{"id":427325,"date":"2026-02-21T21:26:45","date_gmt":"2026-02-21T20:26:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=427325"},"modified":"2026-02-22T21:34:05","modified_gmt":"2026-02-22T20:34:05","slug":"germanys-energy-transition-hits-the-ice-lng-crisis-exposes-the-costs-of-shunning-nuclear-and-baseload-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=427325","title":{"rendered":"Germany\u2019s \u201cEnergy Transition\u201d Hits the Ice: LNG Crisis Exposes the Costs of Shunning Nuclear and Baseload Power"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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From Watts Up With That?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Charles Rotter<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Germany\u2019s week-by-week battle to keep its LNG imports flowing isn\u2019t just a story about weather and stuck ships. It\u2019s a tale about energy policy choices made over decades \u2014 choices that sidelined reliable baseload power sources like nuclear and coal in favor of intermittent renewables and imported fuels. The recent incident in which\u00a0\u201cGermany\u2019s largest LNG terminal \u2026 ran out of gas because the tanker got stuck, and the icebreaker broke down\u201d<\/a><\/em>\u00a0is an apt metaphor for a system that was designed more for political signaling than for robust, weather-proof reliability.<\/p>\n\n\n

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https:\/\/www.sott.net\/article\/504686-Germanys-largest-LNG-terminal-running-out-of-gas-The-tanker-got-stuck-the-icebreaker-broke-down<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

The SOTT<\/em> piece <\/a>notes that Germany\u2019s largest LNG regasification hub at Mukran on the Baltic Island of R\u00fcgen \u201cstopped shipping gas to the country\u2019s gas transportation system since early February,\u201d<\/em> because a tanker became immobilized by ice and the icebreaker sent to free it \u201cbroke down.\u201d<\/em> With LNG imports cut sharply and German underground gas storage at historically low levels, the situation is not a trivial inconvenience but a systemic weak point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But this vulnerability didn\u2019t arise in a vacuum. It was engineered over time by policy decisions<\/strong> that eliminated some of the most reliable sources of domestic power generation and replaced them with inherently intermittent ones and imported fuels that require long logistics chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Until April 15, 2023, Germany maintained a fleet of nuclear reactors that once provided a significant percentage of its electricity. Those reactors were dismantled in accordance with the long-standing Atomausstieg<\/em> (nuclear phase-out) policy, which had been enshrined in law well before the current crisis. Germany did not<\/em> pause permanently when other countries doubled down on nuclear as a way to balance grids dominated by renewables. Instead, it completed<\/em> its nuclear exit \u2014 even though nuclear plants had historically contributed roughly a quarter of German electricity and provided steady, dispatchable baseload power. (agora-energiewende.org<\/a>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critics have long argued that removing these zero-carbon, continuous output plants from the grid would leave Germany exposed when weather-driven sources like wind and solar falter, and when imported fuels become constrained or expensive. It\u2019s obvious that maintaining nuclear operations would have reduced gas-fired generation and lowered electricity prices<\/em> during the recent energy crunch. For example, postponing the nuclear shutdown as was briefly done during the 2022 energy crisis reduced gas generation and held down power prices by an estimated \u20ac9\/MWh before the reactors were finally taken offline.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany\u2019s phase-out of coal is also underway. After decades of reliance on lignite and hard coal for consistent, high-volume power generation, the plan is to shut coal plants down by 2038. Coal historically provided a large share of dispatchable electricity, and even recent years saw the temporary restart of coal plants to conserve gas when supplies were tight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What remains in Germany\u2019s energy mix today is heavily skewed toward intermittent renewables, a growing share of imports, and fuels like LNG that must clear logistical bottlenecks before they enter the grid. Renewables are a major part of the production mix \u2014 but they cannot on their own<\/em> supply the steady baseload that economies depend on day in, day out. Nuclear and coal both do<\/em> supply baseload; wind and solar do not, by design. That\u2019s why systems that rely on them either need dispatchable alternatives, massive storage, or extensive interconnections \u2014 and Germany\u2019s grid and storage infrastructure has struggled to keep pace with the rapid pivot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The current LNG fiasco brings these deficiencies into sharp relief:<\/p>\n\n\n\n