{"id":423594,"date":"2026-01-28T13:00:35","date_gmt":"2026-01-28T12:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=423594"},"modified":"2026-01-28T13:00:38","modified_gmt":"2026-01-28T12:00:38","slug":"storm-ferm-remember-uri-centrally-planned-electricity-transition-in-texas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=423594","title":{"rendered":"Storm Ferm: Remember Uri (centrally planned electricity \u2018transition\u2019 in Texas)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"Aerial<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From The Master Resource<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Robert Bradley Jr.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"A<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Ed. note<\/strong>: The current cold snap (\u201cwhere is global warming when you need it?\u201d) makes timely a review of the Texas electricity debacle of February 2021. This post by Robert Bradley, \u201cWind, Solar, and the Great Texas Blackout: Guilty as Charged<\/a>,\u201d was originally published by the Institute for Energy Research. As of 5 pm yesterday, natural gas and coal supplied about 75 percent of Texas\u2019s electricity (ERCOT scoreboard) and wind\/solar 17 percent (versus 50 percent of rated capacity).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cCentral planning for a forced energy transformation produced the debacle of debacles two years ago in Texas. It is time for a new era for U.S. electricity policy premised on market entrepreneurship.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Electricity specialists at the University of Texas at Austin recently revisited the Great Texas Blackout of February 2021. The op-ed, \u201cTwo years after its historic deep freeze, Texas is increasingly vulnerable to cold snaps \u2013 and there are more solutions than just building power plants<\/a>\u201d (The Conversation<\/em>), spreads the blame and recommends more government planning, not less.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The authors want to let wind and solar continue to \u201csaturate\u201d the market and regulate (via \u201csmart meters\u201d) usage in your home and business to save the grid. But this is a recipe for intrusion, inconvenience, hassle, and conflict. And it neglects the logical alternative of denationalizing (privatizing) the state\u2019s power grid to create the right incentives for the provision of reliable, affordable electricity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As it is now, the governmental Electric Reliability Council of Texas<\/a> (ERCOT) manages the wholesale grid, covering 90 percent of the state. Power-in, power-out is governed by 1,500 pages of rules and regulations<\/a>\u2014with more coming if the \u201cexperts\u201d and \u201cplanners\u201d have their way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Politically Correct Misinterpretation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAs energy researchers based in Texas, we have spent much of the past two years analyzing why the state was so unprepared for this event and how it can do better,\u201d the study begins. Michael Webber et al. continue<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

A common knee-jerk reaction to disasters that cause widespread power outages is to call for building more \u201cfirm\u201d power plants \u2013 those that use fuels like coal or natural gas and are designed to deliver power at any time of day or night. But coal and gas plants, and their fuel supplies, can fail spectacularly.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Thus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

We think it is important to think beyond just building more power plants. Our findings spotlight other solutions that can be cleaner, cheaper and faster to put in place.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The \u201ccleaner, cheaper and faster\u201d policy is ultra-prescriptive, inside-the-walls demand-side management programs (to be determined). Something is amiss in this engineering world where humans, as Adam Smith\u00a0warned<\/a>\u00a0centuries ago, are just \u201cdifferent pieces upon a chess- board.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The authors claim that the to-be-accommodated political<\/em> energies\u2014dilute, intermittent, and thus noncompetitive\u2014are somehow cheaper<\/em>: \u201cRapid growth in wind and solar generation in Texas has saved the state\u2019s consumers billions of dollars while making a lot of money for rural landowners and local governments.\u201d But U.S. taxpayers are paying part of the wind\/solar bill, and all state residents pay a monthly fee to cover the cost of the $7 billion CREZ transmission system<\/a> built for renewables. Then there are local and state tax favors<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is back to the soft energy path<\/a> of Amory Lovins of the 1970s. Replace reliable, consumer-chosen, taxpayer-neutral electricity with weather-dependent ones. Tighten the usage screws to cover up for supply-side gaps and unreliability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Renewables Were<\/em> the Culprit<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The politically correct interpretation dodges the hard questions and avoids the analysis needed to get to the underlying causes of the worse electricity disruption in history. The central error is concentrating on the data without understanding the \u201cwhy.\u201d What happened in February 2021 was a long predicted<\/a> \u201cperfect storm.\u201d It had precedents in the winters of 1989 and 2011 and should have been anticipated and overcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The statement \u201ccoal and gas plants, and their fuel supplies, can fail spectacularly\u201d ignores incentives<\/em> and opportunity cost<\/em>, Economics 101.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is the reason and the answer, with quite different policy implications:\u00a0the unreliables caused the underperformance of the reliables<\/em>. As I explained nearly two years ago in \u201cRenewables \u2018Market-Failed\u2019 Natural Gas in Texas<\/a>\u201d:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

Renewables, representing more than one-fourth of Texas\u2019s generating capacity,\u00a0<\/em>all but disappeared at the peak<\/a>. But there is a very important second part of the story:\u00a0the tax-break-driven pricing of wind severely compromised the economics of existing and new natural gas and coal plants.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I cited a\u00a0Houston Chronicle<\/em>\u00a0story, \u201cHigh Risk, Low Reward Drives Shift from Power Generation<\/a>\u201d (March 14, 2021). That story asked: \u201cHow did Texas get to the point where more than half its electricity generation got knocked offline?\u201d What those in the industry knew (but outside \u201cexperts\u201d do not seem to want to know) was unveiled in this one simple article:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

The failure of so many power plants during the brutal winter weather that swept through Texas last month was perhaps years in the making, the result of a merchant power industry that has struggled to earn profits, satisfy Wall Street and keep the confidence of lenders and investors.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And why did the reliable plants become unreliable?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

Lenders and investors have agreed. A major new power plant \u2014 excluding wind and solar installations \u2014 has not been built in Texas since 2017, when the Chicago company Exelon completed two 1,100-megawatt gas-fired power plants, according to the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, the state\u2019s grid manager. One reason: financing for projects that can cost hundreds of millions of dollars has become increasingly hard to get.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Continuing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThere is a lot of uncertainty about how much profit gas plants can make year to year,\u201d said Travis Miller, an energy and utilities equity strategist at Morningstar Securities Research. \u201cInvestors typically don\u2019t want to finance projects when they don\u2019t have confidence the project can produce steady cash flows.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The sum result:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

The companies, meanwhile, have not just slowed or stopped investing in generation. They have sold off and shut down power plants to refocus on businesses with higher profit margins, such as retail electricity.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Phantom capacity- early retired gas and coal plants and would-have- been new capacity- was missed at a most crucial time. Poorly maintained capacity was another consequence from ruined margins from government-enabled, low- marginal-cost wind and solar. There were other reasons (here<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0here<\/a>)- pointing toward government, not free markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unreliable capacity that never should have been built crowded out the reliables- as intended by \u201cmagical thinking<\/a>\u201d policymakers. Storm Uri was not the straw that broke the camel\u2019s back, it was the moment that showed the animal\u2019s back was badly broken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The way forward is the opposite of what the UT- Austin authors recommend. Wind, solar, and batteries should no longer receive government advantage. The wholesale power grid now run by ERCOT should be denationalized and mandatory transmission rules rescinded. Third, franchise protection and other \u201cpublic utility\u201d regulation should be removed for the denationalized grid, a program\u00a0outlined<\/a>\u00a0elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Central planning for a forced energy transformation produced the debacle of debacles two years ago in Texas. It is time for a new era for U.S. electricity policy premised on market entrepreneurship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014-<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appendix: Other MR Articles on the Texas Blackout<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Great Texas Blackout (2021): When the Free Market Electricity Debate Began<\/a> (February 24, 2025)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Great Texas Blackout Revisited: Market Failure Not<\/a> (February 14, 2025)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tomlinson on the Texas Grid Three Years Ago (prediction fail!)<\/a> (February 23, 2024)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electricity Expert\/Planner \u2018Shaken\u2019 (Texas debacle shocks worldview)<\/a> February 21, 2024)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Great Texas Blackout of 2021: Triumph of the Unreliables<\/a> (February 20, 2024)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sheridan Shakes the Texas\/ERCOT Narrative (fossil fuels did rescue wind\/solar)<\/a> (January 19, 2024)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Wounded Texas Grid: Who\u2019s On First?<\/a> (August 29, 2023)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tomlinson\u2019s Narrative on the (Wounded) Texas Grid: More Misdirection from the Houston Chronicle<\/a> (July 13, 2023)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electrified Compressors and the Great Texas Blackout (a threat to grid reliability everywhere)<\/a> Ed Ireland: May 4, 2023)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Texas Blackout: Markets or Regulators?<\/a> (February 24, 2023)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An Exchange with Michael Webber (UT- Austin) on the February 2021 Texas Blackouts<\/a> ((February 15, 2023)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Renewables and the Great Texas Blackout: Baker Institute Study Tip-toes to Key Causality<\/a> (September 29, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Texas Grid Reliability: Gone With the Wind (and solar)<\/a> (Bill Peacock: September 14, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cElectricity Restructuring: The Texas Story\u201d (revisiting a book gone sour)<\/a> (August 18, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pokalsky, Borlick, Kiesling: Capacity Markets Now Essential in Texas (central planning rethink)<\/a> (August 5, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Texas\u2019 Wounded Grid: Reliable Generators Call for Public Subsidies (renewables distortion for all to see)<\/a> (July 12, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Renewables, renewables \u2026 a Texas-sized Truth Creeping In<\/a> (June 16, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

PUCT Leaders in Denial: Erasing Renewables from Blackout Causality<\/a> (June 10, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electricity Markets: Contrived\/Distorted vs. Real (debating the Texas Blackout)<\/a> (April 8, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Texas Blackout: Costs, Blame Mount<\/a> (April 5, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Civil Society and Natural Gas during the Great Texas Blackout<\/a> (March 24, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Numbers and the Great Texas Blackout<\/a> (Bill Peacock: March 4, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And anticipating the Texas blackout:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

Texas Windpower: Will Negative Pricing Blow Out the Lights? (PTC vs. reliable new capacity<\/a>)<\/a>\u00a0(Josiah Neeley: November 27, 2012)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The current cold snap (\u201cwhere is global warming when you need it?\u201d) makes timely a review of the Texas electricity debacle of February 2021. This post by Robert Bradley, \u201cWind, Solar, and the Great Texas Blackout: Guilty as Charged,\u201d was originally published by the Institute for Energy Research. As of 5 pm yesterday, natural gas and coal supplied about 75 percent of Texas\u2019s electricity (ERCOT scoreboard) and wind\/solar 17 percent (versus 50 percent of rated capacity).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":121246920,"featured_media":423606,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_coblocks_attr":"","_coblocks_dimensions":"","_coblocks_responsive_height":"","_coblocks_accordion_ie_support":"","_crdt_document":"","advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"Lessons from the Texas Blackout: Rethinking Energy Policy","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":true,"token":"eyJpbWciOiJodHRwczpcL1wvY2xpbWF0ZS1zY2llbmNlLnByZXNzXC93cC1jb250ZW50XC91cGxvYWRzXC8yMDI2XC8wMVwvQVFNdS1IRHN3UHFJeWVoUDgtNFJ6R3VNSERobUd6SXprcFV5RlpqWlJxMy1EV09hTU9HUWtoc2s4S19LYmNKYmpiSTFhbzQ5cFZUZE1HXzUta3V3cFB6MU1KVkFXdmdZYjdscy1wVnJkMGNNM2JzMnBwTndNNXZtdUtlQ1hSZXktMTAyNHg2MDMuanBlZyIsInR4dCI6IlN0b3JtIEZlcm06IFJlbWVtYmVyIFVyaSAoY2VudHJhbGx5IHBsYW5uZWQgZWxlY3RyaWNpdHkgXHUyMDE4dHJhbnNpdGlvblx1MjAxOSBpbiBUZXhhcykiLCJ0ZW1wbGF0ZSI6ImhpZ2h3YXkiLCJmb250IjoiIiwiYmxvZ19pZCI6MTU1ODEyNDQ5fQ.gUvdXsgsxh5d5I0XRXSk7LQr3cX42qCLmAky-VJ3beQMQ"},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1],"tags":[691840975,691821003,691823281,691818618,691819094,691823533,691825722,691818728],"class_list":{"0":"post-423594","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"hentry","7":"category-uncategorized","8":"tag-magical-thinking-policymakers","9":"tag-central-planning","10":"tag-electric-reliability-council-of-texas-ercot-2","11":"tag-energy-transition","12":"tag-renewable-green-energy","13":"tag-storm-uri","14":"tag-texas-blackout-disaster","15":"tag-wind-and-solar","17":"fallback-thumbnail"},"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/AQMu-HDswPqIyehP8-4RzGuMHDhmGzIzkpUyFZjZRq3-DWOaMOGQkhsk8K_KbcJbjbI1ao49pVTdMG_5-kuwpPz1MJVAWvgYb7ls-pVrd0cM3bs2ppNwM5vmuKeCXRey.jpeg?fit=1523%2C897&ssl=1","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paxLW1-1Mca","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":211778,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=211778","url_meta":{"origin":423594,"position":0},"title":"Excusing Wind in Texas? 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The mainstream media implicated natural gas instead, failing to explore\u00a0the why behind the why. Rather than deregulation, Texas has chosen to add wind, solar, and batteries, while subsidizing natural gas\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"Blackout\"","block_context":{"text":"Blackout","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=blackout"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/0ac123c14-da9c-4e2e-8521-fc474aa5b8f3-texas_topper.webp?fit=1200%2C676&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/0ac123c14-da9c-4e2e-8521-fc474aa5b8f3-texas_topper.webp?fit=1200%2C676&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/0ac123c14-da9c-4e2e-8521-fc474aa5b8f3-texas_topper.webp?fit=1200%2C676&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/0ac123c14-da9c-4e2e-8521-fc474aa5b8f3-texas_topper.webp?fit=1200%2C676&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/0ac123c14-da9c-4e2e-8521-fc474aa5b8f3-texas_topper.webp?fit=1200%2C676&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":278376,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=278376","url_meta":{"origin":423594,"position":5},"title":"Energy Emergency Alert! ERCOT\u2019s Close Call of September 6 (Part I)","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"12\/09\/2023","format":false,"excerpt":"When the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), the operator of most of the Texas electric grid, declared an\u00a0Energy Emergency Alert 2\u00a0on September 6 for the\u00a0first time\u00a0since Winter Storm Uri, it exposed how renewable energy and renewable energy subsidies are rapidly undermining the reliability of the Texas electric grid.","rel":"","context":"In \"Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)\"","block_context":{"text":"Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=electric-reliability-council-of-texas-ercot"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/0apocalyptic-scenario-1392x770-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C664&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/0apocalyptic-scenario-1392x770-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C664&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/0apocalyptic-scenario-1392x770-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C664&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/0apocalyptic-scenario-1392x770-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C664&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/0apocalyptic-scenario-1392x770-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C664&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/423594","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/121246920"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=423594"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/423594\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":423610,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/423594\/revisions\/423610"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/423606"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=423594"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=423594"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=423594"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}