{"id":366230,"date":"2025-02-15T10:52:02","date_gmt":"2025-02-15T09:52:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=366230"},"modified":"2025-02-15T10:58:23","modified_gmt":"2025-02-15T09:58:23","slug":"the-great-texas-blackout-revisited-market-failure-not","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=366230","title":{"rendered":"The Great Texas Blackout Revisited: Market Failure Not"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Master Resource<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By Robert Bradley Jr.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ed. Note<\/strong>: Four years ago, Storm Uri caused Texas\u2019s centrally planned wholesale electricity market (ERCOT) to buckle, vindicating warnings<\/a> about the state\u2019s wind\/solar reliance. The mainstream media implicated natural gas instead, failing to explore the why behind the why<\/em>. Rather than deregulation, Texas has chosen to add wind, solar, and batteries, while subsidizing natural gas plants to counter intermittency. This duplicated grid is now driving rates up<\/a> in a state that could have relied on surplus natural gas instead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was not so much the story of freak weather triggering a market failure writ large. It was a classic application of the political economy of government intervention: the seen and the unseen, expert\/regulatory failure, and unintended consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Don Lavoie, a preeminent thinker in the field of market-versus-government planning, once warned:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

If the guiding agency is less knowledgeable than the system it is trying to guide\u2014and even worse, if its actions necessarily result in further undesired consequences in the working of that system\u2014then what is going on is not planning at all but, rather, blind interference by some agents with the plans of others.\u201d [1]<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Planned chaos, in other words.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The failure of governmental electricity in Texas humbled many electricity design experts (including technocrat Lynne Kiesling<\/a>); the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT); the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT); and the Texas Legislature. Other players at a distance were the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation [n\u00e9 Council] (NERC); and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Classical liberals can tie experience to theory to identify expert\/regulatory failure. This should not be surprising given that electricity is the most regulated industry in the United States next to money & banking and the national-defense contracting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Superficial View<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u2018mainstream\u2019 view is that an \u201cextreme tail event\u201d caught the private-sector firms, most in natural gas, unprepared. The regulators, in the middle for the most part, did their job. I have challenged this interpretation in detail here<\/a> and here<\/a>. \u201cRenewables, representing more than one-fourth of Texas\u2019s generating capacity,\u201d I argued, \u201call but disappeared at the peak<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

But there is a very important second part of the story: the tax-break-driven pricing of wind severely compromised the economics of existing and new natural gas and coal plants.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

But the rare event was not a market situation begging for market reform. It was a governmental situation where the inertia of intervention resulted in more intervention: continued wind\/solar, battery storage, and even talk about demand-side responses (meter technology and incentives). The experts can solve this, in other words, with a lot of studies and planning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Enron Analogy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reminds me of the (superficial) Enron interpretation. Enron made bad investments, tried to cover them up, and lost the confidence of the market. They went bankrupt and \u2018the market worked.\u2019 Why the massive failure? Fish rot at the head, one book concluded. But why<\/em>?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With Enron (as with the Blackout), I argue that something greater was at work. It was \u2018contra-capitalism,<\/em>\u2019 the pursuit of the unearned, in the form of pervasive rent-seeking<\/em>, strategic deceit<\/em> (\u2019philosophical fraud,\u2019 short of prosecutable fraud), and imprudence<\/em> that Adam Smith, Samuel Smiles, Ayn Rand, and Charles Koch, among others, have warned against.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For me, at least, getting to the \u2018why behind the why\u2019 to explain a \u2018systemic failure\u2019 like Enron opened up a lot of deep thinking that tested and expanded my theory. Capitalism was not to blame for Enron considering all the warnings from our side on bad commercial behaviors, and same for electricity in Texas in February 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reinterpreting the Backout<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With Texas, the surface explanation of wind and solar all but disappearing at the peak is just the beginning. (\u2018This was expected by planners\u2014can\u2019t blame them.\u2019)  It was a pervasive lack of weatherization among natural gas companies from the wellhead to the power plant. But why? Reliability is JOB 1 with electricity, and this job was outsourced to regulators working with a very (regulatory) weakened\/fragmented industry. Coordination issues aplenty!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u2018why behind the why\u2019 gets to a lot of regulation and political\/social pressure that brought the worst out of private sector parties. Think about the intended and unintended consequences of government forcing of wind power in particular. Wind\u2019s intermittency and negative pricing (from the federal tax credit) ruined the economics of conventional power plants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding (mal)coordination, federal and state regulation has disaggregated the natural gas industry in three phases, and the same for electricity in three\/four phases. There are no \u2018electricity majors\u2019 or \u2018natural gas majors\u2019 that are vertically and horizontally integrated (regulation forced the disaggregation of the industry). We needed Majors, in fact\u2026. (The business strategy of integration (\u201coil majors\u201d), by the way, was part of the answer to the \u201ccommons problem\u201d of oil and gas production under the \u2018rule of capture.\u2019 another story.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electricity is different, they say. Need large control areas because of the nature of electrons. A \u2018commons problem\u2019 says Lynne Kiesling.  Okay, then who do you trust? Markets or experts\/regulators? And no, there is no Hayekian\/ central planning solution of private resources in the electricity \u2018commons\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The experts have been working hard on market design to find that right balance between reliability and price. Texas went virtually all price (thinking that peak pricing for several weeks of the year would compensate for not having \u2018capacity payments\u2019 for standing ready to meet peak demand). But the shortage during Storm Uri sent prices to astronomical levels, which now will result in a bunch of nonpayment, lawsuits, and probably socialistic cost-spreading among all customers. Total mess\u2014and most all of the involved regulators have resigned and have court dates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Facebook, Lynne had a revealing exchange with economist Steve Postrel:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Postrel<\/strong>: According to the data I\u2019ve seen, ERCOT consistently plans for lower reserve margins than other grids. ERCOT now planning for 15-20%, but that\u2019s still lower than surrounding grids.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kiesling<\/strong>: Reserve margin: In contrast to your interpretation, I would argue that other RTOs (PJM in particular) have excessive reserve margins relative to supply requirements and relative to the ability of demand to respond to higher prices. Other RTOs (PJM in particular) are governed by generators, who clearly have an incentive to have higher than needed reserve margins. Again I say to you: what do you think the cost is of a reserve margin to achieve 100% reliability during a 1-in-20-year extreme tail event??????<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Postrel<\/strong>: As I noted on your other post, the decision to just accept blackouts like these (in extreme freezes) as the cost of doing business cannot be ruled out as the optimal policy, given the cost of incremental reliability. Presumably, this would be a good subject for cost-benefit analysis with reference to the degree of public risk-aversion. But the \u201cexcess\u201d reserves in other places, if adequate to mitigate the consequences currently being felt in Texas, don\u2019t seem so burdensome as to be obviously superoptimal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is a huge planning issue: reliability vs. price. Experts (like Kiesling) must tell the regulators what to do. NO, we cannot let the market decide because it is a \u201ccommons problem.\u201d  But I say: deregulate to let the electricity majors into the market<\/em> \u2026 And short of this, at least understand the \u2018coordination problem\u2019 as an expert\/regulatory failure, not market failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is time for an entrepreneurial discovery process in a true market, not a contrived market under mandatory open access. Firms must be allowed to internalize the reliability function with their Grade A corporate guarantee. Lots of laws must be repealed, another story.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/strong> Don Lavoie, National Economic Planning: What is Left?<\/em> (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), p. 95.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014\u2014<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appendix: Storm Uri Blackout Reinterpretation<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

My posts on the Great Texas Blackout:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wind, Solar, and the Great Texas Blackout: Guilty as Charged<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Renewables \u201cMarket-Failed\u201d Natural Gas in Texas<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Electricity Planning: Physical vs. Economic (an exchange with Eric Schubert)  <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

ERCOT \u201cworked as planned\u201d (architect Hogan gives no quarter)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Civil Society and Natural Gas during the Great Texas Blackout<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For other posts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cU.S. Winter Outlook: Cooler North, Warmer South\u201d (NOAA\u2019s prediction bust)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Numbers and the Great Texas Blackout<\/a> (Bill Peacock: March 4, 2021 )<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ERCOT: A Central Planning Government Agency<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

ERCOT: A Government Agency<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Texas\u2019 Renewable Fail: Remember Georgetown\u2019s Green New Deal Too<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oklahoma\u2019s Rolling Blackouts: Remembering Audrey McClendon\u2019s War on Coal<\/a> (Charlie Meadows: February 23, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wind Subsidies Help Freeze Texans<\/a> (Bill Peacock: February 18, 2021)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Texas Windpower: Will Negative Pricing Blow Out the Lights? (PTC vs. reliable new capacity)<\/a> (Josiah Neeley: February 17, 2021)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Four years ago, Storm Uri caused Texas\u2019s centrally planned wholesale electricity market (ERCOT) to buckle, vindicating\u00a0warnings\u00a0about the state\u2019s wind\/solar reliance. The mainstream media implicated natural gas instead, failing to explore\u00a0the why behind the why. Rather than deregulation, Texas has chosen to add wind, solar, and batteries, while subsidizing natural gas plants to counter intermittency. This duplicated grid is now\u00a0driving rates up\u00a0in a state that could have relied on surplus natural gas instead.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":121246920,"featured_media":366233,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_coblocks_attr":"","_coblocks_dimensions":"","_coblocks_responsive_height":"","_coblocks_accordion_ie_support":"","_crdt_document":"","advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1],"tags":[691818226,691820976,691821737,691822844,691818577],"class_list":{"0":"post-366230","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"hentry","7":"category-uncategorized","8":"tag-blackout","9":"tag-electric-reliability-council-of-texas-ercot","10":"tag-enron","11":"tag-natural-gas-plants","12":"tag-texas","14":"fallback-thumbnail"},"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/0ac123c14-da9c-4e2e-8521-fc474aa5b8f3-texas_topper.webp?fit=2160%2C1217&ssl=1","jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paxLW1-1xgW","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":378317,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=378317","url_meta":{"origin":366230,"position":0},"title":"New Texas Law To Force Renewables To Be\u00a0Dispatchable","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"14\/05\/2025","format":false,"excerpt":"Sounds like Texas is getting fed up with its electricity system being increasingly put at risk by wind and solar power.","rel":"","context":"In \"Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)\"","block_context":{"text":"Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=electric-reliability-council-of-texas-ercot"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/0TxDOTAustin.webp?fit=1039%2C726&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/0TxDOTAustin.webp?fit=1039%2C726&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/0TxDOTAustin.webp?fit=1039%2C726&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/0TxDOTAustin.webp?fit=1039%2C726&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":301699,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=301699","url_meta":{"origin":366230,"position":1},"title":"In January Cold, the Texas Electricity Grid Held \u2013 Barely","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"14\/02\/2024","format":false,"excerpt":"During the recent Winter Storm Heather (Jan. 13-16), the Texas grid was able to produce enough energy to meet the demand, but just barely.\u00a0Since Winter Storm Uri (February 2021), it appears that improvements have been made to the reliability of natural gas generation.","rel":"","context":"In \"catastrophic failure\"","block_context":{"text":"catastrophic failure","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=catastrophic-failure"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0-Texas-Electricity-Grid.jpeg?fit=1200%2C798&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0-Texas-Electricity-Grid.jpeg?fit=1200%2C798&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0-Texas-Electricity-Grid.jpeg?fit=1200%2C798&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0-Texas-Electricity-Grid.jpeg?fit=1200%2C798&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0-Texas-Electricity-Grid.jpeg?fit=1200%2C798&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":303627,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=303627","url_meta":{"origin":366230,"position":2},"title":"The Great Texas Blackout of 2021: Triumph of the Unreliables","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"20\/02\/2024","format":false,"excerpt":"Three years ago this month, a prolonged, extensive cold snap did the unthinkable to Texas\u2019s huge electricity grid. The\u00a0shared narrative\u00a0from proponents\/apologists of forced energy transformation (\u2018Energy Transition\u2019, \u2018Decarbonization\u2019, \u2018Net Zero\u2019, \u2018Green New Deal\u2019, \u2018Virtual Power Plant\u2019) focused on the failure of natural gas infrastructure as the cause of the debacle,\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"Blackout of 2021\"","block_context":{"text":"Blackout of 2021","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=blackout-of-2021"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0texas-blackout-banner-1-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C480&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0texas-blackout-banner-1-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C480&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0texas-blackout-banner-1-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C480&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0texas-blackout-banner-1-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C480&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/0texas-blackout-banner-1-1.jpg?fit=1200%2C480&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":303990,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=303990","url_meta":{"origin":366230,"position":3},"title":"Tomlinson on the Texas Grid Three Years Ago (prediction fail!)","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"24\/02\/2024","format":false,"excerpt":"With the 3rd anniversary of the Great Texas Blackout (February 2021) this week, it is worth revisiting an (egregious?)\u00a0forecasting error\u00a0of\u00a0Houston Chronicle\u00a0business editorialist Chris Tomlinson.","rel":"","context":"In \"ERCOT\"","block_context":{"text":"ERCOT","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=ercot"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/01200x0.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/01200x0.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/01200x0.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/01200x0.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/01200x0.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":423594,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=423594","url_meta":{"origin":366230,"position":4},"title":"Storm Ferm: Remember Uri (centrally planned electricity \u2018transition\u2019 in Texas)","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"28\/01\/2026","format":false,"excerpt":"The current cold snap (\u201cwhere is global warming when you need it?\u201d) makes timely a review of the Texas electricity debacle of February 2021. This post by Robert Bradley, \u201cWind, Solar, and the Great Texas Blackout: Guilty as Charged,\u201d was originally published by the Institute for Energy Research. As of\u2026","rel":"","context":"In \"\u201cmagical thinking\u201d policymakers\"","block_context":{"text":"\u201cmagical thinking\u201d policymakers","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=magical-thinking-policymakers"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/AQMu-HDswPqIyehP8-4RzGuMHDhmGzIzkpUyFZjZRq3-DWOaMOGQkhsk8K_KbcJbjbI1ao49pVTdMG_5-kuwpPz1MJVAWvgYb7ls-pVrd0cM3bs2ppNwM5vmuKeCXRey.jpeg?fit=1200%2C707&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/AQMu-HDswPqIyehP8-4RzGuMHDhmGzIzkpUyFZjZRq3-DWOaMOGQkhsk8K_KbcJbjbI1ao49pVTdMG_5-kuwpPz1MJVAWvgYb7ls-pVrd0cM3bs2ppNwM5vmuKeCXRey.jpeg?fit=1200%2C707&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/AQMu-HDswPqIyehP8-4RzGuMHDhmGzIzkpUyFZjZRq3-DWOaMOGQkhsk8K_KbcJbjbI1ao49pVTdMG_5-kuwpPz1MJVAWvgYb7ls-pVrd0cM3bs2ppNwM5vmuKeCXRey.jpeg?fit=1200%2C707&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/AQMu-HDswPqIyehP8-4RzGuMHDhmGzIzkpUyFZjZRq3-DWOaMOGQkhsk8K_KbcJbjbI1ao49pVTdMG_5-kuwpPz1MJVAWvgYb7ls-pVrd0cM3bs2ppNwM5vmuKeCXRey.jpeg?fit=1200%2C707&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/AQMu-HDswPqIyehP8-4RzGuMHDhmGzIzkpUyFZjZRq3-DWOaMOGQkhsk8K_KbcJbjbI1ao49pVTdMG_5-kuwpPz1MJVAWvgYb7ls-pVrd0cM3bs2ppNwM5vmuKeCXRey.jpeg?fit=1200%2C707&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":336895,"url":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=336895","url_meta":{"origin":366230,"position":5},"title":"The Government-Imposed Cost of Electricity in Texas","author":"uwe.roland.gross","date":"18\/07\/2024","format":false,"excerpt":"\u201cGovernment increased the cost of Texas electricity by $20 Billion in 2023.\u201d","rel":"","context":"In \"Cost of Electricity\"","block_context":{"text":"Cost of Electricity","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?tag=cost-of-electricity"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/0flag-map-of-texas.png?fit=1200%2C1169&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/0flag-map-of-texas.png?fit=1200%2C1169&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/0flag-map-of-texas.png?fit=1200%2C1169&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/0flag-map-of-texas.png?fit=1200%2C1169&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/climatescience.press\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/0flag-map-of-texas.png?fit=1200%2C1169&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/366230","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/121246920"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=366230"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/366230\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":366234,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/366230\/revisions\/366234"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/366233"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=366230"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=366230"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=366230"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}