{"id":450835,"date":"2026-06-17T04:30:55","date_gmt":"2026-06-17T11:30:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=450835"},"modified":"2026-06-17T04:30:56","modified_gmt":"2026-06-17T11:30:56","slug":"follow-the-money-leaving-wind-farms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=450835","title":{"rendered":"Follow the Money Leaving Wind\u00a0Farms"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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From Science Matters<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Ron Clutz<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Boluwatife Remy reveals what many have overlooked, widespread disinvesting in wind power.  Not so long ago, the climate feaful were badgering education and religious institutions, among others, to disinvest in hydrocarbons from Big Oil companies.  Well, the worm has turned.  Remy\u2019s article at benzinga is
Why Shell Is Selling Its Wind Farms\u2014And What It\u2019s Building Instead. <\/strong><\/a>Excerpts in italics with my bolds and added images.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The energy transition was supposed to be the defining corporate story of the 2020s.<\/strong> For Shell<\/strong> (NYSE:<\/a>SHEL<\/a>), it has become the story of what the company tried, reconsidered, and is now unwinding<\/strong> at a pace that leaves little room for ambiguity about where management stands.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bloomberg reported Friday that Shell is preparing to offload a portfolio of offshore wind farms in a transaction expected to generate more than $1 billion.<\/strong> Rothschild and PJT Partners are handling the advisory work, with the formal sale process targeted for 2027. Shell said nothing publicly. What the company has not stayed quiet about, expressed through a long sequence of exits and disposals<\/strong> over the past two years, is the direction it has chosen and the conviction behind it.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This Is Not a One-Off Decision<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyone tempted to read the Bloomberg report as an isolated portfolio adjustment has not been following what Shell has been doing since Wael Sawan took the chief executive<\/strong> role with an explicit mandate to tighten the company\u2019s strategic focus and restore the return on capital<\/strong> that investors had been pushing for.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The wind exits<\/strong> have been coming in steady succession. Shell walked away from the Atlantic Shores<\/strong> offshore wind project in the United States, absorbing a $1 billion writedown after concluding the numbers no longer worked. It sold its half of the MarramWind floating offshore<\/strong> wind development off Scotland t<\/strong>o joint venture partner ScottishPower Renewables and abandoned the CampionWind project<\/strong> it had been developing independently.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Positions in other offshore wind assets across multiple markets have been quietly sold down as each successive review of the business case reached the same conclusion<\/strong>. The explanation attached to each departure has been consistent: the project either fails to meet<\/strong> the company\u2019s return thresholds or<\/strong> no longer fits what Shell believes it does well.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One exit looks like a portfolio decision. A dozen exits
over twenty-four months looks like a verdict.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Shell Is Building in Place of Wind<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The company Sawan is assembling has a narrower and more deliberate focus than the Shell that spent the early 2020s presenting sweeping energy transition commitments to investors and government audiences. Liquefied natural gas trading and upstream oil and gas production<\/strong> are where the strategy now concentrates, businesses where Shell carries genuine competitive advantages built over decades<\/strong> that no amount of capital could quickly replicate elsewhere.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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That repositioning is not unique to Shell<\/strong>. The same reassessment has been running simultaneously across the major integrated oil companies. BP<\/strong> has been selling renewable assets and reorienting capital toward upstream production. Equinor<\/strong> reduced its renewable energy workforce by around 20% while boosting spending on oil and gas. TotalEnergies <\/strong>negotiated an exit from nearly $1 billion in U.S. offshore wind leases and committed the equivalent amount to domestic fossil fuel development instead.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The companies<\/strong> that arrived at the 2021 and 2022 investor days with<\/strong> ambitious clean energy targets have<\/strong> each, at their own pace and with varying degrees of public candor, concluded<\/strong> that those targets were built on assumptions that did not hold.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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How Offshore Wind Lost Its Financial Logic<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The deterioration in offshore wind economics<\/strong> between 2021 and 2024 was sharper than almost anyone inside the industry publicly acknowledged while it was happening. Construction costs<\/strong> climbed<\/strong> as specialist installation vessels became scarce and supply chains struggled<\/strong> to keep pace with the volume of projects that had been approved simultaneously across European and American markets.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interest rates moved<\/strong> from near zero to levels that fundamentally changed the math on capital-intensive long-duration infrastructure. Turbine manufacturers, squeezed between fixed-price contracts and rising input costs<\/strong>, ran into serious financial difficulty.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n

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The gap<\/strong> between what projects were expected to cost when developers submitted bids and what actually arrived on the invoice<\/strong> became a recurring crisis.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contracts got cancelled. Projects got written down. <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Governments<\/strong> that had structured power purchase agreements around cost assumptions from a different era<\/strong> found themselves in renegotiations that pleased nobody. The companies carrying the heaviest exposure to offshore wind at the peak of the enthusiasm cycle spent years managing the fallout from decisions that looked reasonable in 2020 and looked considerably<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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What This Means for Shell Shareholders<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Selling wind farms that are not generating acceptable returns and redirecting the proceeds into businesses that are creates a cleaner financial picture for investors<\/strong> who have been watching Shell carry underperforming assets longer than they would have preferred. <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shell has been among the more aggressive capital returners among the major oil companies, and management has been consistent about treating buyback capacity and dividend sustainability<\/strong> as priorities that outrank maintaining positions in low-return businesses.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The assets being brought to market will find buyers. Infrastructure funds and specialist renewable developers have been steady acquirers of divested offshore wind portfolios throughout this cycle, often able to hold the assets more cheaply than integrated oil companies whose capital costs and return expectations create a structural disadvantage in low-margin infrastructure. Shell selling is not the same as the assets disappearing. It is the assets moving to owners better suited to hold them.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What stays with Shell<\/strong> is the part of the energy business<\/strong> it has decided it is actually good at.<\/strong> For investors, that clarity is worth more than a diversified portfolio of businesses generating mixed returns and requiring constant explanation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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See Also: Wind Power Economic Failure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The Short Lives of Wind Turbines<\/a><\/blockquote>