From KlimaNachrichten

By Frank Bosse

We had reported here on the facts that were the cause of this: Increasing oscillations of a control system that contained too few integrative components that had previously prevented such a thing. The increasing number of inverters that enter photovoltaics (PV) there are particularly suitable for this.

They have practically no inert elements, as was the case before the many PV with rotating masses of large turbines. This is the obvious and, from a control point of view, completely clear indication of “too many” inverters synchronized only to the 50 Hz of the power grid. There are also technical solutions that avoid such a thing: An external frequency standard as a “target frequency”, coupled in phase at all feed-in points (no matter how the generation takes place) and “disciplined” with GPS. Such an arrangement is described here. Of course, retrofitting is not cheap and takes time. On the other hand, the power grid would be more resilient, and a possible “black start” after a blackout would also be much easier to manage and much faster.

To this day, one hears many opinions and “quick shots” about the cause and the future avoidance of such incidents.
We had reported here that Spain is politically focusing on more electricity storage. Something like this also takes decades (if the required quantities should ever become sufficient) and until then a bomb is ticking.

Now, political decisions are political and do not help the power grid at all.
This is where the control technology strikes and it has no convictions and party books.

So, what would a technician do if it is clear that too much PV (with the associated inverters) contributed to the blackout? That’s right, it would reduce the share of electricity production in it. Anything else would be illogical. What was actually done? The daily data from here will help. A look at the share of PV and nuclear power in the daily electricity production in Spain around the time of the blackout on April 28:

In the case of PV (solar), the average share was 27% until April 27, after which it was only 20%. The downward trend is highly significant.

In contrast, the share of nuclear power increased slightly, but has an upper limit: the installed capacity. Almost everything that was available in terms of integrating parts (= inert masses) was activated. The “fast” inverters have been reduced. The total PV output fell from an average of 182 GWh/day to 127 GWh/day. So after the blackout in Spain, PV was reduced by about 30%. This is logical and speaks a clear language.
All (political/ideological) attempts to blame something else for the failure in Spain must be shattered by these clear realities. So, no matter what soup is trying to be cooked, the technology can neither be persuaded nor deceived.