These Ancient Eruptions Were Thousands of Times More Powerful Than Anything Humans Have Ever Witnessed

The most powerful volcanic eruptions are ranked primarily by the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI), a logarithmic scale (0- 8 or more) based mainly on the volume of ejected material (tephra), plume height, and qualitative descriptors.

Most powerful eruptions in recorded human history are those of VEI 7 (and the largest VEI 6 events). No VEI 8 supereruptions have occurred in the Holocene.

Wah Wah Springs, La Garita (Fish Canyon Tuff), and Toba rank among the largest known single explosive (VEI 8) eruptions by erupted volume in Earth’s geological record.

A dramatic eruption depicting a volcanic explosion with ash and lava, accompanied by bold text emphasizing the power of ancient eruptions compared to human experiences.
AI generated by Grok

The most powerful volcanic eruptions are ranked primarily by the Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI), a logarithmic scale (0- 8 or more) based mainly on the volume of ejected material (tephra), plume height, and qualitative descriptors.

Each step up generally represents about a tenfold increase in ejecta volume. VEI 8 events are “mega-colossal” supereruptions (≥1,000 km³ of ejecta).

Power can also be considered by dense- rock equivalent (DRE) volume of magma, energy release, or climate impact (e.g., sulfur dioxide emissions), but VEI is the standard for explosivity. Note that enormous effusive flood- basalt events (such as the Siberian Traps ~252 million years ago) released millions of km³ of lava over long periods and are linked to mass extinctions, but they are not highly explosive and thus score low on the VEI.

Most Powerful in Recorded Human History

No VEI 8 eruptions have occurred in the Holocene (last ~11,700 years). The largest in the historical/written record are VEI 7:

Mount Tambora (Indonesia), 1815: The most powerful eruption in recorded history (VEI 7; ~30- 50 and more km³ DRE / ~100 or more km³ bulk ejecta). It was heard ~1,600- 2,000 km away, killed ~10,000 people directly (and tens of thousands more from famine and disease), and caused the 1816 “Year Without a Summer” with global cooling, crop failures, and widespread hardship.

Other notable large historical or near- historical eruptions include:

  • Samalas (Rinjani, Indonesia), 1257: VEI 7; major climate impact.
  • Paektu/Changbaishan (China/North Korea border), ~946 CE: VEI 7.
  • Santorini/Thera (Greece), ~1600 BCE: VEI 7; heavily impacted Minoan civilization.
  • Taupo (New Zealand), ~232 CE: VEI 7.
  • Krakatoa (Indonesia), 1883: VEI 6; extremely loud explosions heard thousands of km away, massive tsunamis, ~36,000 deaths.
  • Novarupta (Alaska, USA), 1912: VEI 6; largest of the 20th century.
  • Mount Pinatubo (Philippines), 1991: VEI 6; significant global cooling.
  • Hunga Tonga- Hunga Haʻapai (Tonga), 2022: Around VEI 5- 6; the most powerful of the 21st century so far, with a massive atmospheric shockwave and tsunami.

VEI 6- 7 events occur on timescales of decades to centuries/millennia and can have regional- to- global climatic effects.

Largest Known Supereruptions (VEI 8) in Earth’s Geological History

These are far larger than anything in human history. Roughly 40- 60 VEI 8 events have been identified in the last ~132 million years (many more are likely lost to erosion and tectonics). Frequency is on the order of once every ~50,000 years or more.

Notable examples (volumes are approximate bulk ejecta and can have significant uncertainty):

Eruption / CalderaAgeLocationApprox. Volume (km³)Notes
Wah Wah Springs Tuff~30 MaUtah/Nevada, USA5,500- 5,900One of the largest known
La Garita (Fish Canyon Tuff)~27.8 MaColorado, USA~5,000Often cited among the very largest
Youngest Toba Tuff~74,000 years agoSumatra, Indonesia~2,800 (range 2,000-13,200)Largest in the last ~1- 2 million years; possible human population bottleneck
Huckleberry Ridge (Yellowstone)~2.1 MaWyoming/Idaho, USA~2,450- 2,500Largest Yellowstone event
Oruanui (Taupō)~26,500 years agoNew Zealand~1,170Most recent VEI 8
Lava Creek (Yellowstone)~640,000 years agoWyoming, USA~1,000Formed the present Yellowstone caldera

Other very large events include various Mid-Tertiary ignimbrite flare- up deposits in the western U.S. and several in the Taupō Volcanic Zone.

Key Context

VEI 8 events eject ≥1,000 km³ and can inject vast amounts of material into the stratosphere, potentially causing multi- year volcanic winters and major ecological disruption.

The largest known explosive events (by volume) date back tens of millions of years; evidence becomes scarcer further back due to geological recycling.

Climate and human impacts depend heavily on sulfur content and latitude as well as raw size (Tambora and Toba are classic examples of strong climate forcing).

In short: Tambora 1815 is the standout for recorded history, while Wah Wah Springs, La Garita/Fish Canyon, and Toba rank among the most powerful known explosive eruptions in Earth’s longer geological record.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Most powerful eruptions in recorded human history are those of VEI 7 (and the largest VEI 6 events). No VEI 8 supereruptions have occurred in the Holocene.

Climate impacts arise mainly from sulfur dioxide (SO₂) injected into the stratosphere, which forms sulfate aerosols that reflect sunlight and cause temporary global or hemispheric cooling (a “volcanic winter”), often lasting 1- 3 years, along with disruptions to precipitation and monsoons.

1. Mount Tambora (Indonesia), April 1815: VEI 7

This is the most powerful eruption in recorded history (~30- 50 or more km³ dense- rock equivalent / >100 km³ bulk ejecta; plume up to ~43- 45 km). It released an estimated 10- 120 Tg (million tons) of sulfur (commonly cited around 50- 60 Tg SO₂).

Climate impact:

  • Global average temperatures dropped by roughly 0.4- 0.7 °C (some regional or Northern Hemisphere estimates higher, up to ~0.8- 1+ °C in places).
  • 1816 became known as the “Year Without a Summer” in the Northern Hemisphere (especially Europe and North America): widespread frosts and snow in June- August, crop failures, livestock deaths, famine, and disease. It contributed to tens of thousands of deaths beyond the immediate local toll (~10,000- 90,000 or more including famine and disease in Indonesia and elsewhere).
  • Effects persisted for 1- 3 years, with altered weather patterns, reduced precipitation in some regions, and vivid sunsets from aerosols.
  • Models confirm the eruption greatly increased the likelihood of the extreme cold (and contributed to wetter conditions in parts of Europe).

2. Samalas (Rinjani, Indonesia), 1257: VEI 7

One of the largest sulfur- rich eruptions of the Common Era (possibly larger sulfur release than Tambora; estimates ~100- 160 Tg SO₂ or more). It ranks among the top stratospheric gas injections of the past 2,000 years.

Climate impact:

  • Produced some of the coldest Northern Hemisphere summers of the past millennium in 1258-1259 (proxy reconstructions show peak cooling of ~0.7- 1.2 °C or more in places; models often simulate stronger cooling, ~1- 2 °C).
  • Cooling was spatially heterogeneous: strong in Western Europe, Siberia, and Japan; milder or even warmer in parts of North America (possibly modulated by El Niño).
  • Aggravated existing food shortages and famines in Europe and Japan (though crises began before the eruption in some areas). Effects lasted a few years and may have contributed to broader 13th-century cooling trends.

Other Major Historical Eruptions and Climate Effects

Huaynaputina (Peru), 1600 (VEI 6): Linked to one of the coldest years of the past millennium (1601); strong Northern Hemisphere cooling and crop failures.

Krakatoa (Indonesia), 1883 (VEI 6): Global cooling of ~0.3–1 °C lasting ~1- 2 years; spectacular sunsets; measurable temperature drops and weather anomalies.

Novarupta (Alaska), 1912 (VEI 6): Largest 20th- century eruption; significant but more regional Northern Hemisphere effects.

Mount Pinatubo (Philippines), 1991 (VEI 6): Best- observed modern large eruption. Injected ~15- 20 Tg SO₂; global surface/tropospheric cooling of ~0.4- 0.7 °C peaking in the following 1- 2 years, with stratospheric warming; reduced tropical precipitation. Effects faded within a few years.

Other notable cases: Paektu/Changbaishan (~946 CE, VEI 7), Ilopango (~450 CE or earlier, VEI 6 or more), and the unknown 1809 tropical eruption (preceding Tambora) also produced detectable cooling signals in ice cores and tree rings.

General Patterns of Climate Impact

Tropical eruptions (like Tambora, Samalas, Pinatubo) tend to produce more global effects because aerosols spread efficiently across both hemispheres. High- latitude eruptions can cause stronger regional (especially Northern Hemisphere) cooling relative to their sulfur load. Cooling peaks in the first 1- 2 years and typically lasts 2- 5 years depending on aerosol lifetime. Secondary effects include:

  • Reduced global and monsoon precipitation in the first summer.
  • Possible modulation of El Niño- Southern Oscillation or other modes of variability.
  • Agricultural disruption, famine risk, and societal stress, especially when combined with other factors (e.g., low solar activity during the Little Ice Age).

Proxy records (tree rings, ice cores) and climate models consistently show that the largest VEI 6- 7 events of the past 2,000 years drove some of the most extreme short- term cooling episodes of the Common Era.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Wah Wah Springs, La Garita (Fish Canyon Tuff), and Toba rank among the largest known single explosive (VEI 8) eruptions by erupted volume in Earth’s geological record.

These far exceed anything in human history (e.g., Tambora 1815 was ~30- 50 or more km³ DRE). Volumes are approximate bulk ejecta (or dense-rock equivalent where noted) and carry uncertainties due to erosion, incomplete exposure, and modeling assumptions. All are supereruptions (≥1,000 km³).

Wah Wah Springs (~30.06 million years ago)

  • Location: Indian Peak- Caliente Caldera Complex, southwestern Utah (near the Utah- Nevada border), USA.
  • Volume: ~5,500- 5,900 km³ (preferred average often cited as ~5,900 km³) of crystal-rich dacite. This makes it one of the largest single explosive eruptions known.
  • Details: Part of a major Mid-Tertiary ignimbrite flare-up. The eruption produced extensive pyroclastic flows (some >500 m thick) and ash that reached as far as Nebraska. The structural caldera is roughly 1,000 km². It occurred over a short period (possibly about a week in models). The deposits are now deeply eroded and dissected.

It ranks as the largest known eruption from its caldera complex and among the very top globally by volume.

La Garita / Fish Canyon Tuff (~27.8- 28.2 million years ago)

  • Location: La Garita Caldera, San Juan volcanic field, southwestern Colorado, USA (near Creede).
  • Volume: ~5,000 km³ of remarkably uniform, crystal- rich dacite (often described as “monotonous intermediate”).
  • Details: One of the largest and best- studied Cenozoic eruptions. The Fish Canyon Tuff is highly homogeneous in composition. The caldera is large and elongate (~35 × 75 km in revised estimates). It is part of the same Oligocene ignimbrite flare- up that produced many other large events in the western U.S. Sanidine crystals from the tuff are widely used as a geochronology standard (astronomically calibrated age ~28.175 Ma). The eruption was followed by smaller associated activity over ~100 ka.

It is frequently ranked among the top two or three largest known explosive eruptions of the past 100 million years.

Youngest Toba Tuff (Toba, ~74,000 years ago)

  • Location: Toba Caldera, northern Sumatra, Indonesia.
  • Volume: Commonly estimated at ~2,800 km³ bulk (or ~2,000- 2,800 km³ DRE in classic figures); more recent modeling of ash fallout plus proximal deposits raises total estimates to ~5,300 km³ DRE (or bulk volumes up to ~8,600- 13,200 km³ in some calculations). It is the largest known eruption of the Quaternary (last ~2.6 million years).
  • Details: Formed the present Lake Toba caldera (one of the world’s largest). Ash blanketed the Indian subcontinent (centimeters thick in places) and reached the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and beyond. The eruption column likely reached 30- 40 and more km.

Climate and environmental impact: The most debated of the three because it is relatively recent. Sulfur release estimates vary widely (hundreds of Tg SO₂ in many models). Climate simulations often predict multi- year global cooling of several degrees (peak global means around 3- 5 °C in high- sulfur scenarios, with stronger regional effects), a possible volcanic winter, and disruption of monsoons. Some ice- core and proxy records support cooling lasting years to a decade or more.

However, the severity and duration are contested: certain African and Indian records show limited long-term disruption or even short- term warming/drying in places, and the long- proposed human population bottleneck (near- extinction of early modern humans) remains highly controversial and is not strongly supported by all genetic or archaeological evidence. Regional effects near the source would have been catastrophic.

Comparison and Context

EruptionAgeVolume (approx.)LocationNotes
Wah Wah Springs~30.06 Ma5,500- 5,900 km³Utah, USALargest of its complex; among the absolute biggest known
La Garita (Fish Canyon)~27.8- 28.2 Ma~5,000 km³Colorado, USAExtremely uniform composition; major dating standard
Toba (Youngest Tuff)~74 ka2,800- 5,300 or more km³ DRESumatra, IndonesiaLargest Quaternary; potential climate & human impacts debated

These three stand out because of their exceptional volumes. Older or less well- preserved candidates (e.g., some Mid-Tertiary or Paleozoic events) exist with potentially comparable or larger estimated sizes, but evidence is more fragmentary. Wah Wah Springs and La Garita belong to a period of intense western North American volcanism; Toba is the most recent of the truly giant ones and the only one with possible direct relevance to modern human populations.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Volcanic ash has limited direct long- term climate impacts compared to sulfate aerosols, but it plays several important short- term and secondary roles.

Primary Distinction: Ash vs. Sulfate Aerosols

The dominant climate effect of large explosive eruptions comes from sulfur dioxide (SO₂), which converts into sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere. These tiny droplets can persist for 1- 3 years, efficiently scatter incoming sunlight back to space, and produce global surface cooling (typically 0.1- 0.5°C or more after major events like Pinatubo 1991).

Volcanic ash (fine particles of rock, glass, and minerals) behaves differently:

  • Larger ash particles fall out of the atmosphere within days to weeks due to gravity.
  • Only very fine ash (sub- micron to a few microns) can remain suspended longer.
  • Even fine ash has a much shorter atmospheric lifetime than sulfate aerosols (weeks to a few months in most cases, though some observations show persistence for months).

As a result, ash contributes mainly to local or regional, short- term effects, while sulfate drives the longer- lasting global cooling.

Direct Radiative Effects of Ash

  • Fine ash can scatter sunlight and contribute to temporary cooling while airborne.
  • Observations after some eruptions (e.g., Kelut 2014) showed ash-rich particles dominating the optical properties of the volcanic cloud for the first ~60 days and accounting for 20- 25% of the aerosol optical depth in certain cases.
  • Ash is generally less efficient at reflecting sunlight than sulfate aerosols on a per- mass basis over long periods.
  • Some studies indicate that persistent fine ash can enhance short- term cooling beyond what models assuming rapid ash fallout predict.

Indirect and Secondary Effects

Ash influences climate and atmospheric chemistry in other ways:

  • Heterogeneous chemistry: Ash surfaces can take up SO₂, accelerating its removal from the atmosphere. In some cases this shortens the SO₂ lifetime and reduces the amount of sulfate that forms (one study found ~43% more sulfur removed in 2 months when ash chemistry was included).
  • Ocean iron fertilization: When ash falls into the ocean, it can supply iron and stimulate phytoplankton growth. This may enhance carbon dioxide uptake from the atmosphere, providing a longer- term (though usually modest) cooling effect via the carbon cycle. This has been observed after events such as the 2008 Kasatochi eruption.
  • Surface albedo: Thick ash deposits on land (especially continental-scale blankets from supereruptions) can increase surface reflectivity, potentially causing regional or longer- lasting cooling lasting years to decades until the ash is weathered or covered.
  • Local weather disruption: Ash reduces solar radiation at the surface near the volcano, lowers daytime temperatures, and can affect precipitation and aviation in the short term.

Summary of Climate Relevance

AspectVolcanic AshSulfate Aerosols
Atmospheric lifetimeDays to months (fine particles)1- 3 years
Main climate effectShort- term local/regional cooling; some optical contributionGlobal surface cooling for years
Key mechanismScattering, chemistry and ocean fertilization and surface albedoScattering of sunlight
Importance for large eruptionsSecondary / short- termPrimary driver

In climate models, ash is often neglected or simplified because of its short lifetime. Recent research shows this may underestimate early post- eruption cooling and chemical interactions. For the largest supereruptions (such as Toba), thick ash blankets could have more significant regional and multi- year surface effects than typically assumed.

Overall, while ash contributes to the initial climate response and has interesting biogeochemical roles, sulfate aerosols remain the main agent responsible for the multi- year global cooling associated with major volcanic eruptions.

Another Big Step In The Removal Of Destructive “Climate” Regulations

And yet, by the time President Joe Biden and his minions had left office in early 2025, such people, operating deep in the administrative state (and with the apparent blessing of a demented President), had managed to impose regulations that, by some time in the 2030s would have, among other things, forced the end of the manufacture and sale of all vehicles except electric vehicles, and forced the closure of all power plants using fossil fuels.

Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump and his people have been actively working to rescind and eliminate this insanity.

Today the EPA took another big step in removing these destructive regulations by finalizing a Rule titled “Partial Repeal of the Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units.”

A cartoon depicting the removal of climate regulations, featuring a character representing climate alarmism surrounded by vines labeled with various regulatory terms. The scene shows individuals discussing changes to the EPA's guidelines, with details about new rules and the benefits of affordable energy.

From Manhattan Contrarian

 By Francis Menton

I will never understand how large numbers of seemingly intelligent people got the idea that they were going to save the world by forcing the closure of all the functional parts of the energy system of the U.S. Nor will I ever understand how enough of those people got themselves into positions of sufficient political power to put their wacko energy ideas into effect. And yet, by the time President Joe Biden and his minions had left office in early 2025, such people, operating deep in the administrative state (and with the apparent blessing of a demented President), had managed to impose regulations that, by some time in the 2030s would have, among other things, forced the end of the manufacture and sale of all vehicles except electric vehicles, and forced the closure of all power plants using fossil fuels.

Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump and his people have been actively working to rescind and eliminate this insanity. I have previously reported on many of these actions, for example here and here. Today the EPA took another big step in removing these destructive regulations by finalizing a Rule titled “Partial Repeal of the Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units.” The final Rule was published today in the Federal Register at 91 F.R. 58,954; it takes effect 60 days from today, that is, November 16, 2026.

Today’s action is ludicrously complex in its efforts to clear away some of the convoluted regulatory thicket erected by the previous administration. (It was 195 pages long in the standard double-spaced typed format issued a few days ago, in advance of the official Federal Register publication.). The complexity of the rescission is a function of the complexity of the prior actions that it seeks to unwind. Today I’ll try to provide a comprehensible summary of the background, and how the latest action fits into the mix.

It was way back in December 2009, during Barack Obama’s first year as President, that EPA adopted what is known as the Endangerment Finding, purporting to determine that carbon dioxide and other “greenhouse gases” constitute a “danger” to human health and welfare. In the same December 2009 regulatory action, EPA also claimed to find that emissions of these gases from “from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contribute to the greenhouse gas pollution that threatens public health and welfare.” That finding then formed the basis for the subsequent regulations that initially imposed fuel economy standards on vehicles, and then further imposed emissions mandates that would ratchet down over time until only fully-electric vehicles could be manufactured and sold.

After the December 2009 action, it remained for further regulations to extend the Endangerment Finding to other emissions sources like industry, aircraft, and power plants. As to power plants, the major initiative of the Obama administration was a regulation informally known as the Clean Power Plan, finally imposed in October 2015, during the second half of Obama’s second term. (The official name of the CPP was “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units.”). The basic structure of the CPP was to set limits on the amounts of CO2 and other GHGs that a power plant could emit, with those limits ratcheting down over the years until, by some point in the late 2030s, it would be impossible for any power plant using fossil fuels to comply. At that point, all fossil fuel power plants would be forced to close.

During President Trump’s first term, EPA attempted to do away with the CPP and replace it with another regulation called the Affordable Clean Energy rule; but that effort got struck down by the D.C. Circuit, thereby seemingly re-instating the CPP pending Supreme Court review. The litigation reached the Supreme Court in 2022, during the Biden presidency, in a case called West Virginia v. EPA. The Supreme Court struck down the CPP as being beyond the authority conferred on EPA by Congress in the Clean Air Act.

But the zealots in the Biden EPA were not going to be deterred by the Supreme Court’s striking down of the CPP, and they looked for another avenue to force the end of electricity generation by fossil fuels. In May 2024 the Biden EPA went final with a Rule with a ridiculously long title but generally referred to as the “Carbon Pollution Standards” for power plants. To avoid the Supreme Court’s West Virginia decision, this regulation took a new approach, which was to declare that the “best system of emissions reduction” (BSER) for a power plant would be to adopt a system of carbon capture and sequestration or storage (CCS), supposedly to capture 90% of the emissions of the power plant.

The problem with CCS is that it is enormously costly and uses up a large fraction of the energy produced by the plant in the effort to capture the emitted CO2. In the limiting case, you can use up all the energy produced by the plant, and still not capture the last bits of the emitted CO2. (I have previously referred to CCS as “a war against the second law of thermodynamics.”)

When the Biden EPA proposed the Carbon Pollution Standards, numerous commenters — including major states like Ohio and West Virginia — pointed out why the standards were technically infeasible. I summarized those comments in this post from August 2023. But EPA went ahead anyway.

EPA’s action today rescinds the Carbon Pollution Standards for existing power plants. In support of its action, EPA basically adopts the infeasibility arguments made in the cited comments of Ohio and West Virginia. Here are some excerpts from the Executive Summary:

The EPA is finalizing the repeal of the emission guidelines for existing fossil fuel-fired steam generating units in their entirety. Specifically, the EPA is finalizing the determination that 90 percent CCS is not the BSER for existing long-term coal-fired steam generating units because 90 percent CCS has not been adequately demonstrated, the costs of 90 percent CCS are not reasonable, and the associated degree of emission limitation is not achievable. In a change from the 2024 CPS, the EPA concludes that previous projects that failed to achieve 90 percent CCS were not a sufficient basis to conclude the technology has been adequately demonstrated. Additionally, the carbon dioxide (CO2) capture, pipeline, and sequestration infrastructure necessary to implement 90 percent CCS for the fleet of existing coal-fired steam generating units does not currently exist and would need to be broadly deployed. Because it is significantly unlikely that the necessary infrastructure for CCS can be deployed by the January 1, 2032 compliance date, the EPA is finalizing the determination that the degree of emission limitation in the 2024 CPS for long-term coal-fired steam generating units is not achievable.

Note that, as with the previous rescission in February 2026 of the Endangerment Finding as to motor vehicle emissions, EPA did not attempt in this rule-making to take on the scientific basis for the claim that human GHG emissions are leading us to some kind of global warming apocalypse. I regard that omission as a lost opportunity. EPA’s 2009 Endangerment Finding rested on a very shaky foundation, most notably claiming to find ongoing warming in a surface temperature record that lacked almost all data for 40% of the earth’s surface (the Southern Hemisphere oceans). It would be great to point out how comically weak were the bases on which this power-hungry agency purported to imposed trillions of dollars in cost on the American people.

Like the February rescission of the EF, this action will undoubtedly quickly proceed to litigation in the D.C. Circuit. Although I would have liked EPA to base its actions on additional arguments besides the ones it has used, I still think its position is strong. Indeed, I can’t even think of what the environmental groups are going to say to the arguments about infeasibility of CCS. There really is no functional economic demonstration of this technology at scale, even today, and there likely never will be. So have at it!

Nuclear radiation and falling out of bed

Thankfully President Trump has issued Executive Order 143000 under which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is undergoing restructuring and is reviewing the use of the Linear No-threshold (LNT) model. The Executive Order stated that the LNT model is flawed, and it instructs reviewers to use science-based measures.

As years went by, the application of the LNT model demanded hugely expensive safety measures be built into nuclear reactors, even though the real risks were negligible.

An interesting illustration was the Fukushima incident. The very old reactor complex was struck by the largest tsunami on record. It also turned out that Fukushima had a number of design faults and management faults as well, and yet the result was that not one single person was killed or injured by nuclear radiation.

A person holding a light bulb covered in green moss, symbolizing sustainability and eco-friendliness.
eco light bulb

From CFACT

By Kelvin Kemm

Thankfully President Trump has issued Executive Order 143000 under which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is undergoing restructuring and is reviewing the use of the Linear No-threshold (LNT) model. The Executive Order stated that the LNT model is flawed, and it instructs reviewers to use science-based measures. In June 2025 President Trump abruptly dismissed sitting NRC Chairman Chris Hanson. This marked the first time in the agency’s history that a sitting commissioner was removed. Before this happened, I had been told confidentially that the NRC had effectively become an anti-nuclear body, under the influence of the anti-nuclear lobby. Looking at the United States from other countries, it certainly had appeared like that. The NRC of the U.S. had become a major obstacle to the advance of nuclear power. Since mid-2025 a major NRC restructuring has been underway.

How did LNT happen, and what was the result?

What happened was that a scientist, Herman Mueller, discovered in 1927 that X-rays caused genetic mutations in fruit flies. Additional research in the 1920s and 1930s suggested a linear relationship between X-ray dose and fly mutations.

As the 1950s and 1960s of the Cold War era unfolded, the International Commission on Radiological Protection introduced this concept into nuclear radiation protection rules. They knew how much nuclear radiation would kill a person, and how much would seriously harm a person. At that point all was OK. But then people with political agendas extended the argument, (like the ice block story) and what they did was draw a straight line all the way to zero. But this was wrong. It implied that there was no dose under which nuclear radiation was harmless. The result was that huge costs were introduced into nuclear power plant construction, based on unrealistic assumptions of possible danger.

I asked a South African nuclear engineer, Andrew Kenny, to give a talk about this at a conference. Andrew did an excellent job and introduced the Falling Out Of Bed (FOOB) concept, as an amusing illustration of how silly LNT had become.

Andrew assembled real figures for injuries and death to people falling at industrial sites. The data was comprehensive. For example, for workers falling from, say, a four-storey building, death is virtually certain. From a two-storey building; very likely, but not certain, and so on. Andrew pointed out that falling from the height of a table would almost certainly not harm anyone, or at worst, break an arm. However, if you use the LNT nuclear radiation model, and foolishly extend the line all the way to zero, it would tell you that the chance of death was not zero. The law would then kick in, and require safety measures to be put in place to prevent anybody falling off a bar stool, from dying. Andrew took it further, and said that the mathematics would say that there was a chance of dying if a person fell out a bed. In the nuclear LNT scenario the law would then require that no bed could be higher than two bricks height, and that safety barriers would have to be built around the bed. This sounds silly but it is exactly what really happened in the nuclear industry.

Crazy cost escalation

As years went by, the application of the LNT model demanded hugely expensive safety measures be built into nuclear reactors, even though the real risks were negligible. These actions were enthusiastically encouraged by the anti-nuclear lobby who openly stated that they wanted to price nuclear power out of the market.

An interesting illustration was the Fukushima incident. The very old reactor complex was struck by the largest tsunami on record. It also turned out that Fukushima had a number of design faults and management faults as well, and yet the result was that not one single person was killed or injured by nuclear radiation. Additionally, no private property was harmed in any way by nuclear radiation. Fukushima was not a nuclear disaster. It was a conventional industrial incident which was very costly for the owners, and very damaging to the image and pride of the Japanese government. But it was not a nuclear disaster.

Air Disaster?

As a comparison, imagine if three large passenger aircraft were parked in a hangar at an airport, and the hangar catches fire. The hangar is burnt to the ground, and the three aircraft totally destroyed. Would you classify that as a major air disaster, merely because aircraft were involved? Not a chance…

Fukushima should have been hailed as an incredible illustration of just how safe nuclear power was. After all that went wrong, there was actually no nuclear problem. But the result of Fukushima internationally was that extra safety measures were demanded at reactors all over the world. Using the LNT model, ridiculously expensive additional safety measures were put in place, merely adding to the cost of nuclear power. So totally false LNT Index criteria were applied foolishly.

This is like creating a silly; Falling Out Of Bed Index (FOOBI) and applying it all over society to anything of any height, even your bed and barstool, supposedly to save lives on a massive scale.

So, the FOOBI concept shows that you can’t just extrapolate some data without actually checking if the extrapolation is valid.

In the case of LNT, it is not valid. Small doses of nuclear radiation are harmless and there’s no need for any concern. As much as you can safely sleep on a normal bed, you can safely sleep next door to a modern nuclear reactor.

Hidden Fire Beneath the Ice: How Subglacial Volcanoes Are Reshaping Antarctica’s Frozen Giant

Antarctica hosts numerous volcanoes, many of them hidden beneath the ice sheet, primarily associated with the West Antarctic Rift System (WARS), a major zone of crustal extension comparable in scale to the East African Rift.

Antarctic Peninsula volcanism spans more than 200 million years and reflects a complex tectonic evolution involving long- lived subduction, progressive ridge- crest- trench collisions, slab- window formation, and back- arc rifting. It differs from the alkaline intraplate volcanism of the West Antarctic Rift System farther south and west.

A dramatic landscape showing cracks in icy terrain with visible red lava, under a twilight sky with mountain silhouettes in the background.
AI generated by Grok

Antarctica hosts numerous volcanoes, many of them hidden beneath the ice sheet, primarily associated with the West Antarctic Rift System (WARS), a major zone of crustal extension comparable in scale to the East African Rift.

Total numbers: More than 100 volcanoes have been identified across Antarctica (including subglacial and submarine ones). A 2017 study identified 138 volcanoes in West Antarctica alone (91 previously unknown), making it one of Earth’s densest volcanic regions under ice.

Holocene (last ~11,700 years) activity: The Smithsonian Global Volcanism Program lists 19 Holocene volcanoes in Antarctica.

Active or recently active examples: At least several large volcanoes show ongoing or Holocene activity (e.g., fumaroles, thermal anomalies, or eruptions). Most eruptions are small or subglacial and have limited global climate impact, though large ones could inject aerosols into the stratosphere.

Volcanism is driven mainly by rifting (thinning of the crust allowing mantle material to rise) and some hotspot activity, producing predominantly alkaline rocks. Many edifices are glaciovolcanic (erupted under or interacting with ice), forming distinctive features like hyaloclastites.

Notable Volcanoes

Mount Erebus (Ross Island, McMurdo Volcanic Province) is the southernmost active volcano on Earth and the most prominent.

  • Elevation: ~3,794 m (12,448 ft).
  • Features a persistent phonolitic lava lake in its summit crater (one of only a few long- lived lava lakes worldwide), with ongoing Strombolian activity since at least the early 1970s (continuing as of recent years).
  • Overlooks McMurdo Station and Scott Base; first climbed in 1908.

Deception Island (South Shetland Islands) is a flooded caldera forming a horseshoe- shaped harbor popular for research and tourism.

  • Last major eruptions: 1967- 1970 (VEI 3). Ongoing geothermal activity.

Other notable or Holocene volcanoes include:

  • Mount Melbourne (northern Victoria Land), fumaroles; last eruption ~1892.
  • Mount Berlin and Mount Takahe / Mount Waesche (Marie Byrd Land), fumaroles or thermal anomalies; Holocene activity.
  • Hudson Mountains, possible eruption ~200 BCE (or later uncertain events).
  • Balleny Islands (Buckle, Young, Sturge/Brown Peak), some historical activity (e.g., Buckle Island 1899).
  • Others: The Pleiades, Mount Rittmann, Peter I Island, Bridgeman Island, etc.

Many large shield volcanoes rise through the West Antarctic Ice Sheet in Marie Byrd Land (e.g., Mount Sidley is the highest volcano in Antarctica at ~4,181- 4,285 m, though dormant). Subglacial volcanoes can influence ice- sheet dynamics by producing basal meltwater.

Volcanism clusters in provinces linked to the WARS (Marie Byrd Land, Victoria Land/McMurdo, Ellsworth Land), the Antarctic Peninsula (post-subduction and back- arc, including Bransfield Strait), and oceanic islands/hotspots (Balleny). East Antarctica has far fewer (e.g., Gaussberg).

Scientific interest focuses on ice-volcano interactions, hazards to research stations and tourism, and potential effects on ice- sheet stability and sea level. Monitoring is limited due to remoteness and ice cover; much knowledge comes from radar, aeromagnetic surveys, ice- core tephra, and rare field expeditions.

In short, Antarctica is far more volcanically active than its icy image suggests, with Mount Erebus as the standout continuously erupting example.

Antarctic Peninsula volcanism spans more than 200 million years and reflects a complex tectonic evolution involving long- lived subduction, progressive ridge- crest- trench collisions, slab- window formation, and back- arc rifting. It differs from the alkaline intraplate volcanism of the West Antarctic Rift System farther south and west.

Major Phases of Volcanism

1. Jurassic- Early Tertiary Continental Margin Arc (Antarctic Peninsula Volcanic Group and related units)

  • Active from Late Jurassic/Early Cretaceous to Early Miocene (~150- 20 Ma or so), linked to eastward subduction of Pacific oceanic lithosphere beneath the continental margin.
  • Forms a ~1,300 km- long belt from the South Shetland Islands and Trinity Peninsula southward through Graham Land and Palmer Land to Alexander Island.
  • Exposed successions reach up to ~1.5 km thick. Early volcanism was often submarine; later phases were mostly subaerial.
  • Rock types include basaltic- andesitic stratocones, large silicic composite volcanoes with calderas, volcaniclastic fans, and distal tuffs.
  • Compositionally dominated by calc- alkaline suites (basalt to rhyolite, low- to high- K), with subordinate high- Mg andesites, adakites (slab- melt related), and high- Zr (possibly peralkaline/extension- related) groups.
  • Hydrothermal alteration, contact metamorphism, and regional zeolite- to prehnite- pumpellyite-facies metamorphism are common.
  • Jurassic felsic “flare- ups” (partly overlapping the Chon Aike province and linked to Gondwana breakup) produced large volumes of rhyolite.

2. Late Neogene Post- Subduction / Slab-Window Volcanism (~7.7 Ma to present)

  • Triggered by successive northward- younging collisions of spreading ridges with the trench, which opened “slab windows” allowing upwelling of relatively unmodified mantle.
  • Consists of monogenetic volcanic fields and small isolated centres of sodic alkaline to tholeiitic composition.
  • Eruptions were overwhelmingly glaciovolcanic (under or interacting with ice), providing key evidence for the configuration and thickness of the Plio- Pleistocene Antarctic Peninsula Ice Sheet.
  • No confirmed historic eruptions (a possible 1893 event at Seal Nunataks is considered dubious), but very young isotopic ages indicate potential for future activity.

3. Bransfield Strait Marginal Basin and Back-Arc Volcanism (northern Antarctic Peninsula)
This is the most active modern setting.

  • Bransfield Strait: A young (~4 Ma or younger cessation of normal arc activity) ensialic back-arc/marginal basin formed by extension between the South Shetland Islands microplate and the Antarctic Peninsula. Subduction of the remnant Phoenix Plate continues at very slow rates.
    • Subaerial volcanoes: Deception Island (most active in the region; last major eruptions 1967-1970, VEI 3; restless caldera with ongoing geothermal activity, seismicity, and deformation; highly visited for science and tourism), Penguin Island (last ~1905), and Bridgeman Island.
    • Numerous submarine edifices and seamounts (at least 7 principal ones plus ~100 smaller) along the rift axis, including Orca volcano (active caldera with shallow magma). Magmas are mainly tholeiitic (basalt to rhyolite) with limited subduction signature.
  • James Ross Island Volcanic Group (JRIVG): The largest volcanic field on the Antarctic Peninsula (~6,000–7,000 km², volume >4,500 km³).
    • Predominantly alkaline mafic (alkali basalt, hawaiite, etc.) in a back- arc setting.
    • Activity from ~7- 6.5 Ma to a few hundred thousand years ago (possibly younger).
    • Dominated by the large shield volcano Mount Haddington (~1,630 m; often cited as Antarctica’s largest volcano by volume).
    • Features extensive lava- fed deltas, tuff cones, and hyaloclastite sequences recording multiple glaciovolcanic eruptions under ice 200- 750 m thick, providing one of the best continuous records of late Neogene–Quaternary ice- sheet history in the region.

Other minor centres occur on Anvers and Brabant islands and smaller sites on Livingston and Greenwich islands (origins sometimes uncertain).

Key Characteristics and Significance

  • Eruptive styles: Range from effusive (lava flows and deltas) to explosive (especially glaciovolcanic and at Deception Island). Subglacial eruptions produce distinctive hyaloclastites and tuya- like or mesa forms.
  • Hazards: Deception Island poses the main risk due to proximity to research stations and tourism; future eruptions are considered possible. Submarine activity in Bransfield Strait is monitored via seismicity and geodesy.
  • Scientific value: The Peninsula’s volcanoes record changing subduction dynamics, slab- window processes, and ice- sheet evolution. Glaciovolcanic successions are particularly important for reconstructing past ice thicknesses and thermal regimes.
  • Research status: Knowledge has expanded greatly since the 1970s-1980s with better mapping and dating, but many centres remain sparsely studied, and precise modern ages are still limited for some slab- window fields.

In summary, Antarctic Peninsula volcanism evolved from a classic long- lived continental arc, through post-subduction alkaline fields linked to slab windows, to active back- arc rifting in the Bransfield Strait, making the northern Peninsula one of Antarctica’s most volcanically diverse and currently active regions.

West Antarctic Rift System (WARS) volcanism is one of Earth’s major continental rift- related alkaline volcanic provinces. The WARS is a broad, largely ice- covered zone of crustal extension (~3,000 km long and 750-1,000 km wide) stretching from the Ross Sea Embayment through the Byrd Subglacial Basin to the base of the Antarctic Peninsula. It is comparable in scale to the East African Rift or the Basin and Range Province.

Rifting began in the Late Cretaceous during Gondwana breakup (extension between East and West Antarctica), with major phases of crustal thinning producing deep rift basins under the Ross Sea and West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS). Extension continues today at low rates (≤1- 2 mm/year). The Transantarctic Mountains form a prominent high rift shoulder (up to 4- 5 km elevation).

Volcanism is attributed to a combination of passive decompression melting of enriched/metasomatized mantle due to lithospheric thinning, possible small-scale convection, and contributions from one or more mantle plumes/hotspots (supported by ocean- island basalt [OIB]– like geochemistry with HIMU/FOZO isotopic affinities, low seismic velocities, and elevated topography in places such as the Marie Byrd Land dome). Models debate the relative roles of plumes versus passive rifting.

Crust under the rift is thinned (often 17- 24 km). Magmatism started ~50- 48 Ma (Eocene) but became abundant and widespread from the Middle Miocene (~14-13 Ma) onward, continuing to the present.

Volcanism is predominantly alkaline (alkali basalt, basanite, hawaiite to phonolite, trachyte, and rare pantellerite/rhyolite), often bimodal, and includes large polygenetic shields/stratovolcanoes, monogenetic fields, seamounts, and extensive subglacial edifices.

Marie Byrd Land Volcanic Group (MBLVG; Marie Byrd Land and western Ellsworth Land)

  • Located on the northern flank of the WARS, atop a large structural dome.
  • Includes ~19 large polygenetic alkaline shield-like composite volcanoes (elevations 2,348- 4,285 m; volumes up to ~1,800 km³ exposed) plus numerous smaller centers. Many are partially or fully buried by the WAIS.
  • Activity from latest Eocene (~36.6 Ma) to Holocene; polygenetic phase since ~13.4 Ma.
  • Features 24 large summit calderas (2- 10 km diameter) and evidence of explosive eruptions.
  • Notable examples: Mount Sidley (highest volcano in Antarctica, ~4,181- 4,285 m), Mount Takahe, Mount Berlin (active fumaroles/ice towers), Mount Waesche (possible Holocene activity indicated by tephra), and others in linear ranges (e.g., Executive Committee, Flood, Ames, Crary Mountains).
  • Subglacial volcanism is widespread; geophysical surveys suggest hundreds of additional centers.

McMurdo Volcanic Group (Victoria Land and western Ross Sea)

  • One of the world’s largest alkaline provinces, subdivided into:
    • Hallett Volcanic Province (northern Victoria Land coast): Elongated shield complexes (~14- 2 Ma).
    • Melbourne Volcanic Province (northern Victoria Land): Includes Mount Melbourne (fumaroles; possible historical activity ~late 19th/early 20th century), Mount Rittmann, The Pleiades, and Mount Overlord. Longest Cenozoic record in the WARS (~50 Ma plutonic precursors to present).
    • Erebus Volcanic Province (southern Victoria Land/Ross Island and Ross Sea): Dominated by Mount Erebus (southernmost active volcano on Earth; persistent phonolitic lava lake with ongoing Strombolian activity since at least the 1970s). Also includes Mount Terror, Mount Discovery, seamounts, and the Terror Rift Volcanic Field (recent discoveries of Holocene submarine explosive volcanism).

Additional activity occurs in Ellsworth Land (e.g., Hudson Mountains) and submarine/oceanic areas (e.g., Adare Basin seamounts).

A 2017 inventory identified 138 subglacial volcanoes in West Antarctica (91 previously unknown), concentrated along the WARS axis and crustal- thickness gradients, one of the densest concentrations on Earth. At least 21 sites show evidence of interaction with the present- day WAIS (aerogeophysics, seismicity, ice-core tephra, heat flux).

Active or Holocene examples include Mount Erebus (continuously active), Mount Berlin and Mount Takahe (fumaroles/Holocene), Mount Melbourne and Mount Rittmann (fumaroles/tephra), Mount Waesche (tephra), and various subglacial/submarine sites (e.g., recent Holocene edifices in the Terror Rift; possible activity under Pine Island Glacier). Subglacial eruptions can produce englacial tephra and enhance basal melting, potentially influencing ice- stream flow and WAIS stability.

Significance and Research

  • Ice- sheet interactions: Subglacial heat and meltwater from volcanism affect ice dynamics; tephra layers in ice cores provide chronological and provenance records.
  • Hazards: Limited for most sites due to remoteness, but relevant near research stations (e.g., McMurdo near Erebus) and for potential large eruptions affecting ice stability.
  • Scientific value: Provides insights into continental rifting, plume; lithosphere interaction, glaciovolcanism, and mantle composition over ~50 million years. Much of the province remains poorly exposed or studied due to ice cover; ongoing work uses radar, aeromagnetics, seismology, dredging, and ice- core analysis.

In summary, WARS volcanism is the dominant source of Antarctica’s recent and active continental volcanoes. It is characterized by long-lived alkaline activity driven by rifting (with possible plume contributions), featuring large exposed shields, extensive subglacial fields, and ongoing eruptions such as at Mount Erebus.

Subglacial volcano- ice interactions (known as glaciovolcanism) involve the complex interplay between erupting magma and overlying ice (including snow, firn, and meltwater).

Antarctica hosts the world’s largest glaciovolcanic province, with hundreds of subglacial volcanoes, particularly under the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) within the West Antarctic Rift System, providing critical records of past ice conditions and influencing present- day ice dynamics.

When magma rises beneath ice:

  • Quenching and fragmentation: Rapid cooling produces distinctive lithofacies such as pillow lavas, hyaloclastite breccias, and glass- rich tuffs. Confined meltwater can drive highly explosive eruptions.
  • Meltwater generation: Heat from magma melts ice, creating cavities, lakes, or drainage systems. This meltwater can enhance basal sliding, lubricate ice flow, or trigger jökulhlaups (glacial outburst floods).
  • Edifice morphology: Under thick ice, volcanoes often form tuyas (flat- topped, steep- sided) or lava-fed deltas with passage zones (transitions from subglacial to subaerial deposits) that record ice thickness. Erosion by advancing ice can flatten summits, as seen in submarine seamounts of the Terror Rift (Ross Sea). nature.com
  • Ice- sheet response: Subglacial heat increases basal melt rates, potentially accelerating ice streams. Tephra can lower surface albedo if it reaches the ice surface, promoting further melting. Eruptions may form ice cauldrons or breach the surface (emergent eruptions).

Conversely, ice affects volcanism:

  • Overburden pressure suppresses explosions or alters magma degassing.
  • Ice unloading (thinning/melting) reduces lithostatic pressure on magma chambers, promoting expansion of magma and volatiles (like opening a soda bottle), which can trigger or enlarge eruptions. Models for West Antarctic basaltic chambers show that the rate of unloading strongly influences erupted mass and heat released to the ice.

Evidence from Antarctica

Inventory and distribution: Recent compilations identify ~138- 207 subglacial volcanic edifices under the WAIS (many previously unknown), concentrated along rift axes and crustal boundaries. Geophysical methods (radar, aeromagnetics, seismics) detect them; ice- core tephra provides physical confirmation of eruptions that breached the ice (e.g., layers dated ~22.3 ka and 44.8 ka near WAIS Divide, likely from nearby subglacial sources such as Mt. Resnik, Thiel, or Casertz).

Glaciovolcanic records: Sequences in Marie Byrd Land, Victoria Land, and the Antarctic Peninsula preserve paleo-ice thickness, basal thermal regime (wet- vs. cold-based), surface elevation, and ice- sheet structure. For example, Late Miocene- Pleistocene deposits document a widespread WAIS by ~9 Ma and variable ice thicknesses (often 200- 750 m in some Peninsula fields).

Active/recent interactions: Ongoing subglacial heating and possible eruptions contribute to basal melt. Holocene submarine explosive volcanism in the Terror Rift occurred during and after ice- sheet groundings. Seismic evidence points to active magmatism in eastern Marie Byrd Land.

Broader Impacts and Feedback

Ice -sheet stability: Enhanced basal melt and lubrication can accelerate ice flow, particularly in marine-based sectors of the WAIS vulnerable to collapse. A positive feedback is possible: ice loss → decompression melting/more eruptions → more heat → further ice loss. Models indicate this operates over centuries and could persist even if anthropogenic warming slows.

Hazards and climate: Subglacial eruptions are often hidden but can produce ash that affects albedo or atmosphere. Icelandic analogs (e.g., Gjálp 1996) show rapid ice loss and floods; Antarctic events could contribute to sea- level rise uncertainty.

Scientific value: Glaciovolcanic deposits are among the best proxies for reconstructing past Antarctic ice sheets, complementing marine sediments and ice cores. They also inform planetary science (e.g., Mars glaciovolcanism).

In summary, subglacial volcano- ice interactions in Antarctica form a two- way system: volcanoes shape ice dynamics through heat and meltwater, while ice modulates eruption style, morphology, and frequency.

These processes are especially relevant under the WAIS, where they may influence future ice- sheet stability and global sea levels.

Ongoing research uses geophysics, modeling, dredging, and ice- core analysis to better quantify feedback.

Fantasy Climate Models Effectively Denied Energy to the Poor: The White House Just Set the Stage for Change

For two decades, the poorest half of humanity had its energy choices dictated by computer-generated climate predictions now considered to be implausible by the people who made them.

Developing countries that are home to the impoverished should be following U.S. actions to abandon these flawed forecasts, which have driven destructive climate policies.

In August, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy opened a public comment period on a proposed amendment to the country’s Fifth National Climate Assessment (NCA5), a congressionally mandated report that steers American regulation, research funding, and infrastructure budgets.

A satirical illustration contrasting energy policies, showing a smug man in a suit with a high-tech machine labeled 'Fantasy Climate Model - Extreme Doom Edition' in front of the White House, while impoverished families struggle in the background with no electricity. Banners above emphasize 'UPDATE: MODELS IMPLAUSIBLE' and 'REAL ENERGY NOW', highlighting a debate on energy and climate models.
AI generated by Meta

From The CO2 Coalition

By Vijay Jayaraj

For two decades, the poorest half of humanity had its energy choices dictated by computer-generated climate predictions now considered to be implausible by the people who made them. Developing countries that are home to the impoverished should be following U.S. actions to abandon these flawed forecasts, which have driven destructive climate policies.

In August, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy opened a public comment period on a proposed amendment to the country’s Fifth National Climate Assessment (NCA5), a congressionally mandated report that steers American regulation, research funding, and infrastructure budgets.

The amendment would tell federal agencies that the United Nations’ unrealistic predictions of dangerous global warming from the industrial emissions of carbon dioxide can no longer be used as a reasonable basis for policy development.

According to the U.N.’s own reckoning, its most extreme predictions of warming were never based on science. They were the ceiling of a modeling exercise that used computers and assumptions with no basis in reality.

Matthew Wielicki, who directs the U.S. Global Change Research Program, pointed out that much of NCA5 rests on scenarios the field of climate science itself has shelved, recognizing that guidance built on an implausible future cannot produce sound decisions. He expects to hear objections to the proposed amendment from activists rather than researchers because the latter already have conceded the point.

The uncomfortable part is that this correction is coming from Washington rather than Delhi or Lagos or Manila. The governments that could least afford the irrational policy prescriptions of the climate industrial complex spent 20 years acquiescing to them. Their negotiators accepted conditions that no Western capital would have tolerated at a comparable stage of its nation’s industrial ascent.

State of Poverty Requires Policy Revisions

The 2024 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index counted 1.1 billion people in acute poverty across 112 countries. India has 234 million of them; Pakistan, 93 million; Ethiopia, 86 million; Nigeria, 74 million; and Democratic Republic of the Congo, 66 million. Those five countries are home to more than 48% of the world’s poor. The so-called deprivation indicators behind that index are electricity and cooking fuel.

A recent report issued by the International Energy Agency found 655 million people without electricity and roughly 2 billion still cooking over polluting fuels. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for more than 560 million of the first group and 970 million of the second. That region’s rural electricity deficit grew between 2010 and 2024, affecting 447 million people.

Those are the households whose coal plants were cancelled, whose gas projects lost financing, and whose grid connections were deferred – all on the authority of climate predictions that the modeling community has withdrawn from service.

The effect of climate hyperbole extended to international trade. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entered a definitive phase in January, attaching costs to imported steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizer, hydrogen, and electricity.

India objected 29 times at the World Trade Organization between 2020 and 2024, arguing that the measure violated non-discrimination rules. Iron and steel make up 90% of Indian exports exposed to the EU tax.

Brussels based the trade barrier on climate predictions now considered implausible. Does the barrier now come down? Put the question to your trade minister. Then ask why nobody has.

For Africa, Asia, and Latin America, this is not a technical footnote in an American regulatory document. It is an opening to reclaim energy policy – and the associated economic benefits – from the manipulations of a criminally deceptive – or woefully incompetent – climate bureaucracy.

Leaders in victimized countries can either cling to a debunked climate agenda or rewrite energy laws to prioritize their own citizens. Choosing the former would disregard the millions suffering in poverty.

Originally published at The Western Journal, September 17th, 2026.

Vijay Jayaraj is a Science and Research Associate at the CO2 Coalition, Fairfax, Virginia. He holds an M.S. in environmental sciences from the University of East Anglia and a postgraduate degree in energy management from Robert Gordon University, both in the U.K., and a bachelor’s in engineering from Anna University, India. He served as a research associate with the Changing Oceans Research Unit at University of British Columbia, Canada.

The anti-nuclear playbook comes for data centers

Half a century ago, raw emotion drove an anti-nuclear energy campaign that still stifles clean energy development in the U.S. Today, that same fear-driven playbook is being deployed in a campaign to shut down data centers.

The U.S. did not build another nuclear power plant between 1996 and 2016. Even today, efforts to revitalize the nation’s nuclear power industry face skepticism and legacy regulatory roadblocks.

A technician in headphones is working on network equipment, surrounded by cables and servers, while two colleagues discuss documents in the background.
Side view portrait of young network engineer in server room doing maintenance work in data center, copy space

From CFACT

By Duggan Flanakin

Half a century ago, raw emotion drove an anti-nuclear energy campaign that still stifles clean energy development in the U.S. Today, that same fear-driven playbook is being deployed in a campaign to shut down data centers.

Between 1970 and 1990, America built 95 nuclear power plants that still supply nearly a fifth of the nation’s electricity, but the minor incident at Three Mile Island led to cancellation of another 67 planned builds.

The U.S. did not build another nuclear power plant between 1996 and 2016. Even today, efforts to revitalize the nation’s nuclear power industry face skepticism and legacy regulatory roadblocks.

Small modular reactors were first tested decades ago and could already be powering data centers had anti-nuclear fearmongering not stopped the Integral Fast Reactor program in 1994.

Many Americans today are rightly riled up about data centers robbing communities of precious drinking water resources and raising their electric bills. Others ask whether data centers are part of a vast secret conspiracy to take away their jobs, their freedom, and perhaps even their lives.

Goldman Sachs estimated that U.S. data center power demand could grow from 31 gigawatts in 2025 to 66 gigawatts in 2027. The push for an all-electric society has helped cause demand to rise faster than the nation can build new capacity. When demand exceeds supply, prices rise.

Neither the media nor the political establishment had prepared Americans for these shocking developments — so it is no wonder that data centers have become a political football.

The growing divide today is between the anti-nuclear playbook – now repurposed in ways that risk crippling the American economy – and the recognition that some data centers have disrupted lives, an unacceptable trade-off no matter how badly they are needed.

Fuel for the anti-data center fire stems from real-life stories of an Oregon community that found nearby Google data centers were using a quarter of their water supply. Data centers connected to the power grid also tend to drive up electricity costs, according to Consumer Reports. These real-life impacts have even the strongest supporters of the American Dream up in arms.

Many data center developers have failed to explain that every time we look up a movie showtime, tap a card at checkout, back up a video, or ask Google a question we can thank a data center for making those tasks easy. They have also failed to fully address citizen concerns.

President Trump pushed the data center industry into signing the Ratepayer Protection Pledge at the White House back in March. But that commitment was voluntary — and people too often tricked by pledges not followed through on remain skeptical.

The Chinese government and its proxies, which thrive on exploiting fear, are funding a national campaign against data centers to slow the growth of the U.S. economy.

A May report from the Bitcoin Policy Institute traced three interlocking vectors that demonstrate China’s targeting of American AI data centers.

These include Chinese and Russian state media propaganda; a U.S.-based NGO network bankrolled by expatriate Neville Roy Singham; and billions in foreign dark money from such sources as Switzerland’s Hansjörg Wyss and the Oak Foundation, funded by British billionaire Alan Parker.

Lead author Sam Lyman says the choice facing America is not between AI or no AI but between American AI or Chinese AI — just as it is between continued Chinese dominance over critical minerals or an America-first mining and processing renaissance.

The Trump Administration’s push for nuclear energy both for the grid and for stand-alone units to power cloud and hyperscale data centers, military facilities, and remote industrial sites is part of a national strategy to expand electric generation without injuring ratepayers – an effort that had quietly begun during his first term.

After years of neglect, just before leaving office, President Biden issued Executive Order 14141 (Advancing U.S. Leadership in AI Infrastructure), which authorized leasing federal sites for gigawatt-scale data centers “with clean energy resources” to prevent public rate increases.

At the signing ceremony for the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, many of the nation’s largest AI and technology companies agreed to cover the costs of all new power generation for their facilities so as not to negatively impact ratepayers.

White House AI and Crypto advisor David Sacks contrasted this “common sense” approach over Bernie Sanders’ demand for a total ban on new data centers, which he said would halt a nationwide construction boom, stunt wage and job growth for blue-collar workers, and effectively cede the future to the Chinese.

Even better, Sacks said that, by allowing AI companies to pay for grid upgrades and sell excess power back to the grid, ratepayers might even see lower bills.

The only problem is that small modular reactors are just now undergoing testing and still have to work their way through a still-labyrinthine permitting process — the legacy of decades of anti-nuclear opposition.

As new data centers begin to generate their own off-grid electricity, the feared escalation of electricity bills should subside. But what about water use?

Most big data centers rely on water-based cooling towers or evaporative chillers to prevent server overheating and equipment failure. While many are using closed-loop water cooling in which the same water circulates in sealed pipes or coils that prevent evaporation, a technique that cuts water use by up to 70%, the public still sees them as stealing their drinking water.

Direct-to-chip cooling, which pipes cold liquid directly to servers, and immersion cooling, which submerges entire servers in a bath of non-conductive fluid, also minimize water use.

Norway is siting data centers near cold-water rivers and fjords, and in cold climates outside air can also keep servers running smoothly. Elon Musk is moving data centers into orbit, connecting them via satellite and Starlink, and requiring no cooling waters. SpaceX and Nvidia are planning to launch the first orbiting data center by 2028.

The trouble is that, with fast-emerging technology, any delay can result in a catastrophic loss of advantage.

Moratoriums, like that issued by New York Governor Kathy Hochul and Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro’s move to strip data center projects from his state’s fast-track program (which he created in November 2024), can turn into long-term prohibitions for a short-term problem.

Manhattan Institute senior fellow Shawn Regan contrasts the actions of these governors with that of Texas Governor Greg Abbott, who is in a dogfight reelection campaign. Texas, he says, mostly refined its existing process “to better sort through a chaotic data-center development pipeline without abandoning growth.”

Texas requires an audit for “Batch Zero” projects under consideration for connection to the state’s grid. Developers must disclose expected electricity and water use, plans for on-site generation, cooling systems, tax incentives, and measures to mitigate noise, traffic, and other local impacts.

The contrast could not be clearer. The same fear-based politics that once stalled nuclear power, amplified today by “No Kings” style protests (funded by Singham NGOs), has left some politicians throwing in with the Chinese. Those who agree with President Trump’s vision for American hegemony do not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater but need a little help from tech giants who many fear do not serve the public interest.

This article originally appeared at RealClear Energy

Thanks, StudyFinds, For Publicizing Health Study Confirming Cold Temperatures Kill More than Hot Temperatures

The science news site, StudyFinds, recently discussed a study that found that cardiac arrests went up substantially during cold spells. This confirms other research that Climate Realism has previously discussed. Cold temperatures kill far more people each year than hot temperatures, the opposite of the narrative the mainstream media usually spins.

A person dressed warmly in a snow-covered environment, wearing a thick coat, hat, and scarf, with frost on their gloves and face.

From ClimateRealism

By H. Sterling Burnett

The science news site, StudyFinds, recently discussed a study that found that cardiac arrests went up substantially during cold spells. This confirms other research that Climate Realism has previously discussed. Cold temperatures kill far more people each year than hot temperatures, the opposite of the narrative the mainstream media usually spins.

The story, “Cold Snaps Line Up With Cardiac Arrest Spikes, New Study Finds,” reports on the findings of a study published in the journal Public Health examining meteorological factors that influence cardiovascular emergency incidences, in common vernacular, heart attacks. The researchers involved, from various universities in Hungary, examined 114,830 incidences of cardiac arrests across 1,584 days reported by the Hungarian National Ambulance Service from November 2018 to December 2023, excluding the COVID-19 disruption period. They then tracked these cases against various meteorological parameters on those days, such as temperature, wind speed, atmospheric pressure, humidity, and air quality. As reported by StudyFinds, the researchers determined;

  • On the days with the most cardiac arrests, counts ran nearly a third above normal, about 19 extra cases nationwide, and those days tended to be cold and calm;
  • Colder temperatures and lower wind speeds were consistently associated with higher cardiac arrest counts, with weather patterns extending across a window of up to three days;
  • Winter months saw almost 18 percent more cardiac arrests than summer months;
  • Wind . . . appeared protective, likely because moving air helps clear out pollution and improves air quality overall, and the study found a real drop in cardiac arrests on breezier days; and
  • Daily cardiac arrest counts averaged close to 66 cases during winter compared with about 56 during summer, a gap of almost 18% that held up across multiple statistical checks.

Machine learning, that is artificial intelligence, validated the study’s results.

The findings of this study should come as no surprise to readers of Climate Realism, as it has refuted dozens of false reports in the mainstream media claiming that hot temperatures cause the most deaths related to temperatures. In contrast to media claims, as explored in Climate at a Glance: Temperature Related Deaths, the peer reviewed literature consistently finds deaths related to cold temperatures are far more prevalent than premature mortality from heat, and as a result, as the planet has modestly warmed, deaths from non-optimum temperatures have fallen dramatically.

The journal StudyFinds was founded by award-winning editor Steve Fink to bring important science findings to the masses. Its mission statement says:

StudyFinds exists to make science accessible without sacrificing accuracy.

We believe that peer-reviewed research belongs to everyone, not just academics. Our job is to find studies that matter to real people, report what they actually say (not what headlines want them to say), and present that information clearly, fairly, and completely.

We have no agenda. We don’t editorialize about whether a finding is good or bad, politically convenient or inconvenient. We report what the research says, note its limitations, and trust our readers to think for themselves.

That is a laudable mission. One would wish more news outlets sought to report the truth about science matters, but in truth about all matters of public policy import, without political bias or promoting an agenda. StudyFinds reporting on this study examining the relation between cardiac arrests incidences and cold weather clearly reflects its writers’ and editors’ fealty to that mission. They reported the truth about the study, and nothing but the truth, leaving out unnecessary or unjustified context or commentary. Bravo, StudyFinds! If this example is consistent with your other reporting on science, Climate Realism can only hope more readers find their way to your online journal.

Why ‘Feel Good’ Climate Activism?

In discussing the emotions motivating climate activists, commentators have proposed ‘guilt,’ ‘self-flagellation,’ ‘sin,’ ‘self-loathing’ , ‘conscience’, and seeking ‘atonement’ and ‘redemption.’ Activists are also described as seeking to fill a ‘God-shaped hole with something good,’ and that ‘Net Zero is like heaven.’

A group of passionate climate activists holding signs while shouting slogans during a protest, with one person using a megaphone.
AI generated by Meta

From Master Resource

By Robert Bradley Jr.

Sam Belfied in his essay, “Climate Activism: ‘It Made Me Feel Like a Good Person’” (August 19, 2026), has a number of interesting insights on the motivations of climate campaigners given the intellectual case that their cause is both futile and wasteful. And ecologically damaging (think wind and solar industrialization). Excerpts follow verbatim; footnotes can be found in the original.

The following commentary and research findings suggest that climate ideology and activism are psychological compensatory responses to painful, emotional, subjective, and even existential aspects of the self. Specifically, the material suggests a deeper and collective psychological malaise, of which anxiety and distress about climate change are an expression, not the root cause….

The climate movement involves guilt, self-loathing and seeking redemption

In discussing the emotions motivating climate activists, commentators have proposed ‘guilt,’ ‘self-flagellation,’ ‘sin,’ ‘self-loathing’ , ‘conscience’, and seeking ‘atonement’ and ‘redemption.’ Activists are also described as seeking to fill a ‘God-shaped hole with something good,’ and that ‘Net Zero is like heaven.’

They are described as supporting an ‘anti-human ideology’ and a worldview in which ‘human beings are parasites, cancers, that consume way too much, we’re in this existential crisis.’ Climate ideologies such as the pursuit of Net Zero are characterised as a ‘belief system,’ ‘quasi-religious,’ and an article of ‘faith’. A parallel is drawn with identity politics and the psychological mechanism of self-validation through identifying as ‘warriors’ for ‘climate justice.’

Incidental feelings of guilt and anger found to increase support for climate actions

Experiencing anger for discrete reasons (not arising from environmental harm) has been found to increase the tendency to condemn and punish perceived perpetrators for negative events, while experiencing guilt predisposes people to make reparations and to seek punishment for their wrongdoing. In the context of climate change, when people were primed to feel angry, they more strongly endorsed actions that entailed punishing others for not preventing such harm. In contrast, when primed to feel guilty, some placed the burden on individuals but the main effect was support for climate policies that targeted offending industries.

The study sought to reconcile these findings thus: to ‘paint self in a positive light,’ in addition to personal accountability, guilt may also lead people to attempt to ‘purge their guilt and responsibility by scapegoating others.’

Inducing environmental guilt and shame found to increase support for climate actions

Negative self-focused moral emotions, or a guilty conscience, have been found to be a powerful motivator of pro-social behaviour, and then found eliciting negative moral emotions through confrontation with human environmental harm led to a ‘guilty conscience,’ ‘guilt and shame’ that in turn led to pro-environmental behaviour, with shame ‘driving the manipulation’s effect.’

Activism as a ‘psychological coping mechanism’ for ‘Eco-anxiety’

A study recognised the emotional and existential nature of eco-anxiety and included the following extracts:

As awareness of [environmental degradation] has grown, so too their psychological impact, giving rise to a condition known as ecological anxiety. The American Psychological Association (APA) defines ecological anxiety as a persistent fear triggered by environmental threats …”This form of anxiety is characterized by feelings of loss, helplessness, and frustration concerning the deteriorating state of the environment.”

‘Although ecological anxiety is not a prerequisite for engaging in pro-environmental actions, it is a strong predictor of such behaviour.

Engaging in environmental activities provides individuals with a sense of control that can mitigate distress, serving as a therapeutic channel for converting feelings of helplessness into empowerment and fostering hope.

Conversely, direct engagement with environmental crises can heighten concern and generate negative psychological effects in personal lives.

[T[he correlation between anxiety and pro-environmental behaviour may suggest that individuals more anxious about the environment are more proactive in mitigating the crisis; they adopt a psychological coping mechanism in the face of significant global challenges …both personal and collective actions may serve as coping mechanisms for individuals experiencing ecological anxiety, offering a sense of control and purpose amid environmental uncertainty.’

A ‘warm glow’ for pro-environmental action and moral licensing to avoid a ‘guilty conscience’

A similar study included these extracts:

The American Psychological Association (APA) defines eco-anxiety as “a chronic fear of environmental doom”.

The concept of eco-anxiety encompasses a broad spectrum of definitions, including emotions such as guilt, fear, worry, despair, shame, and hopelessness. It is possible to differentiate at least three distinct behavioural responses: an anxiety-type response characterised by nervousness and fear, a self-reflective response involving shame and guilt, and a pain-oriented response manifesting as anger and distress.

Specific emotions, such as fear, are associated with increased pro-environmental behaviour, while emotions like guilt and anger are linked to participation in protests. Other climate-related emotions, including eco-guilt and eco-grief, eco-rage, eco-fear have also been shown to promote pro-environmental actions.

[Another] study argues that emotions such as fear, hope, anger and guilt underpin climate activism.

Research into the psychology of pro-environmental actions has recognised a feel-good ‘warm glow’ and ‘intrinsic emotional reward’ and the potential for reinforcing a ‘virtuous cycle’ of feel-good. Moral licensing whereby ‘past virtuous [climate] behaviour’ is used to justify ‘immoral, unethical and problematic’ climatic behaviour to avoid ‘the fear of feeling or appearing immoral’ and a ‘guilty conscience’—and reduce the motivation to change the problematic climate related behaviour.

Moral emotions leading to performative morality

Psychological commentary on virtue signalling and moral grandstanding has recognised that ‘moral talk’ can be a means of ‘seeking approval, status, belonging, attention, or protection,’ and that ‘being seen to care is more important than caring.’ Furthermore, ‘moral emotions’ including ‘anger, guilt, shame, pride, and disgust’ can drive moral expression, and while this can motivate ‘action and solidarity’ these emotions ‘can also make people impulsive, punitive, performative, or more concerned with emotional release than practical repair.’

Grandiose and vulnerable narcissism

One study has found that ‘grandiose narcissism is positively associated with pro-environmental values and virtue signalling mediates this relationship. This suggests that individuals high in grandiose narcissism may adopt pro-environmental values primarily to enhance their self-image.’ Conversely, vulnerable narcissists may engage in virtue-signalling to ‘protect their fragile self-esteem,’ as a ‘self-protective mechanism,’ and ‘guard their fragile self-concept.’

[Narcissistic vulnerability] is characterised by feelings of inadequacy, helplessness, low self-esteem, shame, and emotional vulnerability, which can lead to the avoidance of interpersonal relationships as the individual is hypersensitive to rejection and criticism. Narcissistic grandiosity entails entitlement, an inflated self-image, interpersonal exploitation, a lack of empathy, and aggressive behaviours.]

Another study notes ‘individuals with pronounced dark personality traits such as narcissism are inclined to use political or social activism as a vehicle to satisfy the needs specifically associated with their dark personality (e.g. getting public attention, feeling morally superior, domineering others, engaging in social conflicts, seeking thrills etc.)’

…In combination, all these traits could make narcissists more prone to participate in environmental activism not to save the planet but to satisfy their own ego-focused needs.

Climate ideology is formulated to avoid ‘difficult’ things and meet ‘psychological needs’

Psychologist Jordan Peterson, in response to being asked on ABC-TV in 2019 if collective responsibility overrides individual responsibility … said ‘no’. Then elaborated as follows ‘I think generally people have things within their personal purview that are more difficult to deal with, and that they’re avoiding, and generally the way they avoid them is by adopting pseudo-moralistic stances on large-scale social issues, so they look good to their friends and neighbours.’

In 2025, Peterson wrote a blog notably titled, ‘Net zero alarmism is a mental illness – Climate hysteria, and policies to ‘cure’ it, are the work of a cabal of ill-informed narcissistic worshippers of fear and force.’ In this blog, he wrote,

There are non-scientific, indeed psychological, reasons that such models [purporting to indicate catastrophic future danger] were and are generated and promoted in the first place.

…Here is the crucial question: Is the climate apocalypse narrative just a scientific theory? Or is it instead a system of belief, unmoored from the objective world, with essentially psychological factors playing the primary role in its initial formulation, current maintenance and widespread dissemination? …I have come to conclude, after much detailed consideration (informed by my professional training and experience as a researcher and clinician), that the climate doomsayers are possessed by an ideology much more akin to a psychogenic epidemic* than they are purveyors of any information remotely scientific.

*Psychogenic is defined as originating in the mind or in mental or emotional conflict; it describes conditions rooted in the mind, such as stress, trauma, or anxiety, rather than structural body damage.

Climate activism as a dysfunctional response to an ‘indifferent world’

In a 2025 article, Jeffrey Blehar provided an update on the evolution of Greta Thunberg’s activism. He wrote,

Thunberg is fulfilment in the flesh of an intellectual conceit: the brutally perfect embodiment of an entire younger left-wing generation’s hopeless attachment to the politics of gesture as opposed to the politics of hard work; politics as little more than an externalised expression of narcissism; politics as a plea for attention from an otherwise indifferent world. With that as Thunberg’s guiding star, no wonder she has captured the attention of a similarly lost segment of progressives. Watching both principal and audience mutually dysfunction like this, spiralling downward together in a self-radicalising vicious cycle, is almost sickeningly poetic to me.

Blehar also noted the shift of Thunberg’s performative activism to other contemporary social justice causes.

The trend in society of elevating the subjective above the objective

In a 2023 podcast, Australian psychiatrist Tanveer Ahmed was asked by the host, ‘How would you assess the dangers of identity politics?’ In response, Ahmed said,

A fundamental thing is the denial of individual responsibility. So, even the moral dimension, there’s a projection of all types of distress. So, “I feel a level of pain, I feel a degree of distress”, automatically that’s projected to the outside.

Later in the same podcast, Tanveer made the observation:

Some wider trends that have happened in society are that the subjective experience has been elevated, and this overlaps a lot with mental health. …at a very simplistic level, feelings have been elevated. And sometimes that clashes with what might be called objective truth. The notion of objective truth has been depicted as a kind of harsh, almost masculine trend, if you like. And as a result, it’s been diminished.

The ‘kernel of truth’ contained within secular ‘isms’: ‘We are not who we ought to be’

In 2025, former Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson AC spoke with Melanie Phillips [10]. In this podcast, Phillips expressed an opinion on the current raft of secular ‘isms’ (e.g. environmentalism, climatism, globalism, etc.). She said they are based on the Christian template of sin, guilt and redemption, and then observed they are like,

medieval, millenarian Christians who believe that …we [must] purge ourselves of our sins,’ ‘they’ve arrived at something which is a kind of weird mirror image of Christianity. It’s called Christianity without God.

In response, Anderson suggests that at the core of secular ‘isms’ is an insecurity of moral worth and meaning:

Allow me a little musing for a moment. I wonder if, in a way, like all great lies, there’s a kernel of truth there somewhere. I wonder whether innately we are not right to think to ourselves, “I’m not who I ought to be. I am flawed. I do need redemption in some way”.

And what you’re now seeing is not so much a problem of people having been shaped to think that way by Christianity; it’s more a reality that we instinctively know we’re not that there’s right and there’s wrong, and we’re not always on the right side of the ledger. The problem is more that we’ve found the wrong answers because the right answers, the ones that real rigour brings you to, are unattractive, really. They’re not comfortable having to face the fact that we all have our bad, to use an expression from your own, the title of your own book. We have our better and our bad angels, everyone of us.’ To which Phillips replied, ‘Yes, it is uncomfortable. Conscience is uncomfortable, but reality is uncomfortable.’

Climate activism in younger generations as an outlet for ‘angst at the world’

American therapist, Stephanie Winn (@sometherapist), in her interview with Biggers, said her time as a ‘climate alarmist came from, for one thing, growing up in an overwhelming city.’ She also described how exposure to the pollution and ‘the apocalyptic events’ of her childhood, like the riots, made her ‘very susceptible to any type of alarmism.’ Winn then made the following revealing observation that is consistent with the research outline above:

If you’d told me the world is ending I would have believed you, because it sure felt like that in so many ways. And then I got involved in radical activism as a teenager, partly as an outlet for angst and some of the things that had happened to me. I was angry at the world. And so I was very susceptible to extreme ideas. And I think I was always seeking good and looking to do good with my life.

Winn goes on to emphasise the severe negative impact climate anxiety had on her mental health, behaviours, and decisions and later says:

We sometimes choose to adopt worldviews, beliefs, social circles, ways of life that match something deeper within. And so I explained how for me, some of the stress and trauma of my childhood made me a very easy target for any messaging that the world is about to end.

Climate activism as a misguided attempt to recreate ‘perfection’, leading to ‘frustration’ and ‘extremism’

During her interview with Biggers, Winn also mentioned her journey to becoming a Christian. She then reflects on her worldview that contributed to her becoming a climate activist, in retrospect through that ‘Christian lens’:

Much of my life I have been experiencing a longing to return to Eden, a longing to return to this original state of perfection. As an environmental activist, I was seeking that perfect state before the ‘Fall’, before ‘sin’, before separation, before evil came into this world. For me, the biblical understanding of the nature of good and evil has actually been really helpful in contextualising some of these [activist] inclinations. Because the thing that you [Biggers] describe of we’re a fallen species that actually resonates. But I think for me personally, having a spiritual understanding of that and then recognising, “Okay, this is life east of Eden. This is life after “The fall”. And our longing for perfection does tell us something about our nature. But some of our attempts at recreating that can also be misguided.” Right? If trying to create a perfect world in a world that cannot be perfect, you know, people will encounter this frustration.

And so I think any type of sort of zealotry or idealism or extremism maybe has that little grain of truth in it where, you know, there is some instinct, some compass in us that tells us that a more perfect world is possible. But I see that as misguided.

Biggers agreed with Winn and affirmed that she had been thinking about the ‘exact same theme’ as well. Shortly after which, Winn said, ‘I think when you get into activism without a foundational faith, you are trying to find that faith in that activism. And that’s a theme that’s very relevant. And it happens with all the types of activism,’ and then referred to several other social justice causes.

The above commentary and research, taken together, strongly suggest that the root cause of climate ideology and activism lies in deeper collective aspects of our experience, encompassing intellectual, emotional, spiritual, and existential aspects of the self. Furthermore, it supports the contention that climate ideology and activism are a psychological compensatory response to avoid and alleviate the emotional pain and confrontation of a deeper realm.

Lucy Biggers: From Climate Activist to Climate Realist

The following draws on three separate interviews with Biggers, by different hosts, including Konstantin Kisin and Francis Foster on Triggernometry, since December 2025.

In 2015, at the age of 25, Biggers emerged as a high-profile American climate activist. In about 2020, Biggers stepped away from the climate movement for several years before becoming, in her words, a ‘climate realist’ advocating against ‘anti-climate alarmism and climate anxiety.’

When asked about how she became a climate activist, Biggers described herself as an average millennial who, at 16, watched Al Gore’s climate documentary, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, which ‘really scared’ her. She described at the time, ‘having an overwhelming feeling of existential dread’ that the ‘planet’s not in a good place.’ Biggers has explained the impact of watching other climate documentaries in her 20s, the emerging significance of social media, algorithms feeding her the climate movement narrative, and her involvement in the Dakota Access Pipeline protest. Her talent for promoting the ‘climate crisis’ led to her gaining a sizeable social media following, advocating for the Green New Deal and interviewing Greta Thunberg.

In retrospect, Biggers describes herself as having ‘climate anxiety’, believing that ‘the world was beyond saving,’ and feeling an ‘existential dread, powerless, and without the prospect of an abundant and prosperous future.’ In contrast, by embracing the movement she gained a ‘persona,’ a lot of support and the next thing she was a ‘gung-ho climate activist.’

On another occasion, when asked in retrospect what led her to make climate activism her life, Biggers described wanting to be of service to the activists and on ‘the side of justice.’ She explained that, politically, at the time she was very left-wing and working in a very progressive environment. She has also emphasised her personal sense of moral guilt stemming from her ‘white privilege’ and ‘oppressor status’ in the context of critical race theory.

Significantly, Biggers has also described a deeper internal dimension at work.

Biggers said she was ‘pulled into’ the climate movement and ‘drawn in by the emotions of it.’ When Biggers was asked on where her generation got the idea to be on the ‘right side of history,’ she attributed it to the context they grew up in: the financial crisis of 2008, income inequality in America, 9/11 and the ensuing ‘Bush “forever wars”.’ In line with the observations of Ahmed included above, Biggers also notes that some people are caught in a ‘fear and victim mindset,’ that allows them to keep ‘blaming other people.’

In the interview with Maya Sulkin, Biggers said, ‘Psychologically, in retrospect, I think it was this desire to atone for my privileged position that I had in the world. And the way I could atone was by propping up these [climate narratives]. So it was very emotional, emotionally driven, and psychologically driven, and then black and white thinking … a lot of that was happening at a subconscious level. But that is, I think, what first drew me to it and I took it on as an armour.’

In a similar vein, in the same interview, Biggers said, ‘When I was in the climate movement, I got my identity from being a good person and from being on the right side of history

… I’m an oppressor by being a white woman in America and so I need to atone for my sins by pushing and being part of this movement and that is what makes me good.

And so if I’m going to leave this, I’m no longer going to be seen as good, and I’m no longer a good person, so who am I? And then that’s when you have to start doing the work of building up yourself, your sense of self and identity in that internal world, which again, it took me, again, five years between questioning and leaving that job and posting this past year [2025].’

Biggers has differentiated between the traditional conservation and environmental movement and the contemporary climate movement. The latter she describes as the ‘demon spawn of environmentalism’; and said it’s about ‘guilting us for our modern life,’ it’s ‘anti-human, anti-progress’ and ‘very nihilistic.’ Furthermore, Biggers has said ‘it’s not a rational movement. It’s an emotional movement’ with ‘spiritual undertones.’ Significantly, Biggers has said that the climate movement is the next iteration on from socialism and communism, and that non-climate related movements have since emerged as ‘causes de jure’ for young people.

Notably, Biggers said the ideology ‘subverted’ her previous worldview and involved abandoning ‘critical’ and logical thinking. Moreover, she also described how once in the movement her internal sense of self was built on sand and that she would get ‘triggered’, insecure and anxious when someone questioned the foundations of her climate beliefs.

To summarise, Biggers has emphasised her generation’s anxiety about the outlook for humanity and the planet, wanting to feel like a good person and atone for a sense of guilt,  and that her shift was emotionally driven. She also said climate ideology involved the inversion of her worldview and her giving up critical thinking, while rational debate threatened the foundations of her existence and identity….

Biggers’ emphasis on her need to feel like a good person and to atone for guilt is germane and enlightening. While Biggers primarily attributes her anxiety and guilt to environmental damage and identity politics respectively, she does recognise the distressing outlook of her generation more generally.

Applying Griffith’s treatise, her eco-anxiety and white privilege guilt can be framed as an expression of the anxiety and guilt arising from this subconscious domain of the human condition. Likewise, the desire to ‘feel like a good person’ and atone can be framed as a desire to refute the harsh self-judgement stemming from the human condition. This is not to diminish the intensity of the eco-anxiety and white privilege guilt but to suggest these emotions are energised by and an expression of a deeper existential source of anxiety and guilt. Relevantly, Biggers’ reference to the movement providing an identity, persona and ‘armour’ alludes to the psychological need to dissociate and seek protection from underlying painful feelings….

Biggers described the radical changes that accompanied her embrace of the climate movement and abandoning her critical thinking. Grasping the intensity of the shame and guilt at the heart of the human condition, as described by Griffith, provides a compelling explanation of these changes and an answer to Biggers’ question of “How did I get here?”….

Biggers has observed that climate ideology is nihilistic, anti-human, anti-capitalist, anti-progress, anti-West, and is based on the assumption that modern humans are ‘inherently evil’, ‘a fallen species,’ and ‘somehow sinful.’ In contrast, Griffith explains that while the human species is psychologically ‘upset’, we are not intrinsically bad, flawed, sinful, or evil; in fact, our species is heroic for having endured the difficulties of our condition. Put simply, “we are mad—mentally and emotionally—but we are not bad.” The nihilistic and anti-human view can be explained as a projection of an overwhelmed, dark internal state, which, in turn, is a result of the intense ‘upset’ (reality) that younger generations are encountering and trying to adjust to.

The climate movement advocates that humanity ‘go backwards’, not forward

Biggers has explained that climate activists maintain that the human species needs to ‘go back’ to ‘a less developed,’ ‘noble savage,’ and ‘more pure’ way of living. Biggers said ‘the road to hell is paved with good intentions’ and has drawn a parallel between communism and the climate movement trying to bring about ‘heaven on earth.’ On another occasion, Biggers has said that climate activists ‘value life on earth and nature over humanity’ and they ‘prioritise untouched nature and a perfect untouched earth over human flourishing’. Significantly, she asserted ‘the flip needed is to realise the goal isn’t untouched nature, the goal is human flourishing.’

Griffith’s treatise provides an explanation that aligns with and validates Biggers’ intuitions here. He argues that our conscious mind needed freedom from the dogmatic demands of our conscience to experiment and self-manage, from a basis of understanding, and to fulfil its extraordinary potential. Capitalism, the West, hydrocarbons, etc have been the engines that have propelled astronomical progress and knowledge toward fulfilling this potential. While it has been far from perfect, there has been immense purpose and meaning in human progress. Human progress and human flourishing can be understood as profound euphemisms for humanity continuing to seek knowledge, in particular self-knowledge, and ultimately, to explain and solve the human condition.

In this context of Griffith’s work, the call for humanity to ‘go back’ to a less developed society to mitigate the trade-offs is the exact opposite of the direction we need to take. However, the need for psychological relief is now so extreme that people are adamant that we must abandon the pursuit of this goal. There is a growing desire to dogmatically impose utopia rather than stay the course and resolve the human condition. Griffith emphasises how dangerous, immoral and unrealistic this retreat is.

Honest and compassionate insight needed to reach the activist mindset and heal the painful feelings

As mentioned, Biggers has been asked what the most effective ways are to ‘reach across the aisle’ to a climate activist. While Biggers said it needs to come from the person, she also emphasised the importance of people outside the movement showing up as normal, kind, and good people. She went on to mention a specific person who was independent in their views but was also kind to Biggers and modelled the values and the type of person she wanted to be as pivotal in her ‘awakening.’ Presumably, this person’s candour and expression of dignity and respect toward Biggers connected with her at the level that led her to embrace the ideology in the first place. Biggers described contrasting this persons values and secure sense of self with her situation as contributing to being reached, so to speak, and seeing through her activist persona. Elsewhere Biggers described not making young activists feel like ‘fools because I don’t think they are’ and approaching them in an open and supportive manner, resulting in an appreciative and receptive response.

Griffith explains that social justice ‘isms’ have been a vehicle to artificially affirm our worth as ‘good’ and alleviate the painful feelings stemming from the human condition. However, as social justice activism doesn’t resolve the core issue, the foundations of ‘feeling like a good person’ are ‘built on sand’ as Biggers described.

In contrast, Griffith honestly and compassionately explains the cause of our ‘upset’—the clash of our biology and psychology—allowing the guilt and shame to subside. It allows us to own our personal and collective shadow of the human condition. The “shattering experience” of facing our ‘upset’ can subside. It authentically establishes that, as a species, we are tremendously ‘beaten up’ mentally and emotionally by our encounter with REALITY—the human condition—but we are extraordinarily worthwhile. Explanation of the human condition ends the intensifying ‘upset’ that younger generations are exposed to. A key tenet of Griffith’s treatise is that we can know why we are worthwhile despite our ‘upset’. Accordingly, the self-loathing, anger, and need for atonement naturally subside. The nihilistic and anti-human worldview is reversed. The need for the highly compromised, superficial, and artificial compensatory response is obsolete. We can genuinely own and talk about the ‘messes’ that we all are, and this is the key to ‘reaching across’ whatever philosophical or political aisle you like.

Conclusion

Biggers asked the question, “How did I get here?” The clues to answering her question lie in her own description of the emotional machinations of her time in the climate movement. In particular, she emphasised that the climate movement made her ‘feel like a good person’ and provided ‘atonement’ for her sense of guilt. Consistent with this self-worth dimension, Biggers described the role of kindness and respect in emotionally reaching people in the climate movement and in having rational, respectful dialogue.

Griffith explains that social justice ‘isms’ have been a vehicle to artificially affirm our worth as ‘good’ and atone for an existential sense of guilt and shame. These painful feelings of unworthiness stem from the psychologically ‘upset’ state of the human condition that we are necessarily unaware of. In contrast, an honest and compassionate explanation of the root cause of this ‘upset’ allows this guilt and shame to subside. Honest insight into our shared and underlying psychological madness, while confronting, establishes our intrinsic worth, and heals the shame and guilt that is the emotional driver at the heart of secular ‘isms’….

Earth’s Atmosphere Is Getting Less Dusty — and That May Be Speeding Up Global Warming

A recent UCLA- led study finds that Earth’s atmosphere has become about 10% less dusty from 2003 to 2023, which may have modestly contributed to recent global warming because atmospheric mineral dust has a slight net cooling effect.

Atmospheric mineral (desert) dust has a modest net cooling effect on Earth’s climate overall, though the exact magnitude remains uncertain and includes both cooling and warming components.

A realistic view of Earth from space, showcasing continents, oceans, and clouds against a dark starry background.
AI generated by Grok

A recent UCLA- led study finds that Earth’s atmosphere has become about 10% less dusty from 2003 to 2023, which may have modestly contributed to recent global warming because atmospheric mineral dust has a slight net cooling effect.

The research (published in Science Advances) combined data from multiple satellites (lidar, infrared sounders, and multi-spectral imagers), three atmospheric aerosol reanalyses/databases, and ground-based AERONET stations. It provides the strongest evidence yet of a coherent global decline in the dust cycle, including dust aerosol optical depth (DAOD), loading, emissions, and deposition. North Africa (the dominant source) and Asia each showed roughly 10% declines, driving the global trend.

Dust primarily cools the planet by reflecting sunlight (shortwave effects), though it also has complex interactions with longwave radiation, clouds, and precipitation. The observed decline produced a small positive effective radiative forcing of about +0.02 ± 0.05 W m⁻² over 2003- 2023, meaning a modest loss of cooling that may have slightly amplified human- caused warming.

Additional effects include:

  • Air quality: Lower dust is beneficial for respiratory health for hundreds of millions of people in dust-prone regions (e.g., Sahel, Middle East, northern China).
  • Ecosystems: Reduced transport of nutrients such as iron and phosphorus that fertilize oceans and land.
  • Other: Influences on clouds, rainfall (including monsoons), and the reflectivity of snow/ice.

Dust levels remain higher than pre- industrial times (they rose through much of the 20th century and peaked around the 1980s). Some current dust still comes from human- influenced sources such as drying lakebeds.

Preliminary analysis points mainly to weaker surface winds (dust emission is highly sensitive to wind speed) and increased vegetation cover (“greening”), particularly over Asia and China. Researchers (including lead author Ashok Gupta, now at Vanderbilt, and co-author Jasper Kok at UCLA) are investigating the drivers further, including implications for future climates.

Atmospheric mineral (desert) dust has a modest net cooling effect on Earth’s climate overall, though the exact magnitude remains uncertain and includes both cooling and warming components.

Dust interacts with radiation in two main ways:

  1. Shortwave (solar) radiation – primarily cooling
    Dust particles scatter (reflect) incoming sunlight back to space. This reduces the energy reaching Earth’s surface and atmosphere.
    • Central estimate of the shortwave direct radiative effect (DRE): about −0.40 W m⁻² (range roughly −0.10 to −0.70 W m⁻²).
    • Finer particles are more efficient scatterers; coarser particles absorb more solar radiation.
  2. Longwave (thermal infrared) radiation – primarily warming
    Dust absorbs and scatters outgoing heat radiation from Earth, acting somewhat like a greenhouse gas and trapping heat.
    • Recent observationally constrained estimates put the longwave DRE at about +0.25 ± 0.06 W m⁻² (nearly twice what most climate models simulate, partly because models under-represent super-coarse dust >10 μm and omit longwave scattering).

Net direct radiative effect (shortwave and longwave) is typically estimated around −0.15 ± 0.35 W m⁻².

When including additional pathways, effects on clouds, atmospheric chemistry, snow/ice albedo (dust darkens snow and reduces reflectivity), and biogeochemistry, the overall dust effective radiative effect is assessed as:

  • −0.2 ± 0.5 W m⁻² (90% confidence interval)
    This indicates that dust is more likely to cool the climate than to warm it, but the uncertainty range still allows for a small net warming or near-zero effect.

Recent studies incorporating better mineralogy data (e.g., from NASA’s EMIT mission) and size distributions sometimes find weaker net cooling (near-neutral or around −0.06 W m⁻² in some model setups) or stronger cooling (e.g., −0.68 W m⁻² when using regionally varying refractive indices). The sign and magnitude remain an active research area.

Historical and recent changes

  • Global dust mass loading increased by about 55 ± 30% since pre-industrial times (mainly from Asia and North Africa). This produced an effective radiative forcing of roughly −0.07 ± 0.18 W m⁻², modestly counteracting greenhouse- gas warming.
  • From 2003- 2023, atmospheric dust declined by ~10%. Because dust cools overall, this reduction produced a small positive forcing of +0.02 ± 0.05 W m⁻², meaning a modest loss of cooling that may have slightly contributed to recent rapid warming.

Regional variations

  • Over dark surfaces (oceans): stronger cooling (scattering dominates).
  • Over bright surfaces (deserts, snow/ice): weaker cooling or local warming (absorption becomes more important; deposited dust further reduces surface albedo).
  • Near major sources (e.g., Sahara): strong surface cooling but atmospheric heating.

In short: Dust’s dominant cooling comes from reflecting sunlight, partially offset by its heat- trapping longwave effects and other interactions. The best current assessment is a small net global cooling, but large uncertainties mean better constraints on particle size, mineral composition (especially iron oxides), and cloud interactions are still needed. This is why the recent observed decline in dust is viewed as removing a small cooling influence.

A global decline in atmospheric dust during the 21st century

This is the full scientific paper corresponding to the Phys.org/UCLA news coverage:
“A global decline in atmospheric dust during the 21st century”

Key findings (from the abstract and results)

Researchers reconstructed the global dust cycle for 2003- 2023 using a large- ensemble inverse modeling framework that integrates:

  • Multiple satellite DAOD (dust aerosol optical depth) products (lidar, infrared sounders, multi- spectral imagers, including LIVAS/CALIPSO, MIDAS, IASI-LMD)
  • Three aerosol reanalyses (MERRA-2, CAMS, NAAPS)
  • Ground-based AERONET observations at dust- dominated sites

Main results:

  • Global atmospheric dust declined by −10 ± 8% between 2003 and 2023 (roughly −5 ± 4% per decade).
  • North Africa (still the dominant source) declined by −10 ± 8%.
  • Asia declined by −10 ± 12%.
  • Parallel declines occurred in dust loading, emissions, and deposition, indicating a coherent weakening of the entire global dust cycle.
  • Individual satellite products largely agree on the downward trend (the strongest evidence to date that the planet became less dusty in the early 21st century).

Climate impact:
The decline produced a positive effective radiative forcing of +0.02 ± 0.05 W m⁻² over 2003–2023. Because dust has a net cooling effect overall, its reduction removes some of that cooling and may have modestly contributed to the rapid warming and growing Earth’s energy imbalance of the past two decades.

Additional context from the paper

  • All seven major DAOD products show negative global trends over the overlapping 2008- 2021 period, though magnitudes vary.
  • Trends are strongest over major source regions; some outflow regions (e.g., parts of the tropical North Atlantic) show more mixed or locally positive signals, possibly linked to transport and wet-scavenging changes.
  • AERONET evaluation shows IASI-LMD and MERRA-2 best match observed long-term trends at dust-dominated sites.
  • The reconstruction produces ready- to- use global datasets of emissions, loading, deposition, and DAOD for use in climate models.

The paper notes that the causes of the decline (weaker surface winds, vegetation “greening,” etc.) are still under investigation, and that dust levels remain elevated relative to pre-industrial conditions.

This matches the news summaries: less dust is good for air quality in exposed regions but removes a small cooling effect and reduces nutrient deposition to ecosystems.

Published:  Science Advances (2026)

DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aef5691

Provided: University of California, Los Angeles

Authors: Ashok K. Gupta, Jasper F. Kok, and colleagues

Abstract

Mineral dust affects Earth’s energy budget, clouds, and biochemistry, yet the evolution of the global dust cycle in recent decades remains shrouded in uncertainty. Here we reconstruct the global dust cycle during the early 21st century by integrating a suite of global dust aerosol optical depth (DAOD) products from satellite-borne lidar, infrared sounders, and multispectral imagers; three aerosol reanalyses; and a compilation of dust-dominated AERONET sites into a large-ensemble inverse modeling framework. We show that North Africa has remained the dominant global dust source, yet it has experienced a decline in DAOD of −10 ± 8% between 2003 and 2023. A comparable reduction is observed across Asia (−10 ± 12%), together driving a global decrease of −10 ± 8%. Similar declines in dust loading, emissions, and deposition indicate a coherent reduction of the global dust cycle. Individual satellite products converge on overall similar trends, providing the strongest evidence to date that the planet has become less dusty in the early 21st century. This decline in atmospheric dust has exerted a positive effective radiative forcing of +0.02 ± 0.05 watts per square meter over 2003–2023, implying that declining atmospheric dust might have modestly contributed to the rapid warming of the past two decades.

Brussels is Building a Climate Protection Racket in the Name of ‘Climate Insurance’

Kurt Vandenberghe, the European Commission’s Director-General for Climate Action, put the new orthodoxy in a single sentence this month. Posting after a round table with Europe’s insurers on closing the “climate protection gap”, he declared that “insurance as usual will not be sustainable”. Climate policy, he argued, is now effectively insurance policy too: whatever risk insurers decline to cover becomes uninvestable.

According to Vandenberghe, a widening protection gap threatens a looming financial-stability problem for the whole European Union.

A political cartoon depicting European Union leaders celebrating the unveiling of the Climate Protection Fund while money flows from a vault. In the background, scenes of natural disasters such as storms, wildfires, and flooding illustrate the climate crisis. Various characters express discontent over insufficient coverage and funding for climate issues.
AI generated by Grok

From Tilak´s Substack’

By Tilak Doshi

Smoke and flames rising from wildfires in Rhodes, Greece, with a caption about extreme weather and firefighting efforts against multiple wildfires.

Kurt Vandenberghe, the European Commission’s Director-General for Climate Action, put the new orthodoxy in a single sentence this month. Posting after a round table with Europe’s insurers on closing the “climate protection gap”, he declared that “insurance as usual will not be sustainable”. Climate policy, he argued, is now effectively insurance policy too: whatever risk insurers decline to cover becomes uninvestable. According to Vandenberghe, a widening protection gap threatens a looming financial-stability problem for the whole European Union.

In April, the Financial Times pushed the same idea, reporting that EU insurance, pensions and financial regulators want a Brussels-backed fund of €10 billion–€65 billion for natural and climate disasters “to close the bloc’s insurance gap for floods, wildfires, heatwaves and storms”. The figures behind the pitch are stark: only €4.5 billion of the €11 billion in losses from the 2024 Valencia floods were insured; only €13 billion of the €51 billion in losses from the 2021 Ahr valley floods were covered. Natural catastrophes, the regulators said, caused more than €900 billion in damage across the EU between 1981 and 2024 – “only a fraction” of it insured.

Brussels has decided that Europe’s storms and bad weather need a new bureaucracy. The Financial Times report drew on a joint discussion paper published that same day by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. It proposed a continent-wide natural catastrophe insurance pool, backed by a loan facility of up to €65 billion, that would supposedly shrink Europe’s “insurance protection gap” from roughly 75% to about 10%. The pool would be financed by risk-based premiums backstopped, ultimately, by the EU’s own credit.

Spain did not wait long to raise the stakes. In a letter to Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra sent on September 2nd 2026, Madrid’s ecological transition ministry proposed a permanent European Climate Adaptation Fund financed by a tax on oil and gas company profits, common EU debt instruments and a public-private reinsurance system issuing “climate risk bonds”. Madrid’s own tally: €822 billion in weather and climate losses across the EU since 1980, with roughly a quarter of that concentrated in just the four years from 2021 to 2024.

Both proposals share the same unstated premise that ordinary weather insurance has failed, and that only a new instrument bearing the word ‘climate’, underwritten by Brussels, can keep Europe insurable. That premise is a category error. It has been made before – by central bankers reaching for ‘climate stress tests’, by ESG fund managers pricing transition risk that never materialised, and now by insurance regulators. Each time, we see the same conflation of routine, priceable risk with manufactured systemic crisis. Each time, the same remedy: more Brussels, less market.

The EU is not starting from zero. The existing EU Solidarity Fund has paid out €8.6 billion since its creation in 2002, across 130 disasters – a modest, largely uncontroversial mechanism for the genuinely catastrophic tail risk. What is being proposed now is something categorically larger: a standing, EU-guaranteed insurance pool for ordinary annual weather losses that private and national markets already price and pay for routinely, rebranded as an unavoidable response to a changing climate rather than what it actually is – a transfer mechanism dressed in actuarial language.

A category error

What households and firms face, and what insurers have priced for centuries, is weather risk – the chance that a specific flood, windstorm, fire or freeze damages a specific asset in a specific place in a specific year. ‘Climate’ is simply the probability distribution that measures the weather: the averages, the tails, and how slowly those tails might shift over decades. As Stanford University economist John Cochrane has argued for more than a decade, a slowly evolving distribution that can be observed, modelled and repriced every year is not a systemic financial surprise. It is the ordinary business of insurance.

Cochrane made the distinction sharpest in his 2021 testimony to the US Senate Banking Committee: “Climate change is an important challenge. But climate change poses no measurable risk to the financial system…. ‘Risk’ means unforeseen events. We know exactly where the climate is going over the horizon that financial regulation can contemplate.” His point about horizons matters. Trouble in 2100, if it materialises, will come from investments made in 2095; supervisors cannot usefully look through 80 years, and treating a century-scale drift as a five-year threat is, in his words, an answer in search of a question – a convenient vehicle for policies that could not otherwise pass ordinary democratic or cost-benefit tests.

None of this requires pretending that weather is stationary. El Niño cycles, the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, land-use change and urban heat islands all move the observed distribution over time, and insurers have always updated their actuarial tables to match. Catastrophe models, reinsurance treaties and catastrophe bonds already transfer tail risk into global capital markets built precisely for that purpose. Dykes, flood barriers, stricter building codes, forestry management and better drainage – the unglamorous business of adaptive practices – have reduced the human and economic toll of weather for generations, largely independent of anything happening to emissions. None of that machinery requires a Brussels-branded relabelling to keep functioning; it requires that insurance premiums be allowed to adjust.

Bar graph illustrating global weather disaster losses as a percentage of global GDP from 1990 to 2023, featuring black bars for yearly data and a green line representing the moving 5-year average. The red dashed line indicates the linear trend.
Source: https://globalextremeweather.thehonestbroker.org/

Buffett’s actuarial common sense

Warren Buffett made the identical point in Berkshire Hathaway’s 2015 shareholder letter, responding to a proxy proposal that fretted about climate risk to the insurer’s books. “Insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures,” he wrote. “Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.” If catastrophe losses become more frequent or costly, the effect on a well-run insurer is not insolvency but a larger, more profitable book of business – provided prices are allowed to move. Fixed-price, multi-decade policies would be a different matter; that is not how property-casualty insurance works, in Valencia or in Iowa.

That is why the industry regularly accused of ‘failing’ on climate keeps functioning: it reprices weather year by year rather than pretending to underwrite an abstract planetary process called “climate change”. Swiss Re’s own sigma reports show global insured catastrophe losses climbing at a steady 5-7% real annual rate, with reinsurers stepping in to absorb the bulk of losses only in rare ‘peak loss’ years that run far above trend. That is not evidence of a broken market. It is evidence of a market doing exactly what actuarial pricing is designed to do.

The empirical case for treating ‘climate’ losses as a new and exceptional category is weaker than Brussels’s rhetoric suggests. Physicist Steven Koonin’s Unsettled compiles what the observational record and the IPCC’s own assessment reports actually say about extremes, as distinct from what press releases claim. The IPCC assigns low confidence to any long-term global increase in tropical-cyclone frequency or intensity. Global flood and drought trends show no clear, high-confidence signal at the global scale. None of this denies that greenhouse gases warm the planet. What it does deny is that the weather extremes insurers price for have become dramatically less predictable.

Roger Pielke Jr.’s normalisation work tells the same story from the loss side. After adjusting European Environment Agency catastrophe-loss data for 1990-2024 by GDP growth, he finds no long-term trend: direct economic losses from weather and climate events have scaled roughly in proportion with the region’s growing economy, not faster than it. Globally, his earlier analysis found catastrophe losses falling from just under 0.3% of world GDP in 1990 to just under 0.2% by 2019. Even Swiss Re’s own chief economist concedes the underlying mechanism: “economic development continues to be the main driver” of rising insured losses over many decades. More buildings and more wealth sitting in harm’s way, not a broken climate, explains most of the rising bill – and a rising share of that bill is simply previously-uninsured property now being covered, which mechanically inflates the insured-loss total without any change in the underlying hazard.

The protection gap is real – but it is not new, and not uniquely climatic

None of this means Europe’s insurance gap is invented. EIOPA’s own figures show only around a quarter of natural catastrophe losses across the bloc were insured between 1980 and 2024, and the Valencia and Ahr valley figures cited above are typical rather than exceptional. But the gap reflects national differences in insurance take-up, in whether cover is mandatory or voluntary, and in the political reluctance to charge risk-based rates on floodplains and fire-prone hillsides – not a sudden climatic discontinuity that only Brussels can address. Layering a Brussels-level insurance pool on top creates a new constituency that benefits, politically and financially, from calling every flood season or hot summer a climate crisis requiring ‘European solidarity’ rather than a pricing and land-use problem.

The insurance pool does not arrive in isolation. It follows an 88-page OECD study, funded and co-written by the European Commission, instructing De Nederlandsche Bank on how to assess “prudential risk” arising from Dutch banks’ Net Zero commitments – a study this writer criticised in these pages last month. The pattern is consistent: once a regulator is allowed to relabel an ordinary commercial or actuarial question as a matter of ‘climate’, the same logic that turned corporate governance into ESG scorecards and central-bank collateral policy into green industrial strategy takes over. Insurance regulators who cannot distinguish a slowly shifting probability distribution from a genuine 2008-style financial crisis will use ‘climate crisis’ as a licence to direct capital, expand mandates and socialise losses that markets already price.

This is mission creep dressed as prudence. Climate and adaptation policy belongs in legislatures that can weigh costs, benefits and trade-offs in the open, subject to a vote. Insurance belongs with underwriters who live or die by whether this year’s premiums cover this year’s losses plus a return on capital. Confusing the two does not make Europe more resilient to weather; it makes Europe’s insurance market less accountable to the price signal that has, for two centuries, told people where not to build.

Prices, not politics

Adam Smith observed that we do not expect our dinner from the benevolence of the butcher. We should not expect solvent insurance from the benevolence of a European facility that treats every wildfire season or a hot summer as an indictment of capitalism. Ordinary insurance already does what Brussels claims only a new ‘climate’ product could do. It prices flood, wind and fire risk; it transfers tail risk into global capital markets through reinsurance and catastrophe bonds; and it sends an unmistakable signal – through the premium, not the press release – about where not to build, or where to elevate, clear brush or improve drainage. Subsidising that signal away with a Brussels-backed pool does not reduce risk. It socialises the cost of ignoring it and calls the result solidarity.

The storms will keep coming, as they always have. The question Brussels keeps avoiding is whether prices, engineering and private contracts should go on allocating that risk, or whether Europe needs another layer of official climate theology bolted onto a market that has spent two centuries learning how to price rain, wind and fire.

Traditional insurance was never the problem. The attempt to rebrand it as something only Brussels can save us from is.

This article was first published in the Daily Sceptic https://dailysceptic.org/2026/09/16/brussels-is-building-a-climate-protection-racket-in-the-name-of-climate-insurance/

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former (cancelled) contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.