establish the general trend that was alleged. It could just be cherry picking. So here, I present a random sample of projects which is sufficient to draw valid statistical conclusions.

Statistical sampling theory is based on probability theory, so a random sample is necessary in order to draw valid conclusions about the population sampled. For example, the global and regional surface temperature statistics use what is called a convenience sample, which is not random, so they are invalid. But I digress.

The UNFCCC database of GCF projects lists them alphabetically by the lead country.

It is extremely unlikely that there is a bias in project goals based on the spelling of each countryโ€™s name, so taking all of the first few adaptation projects listed gives us a random sample of all such projects.

In this case, I have taken the first seven โ€œadaptationโ€ projects and briefly assessed each for meeting immediate needs versus adaptation to climate change. 100% of them address immediate needs, so we can validly infer that it is very likely that 100% of the entire population of โ€œadaptationโ€ projects are not about adaptation to climate change.

Here are the assessments of the first seven listed adaptation projects:

1. โ€œALBAdapt โ€“ Climate Services for a Resilient Albania

โ€ฆ.develop a fully functional and well-resourced National Meteorological and Hydrological Service (NMHS) that complies with World Meteorological Organization (WMO) standards. The project also includes the implementation of a people-centered Multi-Hazard Early Warning System (MHEWS) and the foundation for ecosystem-based approaches to climate change adaptation (EbA) and disaster risk reduction (Eco-DRR).โ€

$40 million

So basically, weather forecasts and early warning of disasters. This is good stuff, but as they say in the project description, Albania is already subject to bad weather and floods, etc. It meets immediate needs.

2. โ€œEmpowering Women Groups to Build Resilience to Climate Impacts in the Province of Cunene in South West Angola (CREW Angola)

Angola, particularly the Cunene region, faces serious socio-economic challenges that increase its vulnerability to climate change. Rising temperatures, unpredictable rainfall, and frequent droughts threaten the regionโ€™s rainfed agriculture. Women, who are key contributors to agricultural production, are disproportionately affected due to limited access to resources.

This project aims to address these challenges by adopting a gender-transformative approach to enable communities to better adapt to changing conditions. It focuses on sectors most affected by climate risks, such as agriculture, water, and nutrition. It invests in financial literacy and improved farming technologies and innovation, both of which will directly contribute to enhancing local adaptive capacity and transforming food systems.โ€

$10 million

The serious risk of unpredictable rainfall and frequent droughts is already there, so this project is addressing an immediate need.

3. โ€œResilience to hurricanes in the building sector in Antigua and Barbuda

This project addresses the resilience of building construction in the country, in addition to climate information systems and post-disaster responses. It will climate proof critical public service and community buildings to improve resilience to, and recovery from, extreme climate events.โ€

$46 million

These folks are already battered by hurricanes and calling them โ€œextreme climate eventsโ€ does not change that. In fact, it is a marketing hoax. Resilience to hurricanes is a great idea, but it is an immediate need that does not arise from climate change.

4. โ€œIntegrated physical adaptation and community resilience through an enhanced direct access pilot in the public, private, and civil society sectors of three Eastern Caribbean small island developing states

Strengthening the resilience of three Caribbean islands to climate change-related threats by improving the hurricane resilience of community buildings, homes, and businesses, and through flood prevention measures.โ€

$22.6 million

As above, hurricanes are already happening, so preparing for them is an immediate need not a โ€œclimate change-related threat.โ€

5. โ€œMulti-country Project Advancing Early Warnings for All (EW4All)

This project aims to strengthen the resilience of communities in seven countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Chad, Cambodia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, and Somalia) by improving the production, dissemination and effective use of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS).โ€

$115 million

The project description says, โ€œHazards like heatwaves, floods, landslides, and droughts cause devastating loss of lives and assets, socio-economic instability, and inequality.โ€ An early warning system is clearly a good idea, but it is an immediate need that has nothing to do with climate change adaptation.

6. โ€œScaling up national adaptive capacities for climate change-driven natural hazards through strengthening monitoring and early warning systems

Structured around three components, the project will modernize meteorological and hydrological observation and forecasting systems; strengthen early warning dissemination through multi-channel alerting and risk communication; and develop innovative resilience financing mechanisms, including forecast-based financing and climate micro-insurance, to sustain early action and encourage private sector engagement.โ€

$10 million

Another useful early warning system for existing hazards, not for climate change.

7. โ€œGlaciers to Farms (G2F) Regional Program: Advancing Climate Resilience & Sustainable Development in Central and West Asia

G2F will deliver substantial, measurable improvements in climate resilience for communities and ecosystems. The programme aims to reduce the vulnerability of approximately 45 million people across nine countries by providing more stable water and food supplies, infrastructure that can withstand shocks, stronger social safety nets, and healthier ecosystems.โ€

$3.5 billion

The listed recipient countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In these poor countries, more stable water and food supplies are an immediate need without climate change.

Seven projects is a relatively small sample of the roughly 200 adaptation projects on the list, so I scanned the next 23 and found all 30 to be addressing immediate needs. 30 out of 200 is a sizable sample, which greatly strengthens the 100% inference.

Calling naturally occurring extreme weather โ€œclimate eventsโ€ is a marketing trick. The Green Climate Fund is not funding climate change adaptation.

As I said in my prior article, the Green Climate Fund says that 60% of their billions in project funding is directed toward adaptation. They are really just meeting immediate needs which makes this greenwashing on a grand scale.

If the countries donating to the GCF think they are contributing to climate change adaptation, they should think again. It is just ordinary foreign aid which they would be better off doing themselves.

Climate Collapse! Four Billion to Perish?

โ€œThe doom industry is alive and well despite a litany of failed predictions along the wayโ€ฆ. Statism and statism alone can cause mass destruction and deaths, as proven in the 20th centuryโ€ฆ. The โ€˜insurance policyโ€™ against this is a free society based on private property rights, voluntary exchange, and the rule of law.โ€

An illustrated cartoon depicting a dramatic headline about climate collapse, featuring a 'Doom-O-Meter' indicating a potential for 4 billion deaths. The left shows a panicking man and a scientist discussing climate impacts, while the right portrays a busy city scene with a sunny day, people enjoying outdoor activities, and construction in progress.

From Master Resource

By Robert Bradley Jr.

โ€œThe doom industry is alive and well despite a litany of failed predictions along the wayโ€ฆ. Statism and statism alone can cause mass destruction and deaths, as proven in the 20th centuryโ€ฆ. The โ€˜insurance policyโ€™ against this is a free society based on private property rights, voluntary exchange, and the rule of law.โ€

The worldโ€™s most viewed climate website (WUWT) contains a list of the exaggerated, failed apocalyptic predictions from neo-Malthusians in the last half century. So I was surprised to see this new prediction making the rounds.

Mark Campbell, โ€œenvironmental journalist and communicator,โ€ posted at his website: โ€œInsurers Say Half the World Could Be Killed by Climate Changeโ€ (June 11, 2026). I learned of him and this prediction in a LinkedIn exchange where he protested against Michael Shellenbergerโ€™s โ€œCaught Pushing an Apocalyptic Scenario They Knew Couldnโ€™t Occur, Climate Scientists Are Now Claiming Their Policies Prevented It.โ€ Cambell commented:

Some of the worst misinformation Iโ€™ve had the displeasure to read on LinkedIn and Substack. A total misrepresentation of the UN report. This sentence says it all: โ€œThey say the new worst-case scenario is just 3.3 degrees Celsius of warming by 2100 over pre-industrial temperatures.โ€ JUST 3.3 degrees?! 3.3 degrees would cause the deaths of 4 billion people, according to a report by the insurance industry โ€“ and they understand risk. Check out the 4 Billion Dead movement if you want actual facts.

Itโ€™s a scandal of sorts:

I would wager thatโ€™s the most important story of your lifetime. But chances are, you havenโ€™t even read it, heard it, seen it. It was in the news cycle briefly in January 2025, and came from extremely credible sources. It was reported on by the likes of The Guardian, Grist, and the insurance media but soon disappeared.

Campbell bases his gloomy warning on a report, Planetary Solvency โ€“ Finding Our Balance with Nature, published in January 2025 by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries in collaboration with the University of Exeter. โ€œThe IFoA is the professional body for actuaries,โ€ Campbell explains,

who underpin global insurance and pension markets โ€“ so itโ€™s basically the insurance industry, which is why it carries significant weight. They understand the risks. They need to know the facts.

Other Support

Wilmar Igl, a statistician from Sweden. commented:

In fact, Professor Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber provided an educated โ€œguess-timateโ€ of the maximum carrying capacity of 1 billion (1 000 000 000) humans under un-controlled global warming at a plenary talk at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 (Schellnhuber, 2015, p. 507).

Professor William Steffen, a leading climate scientist and senior research fellow at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, also used Schellnhuberโ€™s estimate for the maximum carrying capacity of โ€œhothouse earthโ€ at a recent presentation at Uppsala University on March 16, 2019. However, at present 7.6 billion people are living on planet Earth. Even if these estimates of the maximum carrying capacity are way off and the actual number is 5 billions, it still indicates an existential crisis for future generations. [1]

The catastrophists are out in force.

In mid-June, Action Network hosted โ€œThe 4 Billion Dead International Public Call,โ€ described here. Doug Grandt contends the debate is over:

Donโ€™t waste any more time engaging in this manufactured brouhaha [of skeptics]โ€ฆ even XOM has acknowledged the foreshadowing of imminent collapse as posted nearby by Rob de Laet https://lnkd.in/p/gfWYA9VH

What does the Brazilian de Laet, โ€œCo-LeadeWhat does the Brazilian de Laet, โ€œCo-Leader at Climate Cooling Initiative,โ€ state?

Emissions cuts alone arrive way too late. We must also actively cool the planet the way Earth has always cooled itself: restoring forests, water cycles and living landscapes at scale, and financing the people who already protect themโ€ฆ. Where is our plan?r at Climate Cooling Initiative,โ€ state?

EXPECT TWO TO FOUR BILLION PEOPLE TO PERISH
Their risk matrix:
โ–ช๏ธ 2ยฐC or more by 2050: โ€œCatastrophic.โ€ GDP losses above 25%, potential mortality above 2 billion people, ocean circulation severely impacted, involuntary migration of billions of people.
โ–ช๏ธ 3ยฐC or more by 2050: โ€œExtreme.โ€ GDP losses of 50% or more, potential mortality above 4 billion, global tipping point cascade, breakdown of critical Earth climate and social systems.
Exxonโ€™s business-as-usual forecast lands squarely between those two rows.

The dashboard already rates the risk trajectory for climate and nature as RED.
So this is where we stand: the fossil industry publishes 2.5 to 3ยฐC as a routine market outlook, and the actuarial profession tells us that range means civilizational breakdown. Both documents are public.

Emissions cuts alone arrive way too late. We must also actively cool the planet the way Earth has always cooled itself: restoring forests, water cycles and living landscapes at scale, and financing the people who already protect themโ€ฆ. Where is our plan?

Conclusion

The doom industry is alive and well despite a litany of failed predictions along the way. Remember what Obamaโ€™s two-term science advisor John Holdren said? Back in the 1980s, he forecast that as many as a billion people could perish from climate change.

Statism and statism alone can cause mass destruction and deaths, as proven in the 20th century by such names as Mao Zedong, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Stalin. The โ€˜insurance policyโ€™ against this is a free society based on private property rights, voluntary exchange, and the rule of law.

[1] References: Schellnhuber, HJ (2015). Selbstverbrennung. Bertelsmann, p. 507.

Steffen, W. (2019-03-16). Climate Change 2019: Rising Risks; Growing Challenges. Uppsala University, Retrieved 2019-05-21 from https://bit.ly/2Isb0Ue .

Rees, W. E. (2019-09-18). Yes, the Climate Crisis May Wipe out Six Billion People. The Tyee Online Magazine. URL: https://thetyee.ca/Analysis/2019/09/18/Climate-Crisis-Wipe-Out/

NEP Global Environmental Alert Service (GEAS) (2012). One Planet, How Many People? A Review of Earthโ€™s Carrying Capacity โ€“ A discussion paper for the year of RIO+20. URL: https://na.unep.net/geas/archive/pdfs/geas_jun_12_carrying_capacity.pdf

McKinsey Global Institute (January 2020). Climate risk and response โ€“ physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts. (โ€œLivability and workabilityโ€, p. 98), https://mck.co/2ZuSYcV

Global economy could face 50% loss in GDP between 2070 and 2090 from climate shocks, say actuaries

Ancient Himalayan- Scale Mountains Buried Under Antarctica Helped Fuel the Rise of Complex Life

Gondwanan Super mountains (also called the Gondwana Super- mountains or linked to the earlier term Transgondwanan Super mountain) refer to an enormous network of Himalayan- scale mountain ranges that formed during the assembly of the supercontinent Gondwana roughly 650- 450 million years ago.

Researchers analyzed 1,712 detrital zircon grains recovered from marine sediments around Antarctica (plus earlier Antarctic zircon data). Zircons act as durable โ€œtime capsulesโ€: U- Pb dating gives crystallization ages, while chemistry (including indicators of high-pressure conditions) reveals the tectonic environment in which they formed.

A panoramic view of mountains beneath ice in Antarctica, with a caption about ancient Himalayan-scale mountains contributing to the rise of complex life.
AI generated by Grok

Researchers Bei Chen (GFZ German Research Center for Geosciences) and Ian H. Campbell (Australian National University) studied microscopic zircon grains from marine sediments around Antarctica. These grains, eroded from ancient mountain roots now buried under ice, mostly date to 650- 450 million years ago, during the assembly of the supercontinent Gondwana (which included modern Antarctica, South America, Africa, Arabia, India, Australia, and Madagascar).

Comparisons with global river- sediment data indicate many zircons originated deep in the roots of Himalayan- scale peaks. The authors describe the Gondwanan Super- mountains as โ€œthe largest ultra-high mountain network in Earthโ€™s history.โ€

As these vast ranges eroded, they delivered large volumes of sediment and nutrients into the oceans. This is thought to have boosted photosynthetic microbes at the base of the food web, increasing oxygen production. Sediment from the mountains also helped bury organic carbon, preventing it from recombining with oxygen and thereby allowing atmospheric oxygen levels to rise.

The researchers note that Earthโ€™s most dramatic evolutionary period (leading into the Cambrian explosion) coincides with this major episode of mountain building, and they consider the connection unlikely to be coincidental.

The study is published in Earth and Planetary Science Letters. It builds on earlier ideas about โ€œsuper mountainsโ€ influencing the evolution of life.

Gondwanan Super mountains (also called the Gondwana Super- mountains or linked to the earlier term Transgondwanan Super mountain) refer to an enormous network of Himalayan- scale mountain ranges that formed during the assembly of the supercontinent Gondwana roughly 650- 450 million years ago.

These were among the largest ultra- high mountain systems in Earthโ€™s history. Estimates for the main Transgondwanan segment put it at over 8,000 km long and more than 1,000 km wide, roughly three to four times the length of todayโ€™s Himalayas. They rose through major continental collisions as East and West Gondwana came together (involving blocks that now form parts of Antarctica, India, Australia, Africa/Kalahari, Arabia, and related regions).

A 2026 study by Bei Chen and Ian H. Campbell (published in Earth and Planetary Science Letters) used detrital zircon grains from Antarctic marine sediments to show that Antarcticaโ€™s tectonics during this interval were dominated by such Himalayan- style mountains.

Chemical signatures in many zircons point to deep crustal roots formed under extreme pressures. The authors describe the Gondwanan Supermountains as โ€œthe largest ultra- high mountain network in Earthโ€™s historyโ€, with remnants of those roots still lying beneath the East Antarctic Ice Sheet.

As the ranges eroded (before land plants existed, so erosion rates were exceptionally high), they dumped vast quantities of sediment and nutrients (phosphorus, iron, etc.) into surrounding oceans. This is thought to have:

  • Stimulated blooms of photosynthetic microbes, boosting oxygen production.
  • Enabled rapid burial of organic carbon and reduced materials (e.g., pyrite) in what may have been the largest turbidite/sediment fan systems in the geological record. Burial allowed free oxygen to accumulate in the atmosphere rather than being consumed again.

The resulting rise in atmospheric oxygen is considered one of the largest in Earthโ€™s history and is linked to the appearance of the first large animals (~575 Ma, Ediacaran) and the subsequent Cambrian explosion (~538- 530 Ma), when most major animal groups appear in the fossil record. Researchers note that the timing of this mountain- building and erosion episode with these evolutionary milestones is unlikely to be coincidental.

This concept builds on earlier work:

  • 2006 research (Squire, Campbell and others) introduced the Transgondwanan Super mountain as a potential trigger for the Cambrian radiation via nutrient flux and sedimentation.
  • A 2022 study (Zhu, Campbell and colleagues) identified only two major super mountain episodes in Earth history: the older Nuna Super- mountains (~2.0-1.8 billion years ago, linked to early eukaryotes) and the Gondwanan/Transgondwanan event. Mountain building was limited during the intervening โ€œBoring Billion.โ€

In short, the Gondwanan Super mountains represent a key geological driver that helped set the environmental stage for the rise of complex animal life.

Do Himalayan- style mountains lie under the Antarctic ice: Implication for the Gondwana Super mountains, the rise of oxygen and the Cambrian explosion?

Researchers analyzed 1,712 detrital zircon grains recovered from marine sediments around Antarctica (plus earlier Antarctic zircon data). Zircons act as durable โ€œtime capsulesโ€: U- Pb dating gives crystallization ages, while chemistry (including indicators of high-pressure conditions) reveals the tectonic environment in which they formed.

  • A strong age peak occurs between 650 and 450 million years ago, coinciding with the assembly of the supercontinent Gondwana.
  • Many zircons carry chemical signatures typical of the deep roots of Himalayan- style (ultra- high) mountains, rocks that experienced extreme pressures under thick crustal piles.
  • When the Antarctic data are integrated into global river- sediment zircon compilations (area- weighted), the Gondwanan signal stands out as the largest supercontinent- related mountain- building peak in Earthโ€™s history. The authors call these the Gondwanan Super mountains, the largest ultra- high mountain network known.

Collisions involving blocks that are now Antarctica, India, Australia, and the Kalahari are inferred to have built these ranges. Their roots are interpreted to still lie buried beneath the East Antarctic Ice Sheet.

As the supermountains eroded, they delivered enormous volumes of sediment and nutrients (including phosphorus and iron) into surrounding oceans. This is thought to have:

  • Stimulated primary production by photosynthetic microbes (algae and cyanobacteria), increasing oxygen generation.
  • Enabled rapid burial of organic carbon and pyrite- rich sediments in what may have been the largest turbidite fan system in the geological record. Burial prevented the oxygen from being consumed again, allowing atmospheric Oโ‚‚ levels to rise substantially.

The authors argue that the temporal overlap between this major mountain- building and erosion episode and Earthโ€™s most dramatic evolutionary radiation (the appearance of large animals in the Ediacaran and the Cambrian explosion ~538- 530 Ma) is unlikely to be coincidental.

This work extends earlier โ€œsuper mountainโ€ ideas (including the Transgondwanan Super mountain concept) by specifically highlighting Antarcticaโ€™s contribution and the chemical evidence for Himalayan-scale topography.

Full text requires institutional or personal access via ScienceDirect. Secondary coverage (Phys.org, ScienceAlert, etc.) provides the detailed public summaries above.

The linked page is the scientific paper itself (behind a ScienceDirect paywall/subscription):

Title: Do Himalayan-style mountains lie under the Antarctic ice: Implication for the Gondwana Supermountains, the rise of oxygen and the Cambrian explosion?

Journal: Earth and Planetary Science Letters (2026)

DOI: 10.1016/j.epsl.2026.120330

Authors: Bei Chen & Ian H. Campbell

Abstract

Analyses of detrital zircons from Antarctica show that its tectonics were dominated by Himalayan-style mountains, the roots of which now underlie the ice sheet. These mountains formed during the amalgamation of Gondwana and when the Antarctic data are added to the global river zircon database and appropriately weighted, it is apparent that the mountains, which formed by the amalgamation of Gondwana, were our planetโ€™s dominant mountain-forming event. Nutrients shed during the erosion of the Gondwanan mountains fertilized the oceans, leading to a proliferation of primary production that formed the base of the animal food web. Burial of the abundant carbon produced by photosynthesis was responsible for a marked increase in atmospheric oxygen, which facilitated first the rise of animals and later the Cambrian explosion. Approximately 46% of the detrital zircons in the weighted global database, during the critical period from the base of the Cambrian to the end of the Cambrian explosion, and 55% of the high-pressure grains, were derived from Antarctica.

The Roman Climate Optimum: Warmer Than Today in Europe โ€” But Not Globally

The Roman Warm Period (RWP), also called the Roman Climatic Optimum (or Roman Climate Optimum), was a multi-century interval of relatively warm and often more stable/humid conditions primarily in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, roughly spanning ~250 BC to AD 400 (with peak or most stable conditions often placed around 100 BC- AD 200 or similar).

Cooling and increased climate variability after the Roman Climatic Optimum are well- documented and are considered contributing stressors to challenges faced by the Roman Empire.

The Roman Warm Period (RWP, or Roman Climatic Optimum, roughly 250 BC- AD 400) was a multi-century phase of relatively warm conditions mainly in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic. Comparisons to today must distinguish regional vs. global scales, proxy uncertainties, and rates of change.

Infographic illustrating the Roman Climate Optimum (200 BCE - 200 CE) and its warmer climate compared to today in Europe, featuring a world map showing temperature variations, historical context, and climate change data.
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The Roman Warm Period (RWP), also called the Roman Climatic Optimum (or Roman Climate Optimum), was a multi-century interval of relatively warm and often more stable/humid conditions primarily in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, roughly spanning ~250 BC to AD 400 (with peak or most stable conditions often placed around 100 BC- AD 200 or similar).

It is named for its chronological overlap with the rise, expansion, and early imperial peak of Rome, though climate was one contributing environmental factor among many (political, military, economic, and technological) rather than a sole cause of Roman success.

Key Characteristics

Temperature: Proxy data (tree rings, speleothems/stalagmites, marine sediments, pollen, glacier advances/retreats, and archaeological indicators) indicate conditions often ~1- 2ยฐC warmer than later pre-industrial centuries in parts of Europe and the Mediterranean. Some high- resolution Mediterranean Sea-surface temperature (SST) reconstructions (e.g., Sicily Channel Mg/Ca ratios from foraminifera) show the Roman period as the warmest of the last ~2,000 years in those records, with peaks up to ~2ยฐC above late pre- modern averages.

Hydrology and variability: Many European and Mediterranean records point to relatively warm and humid/stable conditions during much of the period (favoring agriculture), though with regional and temporal differences, including drier intervals and a shift toward cooler, drier, or more variable conditions later (especially from the 3rd- 5th centuries).

Regional nature: Modern multi- proxy analyses treat it (like the Medieval Warm Period or Little Ice Age) as a regional phenomenon rather than a globally coherent, synchronous event. Evidence is strongest for Europe, Mediterranean, North Atlantic; signals elsewhere are weaker or asynchronous.

Evidence Sources

Proxies include:

  • Tree- ring width/density and dendrochronology (e.g., Alps, Italy, Scandinavia).
  • Speleothem (stalagmite) isotope records (e.g., northern Italy showing warming and humidity trends).
  • Marine sediments and SST reconstructions across the Mediterranean (Alboran, Sicily, Aegean, etc.).
  • Glacier behavior (Alpine retreat facilitating passes).
  • Historical/literary notes (e.g., Theophrastus on date palms in Greece; Pliny; grape/olive cultivation extents) and archaeological finds (e.g., warmth- loving insects farther north, such as the nettlebug in Britain).
  • Other indicators like mollusk shells, pollen, and biomarkers.

The term itself entered wider use after a 1995 thesis and a 1999 Nature paper; earlier literature discussed related warm/stable conditions without the specific label.

Relation to Roman History

Favorable conditions (milder winters, longer growing seasons, reliable harvests in key grain and agricultural zones, and more passable Alpine routes) coincided with Romeโ€™s expansion and the early Empireโ€™s prosperity and stability. Climate deterioration and increased variability (linked in some reconstructions to the 3rd- century crisis and later challenges) have been discussed as one stressor among many contributing to later difficulties, including in the Western Empireโ€™s decline, though historians emphasize that climate was not deterministic.

Some recent local studies (e.g., biomarkers from Roman sites in Dacia/Romania) reconstruct mean annual temperatures ~2ยฐC above modern local values during occupation, consistent with broader warmer/drier signals in parts of Eastern Europe.

Context and Caveats

It is one of several late-Holocene climate fluctuations (preceding the Late Antique Little Ice Age and followed much later by the Medieval Warm Period). Reconstructions continue to be refined with denser proxy networks; absolute temperatures, exact boundaries, and global vs. regional coherence remain subjects of ongoing research. Comparisons to modern instrumental temperatures depend on the baseline chosen and the specific region/proxy.

In short, the RWP reflects a well- documented phase of relatively favorable climate in the Roman heartland and surrounding regions that provided a supportive environmental backdrop for classical Mediterranean civilization at its height.

A historic scene depicting an ornate fountain with sculptures, surrounded by ancient Roman architecture and people dressed in traditional attire.

The climate of ancient Rome (roughly the period of the Roman Kingdom, Republic, and Empire, ~753 BC- AD 476 in the West) was fundamentally Mediterranean: mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers, with regional variations across the Italian peninsula and the wider empire. It largely coincided with the Roman Warm Period (or Roman Climatic Optimum, ~250 BC- AD 400), a phase of relatively warm, stable, and often more humid conditions that supported agriculture and population growth.

Overall Climate Regime

Italy sat in a subtropical/Mediterranean zone. Northern areas were more temperate, while central and southern Italy experienced classic Mediterranean patterns. Annual precipitation in the Rome area was typically in the range of several hundred millimeters, concentrated in autumn and winter, with dry summers. The Tiber River and surrounding marshes were prone to seasonal flooding, especially during snowmelt or heavy rains.

Key features during the Roman era included:

Temperatures: Often comparable to or slightly warmer than mid- 20th- century averages in many proxies (sometimes estimated ~1- 2ยฐC warmer in parts of the Mediterranean and Europe during peak phases). Evidence includes northward shifts of warmth- loving species (e.g., the nettlebug Heterogaster urticae farther north in Britain than in the 1950s) and expanded cultivation of olives, grapes, and other crops.

Precipitation and humidity: Relatively reliable and sometimes wetter than in intervening cooler periods, aiding agriculture. Some records indicate more frequent summer rain in parts of southern Italy than today. North Africa (a key grain supplier) and parts of Spain also benefited from adequate moisture.

Stability: The early and high Empire (~100 BC- AD 200) featured exceptional climatic stability, which correlated with agricultural productivity, urban growth, and imperial expansion.

Chronological Variations

Climate was not static:

Early period (Kingdom and Republic, before ~100 BC): Part of the broader Subatlantic phase, with cool summers and mild, rainy winters. Occasional severe winters froze the Tiber (recorded in 398 BC, 396 BC, 271 BC, and 177 BC). The climate was generally more humid and cooler than the modern baseline in the first half of the 1st millennium BC, with higher precipitation in what is now more arid southern Italy.

Roman Climatic Optimum peak (~100 BC- AD 150/200): Warmer and more stable conditions prevailed. Alpine glaciers retreated, improving passes; growing seasons lengthened; and agriculture expanded (e.g., viticulture farther north). This phase supported the Republicโ€™s late expansion and the early Empireโ€™s prosperity.

Later Empire (3rd century onward): Increased variability, cooling, and shifts toward drier conditions in some regions. These changes overlapped with the 3rd- century crisis and later stresses. A brief recovery of more favorable conditions occurred in the 4th century, after which cooler and more variable climate (leading into the Late Antique Little Ice Age) contributed to challenges in the West, while the East sometimes fared differently.

Extreme events are recorded in historical sources: powerful storms that wrecked fleets during the First Punic War (255 BC and 249 BC), droughts (e.g., 226 BC lasting months), and occasional unusual phenomena.

Impact on Roman Society and Agriculture

Favorable conditions during the Optimum enhanced yields of the Mediterranean triad (cereals/wheat, vines, olives), supporting large urban populations (Rome itself exceeding 1 million at peak) and military logistics. Expanded cultivation is attested by writers such as Pliny and archaeological evidence. The empireโ€™s grain supply from North Africa, Egypt (Nile- dependent), Sicily, and elsewhere relied on these climatic patterns.

Climate was an enabling factor rather than a deterministic cause of Romeโ€™s rise or fall. Political organization, technology (e.g., aqueducts, villa systems, irrigation), trade, and institutions allowed Romans to buffer variability better than many earlier societies. Later cooling and variability, combined with disease (e.g., Antonine Plague and others coinciding with cooler/drier phases), migrations, and internal stresses, added to difficulties.

Evidence Base

Reconstructions draw on multi- proxy data:

  • Tree rings, speleothems (cave formations), marine sediments (sea-surface temperatures), pollen, glaciers, and ice cores.
  • Historical texts (Pliny, Columella, Ptolemyโ€™s weather notes from Alexandria, literary accounts of floods/freezes).
  • Archaeology (insect remains, crop distributions, villa remains).

Modern Rome retains a similar Mediterranean (Kรถppen Csa) climate, mild winters and hot summers, but the ancient periodโ€™s relative warmth and stability during the empireโ€™s height provided a supportive environmental context for classical civilization.

In summary, ancient Rome experienced a predominantly favorable Mediterranean climate, especially during its imperial peak, that facilitated agricultural surplus and expansion within the broader Roman Warm Period framework.

Cooling and increased climate variability after the Roman Climatic Optimum (roughly ending between the 2nd and 4th centuries AD) are well- documented and are considered contributing stressors (among many others) to challenges faced by the Roman Empire.

These shifts interacted with disease, politics, economics, and migrations rather than acting as a sole cause of decline.

Main Cooling Phases and Transitions

End of the Roman Climatic Optimum / early instability (from ~AD 130- 200 onward): Gradual transition from the warm, relatively stable, and often humid conditions of the Optimum. Proxy records (tree rings, marine sediments, speleothems, ice cores) show increased variability, with cooler and sometimes drier intervals. A high-resolution southern Italian marine record indicates instability and cooling from ~AD 100, more notably after ~130, with pronounced cold phases ~160-180 and ~245-275.

3rd- century cooling and Crisis of the Third Century (~AD 235- 284, peaking around 250- 275): Cooler and more arid conditions in parts of Italy and the Mediterranean overlapped with political fragmentation, military anarchy, economic troubles, and the Plague of Cyprian (~251- 266). Settlement contraction occurred in Italy. Climate stress is viewed as one amplifying factor in this multifaceted crisis.

4th- century partial recovery: A shorter interval of more favorable conditions aligned with imperial recovery and reorganization under emperors such as Constantine and others.

Late Antique Little Ice Age (LALIA, ~AD 536- 660): A sharp, severe, Northern Hemisphere- wide cooling triggered primarily by a cluster of major volcanic eruptions (notably 536, 540, and 547 AD), possibly amplified by ocean/sea- ice feedback and a solar minimum. Summer temperatures dropped substantially (reconstructions show averages ~1.5- 3ยฐC or more below prior peaks in some records; southern Italian data indicate ~3ยฐC colder than Optimum highs in the late 6th century). This was one of the coldest multi-decadal intervals of the last 2,000 years

Key Impacts of Cooling

Agriculture and food supply:

  • Shorter growing seasons, increased frost risk, and shifts in precipitation reduced yields of key crops. Modeling studies estimate substantial declines: e.g., average wheat yields potentially ~50% lower and grape yields ~70% and lower in some Mediterranean/Italian locations during LALIA conditions compared with the Optimum.
  • Harvest failures contributed to famines, higher grain prices or import costs in parts of the empire, and strain on urban food systems (Rome and other cities depended heavily on reliable surpluses from Italy, North Africa, Egypt, Sicily, etc.).
  • Northward or higher- elevation cultivation that had expanded under warmer conditions became less viable.

Disease and demography:

  • Cold/dry periods strongly coincided with major pandemics: Antonine Plague (~165- 180), Plague of Cyprian (~251- 266), and especially the Plague of Justinian (starting 541- 542, first wave of the First Plague Pandemic caused by Yersinia pestis). Cooling likely disrupted ecosystems (affecting rodent hosts and flea vectors), stressed populations via poorer nutrition, and facilitated disease spread amid migration and conflict.
  • Demographic losses compounded economic and military pressures; the Justinianic plague alone caused massive mortality across the Eastern (Byzantine) Empire and beyond.

Society, politics, and migrations:

  • Agricultural shortfalls and economic strain weakened state revenues, military logistics, and urban vitality.
  • Cooler/drier conditions on the empireโ€™s periphery and in steppe regions (linked in some studies to North Atlantic Oscillation shifts) acted as โ€œpushโ€ factors for migrations and invasions (e.g., associated with movements involving Goths, other groups in the Migration Period, and broader Eurasian upheavals).
  • In the East, LALIA cooling overlapped with the transformation of the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire, wars, territorial losses, and the eventual rise of new powers; similar stresses affected the Sasanian Empire and other Eurasian societies.
  • Overall, the shift from the supportive Optimum climate to more hostile variability and cold helped erode the environmental foundations that had aided earlier prosperity, interacting with internal weaknesses and external pressures.

Causes of the Cooling

Primarily natural: declining solar irradiance in some intervals, increased volcanic activity (especially the 6th-century cluster that dimmed sunlight for years, โ€œthe sun gave forth its light without brightness, like the moonโ€, as Procopius described in 536), and possible ocean feedback. These were independent of human activity.

Important Caveats

Climate was a contributing environmental stressor, not a deterministic โ€œcauseโ€ of the fall of the Western Empire (476) or later Byzantine challenges.

Historians emphasize multifactorial explanations: political instability, overextension, economic issues, military pressures, institutional changes, and pandemics. Regional differences mattered, the East often adapted differently or recovered better in some periods. Proxy data continue to be refined, and absolute magnitudes/regional expressions vary.

In short, the transition from the relatively benign Roman Climatic Optimum to phases of cooling and instability (especially the severe LALIA) reduced agricultural reliability, amplified disease impacts, and added pressure during already turbulent centuries, forming part of the complex environmental backdrop to late Roman and early medieval transformations.

The Roman Warm Period (RWP, or Roman Climatic Optimum, roughly 250 BC- AD 400) was a multi-century phase of relatively warm conditions mainly in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic. Comparisons to today must distinguish regional vs. global scales, proxy uncertainties, and rates of change.

Temperature Comparison

Regional (Europe/Mediterranean): Some high- resolution proxies, especially Mediterranean Sea- surface temperatures (e.g., Sicily Channel and western Mediterranean records), indicate the RWP was among the warmest intervals of the last ~2,000 years in those areas, often estimated ~1- 2ยฐC warmer than late pre-industrial or mid- 20th- century averages in specific locations. Certain studies describe Roman- period SSTs as the warmest of the past two millennia in parts of the central/western Mediterranean, with peaks roughly 2ยฐC above late- century pre- modern values. Alpine glaciers were relatively small (comparable in some reconstructions to early 21st- century extents), and warmth- loving species or crops expanded northward.

Global scale: multi- proxy syntheses (e.g., PAGES 2k) show that pre-industrial warm intervals like the RWP (and the Medieval Warm Period) were primarily regional, not globally synchronous or coherent. Global mean surface temperatures during the RWP were not higher than the present day. Recent decades (especially post- 2010s, including years through the mid- 2020s) have been warmer globally than any multi-decadal period in the last 2,000 years according to large-scale reconstructions. Global warming since the late 19th century is ~1.1- 1.5ยฐC above 1850- 1900 pre- industrial levels, with the most recent years setting successive records.

Proxy data (tree rings, sediments, speleothems, etc.) have uncertainties of roughly ยฑ0.5-1.5ยฐC or more depending on the record and region, and they often reconstruct seasonal or local signals rather than annual global means. Instrumental records since the mid-19th century provide far higher precision.

Key Differences from Today

AspectRoman Warm PeriodPresent Day (earlyโ€“mid 21st century)
Spatial extentRegional (strongest in Europe/Med/N. Atlantic)Global, nearly all regions warming
Rate of changeGradual, multi- centuryVery rapid (~0.2ยฐC per decade recently; faster than any 50-year period in at least the last 2,000 years)
Primary driversNatural (solar irradiance, low volcanism, ocean dynamics)Dominantly anthropogenic greenhouse gases (COโ‚‚, etc.), with natural factors secondary
COโ‚‚ levels~280 ppm (pre- industrial Holocene range)~420 and more ppm (rising rapidly)
StabilityRelatively stable for centuries in key regionsIncreasing extremes, rapid shifts
ContextWithin natural Holocene variabilityOutside the range of the last ~2,000 years globally; continuing upward trend

Other Factors

Hydrology and extremes: The RWP was often associated with relatively humid/stable conditions favorable to Mediterranean agriculture in many records. Todayโ€™s warming includes changes in precipitation patterns, more intense heat extremes, and other impacts not identical to the RWP.

Sea level and cryosphere: Modern sea- level rise and glacier/ice- sheet responses are driven by the current rapid warming and are ongoing; RWP glacier extents were reduced regionally but without the same global ice- volume implications.

Rate matters: The speed of modern warming is a critical distinction. Natural past changes of similar magnitude typically unfolded over centuries to millennia, allowing more time for ecosystems and societies to adjust. Current change is occurring within a human lifetime and continues.

In summary, parts of the Mediterranean and Europe experienced warmth during the RWP that was comparable to or locally exceeded mid- to- late 20th- century levels and ranked among the warmest of the last two millennia regionally.

However, todayโ€™s climate is warmer globally, the warming is far more rapid and widespread, and it is driven primarily by human greenhouse-gas emissions rather than natural forcings. Large- scale reconstructions indicate that recent global temperatures surpass those of the RWP and other pre- industrial warm intervals of the last 2,000 years.

No, Climate Change is Not โ€˜Squeezingโ€™ the Worldโ€™s Vineyards

It has become one of the settled rituals of the climate-activist press: almost any hardship afflicting any agricultural sector, anywhere in the world, is now reflexively laid at the door of โ€œclimate changeโ€.

The latest instalment arrived via the Conversation, under a headline declaring that climate change is putting the squeeze on the worldโ€™s grape-growers, dressed up as fresh research.

An illustration depicting the impact of climate change on vineyards, featuring a worried man squeezing bunches of grapes with the text 'CLIMATE CHANGE IS SQUEEZING THE VINEYARDS!' in the background. Other vineyard workers are shown happily harvesting grapes, surrounded by baskets filled with grapes and signposts pointing to options like 'Adapt' and 'New Regions.'

From The Daily Sceptic

By Tilak Doshi

It has become one of the settled rituals of the climate-activist press: almost any hardship afflicting any agricultural sector, anywhere in the world, is now reflexively laid at the door of โ€œclimate changeโ€. No mention of ordinary weather variability, market economics, pests or poor planning. The latest instalment arrived via the Conversation, under a headline declaring that climate change is putting the squeeze on the worldโ€™s grape-growers, dressed up as fresh research. It was duly amplified across social media as further proof that the planetโ€™s vineyards are dying on the vine. This should be duly mocked by those weary of seeing every inconvenience โ€“ from frost and floods to a merely disappointing harvest โ€“ blamed on โ€œclimate changeโ€. The truth, as usual, lies in the data โ€“ and the data on grape and wine production tell a rather different story from the one being sold to a public primed to expect climate catastrophe in every news cycle.

A narrower study than the headline admits

Read past the headline and the underlying research turns out to be considerably narrower than the framing suggests. The paper behind the Conversation piece is a modelling exercise by Australian researchers projecting how warming and drying trends could, over coming decades, alter the suitability of Australiaโ€™s wine regions for viticulture. It is a study of possible future risk โ€“ among many future risks โ€“ in one country. It is not a documented account of a global industry currently in decline, though it comes across as such.

Even the articleโ€™s own examples cut against the doom framing: it notes that warming has allowed English growers to expand sparkling wine production in areas once thought unsuitable for anything but hedgerows, and that Tasmania stands to benefit as conditions there become more favourable. An industry that is simultaneously said to be collapsing in one hemisphere and blossoming in another is not evidence of crisis. It is evidence of what agriculture has always done in response to a changing climate: move, adapt and substitute varietals.

What the hard production data actually show

The relevant test of an existential โ€˜squeezeโ€™ on grape-growers is not a projection but the actual harvest. On that score, the figures compiled annually by the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) โ€“ the industryโ€™s own statistical authority โ€“ are unambiguous. World fresh grape production has been on a broadly rising trend since the 1990s and stood at roughly 77.7 million tonnes in 2024, according to the OIVโ€™s 2024 statistical brief โ€“ a level that has essentially held or grown even as the area under vine has shrunk, reflecting steady gains in yields and viticultural technique rather than any climate-driven contraction.

Production has shifted geographically, away from a shrinking European vineyard area and toward China, the Americas and other emerging producers, as documented in the OIVโ€™s historical releases. The geographic reshuffling is driven substantially by economics and land-use policy and is not the same thing as a climate-induced collapse in supply. The Climate Realism project at the Watts Up With That? website reached a similar conclusion when it dug into UN Food and Agriculture Organization data in response to Canadian media claims of a climate-driven wine crisis: both grape and wine output have risen sharply worldwide since 1990, during the very period of modest global warming that is supposedly squeezing growers out of business.

The real pressure is demand, not climate

If the wine business is genuinely under strain โ€“ and in places it is โ€“ the industryโ€™s own trade body points to a very different culprit than the one making headlines via the Conversationโ€™s cited Left-leaning academic experts. The OIV reported that global wine consumption fell for a seventh straight year in 2025, down 2.7% to roughly 208 million hectolitres and some 14% below 2018 levels โ€“ the lowest volume in a quarter of a century. Nine of the worldโ€™s 10 largest markets saw demand fall, led by steep declines in China, France and the United States. Asked to explain the slide, the OIVโ€™s Director General did not reach first for the catch-all โ€œclimate changeโ€. He pointed to structural shifts in mature markets, changing generational habits, reduced alcohol consumption among younger drinkers, tariff disruption and squeezed household budgets after years of inflation. Production, meanwhile, actually rose slightly in 2025 after a weak prior vintage. In other words, to the extent growers and vintners are under genuine commercial pressure today, the evidence from the industryโ€™s own statisticians points overwhelmingly to a demand-side story about shifting tastes and stretched wallets โ€“ not a supply-side story about vines withering in a hotter world.

This is not the first time the wine-apocalypse story has been told, and it will not be the last. Canadaโ€™s public broadcaster ran essentially the same segment twice within two months in 2023, and was debunked twice โ€“ once by pointing out that the varietals Canada is well suited to growing have expanded output even as the country remains poorly suited to others. American audiences, meanwhile, were treated to a CBS 60 Minutes segment built around Franceโ€™s genuinely poor 2021 vintage โ€“ a year of frost, hail and summer humidity that French winemakers themselves attributed to unfavourable weather, not a climate change trend, and one in which other major producers simply made up the shortfall. A single bad season, cherry-picked and stripped of context, is a typical mainstream media headline: find the worst year on record for one region, attribute it to climate change and ignore the global aggregate that shows the opposite.

The European summer of 2026

Summer 2026 was hot in western Europe but it is not historically unique as the headlines would have us believe. Continent-wide, Copernicus ranked it only third among recent summers, behind 2024 and 2022, while โ€œrecordโ€ headlines often refer to a single station or month in a short modern network. Longer instrumental series still put 1976, 1947, 1911 and even 1826 among Europeโ€™s great hot summers; Franceโ€™s 1947 canicule โ€“ the French term for a sustained heatwave โ€“ put 40ยฐC on the Paris record for 72 years.

But even here, the alarmist framing that treats every fire as a direct emission of carbon dioxide from SUV tailpipes and power plants obscures an inconvenient human element. French authorities reported that close to 500 people had been arrested on suspicion of starting wildfires across the country by the end of July, with roughly seven in 10 suspected of deliberate arson rather than accident. The vines around Bordeaux were threatened that summer rather less by an abstraction called โ€œclimate changeโ€ than by matches, cigarette ends and, in a meaningful share of cases, deliberate criminality.

Even on the heatwaves themselves, the single-cause story that dominates headlines is misleading. In a two-part analysis, the climate scientist Roger Pielke Jr. has argued that โ€œclimate changeโ€ is properly understood as an outcome โ€“ a detected shift in the statistics of weather โ€“ rather than a single cause, and that Europeโ€™s accelerated warming reflects several interacting factors, prominently including the sharp post-1980 reduction in aerosol pollution over the continent, alongside the direct and indirect effects of greenhouse gases. Pielke has separately cautioned that even an aggressive near-term push to Net Zero would do little to alter European heat trends on any policy-relevant timescale, given the physics of the climate system and the other forces at work. None of this is a claim that nothing is happening; it is a caution against the lazy shorthand โ€“ repeated uncritically by outlets from the Leftist academics cited in the Conversation to the wire services โ€“ that collapses a set of causal factors into a single โ€œclimate changeโ€ narrative.

Agriculture has always adapted

Grape-growing has never been a fixed, immovable enterprise pinned to one patch of soil for all time; it has shifted with climate for as long as it has existed, from Roman-era vineyards in a warmer southern Britain during the Roman Warming Period to the retreat of continental viticulture during the Little Ice Age and its subsequent recovery. That English sparkling wine and Tasmanian pinot noir are now expanding is not a symptom of catastrophe but a textbook case of adaptation. It is the response that economists in the tradition of William Nordhaus, rather than the catastrophist school associated with Nicholas Stern, would predict from an industry facing a gradual, foreseeable shift in growing conditions over decades.

Growers substitute varietals, move up in altitude or latitude, adjust irrigation and canopy management, and in some cases relocate entirely. This is what farmers of every crop have done since agriculture began at the dawn of time. Treating each such adjustment as proof of an unfolding emergency, rather than evidence of a resilient and adaptive industry, inverts the actual lesson of the data. The Nordhaus approach to a gradually warming world (as it emerges out of the Little Ice Age) was never premised on warming being costless. Most industries, agriculture included, adjust incrementally and at manageable cost when they are left to respond to price signals and changing conditions over time, rather than being frog-marched toward a predetermined transition on the timetable of NGO activists and Al Gore-type alarmists.

Wine is, if anything, an unusually favourable case: it is a high-value, adaptable crop grown by sophisticated producers with every commercial incentive to track shifting conditions closely and to invest accordingly. This is, unsurprisingly, precisely what the industryโ€™s own investment patterns โ€“ new plantings in southern England, Tasmania, higher-altitude Andean valleys and elsewhere โ€“ show it doing.

Read the harvest data, not the press release

This is a pattern this column has traced before in other domains โ€“ wildfires attributed reflexively to global warming while arson and land-management failures go unmentioned, insurance losses attributed to climate change when rising property values and denser coastal development are the primary causes, extreme-weather deaths cited in isolation from the sharp long-term decline in weather-related mortality that better forecasting, infrastructure and adaptation have delivered. The grape-growers story fits the template precisely. A narrow, speculative modelling study is packaged as proof of an ongoing global collapse, amplified by outlets with every institutional incentive to find the climate angle in each weekโ€™s news, and left largely unchallenged by a mainstream media in search of bleeding, leading stories.

Readers who want to know whether the worldโ€™s wine supply is being โ€˜squeezedโ€™ by climate change would do better to consult the OIVโ€™s harvest tables than the latest alarming headline. None of this is to deny that a warming world poses genuine, gradual challenges to which growers must respond, as they always have. Indeed, most growers in general would rejoice at a greening world brought about by an increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. The distinction between a real and manageable long-term adjustment and a fabricated emergency is often erased in modern climate journalism.

Grape-growers who have spent centuries chasing the right slope, the right soil and the right microclimate will go on doing so, altitude by altitude and varietal by varietal, largely indifferent to the press releases written in their name. The vines, as it happens, are doing rather well. I just had a very nice Shiraz vintage this evening. Cheers!

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Scepticโ€˜s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the COโ‚‚ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

The El Nino is but a Band-Aid on the western drought

The drought in the West will persist until the La Niรฑa base state changes.

And that wonโ€™t happen until the forcing causing the distorted warming changes.

And there is no reason to believe it will happen, even if nations decide to commit economic suicide via net zero.

Le Chatelierโ€™s principle states that if a dynamic equilibrium is disturbed by changing conditions, the position of equilibrium shifts to counteract the change and reestablish equilibrium.

A single sunflower growing out of cracked, dry earth with mountains in the background under a cloudy sky.
A solitary sunflower stands defiantly amid a jagged, parched terrain, with rugged mountains fading into the horizon, symbolizing hope amid desolation.

From CFACT

By Joe Bastardi|

The drought in the West will persist until the La Niรฑa base state changes. And that wonโ€™t happen until the forcing causing the distorted warming changes. And there is no reason to believe it will happen, even if nations decide to commit economic suicide via net zero.

But what is the La Niรฑa Base State? It is a climate Le Chatelierian response to the warming. Remember what Le Chatelierโ€™s principle says:

Le Chatelierโ€™s principle states that if a dynamic equilibrium is disturbed by changing conditions, the position of equilibrium shifts to counteract the change and reestablish equilibrium.

This is obvious when we look at the Multivariate ENSO Index, which, since the great El Niรฑo of 1997-98, has been more negative than positive.

Line graph displaying the Multivariate ENSO Index Version 2 using JRA3Q, spanning from 1980 to 2025, with red bars indicating positive values and blue bars indicating negative values, and a horizontal line at zero.

The climate debate has prostituted the physical meaning of this. People on my side of the AGW issue try to push the idea that a La Niรฑa has a cooling impact. It does, but only in response to the sudden warming of El Niรฑo (which, btw, shows you itโ€™s water vapor, not CO2 that impacts temperature) and only to establish a new equilibrium, which can be clearly seen if one examines the relationship of El Niรฑo to the temperature surges, the fall-off, and the new plateau that develops behind it.

Graph depicting UAH satellite-based temperature deviations from the 1991-2020 average for the global lower atmosphere, showing data points from 1979 to projected values for July 2026.

You can clearly see when the strong El Niรฑos went off: the rapid rise, then the fall to a higher equilibrium. Itโ€™s a step-up function. These started to become really impactful after the geothermal input started. There was a very strong El Niรฑo in 1982-83, and then 1986-87, and yet no equilibrium increase.

Graph depicting the relationship between ocean heat content anomaly and mid-ocean seismic activity from 1977 to 2022, showing a rising trend in both metrics over time.

But if we then look at the increase in SST after the input from geothermal, we get the answer to why the 1997-98 event did what the previous ones did not, and why each subsequent one has continued: There is more heat to put into the atmosphere. The fact that there were more El Niรฑos before 1997-98 shows that the earth was not warming, as there was a warm response to the cooling, but overall, the planet did not warm. That can be plainly seen in the decadal temperatures from the 1950s to the decade ending in 1985 (the input started its rise after that).

Global surface air temperature anomalies from 1951 to 1960, with colors indicating variations from the average temperature 1991-2020, presented in a world map format.
World map displaying surface air temperature anomalies in Celsius from 1991 to 2020, created by NCEP/NCAR, showing variations from January to December 1976 to 1985.

The change there is much less than what has occurred since then.

World map showing surface air temperature anomalies from 2016 to 2025, with color gradients indicating warmer and cooler areas compared to the 1991-2020 average.

This is why the global temperature metric, though mathematical, has some value in helping to explain what we are seeing. The nature of the warming, more away from the tropical Pacific than around it, means warmer temperatures and more low pressure over Indonesia and the Indian Ocean, and higher pressures in the mid-latitudes in the northern and southern hemispheres.

World map showing surface pressure anomalies in millibars from January to December 2016 to 2025, based on NCEP/NCAR reanalysis data from 1991 to 2020.

This creates a stronger easterly flow in the mean in the equatorial Pacific and hence the La Niรฑa base state overall. El Niรฑos, when they occur, have a greater heat source to tap, so they can go off, but you will see this collapse quickly in the spring, and next year at this time there should be a strengthening La Niรฑa. And the lack of hurricanes this season will reverse. We are already thinking a major impact year is on the way next year.

All this is to explain that the drought-quenching rains with this El Niรฑo, in the West, are a Band-Aid on a wound that cannot heal in this state. And itโ€™s feeding back. You see that same distortion leads to less cloud cover in areas with the most incoming solar radiation, which in turn leads to a reduction in the Earthโ€™s albedo (along with less ice), and that is a major natural warming signal. The man-made climate advocates want you to believe itโ€™s CO2. Any point they have is dwarfed by the large natural forcing as described above. So, until the natural causes change, the West is in big trouble. For a while, I have been on record since April saying this El Niรฑo is going to bust up the drought across the South and Southwest, itโ€™s a one-year event, and they will be right back in the overall trend toward drier within a few months of the El Niรฑo ending.

Knowing this, people in the West have to adapt rather than shake their fists at the sky or blame this or that. But overall, they have been just as negligent as people who should have had all hands on deck for the grid (if anything, the Biden administration was doing all it could to sabotage that). But what is going on in the West will get a Band-Aid. It has already started, as the anticipated Pacific-tropical connection, be it direct or indirect, is occurring. But this El Niรฑo, with a negative PDO and such high-water temps off the Mexican coast, is going to be able to dump heavy to excessive amounts of precipitation across the South into the spring. I said the drought headlines will be replaced by flood headlines, and itโ€™s already starting.

But the bottom line: This is a Band-Aid on the overall situation in the West, and adaptation policies need to be developed with all haste.

The history tells us that:

Tree-ring reconstructions (the North American Drought Atlas and related Colorado River / Sierra Nevada streamflow reconstructions) show repeated โ€œmegadroughtsโ€ โ€” persistent dry spells of roughly 20โ€“40 years or more โ€” especially between about 800 and 1600 CE. Notable examples include:

  • Two long dry intervals in California and the Sierra Nevada, roughly 862โ€“1074 and 1122โ€“1299, documented by trees that grew in lake beds and river channels that later refilled.
  • A particularly severe mid-12th-century drought (roughly 1130sโ€“1170s), including the driest decade in some Colorado River reconstructions around 1146โ€“1155.
  • Additional multi-decadal dry spells in the 13th century and a widespread late-16th-century megadrought (about 1559โ€“1590s).

The difference, of course, is there werenโ€™t about 85โ€“90 million people, or roughly one-quarter of the U.S. population then.

You arenโ€™t going to stop it. Itโ€™s already entering mega-drought status. And this El Niรฑo may stop the bleeding, but again itโ€™s a Band-Aid on a gashing wound. Adaptation is the answer, not draconian COโ‚‚ policies that have no impact.