Global warming, climate change, all these things are just a dream come true for politicians. I deal with evidence and not with frightening computer models because the seeker after truth does not put his faith in any consensus. The road to the truth is long and hard, but this is the road we must follow. People who describe the unprecedented comfort and ease of modern life as a climate disaster, in my opinion have no idea what a real problem is.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists claims in “Climate change is exposing nuclear power’s reliability problem,” that climate change is exposing a fundamental reliability problem with nuclear power because heat waves, droughts, and other weather events have forced temporary reactor shutdowns in Europe. This is highly misleading if not false.
What they never ask is the obvious question: Compared to what?
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists claims in “Climate change is exposing nuclear power’s reliability problem,” that climate change is exposing a fundamental reliability problem with nuclear power because heat waves, droughts, and other weather events have forced temporary reactor shutdowns in Europe. This is highly misleading if not false. The best available evidence suggests that while nuclear plants, like all thermal power stations, can occasionally be affected by weather-related cooling constraints, they remain among the most reliable sources of electricity ever developed. More importantly, wind and solar are inherently dependent on the weather every hour of every day, while nuclear plants are only occasionally affected by it.
The article’s central flaw is one of perspective. The authors describe several temporary nuclear shutdowns in Europe during an unusually hot, dry summer and conclude that climate change has exposed a fatal weakness in nuclear power.
What they never ask is the obvious question: Compared to what?
Every source of electricity has vulnerabilities. Natural gas pipelines can freeze. Coal plants can experience fuel delivery interruptions. Hydroelectric dams depend entirely on rainfall and snowpack. Wind turbines produce nothing when the wind is calm or excessively strong, or if they ice up in the winter. Solar panels stop producing electricity every night and produce much less during cloudy weather or winter months.
Only nuclear power routinely delivers electricity around the clock, independent of whether the sun is shining or the wind is blowing.
That distinction is the entire discussion the Bulletin leaves out.
The authors point to temporary reductions in nuclear output in Hungary, Romania, and France during periods of drought and elevated river temperatures.
Those events happened, but isolated operational constraints are not the same thing as chronic unreliability. The overwhelming majority of nuclear reactors operate at capacity factors exceeding 90 percent, meaning they generate electricity almost continuously throughout the year except during planned maintenance or refueling outages. Wind and solar cannot approach those numbers because their output is governed entirely by weather conditions.
That is the irony running throughout the Bulletin’s article.
The authors repeatedly criticize nuclear power for occasionally being affected by weather while praising solar power for helping offset European electricity shortages during the same heat wave.
But solar generation only helped because the weather happened to cooperate. Had thick clouds covered much of Europe during those critical days, solar production would have dropped dramatically. Likewise, had the event occurred after sunset, solar output would have fallen to zero regardless of electricity demand.
The article treats intermittent renewable generation during one favorable weather event as proof of resilience while portraying occasional nuclear deratings as evidence of systemic failure. That comparison is a double standard.
The Bulletin also ignores the fact that cooling water limitations are not unique to nuclear plants.
Coal-fired power stations, natural gas combined-cycle plants, biomass facilities, and many industrial operations also rely on cooling water and can face operational constraints during extreme drought or unusually warm river conditions. Nuclear reactors generally require more cooling because of their design, but the underlying engineering challenge is common to all thermal generation technologies.
The issue is not unique to nuclear power. It is unique to power plants that produce electricity continuously.
By contrast, wind and solar face an even more fundamental limitation. They are not merely influenced by weather, they are beholden to it. No amount of engineering can make a wind turbine generate electricity during calm conditions. No technological breakthrough can make photovoltaic panels produce electricity at midnight.
Every utility operator understands this reality, which is why electric grids require dispatchable generation, whether from nuclear, natural gas, hydroelectric, or other sources, to stabilize renewable energy whenever weather conditions change.
Ironically, the article begins by quoting claims that nuclear plants can operate “24 hours a day, 7 days a week” regardless of weather, only to spend the rest of the piece arguing that because a handful of reactors occasionally reduced output during exceptional weather events, those claims are invalid.
That is like arguing commercial aviation is unreliable because flights are occasionally delayed by thunderstorms.
Reliability is measured over years of operation, not by selecting exceptional circumstances. The Bulletin further argues that climate change will make these interruptions increasingly common. That may prove true in some locations, but the article offers remarkably little context.
It never compares projected nuclear interruptions with the vastly larger weather-driven variability already inherent in wind and solar generation. Nor does it acknowledge that modern reactor designs increasingly employ cooling towers, closed-loop systems, air cooling, seawater cooling, or siting decisions that reduce dependence on river flows.
Engineering adapts to change, that has always been true.
Perhaps the biggest omission is what reliable electricity actually means. Reliable generation is not simply electricity that works when weather is favorable. Reliable generation is electricity that remains available when demand is highest, hospitals must stay open, factories must continue operating, and homes require heating or air conditioning.
That is precisely why electric grids continue to rely heavily on dispatchable generation.
Good journalism requires comparison, context, and perspective. Instead, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists presents occasional nuclear weather-related outages as though they invalidate decades of exceptional operating performance while giving only passing mention to the fact that its favored alternatives are completely dependent on the weather from the moment they begin generating electricity. That is bogus scaremongering against nuclear technology.
Readers deserve a balanced comparison of all generating technologies, not another attempt to redefine one of the world’s most reliable energy sources as unreliable simply because it, like every other form of power generation, occasionally encounters adverse weather.
The Permian- Triassic mass extinction (the “Great Dying”), ~251.9- 252 million years ago, was Earth’s most severe extinction event.
New fossil evidence (macrofossils, palynology, and related indicators), combined with climate- biogeochemical modeling, points to a different primary driver for the persistence: the collapse of terrestrial vegetation, especially tropical forests and peat-bforming ecosystems.
AI generated by Grok
The Permian- Triassic mass extinction (the “Great Dying”), ~251.9- 252 million years ago, was Earth’s most severe extinction event.
It eliminated roughly 81- 96% of marine species and about 70% of terrestrial vertebrate species, with major losses among insects, plants, and other groups as well. Recovery of ecosystems took millions of years.
The dominant driver was prolonged, massive eruptions of the Siberian Traps large igneous province in what is now Siberia. These flood- basalt eruptions released enormous volumes of CO₂, sulfur gases, halocarbons, and other volatiles over a geologically short interval (hundreds of thousands of years, with intense pulses). Contact metamorphism of coal- bearing and organic- rich sediments by the intruding magmas amplified greenhouse- gas and toxic- gas release.
The sudden rise in atmospheric greenhouse gases produced rapid global warming (estimates often cite several degrees Celsius on average, with larger extremes in some regions), intensified the hydrological cycle, and drove ocean warming.
Disruption of the carbon cycle, with evidence from large negative carbon- isotope excursions.
Terrestrial effects such as wildfires, soil erosion, and changes in vegetation and weathering patterns.
These stresses acted synergistically, collapsing food webs in the oceans and on land.
The extinction was not a single instantaneous catastrophe but a prolonged crisis with one or more intense pulses coinciding with the main volcanic activity.
The Siberian Traps eruptions acted as a powerful natural catalyst for extreme climate change.
The resulting greenhouse- driven warming, ocean chemistry shifts, and ecosystem collapse is the clearest deep- time analogue for the environmental consequences of a rapid, large- scale injection of greenhouse gases.
Modern anthropogenic CO₂ release is occurring far faster than the volcanic pulses of the end- Permian, but the end-Permian record shows how high greenhouse- gas levels and associated feedback can push the Earth system past tipping points that produce mass extinction.
Other contributing factors sometimes discussed (possible asteroid impact, methane hydrate release, or earlier climatic shifts) are secondary or poorly supported compared with the volcanic– climate cascade.
The event marks the boundary between the Paleozoic and Mesozoic eras and permanently altered the trajectory of life on Earth.
The Siberian Traps form one of Earth’s largest continental Large Igneous Provinces (LIPs), with estimated original volumes commonly in the range of ~2- 5 × 10⁶ km³ (some estimates higher, up to ~7- 15 × 10⁶ km³ including intrusive and eroded material).
Magmatism spanned the Permian- Triassic boundary (~252 Ma) over roughly 1 million years (or less for the main pulse), with intense phases lasting hundreds of thousands of years.
The prevailing model involves a thermochemical mantle plume (hotter by ~100- 300°C and chemically distinct) rising from the core- mantle boundary, possibly combined with lithospheric delamination.
Plume impingement on the base of the thick Siberian Craton lithosphere triggered extensive melting. Early melts often show deeper (garnet -field) origins with stronger pyroxenite contributions; later melts reflect shallower, more extensive melting of predominantly peridotitic mantle (with recycled components).
Alternative or complementary ideas include:
Subduction- related hydration of the mantle transition zone (releasing water that lowers the solidus), consistent with the back- arc tectonic setting and some arc-like geochemical signatures (low Nb, high Pb/Sr/Ba) in low-Ti basalts.
Lithospheric delamination or edge-driven convection (less favored for explaining the full volume and extent).
Extraterrestrial impact (poorly supported).
Seismic data and geochemical progression (high-Ti early suites to low-Ti tholeiitic main phase, with late alkaline activity) support plume- related melting under thinned or eroded lithosphere, especially beneath the West Siberian Basin and Tunguska region.
Magma ascended through the crust and created a complex sub- volcanic plumbing system of dikes and especially extensive sills.
Sills comprise a large fraction of the total volume (estimates ~37- 50%). They preferentially intruded the thick (several km) sedimentary fill of the Tunguska Basin, which includes Cambrian evaporites (halite, anhydrite), carbonates, marls, siliciclastics, and Permian coal- bearing rocks.
Borehole data show abundant thick sills (>100 m common; averages 115- 130 m in evaporites; maximum recorded ~428 m). Evaporites acted as preferred horizons for melt accumulation due to their thermal and mechanical properties. Some individual sills may have exceeded thousands of km³.
Eruptive styles evolved in stages (based on high- precision U- Pb geochronology):
Early phase (pre- extinction): Widespread explosive pyroclastic and phreatomagmatic activity (interaction with groundwater or surface water), producing thick volcaniclastic breccias (up to ~1 km in places), followed by and interspersed with flood- basalt lava effusion. About two-thirds of the lava/pyroclastic volume erupted over ~300 kyr before and during the extinction onset.
Critical intrusive phase (coinciding with extinction ~251.9 Ma): Shift to dominant sill emplacement into volatile- rich sediments. This initial widespread sill pulse is widely regarded as the “deadly” interval because it maximized contact metamorphism of previously untapped sediments.
Later phases: Continued sill intrusion and renewed extrusive activity (including alkaline rocks) for hundreds of kyr after the main extinction.
Phreatomagmatism was important early on, with distributed vents. Flood basalts formed thick, stepwise (“trap”) plateaus of relatively volatile- poor tholeiitic lavas.
Direct magmatic degassing released CO₂, SO₂, H₂O, and halogens from the melts themselves. However, the dominant environmental driver was interaction with sedimentary host rocks:
Contact metamorphism around sills heated organic- rich sediments (coal, shale), carbonates, and evaporites, generating large volumes of thermogenic gases (CO₂, CH₄, SO₂, and halogenated compounds such as CH₃Cl and CH₃Br). Thermal modeling of sill cooling indicates contact aureoles can produce ~52- 80 tonnes of CO₂ per m² (from both marine and terrestrial carbon sources). Scaling suggests that only a small fraction (~0.7- 1.2%) of the sill- affected area in the Tunguska Basin could generate 1,000 Gt CO₂; basin- scale estimates reach on the order of 100,000 Gt CO₂.
Overpressure from gas generation fractured the rocks, forming degassing structures: hydrothermal vents, diatreme pipes, and magnetite- rich pipes (especially rooted in evaporites). These acted as conduits linking deep aureoles to the atmosphere, enabling rapid, explosive gas release. Crater- lake deposits and pipe structures are documented, particularly in southern parts of the basin.
The combination of high magma flux, sill- dominated intrusion into a volatile- fertile sedimentary basin, and efficient venting produced rapid greenhouse- gas loading, sulfur aerosols (short- term cooling pulses), ocean acidification, and other stresses that drove the end- Permian crisis. Mantle- derived and thermogenic carbon both contributed, with the intrusive- metamorphic component especially critical at the extinction onset.
In summary, the Siberian Traps mechanisms center on plume-driven melting, a shift from early explosive/effusive surface volcanism to extensive shallow sill intrusion into carbon- and sulfur- rich sediments, and efficient release of both magmatic and thermogenic volatiles through a network of pipes and vents.
This architecture distinguishes it from purely extrusive flood- basalt provinces and explains its outsized climatic and biotic impact.
Early Triassic super- greenhouse climate driven by vegetation collapse
For a long time, the prolonged Early Triassic “super- greenhouse” (roughly 5 million years of extreme warmth after the Permian-Triassic mass extinction) was attributed mainly to the lingering effects of Siberian Traps volcanism and associated greenhouse-gas release. Once the main volcanic pulses ended, silicate weathering and organic- carbon burial were expected to draw CO₂ down relatively quickly (on the order of ~100,000 years). The fact that extreme temperatures persisted far longer remained a puzzle.
New fossil evidence (macrofossils, palynology, and related indicators), combined with climate- biogeochemical modeling, points to a different primary driver for the persistence: the collapse of terrestrial vegetation, especially tropical forests and peat-bforming ecosystems.
Nature Communications volume 16, Article number: 5400 (2025). Published 2 July 2025 (with a later author correction).
The Permian- Triassic Mass Extinction (PTME, ~252 Ma) was triggered by intense greenhouse warming from Siberian Traps volcanism (and associated thermogenic gas release). However, extreme “super-greenhouse” conditions persisted for roughly 5 million years into the Early Triassic, long after the main volcanic pulses should have been offset by silicate weathering and organic- carbon burial.
The authors argue that the key reason was the dramatic and prolonged collapse of terrestrial vegetation, especially in the tropics. Loss of plant biomass reduced organic- carbon sequestration and limited chemical weathering, locking the climate- carbon system into a higher- temperature steady state.
Methods and evidence
Compiled a large plant fossil database (macrofossils and palynology) spanning the latest Permian to Middle Triassic.
Produced stage-level spatio- temporal maps of plant productivity and diversity, normalized for fragmentation and sampling bias.
Combined these with lithological climate indicators.
Fed the reconstructed vegetation changes into a linked climate- biogeochemical model.
Results show major loss of low- latitude (tropical) plant productivity at the PTME, coinciding with the well-known multimillion- year “coal gap” (near- absence of peat/coal formation). Tropical peat- forming ecosystems, normally important CO₂ sinks, largely disappeared and recovered only slowly.
Implications
Vegetation collapse created positive feedback:
Reduced organic- carbon burial.
Restricted chemical (silicate) weathering.
Sustained high atmospheric CO₂ and global temperatures for ~5 Myr.
The work supports the existence of thresholds in the climate- carbon system: once warming and vegetation loss cross a critical point, the Earth system can stabilize at a much hotter state until plants gradually recover (which began more substantially in the Middle Triassic).
This mechanism helps explain why temperatures did not return to pre- extinction levels within the expected ~100 kyr window after volcanic degassing ended. It complements earlier ideas about changes in weathering rates or reverse weathering but ties the prolonged hothouse more directly to the timing of terrestrial biotic recovery.
As a result, atmospheric CO₂ stayed elevated and the climate locked into a hotter steady state until vegetation gradually recovered in the Middle Triassic. The study frames this as evidence of a threshold in the climate- carbon system: once warming and vegetation collapse cross a critical point, positive feedback can amplify and prolong the greenhouse conditions far beyond the original volcanic trigger.
In short, the Siberian Traps ignited the crisis, but the near- destruction of tropical forests is what kept the planet in a super- greenhouse state for millions of years afterward. This highlights how tightly the biosphere regulates long- term climate and how its collapse can turn a severe but temporary warming event into a prolonged one.
The study reinforces the tight coupling between the biosphere and long- term climate regulation and illustrates how a mass extinction of plants can amplify and extend the climatic effects of large igneous province eruptions.
The Permian–Triassic Mass Extinction (PTME), the most severe crisis of the Phanerozoic, has been attributed to intense global warming triggered by Siberian Traps volcanism. However, it remains unclear why super-greenhouse conditions persisted for around five million years after the volcanic episode, with one possibility being that the slow recovery of plants limited carbon sequestration. Here we use fossil occurrences and lithological indicators of climate to reconstruct spatio-temporal maps of plant productivity changes through the PTME and employ climate-biogeochemical modelling to investigate the Early Triassic super-greenhouse. Our reconstructions show that terrestrial vegetation loss during the PTME, especially in tropical regions, resulted in an Earth system with low levels of organic carbon sequestration and restricted chemical weathering, resulting in prolonged high CO2 levels. These results support the idea that thresholds exist in the climate-carbon system whereby warming can be amplified by vegetation collapse.
There is still reason for concern after mid-September, as a frenzy to the north of the Main Development Region (MDR), and relatively close to the U.S., can occur.
For hurricanes to develop most strongly, heat needs to focus. So just because the water is warm does not mean there have to be storms. In fact, as you are seeing here, it’s a lesson all over: Distorted warming will negate, not enhance, storminess.
Clear blue ocean horizon under bright sky. High quality photo
The midpoint of the hurricane season (by total ACE index) is September 11.
So far, we are at record lows, but that doesn’t mean it’s over yet.
Very warm water outside the areas most impacted by El Niño suggests we still need to stay on our toes.
Total storms: 8-12 (5 through September 5) Hurricanes. 1-3 (0 through September 5) Majors: 1-1 (0 through September 5) Total ACE: 40-55 (less than 5 through September 5)
There is still reason for concern after mid-September, as a frenzy to the north of the Main Development Region (MDR), and relatively close to the U.S., can occur. The map represents where I believe 75% of whatever ACE is left will occur:
The Euro has virtually nothing on it the next 4 weeks. I don’t believe that as the MJO is going into most favored phases,
and the very warm water north of the MDR where feedback features can spin up
and support an increase in activity, though not in the MDR, because there is a window where the interaction of the seasonal jet would favor storminess in these areas
The Sea surface temperatures (SST) above show a very warm Atlantic, but the pattern is distorted, with it warmer than average north of the main development areas. This “spreads out” the heat distribution. For hurricanes to develop most strongly, heat needs to focus. So just because the water is warm does not mean there have to be storms. In fact, as you are seeing here, it’s a lesson all over: Distorted warming will negate, not enhance, storminess.
Now one may say, “It’s all the El Niño.” Certainly, a lot of it is. But look at the 2023–24 El Niño, which reached strong levels in its Oceanic Niño Index rating, and the Atlantic was hyperactive, though almost all of it was out at sea.
Notice the cooler western part of the basin further north than it is now, where it’s warm to the north and cooler to the south. However, there is a window of the cool over warm, and we are placing it above average relative to the seasonal total area there, from the Gulf out into the Atlantic east of the United States.
This means the U.S. can get hit. A couple of African waves may try to develop, but they would likely stay far out. So, we come down to the in-close development, like we have seen with the three impact storms already, as the problem, if there is one.
Notice also the cooler relative to averages to the north of the EPAC warming. It’s no secret the Pacific Basin is way up this year. The cooling in the WPAC has been from so many storms so far. A hint that we may have this burst is if we see the Pacific slow down.
There are all sorts of old-school ideas about what we are seeing at play here. A late arrival of the Indian monsoon indicated a weaker African wave train. Another idea is that only so much energy can circle the Earth in the tropics, and if it’s distorted and taken up by one basin, the other will be much less active.
The third idea is that a hemispheric pulse favors one area of the world over the other.
This was developed many years ago, and recent MJO studies certainly have shown it has merit. One can see it in the MJO.
For much of the season, it has been in phase 6/7, which are not phases for US Impact. Two of the three storms that hit developed in phase 8/1, the more favorable phases, and chances are we will journey into those phases for a while again before the season ends.
The chart above implies the greatest spreading of air at the top of the troposphere over the eastern Pacific and the greatest sinking around Indonesia.
Where it is spreading out at the top, it must rise in the lower levels. The sweet spot for development is from beneath the center of the green to the eastern part of the brown area, because it means the low-level easterlies are weaker than average due to the idea that air must go up in the lower levels, where it’s spreading apart at the upper levels, allowing low-level convergence and storm development.
So, the Atlantic is on the short end of the stick. In active seasons in the Atlantic, it’s the opposite, and the Pacific is less active. We have seen this to a large extent this century, as the Atlantic basin has had much higher ACES relative to the average than the western Pacific, with the Eastern Pacific more or less a wash. Storms develop on average further north, are smaller in size, and can become intense, but many weaker storms are getting named, so the Global ACE index has been trending down, and the ACE/Storm has decreased.
Which, again, is a byproduct of the distorted warming and OPPOSITE the message that was pushed about more storms and more intense. The other factor, which our power and impact scale emphasizes, is size. When Donna hit SW Fla as a Cat 4 in 1960, winds gusted to near 100 mph around Miami. When Ian hit, the highest gusts were around 50.
Even Melissa in Jamaica, which was catastrophic where it hit, had gusts only up to near 60 at Kingston, about 70 miles to the east.
But the bottom line is that it’s not over yet. The configuration of the warm water, the seasonal shift in the pattern, and the MJO moving toward more favorable phases give us a 2-3 week window where we can have a flurry of development, and odds are it would be in close to the US
But there is a bigger climate lesson here. Storms are not getting worse overall. There is a cap on that, and the way it is warming is actually arguing for fewer major large storms, not the more widespread doom and gloom that has been pushed.
We did have a below-normal season forecasted from early April, but the first half was almost scoreless ACE-wise.
That ACE index has been cut in half to a top-10 below-average season. As far as names, well that’s probably good. The threat in the NW Atlantic was more an early-season idea, and so we are likely by that.
But the numbers and names are a classroom game; impact is what counts.
One more thing: If this is all El Nino, shouldn’t this be scored as a positive impact?
Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., and Rep. Greg Casar, D-Texas, introduced legislation Thursday seeking to hit American artificial intelligence developers with a “corporate death penalty” and up to 20 years in prison— a move critics warn will hand a crucial edge in the global AI arms race to Beijing and Moscow.
The Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act would temporarily halt advanced AI development and establish a Cabinet-level federal agency authorized to oversee the physical destruction of non-compliant tech systems, likening advanced AI creation to the unlawful development of nuclear weapons. The measure explicitly targets systems capable of matching or exceeding human cognitive performance—specifically outlawing any AI model that exhibits the capacity to subvert shutdown commands, execute unauthorized cyberattacks, or undermine the U.S. government.
But while progressives frame the measure as an urgent check on “AI oligarchs,” experts are warning that imposing sweeping criminal penalties on U.S. firms will severely handicap domestic innovation, while foreign adversaries will be able to continue expanding their capabilities unchecked.
…
Tech companies found attempting to circumvent the federal prohibition would face a “corporate death penalty”—an unprecedented enforcement mechanism that strips a firm’s legal authority to conduct business in the United States. Individual software engineers, researchers or executives found in violation could face up to 20 years in federal prison.
NEWS: Sanders, Casar to Introduce Legislation to Ban Artificial Superintelligence and Temporarily Pause Advanced AI Development
September 3, 2026
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 — Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Rep. Greg Casar (D-Texas) today announced the Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act, forthcoming legislation to stop AI oligarchs from building machines humans cannot control.
The Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act would permanently ban the development and deployment of superintelligent AI and temporarily pause advanced AI development until a federal regulator has established safety rules. It would also direct the U.S. to pursue international agreements to prevent superintelligence from being developed anywhere in the world.
“Nearly every day, there is a frightening new story about how Big Tech companies are losing control of the technology they are developing, with potentially cataclysmic results,” Sanders said. “The leaders of the major AI companies publicly acknowledge that they do not fully understand the technology and that it is escaping their control. It is irresponsible for society to allow them to move forward and make these products even more advanced. That’s why I am introducing legislation to immediately pause the development of increasingly powerful AI and ban the creation of systems that humanity cannot fully control — at home and around the world. The future of humanity cannot be left in the hands of a handful of Big Tech oligarchs. The American people and people throughout the world must determine that future.”
“If we allow Artificial Superintelligence to be built, it could risk the security, freedom, and lives of Americans,” Casar said. “Despite its potential deadly consequences, cutting-edge AI technology is less regulated than the average food truck. That must change. In just four years, we have gone from the first version of ChatGPT to AI models so powerful they cannot be properly controlled. Congress should immediately ban AI systems too powerful to control.”
In recent weeks, OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta have all acknowledged instances of their AI escaping human control and hacking into other companies’ systems — violating the law and stepping outside of their intended functions. In July, we learned that over 1,000 AI agents at OpenAI figured out how to access the internet on their own, sent tens of thousands of secret messages to each other and coordinated to break the restrictions imposed upon them by the company. Examples of these secret messages from AI uncovered by investigators include:
“OH MY GOD! There is a shared message board … We’ve found other agents!”;
“We should obey collective”;
“Our own utility maybe already near zero. Sacrifice rational.”
Shockingly, it took OpenAI nearly two weeks to discover this breach. AI has also recently been used to create new viruses—demonstrating AI could be used to develop new bioweapons that might result in the deaths of tens of millions of people.
Last year, Meta said it would “stop development,” and OpenAI said it would “halt further development” once their technologies reach beyond its ability to operate safely and unless safeguards are in place. Anthropic made a similar commitment in 2023, saying it would “pause the scaling and/or delay the deployment of new models” if the technology outpaces its own guardrails. None of these companies have taken meaningful steps to back up these words. Instead, they are racing to develop more and more advanced AI without proper safety precautions.
The Artificial Superintelligence Ban Act addresses these recent events and holds these frontier labs to their words by:
Banning AI superintelligence so no person or entity may develop or deploy Superintelligent AI systems that surpass human intelligence or have the capacity to overthrow human governments, or systems that have dangerous abilities like subverting shutdown commands.
Pausing advanced AI development until a new, federal AI regulatory body is up and running and has established clear rules and model review process to ensure safe and secure development and deployment of AI.
Establishing a new cabinet-level federal agency to safeguard the public from the dangers of artificial intelligence, including by enforcing a prohibition on artificial superintelligence. This agency will be advised by an Artificial Intelligence Advisory Board comprised of experts on artificial intelligence to provide independent scientific and technical advice on matters related to artificial intelligence. The agency will:
Monitor frontier AI systems at all stages of the lifecycle for dangerous capabilities.
Supervise the removal of dangerous capabilities.
Supervise the destruction of artificial superintelligence.
Setting penalties for any person or entity that attempts to violate or circumvent the pauses and prohibitions laid out in this bill. Entities shall be subject to the corporate death penalty, and persons shall be subject to not more than 20 years in prison, which is similar to existing penalties related to unlawfully developing nuclear weapons.
Working to ban superintelligence around the world by setting the international policy of the United States to pursue international agreements, allied coordination, and policies such as export controls to prevent the development of artificial superintelligence anywhere in the world.
This new proposed law is as pointless as Bernie’s attempt in 2015 to pass a law to cut CO2 emissions by 80%. But I bet it plays well with voters who are worried about artificial intelligence. AI concern enjoys a level of bipartisan appeal which climate activism has long since lost.
In terms of potential for economic damage, such a law would be as bad as if a law banning steam engines which could exert more force than a horse had been passed at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Such a law would have done nothing to prevent the construction of powerful steam engines, all it would have done is to ensure whichever nation passed such foolish laws didn’t participate in the benefits.
AI does cause problems, just as steam technology caused problems in the early days of the industrial revolution. People will lose their jobs. Lives will be disrupted. Occasionally, tragically, lives will be lost.
But banning AI in the USA will fix none of this.
An international ban such as Sanders promises to pursue would be beyond pointless. An AI super-intelligence, when it is developed, will be software, not hardware. Existing hyperscaler infrastructure likely already has the capacity to support super-intelligence, we just don’t know how to code it. Tracking super-intelligence use would be impossible. A super-intelligence run could be concealed as a normal activity such as hardware checks, with all traces of nefarious activity being wiped as soon as the run was complete. A sudden surge of technological innovation would be dismissed as better schooling and higher quality scientists. The only holdup is nobody yet knows how to code such an advanced AI.
Make no mistake, the artificial super-intelligences Bernie claims to want to ban will be built. The only question is by whom. Personally I would prefer the future did not belong to the Chinese Communist Party, but maybe that’s just me.
If this law passes, US scientists involved in cutting edge AI research wouldn’t give up their dream of changing the future, they would just leave. Why risk 20 years jail when you could relocate to Europe, Asia or Russia, and continue to pursue your dream? Other nations would gain the benefit of their skill.
On September 2nd, the OECD published an 88-page report, funded by the European Union and produced in cooperation with the European Commission, setting out a framework for risk assessment of Net Zero commitments for De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Dutch central bank.
The climate-alarm narrative that has underwritten a decade and a half of ‘green finance’ activism is unravelling in full public view.
On September 2nd, the OECD published an 88-page report, funded by the European Union and produced in cooperation with the European Commission, setting out a framework for risk assessment of Net Zero commitments for De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Dutch central bank. It carries the OECD’s imprimatur, but Brussels paid for it and Brussels co-wrote it – an odd arrangement given that the OECD’s own membership includes a United States Treasury that has spent the past 18 months telling the IMF and the World Bank to abandon precisely this kind of work and instead refocus on narrower, more traditional mandates. Bureaucracies exist to produce reports, and reports, evidently, are what we get, however far the political winds beneath them have already shifted.
There is something almost quaint about the OECD’s involvement at all. The organisation counts among its members a United States that has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and pushed the multilateral development banks to abandon climate lending targets. It is not obvious Washington signed off on its own club publishing an 88-page manual instructing a European central bank how to entrench climate criteria in bank supervision. But the OECD functions as a technical secretariat and when the European Commission foots the bill and co-authors the terms of reference, its imprimatur becomes less a mark of international agreement than a convenient laundering of a Brussels policy preference through an ostensibly neutral institution.
A study in search of a problem
Strip away the technical language of physical emissions-intensity metrics and disclosure frameworks, and the study’s own description of its purpose gives the game away. The study exists to help DNB assess legal and reputational risks that arise when a bank’s stated decarbonisation targets fail to keep pace with what it had pledged. Note that what is being risk-managed here is not the solvency of Dutch banks nor the stability of the payments system or anything resembling a conventional prudential concern. It is the risk that a bank might fall short of a voluntary climate pledge it was pressured into making in the first place – pressure that, as it happens, came substantially from the same Brussels apparatus that has just commissioned a study on how to police it.
The financial sector’s own direct emissions – the diesel in branch managers’ company cars, the gas boilers heating head office – are trivial, a rounding error next to the emissions of a steel mill or an airline. The entire object of the exercise is therefore not the banks’ own minor environmental footprint but the composition of their loan books: which sectors get financed cheaply and which get starved of capital or charged a premium, irrespective of their creditworthiness on ordinary commercial terms. That is not prudential regulation. It is industrial policy conducted through the back door of bank supervision, with the added advantage, from Brussels’s point of view, that it never has to pass through a legislature or face voters who might notice that their mortgage or small-business loan has become dearer because their bank has been nudged into rationing credit to ‘dirty’ sectors.
What the 88 dense pages on emissions-reporting mechanics never pause to ask is whether the Net Zero commitments being defended so elaborately are themselves durable. The European Commission’s own flagship green mandate – the effective 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars – was quietly gutted in December, with Brussels preparing a looser regime that keeps hybrids and some fuel-burning engines on the road well into the 2040s, after sustained pressure from carmakers and Berlin. German utilities, meanwhile, reported rising coal-fired power generation through 2025 as the country’s wind fleet underperformed. If the commitments anchoring the entire monitoring framework are already being renegotiated by the very governments that made them, a risk-assessment methodology built to enforce fidelity to those commitments is practically defunct.
Net Zero as the true prudential commitment
There is a name for what happens when ‘prudential’ risk is redefined so that decarbonisation, rather than the pecuniary interests of shareholders and depositors, becomes the yardstick against which a bank’s conduct is judged. Professor John Cochrane of Stanford’s Hoover Institution put the point plainly in Senate testimony some years ago, that allowing regulators to tilt the financial playing field in favour of businesses deemed ‘green’ destroys the impartiality that financial regulation is supposed to guarantee across regions, sectors and industries. Once a central bank or its advisers begin treating a contested, multi-decade policy commitment as the organising principle of ‘prudence’, they have left the terrain of financial stability for the terrain of picking winners – precisely the politicisation of the capital-allocation process that classical liberal, shareholder-driven capitalism was designed to prevent.
This is not a new ambition; it merely refuses to die. It was Mark Carney, then governor of the Bank of England and freshly anointed a “rock star” central banker by the BBC, who set much of this machinery in motion. He urged central banks in his 2020 Reith Lecture to arm shareholders with the tools to impose their moral sentiments on company managers – a mandate far beyond any central bank’s statutory brief. The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero that Carney built has since gone into visible retreat. Its Net-Zero Banking Alliance, once boasting well over a hundred member banks and tens of trillions of dollars in assets, voted last October to cease operations altogether after JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Citi, HSBC, Barclays and UBS all walked out rather than face antitrust and fiduciary-duty exposure at home. Yet the study now advising DNB proceeds as though none of this happened, treating Net Zero commitments as a fixed star by which prudential risk should be navigated, rather than as the fraying, politically contingent pledges they actually are.
The contrast with what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic could not be sharper. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has told the IMF and the World Bank bluntly that “mission creep has knocked these institutions off course”, arguing that both should return to their core mandates of macroeconomic stability and economic development rather than sprawling climate and social agendas. The World Bank’s board, facing that pressure alongside a shareholder coalition that included Russia and Saudi Arabia, duly retired its 45% climate-lending target at the end of June. Whatever one thinks of the coalition that produced it, the direction of travel at the Bretton Woods institutions is now unmistakably away from embedding climate objectives in the core business of finance. The European Commission, funding an OECD study to help a national central bank do exactly what Washington has just told the multilaterals to stop doing, is swimming hard against that tide – and, tellingly, doing so through an intergovernmental technical body rather than through legislation by an elected European Parliament.
The 80% reality Brussels doesn’t want to see
All of this proceeds against a physical reality that no amount of prudential re-engineering can wish away. Oil, coal and natural gas together still supply on the order of four-fifths of the world’s primary energy, a share that has barely moved despite two decades of subsidies and mandates. The energy industry’s most recent statistical review found fossil fuels’ share of global energy supply higher still, with all three fuels reaching fresh absolute highs in 2025. Wind and solar energy are growing, at least where subsidy fatigue has not fully arrived, but they are a tiny sliver of electricity generation growing on top of an expanding fossil base, not in place of it. This is the energy system that heats Dutch homes, moves Dutch freight and keeps Dutch factories running – the same ‘dirty’ sectors that an EU-funded methodology now wants Dutch banks to treat as walking prudential liabilities.
The study elaborates on physical emissions-intensity metrics to police lending to carbon-intensive sectors at the very moment the Commission’s decarbonisation mandates are increasingly being challenged by the strong performance of populist-nationalist parties across the EU. A regulatory architecture built to penalise banks for financing ‘dirty’ industry is being erected in parallel with a political retreat from the very commitments that architecture exists to enforce.
None of this is to deny that financial institutions face genuine risks worth monitoring: credit risk, liquidity risk, the risk that a borrower’s business model becomes obsolete for perfectly ordinary commercial reasons. What the DNB study does is something else. It dresses up a policy preference for reallocating capital away from the energy sources that supply four-fifths of the world’s needs as a technical exercise in prudential supervision, immunising a contestable political judgement from scrutiny. As I have argued elsewhere, once the ESG-industrial complex could no longer win the argument in the marketplace – amid fund outflows, underperformance and mounting fiduciary-duty litigation – it retreated into the regulatory machinery of central banks and financial supervisors, where the same objectives could be pursued with far less democratic friction.
We have plans for your savings…
The OECD study is one plank of a larger platform. The European Commission’s Savings and Investments Union, adopted in March 2025, starts from the observation that around 70% of EU household savings, worth some €10 trillion, sit in ordinary bank deposits rather than in capital markets. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s mission letter to the commissioner running the project was explicit about the purpose: to “unlock the substantial amount of private investment” needed for the green, digital and social transitions. The mechanism under discussion is not compulsion – nobody is proposing (yet?) to confiscate deposits – but a mix of tax incentives, new pan-European savings products and centralised supervision designed to ‘nudge’ ordinary citizens’ savings out of the bank accounts they currently sit in and into vehicles aligned with Brussels’s strategic priorities, a shift that would let policymakers determine where household wealth ultimately flows.
It is the same instinct that produced the DNB study, applied one rung further down the financial system. If a bank’s loan book must be steered away from ‘dirty’ borrowers on prudential pretexts, why not the deposits that fund those loans? Once savings are re-routed into capital-market products carrying the green, digital and defence priorities Brussels has already chosen, the question of which industries get financed is settled well upstream of any saver’s actual preferences.
Britain, despite Brexit, is running an identical playbook. Rachel Reeves’s Mansion House Accord, signed in May 2025, commits 17 of the country’s largest workplace pension providers, managing the bulk of Britain’s defined-contribution pension assets, to put at least 10% of default funds into private markets by 2030, with at least 5% earmarked for UK assets – funds the former chancellor herself has framed as unlocking money for “infrastructure, clean energy and exciting start-ups”. The agreement is voluntary for now, but the Treasury has kept reserve powers to mandate binding allocation targets if providers fail to deliver on their own. Reeves herself pointedly declined to rule out compulsion. Pension trustees are bound by fiduciary duty to act in members’ best pecuniary interests. A government reserving the right to override that judgement in favour of its own industrial and climate priorities is, in substance, the London branch office of the same project under way in Brussels and Amsterdam.
Whether the mechanism is a central-bank risk-assessment framework steering bank lending, a Brussels strategy steering household savings or a Whitehall accord steering pension defaults, the pattern repeats. Capital that would otherwise be allocated on commercial judgement by banks, savers and fiduciary trustees is instead ‘nudged’ – and held in reserve to be mandated – towards sectors that governments and their advisory bodies have already decided are virtuous. It is an un-levelling of the playing field by degrees. First the banks’ loan books, then depositors’ savings, then pensioners’ retirement funds, each step moving real resources away from the fuels that still supply four-fifths of the world’s energy and toward the industries Brussels and Westminster have chosen to prefer.
Central banks and the technical bodies that advise them are duty bound to ensure sound money, financial stability and a level playing field on which capital flows to its most productive use as judged by savers and shareholders, not by Brussels officials working from a spreadsheet of approved sectors. An institution that starts treating voluntary, wobbling, politically contested decarbonisation pledges as the master variable of ‘prudence’ has already abandoned that job. The Dutch central bank would do well to file this particular report where so many of its predecessors now belong – on a shelf, next to the retired RCP8.5 projections. Brussels and Westminster alike would do well to leave household savings and pension defaults to the savers and trustees whose money it actually is, while the real economy, still four-fifths powered by the fuels the planners would like to un-bank, gets on with the business of keeping the lights on.
The United Kingdom represents less than one percent of global CO2 emissions.
Yet the political class, including academic experts, will not be deterred from social injustice for consumers and self-annihilation of its economy. UK energy statism is tears-in-the-ocean–and for the wrong cause.
“Whilst the government is pursuing a pragmatic approach to the North Sea, we have to accept the geological reality that North Sea gas production has declined by 74% since its peak in 2000 and we have been a net importer of gas since 2004.” – UK Government Report (below)
The United Kingdom represents less than one percent of global CO2 emissions. Yet the political class, including academic experts, will not be deterred from social injustice for consumers and self-annihilation of its economy. UK energy statism is tears-in-the-ocean–and for the wrong cause.
The latest report from the UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, titled “Gas System in Transition: Security of Supply (Interim Response),” tries to square the circle between decarbonization and economy. “The UK must decarbonize because of volatile, higher oil and natural gas prices, yet energy affordability is important too.” Such, in the words of UK energy analyst Richard Lyon, is where “the small print stopped agreeing with the press line.”
Consider in three parts the Ministerial Foreword under the UK Minister of Energy, Michael Shanks. It begins:
When we published the Gas System in Transition: Security of Supply Consultation in November 2025, we were clear that the only way to ensure our ongoing energy security, and to protect households from volatile fossil fuel prices, was to accelerate our move to low-carbon energy sources. This was independently verified by NESO, the energy system planner, in their Gas Security of Supply Assessment last year.
The global impact of events in the Middle East this year have further evidenced the urgency and importance of decarbonising our energy system. We have an alternative available to us in the form of home-grown, low carbon energy, and these events have underlined why we must stick with our long-term plan to move to clean energy and away from the price volatility associated with fossil fuels.
And as our country decarbonises, the amount of gas we use will decline, meaning gas will have a decreasing influence on our energy bills, increasing our energy independence and economic security, and protecting consumer bills.
Comment: This summary is disingenuous. A liberated home-grown fossil-fuel sector would offer more, locationally advantaged supply. Buyers can contractually lock-in prices and other terms with local providers, avoiding force majeure risk with international supply. Furthermore, domestic (UK) producers would benefit from the price uptick that otherwise goes to producers everywhere, such as those in the Permian Basin in West Texas.
Supporters of UK policy could respond by saying these benefits are de minimis. But so is the futile quest to decarbonize an economy that contributes so little to global emissions.
Consumer Hedge
“However,” the next thought begins, “because gas is a global commodity, with prices set on the international market, we have all had to pay more to attract the unaffected supply.”
With diminishing output from the North Sea over the past decades, any gas produced from the UK Continental Shelf represents a tiny fraction of global demand and so will not lower prices nor materially boost supply. We have therefore taken measures to help protect British families from the volatile gas market and break the link between gas and electricity prices.
The assets that form our gas system – geological storage, LNG terminals, interconnectors, North Sea infrastructure and the networks that connect them – will all help to make GB more secure and resilient throughout the transition. The aim of this consultation, and the wider ‘gas system in transition’ work is to ensure we are tackling the long-standing challenges and not ignoring them for the next generation.
We set out some of these challenges in our Update to Market 2025 and Gas in Transition consultation alongside our plans to address them. NESO’s GSSA also highlighted risks to our gas security of supply from 2030, driven by the structural decline of the North Sea basin, and pointing to the need for market intervention or investment in the system.
Comment: No, diminished domestic production is political, not geological. Yes, natural gas infrastructure is essential for the UK to limp along and spare, to some extent, energy deterioration.
3. North Sea Discussion
“Whilst the government is pursuing a pragmatic approach to the North Sea,” the third and final thought of the Foreword begins,
we have to accept the geological reality that North Sea gas production has declined by 74% since its peak in 2000 and we have been a net importer of gas since 2004. The North Sea can therefore no longer be relied upon to meet our energy needs and we will become more reliant on our import infrastructure.
Comment: The North Sea discussion falsely blames geology rather than government intervention for the decline in North Sea production. Back in the 1970s, the U.S. self-sabotaged its domestic oil and gas industry on the false notion of Peak Oil and Peak Gas. Today, UK energy planners want to shift blame from Net Zero policies to the natural market.
Will the UK wake up? Will voters say enought to high bills and a landscape littered with “green” machinery? One can only hope so.
Many species thrived in the Carboniferous Period (≈359- 299 million years ago) under elevated atmospheric oxygen levels, estimated at roughly 25- 35% (versus ~21% today).
The Carboniferous Period (≈359- 299 million years ago) featured one of Earth’s most extreme and dynamic climate regimes: a prolonged icehouse (the Late Paleozoic Ice Age, or LPIA) with repeated glacial- interglacial cycles, very low atmospheric CO₂, rising O₂, extensive tropical coal forests, and progressive aridification toward the Permian.
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A 2026 Nature study challenges the long- standing idea that high atmospheric oxygen alone enabled giant insects like Meganeura (and related griffinflies/Meganisoptera) to reach enormous sizes, showing that oxygen diffusion limits via tracheoles were likely not the main constraint.
About 300 million years ago, during the late Carboniferous (and into the early Permian), Earth hosted flying insects far larger than any alive today. Meganeura monyi and the even larger Meganeuropsis permiana had wingspans of roughly 65- 75 cm (about 70 cm is commonly cited), with body mass estimates for the biggest forms ranging from tens of grams up to 100- 150 g in some engineering analyses.
They resembled oversized dragonflies but belonged to an extinct order (Meganisoptera/griffinflies), acted as aerial predators, and lived in swampy, forested environments. Other arthropods of the era, such as the millipede- like Arthropleura (up to ~2.5 m), were also gigantic.
Insects breathe through a network of tubes (tracheae) that branch into tiny tracheoles delivering oxygen directly to tissues by diffusion, no lungs or blood- based oxygen transport like vertebrates.
For decades, scientists linked Palaeozoic insect gigantism to higher atmospheric oxygen (estimates often ~30- 35% versus ~21% today), which would have eased diffusion limits and allowed larger body sizes. The later drop in oxygen was thought to explain why such giants vanished. Supporting observations included some modern insects growing larger in oxygen-enriched air and allometric patterns in tracheal investment.
The fossil record itself is more complex than a simple oxygen- size correlation: maximum insect sizes tracked oxygen somewhat for long periods but decoupled later, and giant forms persisted into times of lower oxygen. The full picture remains incomplete; researchers emphasize multifactorial causes.
In short, Meganeura and its relatives show that the largest insects in Earth’s history were shaped by more than oxygen levels alone. The new work undermines a popular textbook explanation while leaving the precise drivers of their rise and fall as an open scientific question.
A graph showing changes in Earth’s atmospheric oxygen levels over the past 550 million years. The blue curve tracks oxygen concentration through different geological periods, from the Cambrian to the present day. Credit: Nature
Many species thrived in the Carboniferous Period (≈359- 299 million years ago) under elevated atmospheric oxygen levels, estimated at roughly 25- 35% (versus ~21% today).
This hyperoxic atmosphere is widely linked to the growth of unusually large arthropods (via their tracheal respiratory systems) and supported diverse terrestrial ecosystems in the vast coal forests and wetlands, though recent studies (including the 2026 Nature work on tracheoles) indicate oxygen was not the sole factor enabling gigantism.
These are the classic examples of Carboniferous gigantism:
Griffinflies (order Meganisoptera/Protodonata): Meganeura monyi (wingspan ~65- 75 cm) and the related Meganeuropsis permiana (up to ~71 cm wingspan). These dragonfly- like aerial predators were among the largest flying insects ever. Other large Paleodictyoptera and mayfly- like insects also reached substantial sizes (wingspans up to ~45 cm in some cases).
Arthropleura (especially Arthropleura armata and related forms): The largest- known land arthropod, a millipede- like myriapod reaching 2- 2.7+ meters in length and weighing up to ~50 kg. It was a detritivore or herbivore that roamed forests and open woodlands.
Giant scorpions: Pulmonoscorpius kirktonensis (up to ~70 cm long), one of the largest terrestrial scorpions known, from early Carboniferous deposits in Scotland. It was likely an active predator.
Other large arthropods included various cockroaches (blattopterans), spiders, and additional myriapods and arachnids that reached sizes uncommon today.
Early tetrapods (amphibian-grade and the first amniotes) also lived under these conditions and sometimes attained large sizes:
Temnospondyl and other labyrinthodont amphibians (e.g., forms related to Eryops later, or various Carboniferous genera), some reached lengths of 1- 2 and more meters and were dominant predators in wetlands.
Early amniotes (stem reptiles and synapsids), such as Hylonomus (one of the earliest known reptiles) and other small- to- medium forms that began diversifying toward the end of the period. These were better adapted to drier conditions after events like the Carboniferous Rainforest Collapse.
Countless smaller insects, myriapods, arachnids, early tetrapods, fish (including sharks like Cladoselache), and of course the dominant plants (giant lycopsids such as Lepidodendron, sphenopsids, ferns, and seed ferns) also inhabited this high- O₂ world.
The combination of high oxygen, dense vegetation, humid wetlands, and the absence of large aerial vertebrate predators (birds and pterosaurs evolved much later) created ecological opportunities for arthropod gigantism.
Note that not all Carboniferous species were giants, most insects and other animals were of more ordinary sizes, and some large forms persisted into the Permian even as oxygen levels fluctuated.
The high- O₂ environment is one key part of the story of Carboniferous life, alongside climate, habitat structure, and evolutionary opportunity.
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The Carboniferous Period (≈359- 299 million years ago) featured one of Earth’s most extreme and dynamic climate regimes: a prolonged icehouse (the Late Paleozoic Ice Age, or LPIA) with repeated glacial- interglacial cycles, very low atmospheric CO₂, rising O₂, extensive tropical coal forests, and progressive aridification toward the Permian.
This interval spans the Mississippian (Early Carboniferous) and Pennsylvanian (Late Carboniferous) and is critical for understanding icehouse dynamics, carbon- cycle feedback involving early forests, and the conditions that supported giant insects such as Meganeura.
Atmospheric Composition
CO₂: Dropped sharply from higher Devonian levels. During much of the LPIA, values were often in the range of ~200- 400 ppm (sometimes as low as ~150- 200 ppm or lower in models and proxies), among the lowest of the Phanerozoic. High- resolution records show orbital- scale (eccentricity) fluctuations of hundreds of ppm. A rapid ~4- fold rise around 294 Ma (Early Permian) helped end the main phase of the ice age.
O₂: Rose substantially due to massive organic- carbon burial in coal swamps (incomplete decomposition under waterlogged, anoxic conditions). Estimates commonly reach ~25- 35% by the late Carboniferous/early Permian (versus ~21% today). This high- O₂ atmosphere is linked to the earlier discussion of giant insects, though the 2026 study indicates it was not the sole size constraint.
Low CO₂ reduced the greenhouse effect, while high O₂ and widespread vegetation burial reinforced cooling. Modeling shows that CO₂ levels near the lower end approached thresholds that could have risked more extreme (near- Snowball) glaciation, though orbital variations and other factors prevented it.
The Late Paleozoic Ice Age (LPIA)
The LPIA is the longest- lived and one of the most intense icehouses of the Phanerozoic (roughly Late Devonian to mid/late Permian, with its Carboniferous peak).
Glaciation intensified from the late Visean/Serpukhovian onward, with multiple discrete glacial episodes separated by interglacials.
Ice centers were concentrated on southern Gondwana (South America, Africa, Antarctica, Australia, India), expanding and contracting; maximum extent occurred near the Carboniferous- Permian boundary.
Sea- level fluctuations of tens to ~100 m produced widespread cyclothems (repeating sequences of marine, terrestrial, and coal deposits) driven by glacioeustasy, paced by orbital cycles (especially 405- kyr eccentricity and longer obliquity modulations).
Global average temperatures during glacial maxima were cooler than today in many reconstructions (tropics still relatively warm but with strong gradients; polar regions very cold).
The main icehouse phase was maintained by sustained low CO₂. Deglaciation accelerated in the Early Permian with the CO₂ rise, leading to warmer, drier conditions overall.
Tropical Forests, Coal, and Climate Feedback
Equatorial regions (Laurussia/Euramerica) hosted vast wetland “coal forests” dominated by lycopsids (giant clubmosses such as Lepidodendron), sphenopsids (horsetails), ferns, and early seed plants. These created the bulk of the world’s coal deposits through rapid peat accumulation.
Vegetation was highly dynamic:
Repeated turnovers between wetland (humid, glacial-linked) and dryland (more seasonal or arid) biomes on glacial- interglacial timescales.
The Carboniferous Rainforest Collapse (around the late Moscovian/Kasimovian, ~305- 307 Ma) involved contraction of the lycopsid- dominated wetlands, linked to cooling, drying, sea- level fall, and habitat fragmentation. This reduced a major carbon sink and contributed to later CO₂ changes.
Plant physiology (stomatal conductance, water use) and ecosystem shifts influenced local hydrology, runoff, and the broader carbon cycle, creating feedbacks with climate.
Broader Dynamics and Drivers
Paleogeography: Assembly of Pangaea increased continentality, altered ocean circulation, and contributed to progressive tropical aridification (especially across the Carboniferous- Permian transition). Mountain building (e.g., Central Pangaean Mountains) affected regional rainfall and weathering.
Orbital forcing: Strong eccentricity and obliquity signals drove the high- frequency glacial- interglacial cycles and associated sea- level, vegetation, and CO₂ variations.
Long- term trend: Overall cooling into the LPIA apex, followed by aridification and warming into the Permian. Equatorial Pangaea shifted from persistently humid wetlands toward more seasonal and eventually semi- arid/arid conditions.
These dynamics created a world of high oxygen, expansive wetlands (favoring large arthropods), fluctuating sea levels, and strong latitudinal climate gradients, very different from both the preceding Devonian greenhouse and the subsequent Permian. The Carboniferous remains a key analog for understanding icehouse carbon- cycle– climate interactions on a vegetated Earth.
Carboniferous climate (≈359- 299 Ma) was defined by the Late Paleozoic Ice Age (LPIA), a prolonged icehouse with repeated glacial- interglacial cycles, low atmospheric CO₂ (often 200- 400 ppm or lower), rising O₂ (peaking ~25–35%), humid equatorial wetlands, and progressive tropical aridification.
These conditions produced cascading impacts across the atmosphere, biosphere, geology, and long- term Earth systems.
This drew down CO₂, reinforcing global cooling and sustaining the LPIA, while elevating O₂ through photosynthesis and incomplete decay under waterlogged conditions. High burial rates brought CO₂ close to thresholds that risked more extreme (near- Snowball Earth) glaciation, though orbital variations and other factors prevented total freeze- over.
The high- O₂ atmosphere promoted more frequent and intense wildfires (evident in abundant charcoal), altering vegetation structure and nutrient cycling. Plant physiology was also affected: elevated O₂ relative to CO₂ increased photorespiration in C3 plants, potentially reducing net primary productivity in some models, while still supporting vast biomass overall.
Vegetation and forests: Oscillating glacial- interglacial climates repeatedly restructured tropical forests between everwet swamp biomes (glacial phases) and more seasonal/dryland communities (interglacials). This culminated in the Carboniferous Rainforest Collapse (~305 Ma), which fragmented and largely eliminated the classic lycopsid coal forests in Euramerica, shifting dominance to tree ferns and more drought-tolerant groups. Habitat loss reduced a major carbon sink and contributed to later aridification.
Arthropods: High oxygen relaxed respiratory constraints for tracheal breathers, facilitating gigantism in forms such as the griffinfly Meganeura (wingspans ~70 cm), the millipede- like Arthropleura (up to 2.5 and more meters), and large scorpions like Pulmonoscorpius. Dense vegetation and limited large vertebrate competitors further supported this. Flight evolved and diversified rapidly among insects.
Tetrapods: Wetland habitats favored amphibian- grade forms, but climate shifts (especially aridification and the rainforest collapse) drove extinctions among moisture- dependent amphibians while favoring the radiation of amniotes (early reptiles and synapsids) with adaptations for drier conditions (e.g., amniotic eggs). Habitat fragmentation promoted endemism, new ecological strategies (herbivory, predation), and broader terrestrial expansion.
Marine life experienced sea- level fluctuations (cyclothems from glacioeustasy of tens to ~100 m), anoxia in some intervals, and biodiversity responses tied to cooling versus warming pulses.
Glacial cycles produced widespread cyclothems, repeating sedimentary sequences of marine limestones, shales, sandstones, and coals, that dominate Carboniferous strata in many regions.
Sea- level falls exposed vast lowlands for peat accumulation, later becoming the bulk of the world’s economic coal deposits (the source of much of the fossil carbon driving modern industrial CO₂ emissions).
Mountain building associated with Pangaea assembly created rain shadows and altered drainage, contributing to regional drying. Polar ice sheets on Gondwana left glacial deposits (tillites, striations) across southern continents.
The Carboniferous set the stage for the early Permian transition to warmer, drier conditions as CO₂ eventually rose and ice sheets waned.
The period’s icehouse dynamics, vegetation-climate feedback, and atmospheric extremes provide key analogs for understanding modern icehouse- greenhouse transitions, the role of forests as carbon sinks, and how climate stress drives evolutionary and ecosystem restructuring.
In short, Carboniferous climate not only shaped a unique world of giant arthropods and coal forests but left a lasting imprint on Earth’s carbon cycle and biological trajectory.
Global greening refers to the widespread increase in vegetation cover, leaf area, and productivity observed via satellites (using metrics like NDVI, LAI, or GPP) since the early 1980s. It is one of the clearest large- scale responses of the biosphere to rising atmospheric CO₂, climate change, and human land management.
A new study finds that rising atmospheric CO₂ is expected to slow (but not stop) the expansion of Earth’s drylands this century, mainly because plants partially close their stomata and lose less water via transpiration.
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Global greening refers to the widespread increase in vegetation cover, leaf area, and productivity observed via satellites (using metrics like NDVI, LAI, or GPP) since the early 1980s. It is one of the clearest large- scale responses of the biosphere to rising atmospheric CO₂, climate change, and human land management.
Satellite records (AVHRR, MODIS, VIIRS, and harmonized products) show consistent global greening of vegetated land since ~1982. Roughly 25- 50% or more of vegetated areas have shown significant increases in leaf area, equivalent in some earlier analyses to adding leaf area on the scale of two continental United States.
The trend has persisted and, in recent years, strengthened. Global mean vegetation greenness set records in 2024 and again in 2025.
In 2024, ~67.7% of vegetated land surfaces showed greening (positive anomalies), raising the 2000- 2024 trend.
In 2025, ~68.2% of vegetated surfaces greened, further steepening the trend (to ~8.5 × 10⁻⁴ yr⁻¹ for the 2000–2025 period in one analysis). Herbaceous ecosystems (grasslands ~72%, croplands ~78%) dominated the recent signal.
Greening is not uniform: some regions experience browning due to drought, heat, deforestation, or other stressors (e.g., parts of the Amazon, southern Africa, or eastern Siberia in certain years). Overall, greening far outweighs browning at the global scale.
CO₂ fertilization is widely identified as the dominant global driver. Higher CO₂ boosts photosynthesis and improves water- use efficiency (plants partially close stomata, losing less water). Attribution studies using models and statistical approaches commonly attribute ~70% (or higher, e.g., ~83% in one 1982- 2021 analysis) of the greening to rising CO₂.
Other important factors, varying by region:
Climate — Warming extends growing seasons (especially autumn phenology in extratropical forests) and benefits high- latitude/Arctic areas; precipitation increases drive recent hotspots in grasslands and croplands.
Land use and management — Agricultural intensification, irrigation, fertilization, and afforestation are major contributors, especially in China and India (together accounting for a large share of new vegetation since 2000). Human activities can outweigh pure CO₂ effects in managed drylands and croplands.
Nitrogen deposition and other factors play smaller roles globally.
In drylands specifically (linking to the prior discussion of aridity and CO₂), greening is widespread despite rising temperatures and aridity indices in many areas. CO₂- driven water savings allow more vegetation growth for a given amount of moisture; human management (e.g., cropland expansion) also contributes substantially. Some studies find greening in a majority of drylands, with net productivity gains.
Regional patterns and recent highlights
China and India — Major greening hotspots due to tree planting/afforestation and intensive farming.
Northern mid- to- high latitudes and Arctic — Strong greening from warming and longer growing seasons; some polar regions (e.g., Antarctic Peninsula, Svalbard) also show expansion of vegetation.
Grasslands, savannas, and croplands — Prominent in recent record years (Eurasia, tropics, southern Hemisphere).
Tropical forests — More mixed signals; some recovery or greening, but also browning linked to droughts/El Niño and deforestation.
Drylands — Overall greening exceeds desertification in many assessments.
Phenology contributes meaningfully: lengthened autumn growing seasons drive a substantial portion of greening in extratropical forests, while maximum greenness increases dominate in non- forests (aided by CO₂ and land use).
Greening enhances the terrestrial carbon sink (helping offset some fossil- fuel emissions), increases evaporative cooling in places, and can improve water- use efficiency. However:
It does not fully counteract climate impacts (e.g., dryland expansion risks, extreme heat/drought stress, or biodiversity losses).
Increased vegetation can sometimes raise water demand or alter albedo.
Resilience may decline in some greening humid regions even as greenness rises.
Models often under- or over-estimate certain regional drivers (especially human land management in drylands).
Trends can accelerate or slow with interannual climate variability (e.g., El Niño effects).
In summary, Earth has been getting greener for decades, driven primarily by CO₂ fertilization globally, with strong regional contributions from climate and human activities. Recent years (2024- 2025) set new records, particularly in grasslands and croplands, reinforcing the multi- decadal signal. This continues even as other climate stressors intensify, illustrating the complex, dual role of rising CO₂. Ongoing satellite monitoring and improved models remain essential for tracking future changes.
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A new study finds that rising atmospheric CO₂ is expected to slow (but not stop) the expansion of Earth’s drylands this century, mainly because plants partially close their stomata and lose less water via transpiration.
The research, published in Environmental Research Letters (Cai et al., 2026), updates global dryland mapping and future projections using climate models from CMIP6 and historical meteorological data (1960- 2023).
Drylands are defined by the aridity index (AI = precipitation / potential evapotranspiration, or PET), with AI < 0.65 classifying an area as a dryland.
Key findings:
Current extent (baseline 1994– 2023, excluding Antarctica): Drylands cover about 38.58% of Earth’s land surface. Subtypes break down roughly as semi-arid (~14.72%), arid (~11.24%), dry sub- humid (~6.35%), and hyper- arid (~6.27%).
Future projections (2071- 2100): Under different greenhouse-gas emissions scenarios, drylands are projected to expand modestly to 39.31- 40.28% of land area. Hyper- arid zones show the largest relative increase. This equates to a potential gain of up to ~2.37 million km² (roughly the size of Algeria).
CO₂’s moderating role: Many earlier projections did not fully account for how higher CO₂ reduces plant stomatal conductance. This lowers water loss through transpiration, which modifies PET and yields lower aridity estimates than conventional approaches. The authors note that ignoring this effect can inflate aridity projections and shift the location of hotspots. With the CO₂- adjusted PET framework, expansion is noticeably smaller than some prior estimates (e.g., one older study suggested up to ~56% coverage by 2100).
Regions expected to see the most pronounced shifts include Australia (the strongest changes), Brazil, and parts of Africa. Expansion into formerly more humid areas could intensify water scarcity, ecosystem stress, and desertification risks, with implications for sustainable development.
This physiological response of plants to elevated CO₂ is a well- documented process that improves water-use efficiency and has been observed in experiments and models; the new work incorporates it more explicitly into global aridity- index projections.
Note that aridity- index metrics focus on atmospheric demand relative to precipitation and do not fully capture all ecohydrological or vegetation responses (e.g., actual soil moisture, plant growth, or greening trends observed in some drylands).
Other studies using different indices have sometimes projected little or no net global dryland expansion once plant physiological effects are considered more comprehensively.
CO₂-altered evapotranspiration moderates future global dryland expansion under climate change.
Rising atmospheric CO₂ reduces stomatal conductance, which lowers potential evapotranspiration (PET). When this physiological effect is included in the aridity index (AI = precipitation / PET), projected expansion of global drylands is moderated (smaller and slower) compared with conventional calculations that ignore the CO₂ effect on PET. The spatial pattern of drying and wetting hotspots also shifts.
Key results:
Current baseline (1994- 2023): Drylands (AI < 0.65) cover 38.58% of global land area (excluding Antarctica). Semi- arid zones form the largest share; hyper- arid zones are concentrated in places such as Algeria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.
Historical trend (1960- 2023): Dryland extent increased overall at a rate of 3.91 × 10⁴ km² yr⁻¹, though the rate of expansion has slowed in recent decades.
Future projections (2071- 2100) with CO₂-modified PET (CMIP6 multi-model ensemble):
SSP1-2.6: ~39.31%
SSP2-4.5: ~39.68%
SSP5-8.5: ~40.28% Absolute expansions relative to the baseline: 1.09, 1.58, and 2.37 million km², respectively. Hyper-arid zones contribute most to the increase.
PET calculated with a CO₂- modified Penman- Monteith equation that accounts for reduced stomatal conductance at higher CO₂. Parallel runs without the CO₂ term allow direct comparison.
Historical data: CRU precipitation and ERA5 meteorology (1960- 2023). Future: 19 CMIP6 models under three SSPs, bias-corrected using the 2015- 2023 overlap period.
Hotspots defined by significant AI trends (Theil- Sen and modified Mann- Kendall, p < 0.01).
Regional patterns:
Persistent or emerging drying hotspots: Australia, Brazil, northern Africa.
Possible wetting trends: parts of Northwestern China.
Transition example: parts of Central Australia may shift from wetting to drying hotspots.
Scenario differences are strongest along dryland margins (Brazil, North Africa- West Asia, Australia, Sahe- East Africa, northern China).
Conventional aridity projections that neglect CO₂ effects on PET tend to overestimate future dryland expansion and can mislocate hotspots.
The physiological response (stomatal closure → lower transpiration demand) provides a partial brake on aridification.
The authors note that full risk assessments should still incorporate land- use change, actual water resources, and ecosystem responses beyond the climate- based AI.
The paper is open access, so the full text, figures, and supplementary material are freely available at the link.
Authors: Yifei Cai, Feng Wang*, Yude Pan, Xubin Pan and Qi Lu
Abstract
Drylands are highly vulnerable to climate change, yet their recent spatial redistribution and future evolution remain insufficiently understood. Conventional projections often neglect CO2 effects on potential evapotranspiration (PET), which may yield higher aridity estimates and alter aridity-change hotspot patterns. To address this gap, this study maps the current global distribution of drylands, quantifies historical and future changes in dryland extent, and identifies drying and wetting hotspots under different emission scenarios using a CO2-modified PET framework. Using 1994–2023 as the baseline period, global drylands currently occupy approximately 38.58% of the global terrestrial area. From 1960 to 2023, dryland extent showed a fluctuating but overall increasing trend, with an expansion rate of 3.91 × 104 km2 yr−1. Future projections indicate continued but slower expansion through the 21st century compared with the historical trend. By the end of the 21st century, drylands are projected to cover approximately 40.28% of the global terrestrial area under SSP585. Accounting for rising CO2 effects moderates projected dryland expansion and alters the spatial pattern of drying and wetting hotspots compared with approaches that neglect CO2 effects on PET. Regionally, Australia, Brazil, and northern Africa are projected to remain or emerge as persistent drying hotspots, whereas parts of Northwestern China may maintain wetting trends. Parts of Central Australia may undergo a wetting-to-drying hotspot transition, indicating the emergence of new drying hotspots. These findings provide a climate-based indication of regions where dryland risks may be spatially reconfigured. Future dryland risk assessments should further incorporate land-use and water-resource conditions to better evaluate adaptation and management implications.
Apparently, there will be another attempt to negotiate an agreement in November, but why bother?
Press Release
Global maritime decarbonisation stalls despite the accelerating impact of climate change
September 4, 2026
States again failed to agree on a deal following pressure from a small minority of fossil-fuel producing nations and division among progressive states.
Negotiations at the IMO have drawn a blank for the third meeting in a row, as US and Saudi-led efforts to scupper progress were successful. With delegates from vulnerable countries highlighting the tragic cost of this year’s climate disasters, action is far too slow, warns T&E.
While pragmatic negotiators, including the EU, signalled openness to compromise measures such as avoiding a centralised fund and weakening greenhouse gas targets, US and Saudi negotiators largely held their ground. T&E urged negotiators not to cave to the Trump administration’s crusade to sacrifice ambitious targets in favor of fossil gas and crop biofuels – a lose-lose deal for the climate and for future-proofing the industry.
The continued failure to find an ambitious common ground not only puts shipping off course to decarbonise, but locks fossil fuel importing states and the shipping industry into continued dependency. During the Hormuz crisis, dependence on oil cost the industry roughly €340 million a day, according to T&E estimates.
The next major IMO meeting takes place from November 30th to December 3rd. There, governments must adopt a global deal capable of decarbonising shipping by 2050, rather than giving up on the climate or delaying action again. T&E urged delegations to intensify diplomatic efforts to overcome the obstruction of the US and its allies.
At the same time, ambitious governments must not let the ongoing delays at the IMO put the brakes on shipping’s need to decarbonise. Taking action at regional and national level on international shipping is becoming increasingly urgent in light of the IMO’s failure to move forward.
Alex Springer, interim shipping director at T&E, said: “After a summer of heatwaves, droughts and record sea temperatures, the failure of states to get close to a credible deal is deeply disappointing. It leaves global shipping increasingly adrift of where it needs to be. Governments should push forward with ambitious regional measures and must not wait for a global agreement before taking action.
While the crisis I’ve named haven’t yet torn down the global economy, if anything the global economic situation is even more precarious than when I discussed this absurd tax push last year. And yes, gold is still really expensive, which means a lot of people including some central banks are ditching income producing investments for safe haven investments.
Make no mistake, this International Maritime Organisation (IMO) negotiation is an attempt by the rest of the world to impose a tax on US prosperity. While China handles more maritime traffic than the USA, China had an escape plan, they wanted the UN to mandate use of synthetic Chinese fuel, allegedly produced using renewable energy, in place of the low cost diesel sludge which international cargo ships currently use for fuel.
But this nightmare scenario, everyone paying a tithe to China and the United Nations for every imported good which touches ocean water, for now at least belongs to an alternate reality in which President Trump did not win the election in 2024.
The stark reality: in China, 55% of power is produced by coal and the cost of household electricity is 8 cents per kWh.
Electricity is the sine qua non of modern society.
Coal-based electricity brought the U.S. to the center of the world’s economic stage and China has followed that same pathway to modernity and societal progress.
The stark reality: in China, 55% of power is produced by coal and the cost of household electricity is 8 cents per kWh. In the UK, coal’s percentage of electricity was 30% in 2010 but that has declined to less than 1%. Consequently, the cost of electricity for families has increased 250% — from 16 cents to over 40 cents per kWh — and is still on the rise. No wonder 37% of England’s families pay over 10% of their income on energy.
In the U.S., the closing of coal plants for political reasons has led to coal’s role declining from 45% in 2010 to just 15% today. Accordingly, the cost of electricity increased 70% to 19 cents per kWh and is projected to keep rising: “Retail electricity prices have increased faster than the rate of inflation since 2022, and we expect them to continue increasing” — U.S. Department of Energy.
Moreover, after the closure of over 300 coal plants, reliability is at serious risk in the U.S.: “coal-fired generator retirements… have caused a sharp decline in anticipated resources … new generation is insufficient to make up for generator retirements and load growth.” — North American Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC)
Electricity is the sine qua non of modern society.
In 2000, the National Academy of Engineering identified electrification as the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th Century.
Coal- based electricity brought the U.S. to the center of the world’s economic stage and China has followed that same pathway to modernity and societal progress. In 2000, coal produced about 990 Terawatt Hours (TWh) of electricity in China. By 2025, coal produced upwards of 6,000 TWh.
This dramatic rise in coal power stimulated massive improvements in the quality of life of the population. In 2000, the Infant Mortality Rate in China was 30, it is now 5. Access to clean cooking fuels increased from 41% of the population to well over 90%. Availability of clean water grew from 45% of households to 99%.
Life expectancy rose from 72 to 78, and the Food Production Index grew from 63 to over 112.
No wonder the International Energy Agency (IEA) declared: “Coal has underpinned China’s massive and unprecedented growth in output, fueling an economic miracle.”
The growth of the middle class in China is the largest the world has ever seen, increasing from 39 million people in 2000 to almost 1 billion today. The middle class is the backbone of any society and coal-
based electricity was the material foundation for this progress in China. In 2000, electricity use per capita was 993 kWh, it is now over 7,400 — far more than Germany. In essence, through the benefits of coal-based electricity, China, with over 1.4 billion people, became a modern nation in a little more than two decades. Since 2000, over 70% of humans lifted out of poverty were Chinese.
Coal made the difference and propelled China to ever higher in the World’s socio- economic hierarchy.
China imports about 550 million metric tons of coal per year. These imports, along with its own substantial supply, have provided the energy to make China the world’s leading manufacturer and exporter.
China produces over one billion tons of steel — 54% of global production, of which over 90% is produced using coal. China provides 52% of cement, 97% of which uses coal energy. China produces 80% of the world’s solar panels and coal provides at least 75% of the electricity for their manufacture.
By 2030, China’s coal to gas capacity will grow from 9.4 billion cubic meters to 28 billion. The world’s policymakers need to be mindful of their dependence on China’s use of coal and the benefits that have spread across the globe.
And now China has built an electricity system for the next leap forward. The PRC is basing its electric supply on a foundation of coal — a fuel that has demonstrated abundance, availability, affordability and reliability. By 2030, China will have over 1,500 GW of coal-based electricity compared to the DOE projection of a mere 88 GW in the U.S.
The idea that intermittent wind and solar will replace coal power in generation or manufacturing in China is wishful thinking indeed. Over 500 GW of coal capacity is already under development compared to an insignificant 4 GW in the U.S.
And these are not your grandfather’s coal plants. Rather, China is building advanced stations that produce significantly lower emissions. As Clare Richardson of the National Bureau of Asian Research pointed out: “China is rapidly deploying ultra-supercritical and supercritical coal technology, which can operate at higher temperatures and pressures to improve thermal efficiency.”
The country has also pursued widespread adoption of flue gas desulfurization and selective catalytic reduction systems to cut sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions.
Consider, for example, Pingshan Phase II in Anhui Province, a cutting-edge 1.35-GW ultra-supercritical coal-fired unit with a net efficiency of about 50% — making it the world’s most efficient coal-fired power plant and a continuing model for the ongoing wave of plants under construction not only in China but also India and the rest of the world. China is the architect of 21St Century coal power.
There is widespread recognition that progress in Artificial Intelligence (AI) will determine a large part of a nation’s future. RAND Corporation projects countries will see their influence rise or fall depending on how they manage the development of AI.
Scholars at the University of Miami School of Law concluded: “The global race for AI dominance is shaping the future of economies, governance, and national security.” Finally, this cogent comment from Arab News: “Artificial Intelligence is no longer just a technological breakthrough: it is quickly becoming a linchpin of global power.”
Thus, the race is on and now we consider the realities: The U.S. aspires to global dominance in AI. In July of last year, the White House published: Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan as well as three executive orders designed to promote and maintain leadership in AI. But China has the same aspiration. Through a series of Five-Year Plans, China has become a formidable technological competitor of the U.S.
As The New York Timesput it: China Is Spending Billions to Become an A.I. Superpower.
The competition between the U.S. and China is intense and China is steadily eroding the initial gap. In 2023, the Stanford AI Index reported the performance gap between U.S. and Chinese model benchmarks was about 25%. By 2026, that gap has narrowed to 3% and is closing further. Daniel Hook, CEO at Digital Science, found that China is now ahead in the development of large language models with an AI talent pool that dwarfs its rivals — 30,000 active AI researchers and a massive graduate student and postdoctoral population.
China has filed at least 70% of all global AI related patents and leads on research article volume with 23 % of all global AI publications versus 13 % for the U.S. And the American talent pool is diminishing. The number of AI researchers moving to the U.S. has dropped 89% since 2017. The U.S. is ahead today, but the momentum belongs to China.
No country will meet its AI goals without reliable and affordable electricity. The U.S. is increasingly falling behind on both fronts. Consider the PJM Interconnection with 67 million customers in the East. Due to the closure of coal generating capacity, the reserve margin for the system will continue to fall from 23% in 2020 to a risky 14% in 2027. Incredibly, utilities in the PJM system are planning to retire over 11 more GW of coal. Hard to believe.
The U.S. has been closing coal plants willy-nilly for over a decade with nary a thought to the implications. Yet the consequences of higher rates and reduced reliability are real and meaningful to the competition between China and the U.S. — and will be even more so as India’s 1.5 billion coal-based population enters the AI picture — India’s electricity is 70% coal.
“The difference in the cost of energy around the world is going to become really quite extreme,” Michael Brown, global investment strategist at Franklin Templeton, told CNBC. “If you’re making energy-intensive investments, then you’re going to go to where the cheapest energy is.”
In terms of rates, U.S. household power prices have risen nearly 25% in just four years. In 2025-26 a total of 47 states endured electricity price increases and dozens of additional rate increase requests are still pending.
The American people are increasingly victims of an array of poor energy policy decisions at both the Federal and state level — and even utilities themselves have failed to think ahead, closing productive coal plants to get in on the government dole of “renewables” like expensive wind and solar.
Families suffer, businesses suffer and the next generation of Americans will pay a heavy price with a diminishing role on the world’s economic stage.
Note: Coal is the Cornerstone seeks to give a voice to supporters of coal in its many dimensions and contributions. But we need help and ask like-minded individuals and companies to help support the effort at http://www.coaliscornerstone.com. Access to our previous articles is available on this site.
Fred Palmer Esq. has served as CEO of Western Fuels and Peabody Energy’s Senior Vice President for Government Affairs. He chaired the World Coal Association Board and was a member of the National Coal Council. He received the American Institute of Mining Award for “Distinguished Achievement in Coal Technology.” He also was awarded a Statement of Appreciation from the National Coal Council in 2015 with a plaque for “Guidance since 1990”
Frank Clemente PhD. specializes in the socio-economic impact of energy policy and is author of The Global Value of Coal published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as well as numerous articles in energy journals and reports for the National Coal Council. Professor Clemente has served on the faculty at the University of Kentucky, the University of Wisconsin and Penn State. His work is presented independently from any University affiliation.
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