Klaus Müller, president of Germany’s Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), has warned that gas consumers and tenants should prepare for higher bills in the medium term.

In comments to t-online (reported 18 August 2026), he cited ongoing uncertainty from the prolonged closure/restriction of the Strait of Hormuz linked to the Iran conflict that began in late February 2026. He described higher costs as unavoidable and noted no clear signs of a lasting easing on the gas market.

Prices are elevated due to the Hormuz disruption and related market effects (including impacts on global LNG flows, notably from Qatar), but they remain well below the extreme peaks of 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Germany can still buy gas on world markets; the issue is cost, not absolute physical shortage.

German gas storage stood at roughly 49–50% in mid-August 2026—well below typical levels for the season and the prior year—raising concerns about winter preparedness. Müller has urged gas traders/suppliers to inject more gas now, stating there is sufficient volume available and that traders should not later claim shortages due to inadequate stocking. LNG terminals can help cover shortfalls (estimated potential contribution of 10–15% of German demand in winter).

Household impact is already visible: the cheapest new-customer rates have risen significantly since the conflict began (reports indicate increases on the order of 20%+ in some comparisons, translating to hundreds of euros more annually for an average household if levels persist). Many existing fixed-price contracts still provide temporary protection.

This illustrates even after Europe largely replaced Russian pipeline gas with diversified LNG and other sources, Germany and the EU remain exposed to global price shocks via international markets.

A chokepoint disruption far from Europe still transmits higher costs quickly because gas is fungible and priced internationally.

Renewables expansion and efficiency measures help reduce overall demand and import needs over time, but they do not eliminate short- to medium-term reliance on gas for heating, industry, and flexible power generation—especially when storage is low and weather or further disruptions intervene.

Supply security itself is not currently described as at immediate risk of blackouts or widespread curtailment (unlike the acute 2022 fears), thanks to post-2022 infrastructure (LNG terminals, diversified suppliers including the US, Norway, etc.).

The main near-term consequence is higher bills for consumers and industry, plus slower storage refill because high prices discourage injection. Uniper and other market participants have similarly flagged elevated prices (around €50–60/MWh range in some outlooks) as long as the strait remains restricted.

In short, Müller’s warning is a pragmatic acknowledgment of persistent geopolitical price risk rather than a claim of imminent shortage, even German gas storage is currently lower than at the same time last year.

As of mid-August 2026 (around 18–19 August), the fill level stands at approximately 50% (reports cite figures such as 50.06% or ~50.1%).

At the comparable point in 2025 it was substantially higher — around 66–67% (for example, ~66.9% on 18 August 2025). It is also well below the 2024 level at this time of year (which was closer to 90%+).

The EU average is higher than Germany’s (roughly 61%), so Germany is lagging both its own recent history and the broader European picture.

This is one of the reasons Klaus Müller and others have been urging traders to inject more gas ahead of winter, even though absolute physical supply on world markets is still available (at elevated prices driven by the ongoing Hormuz/Iran-related disruption).

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Worst-case scenario: A hard German winter 2026/27 under current constraints Starting conditions (realistic baseline as of mid-August 2026):

Nuclear power: fully phased out (0 GW).

Gas storage: ~50% full (historically low for the season; target for 1 November is normally 80–90%).

Wind and solar: dominant variable renewables; winter capacity factors typically low (solar near zero on many days, wind highly variable).

Additional pressures: elevated gas prices and constrained LNG flow due to ongoing Strait of Hormuz disruption; limited firm dispatchable capacity beyond remaining coal, some gas plants, and imports.

Cascade of events in a severe winter

November–December 2026: Early cold snap and prolonged dunkelflaute

A prolonged high-pressure weather system settles over Central Europe. Temperatures drop to –10 °C to –15 °C for two weeks across much of Germany. Wind speeds collapse (average capacity factor for onshore/offshore wind falls below 10–15% for 10–14 consecutive days). Solar output is negligible due to short days, low sun angle, and frequent cloud cover.

Electricity demand surges for heating (heat pumps and resistance heating) and industry. Residual load (demand minus wind/solar) climbs sharply. Gas-fired power plants and remaining coal units run near maximum, but gas storage withdrawals accelerate. Cross-border imports from France, Norway, and others are constrained because neighbouring countries face similar cold and low-wind conditions.

January 2027: Storage crisis intensifies

Gas storage drops below 20–25%. Spot gas prices spike to levels last seen in 2022 (or higher because of the Hormuz bottleneck). Some industrial users face voluntary or mandatory curtailments. Households with gas heating see bills rise dramatically; those on heat pumps experience high electricity prices and occasional voltage reductions or controlled load-shedding in stressed regions.

Grid operators declare heightened alert stages. Frequency and voltage management become difficult during evening peaks. Rolling blackouts or targeted industrial shutdowns begin in the most strained control areas to protect system stability. Emergency coal plants (if any still available) are pushed to their limits; emissions spike temporarily.

February 2027: Compounding failures

Another multi-day dunkelflaute coincides with residual cold. LNG terminals operate at high utilisation, but global competition for cargoes (Asia also cold) and lingering Hormuz restrictions limit arrivals. Pipeline imports from Norway and the Netherlands cannot fully compensate.

Critical infrastructure (hospitals, data centres, water treatment) remains prioritised, but non-essential industry is heavily curtailed. Some district heating systems switch to backup oil or reduce temperatures. Public messaging shifts to emergency energy-saving appeals.

Economic damage mounts: production losses in energy-intensive sectors (chemicals, steel, glass, automotive), higher unemployment risk, and political pressure.

Possible extreme outcomes if the cold and low-wind period lasts 3–4 weeks cumulative

Gas storage approaches critical minimums, forcing deeper industrial rationing.

Spot electricity prices hit multi-thousand €/MWh for several hours on multiple days.

Localised or regional controlled outages become necessary to avoid cascading blackouts.

Social and political strain intensifies: protests over heating costs, debates over restarting mothballed capacity or emergency nuclear measures (legally and technically difficult in the short term), and questions about the speed of the renewable-only pathway.

Why this scenario is physically plausible

Wind and solar cannot be dispatched on demand.

Without sufficient firm capacity (nuclear, gas with full storage, or coal), or massive long-duration storage and overbuilt renewables plus interconnectors that also suffer the same weather, a simultaneous high-demand / low-generation event creates a residual-load gap that must be filled by the remaining thermal fleet and imports.

Low starting storage shrinks the buffer; geopolitical LNG friction raises the cost and reduces flexibility of the gas backstop.

This is a worst-case, not a base-case forecast.

Milder weather, stronger winds, successful rapid storage refill, or additional LNG arrivals would significantly reduce the severity.

The structural vulnerabilities (zero nuclear, weather-dependent generation share, and currently low storage) simply make the downside risk larger than in systems that retain more firm, weather-independent capacity.