{"id":279450,"date":"2023-09-19T14:35:05","date_gmt":"2023-09-19T12:35:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=279450"},"modified":"2023-09-19T14:35:24","modified_gmt":"2023-09-19T12:35:24","slug":"update-doe-appliance-minimum-efficiency-standards","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/climatescience.press\/?p=279450","title":{"rendered":"Update: DOE Appliance Minimum Efficiency Standards"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\u00a0From Master Resource<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By\u00a0<\/em>Mark Krebs<\/a>\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIt started with gas cooking.  It will end with getting gas out of homes and business entirely, If they can. Basically, what we\u2019re witnessing is the energy equivalent of ethnic cleansing. I\u2019ve been saying this for years but now it should be obvious.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under the Biden Administration has significantly accelerated the pace of minimum appliance efficiency rulemaking. With this acceleration, there has been a marked decrease in DOE\u2019s analytical quality and transparency. The purpose of this update is to summarize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. Energy Conservation Standards for Consumer Conventional Cooking Products<\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Energy Conservation Standards for Consumer Products; Boilers<\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Energy Conservation Standards for Consumer Water Heaters<\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Note: In DOE-speak, the term \u2018consumer\u2019 means non commercial\/industrial, or just residential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Part 1: Consumer Cooking Products<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

    On April 27, 2023, MasterResource published DOE vs. Gas Cooking: A Review of Critical Comments<\/a>. On August 2, 2023, DOE reopened the docket with a \u201cNotification of data availability and request for comment<\/a> (NODA) with comments due September 1. More than 100 comments were filed. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The NODA substantially changed the Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking and announcement of public meeting & request for comments<\/a> (SNOPR) that my April 27 article summarized . DOE probably should have (or at least could have) issued its NODA as a SNOPR and allowed more time to develop comments than the 30 days the NOPR allowed. A request for extension<\/a> of the comment period was timely filed but denied<\/a> by DOE on August 30. This request contained the following excerpt that summarized the effects of ignoring such requests:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

     \u201cAd hoc departures are not proper, for such activities disrupt orderly processes and harm predictability, which are the hallmarks of lawful administrative action<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Footnote 5 of that statement further stated:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    See, e.g., Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (\u201c[I]t is elementary that an agency must adhere to its own rules and regulations. Ad hoc departures from those rules, even to achieve laudable aims, cannot be sanctioned . . . for therein lie the seeds of destruction of the orderliness and predictability which are the hallmarks of lawful administrative action. Simply stated, rules are rules, and fidelity to the rules which have been properly promulgated, consistent with applicable statutory requirements, is required of those to whom Congress has entrusted the regulatory missions of modern life.\u201d<\/strong>); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (\u201cIt is axiomatic that an agency must adhere to its own regulations.\u201d); Mine Reclamation Corp. v. FERC, 30 F.3d 1519, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (on its way to decision an agency must follow its own regulations).<\/em> [emphasis added]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Some commenters viewed the NODA and relatively short (30-day) comment period as a violation to  the Administrative Procedures Act<\/a> codified by 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551(5)\u2013(7)<\/a> and the DOE\u2019s \u201cprocess rule<\/a>\u201d codified by 10 CFR 430 Appendix A to Subpart C<\/a>. One such commenter making this case was the Institute for Energy Research<\/a> (IER).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Other comments with detailed content in opposition of DOE\u2019s proposal for consumer cooking products included those of:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    1. Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers (AHAM)<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. National Association of Home Builders (NAHB)<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. Gas Analytics & Advocacy Services, LLC (GAAS)<\/a><\/li>\n\n\n\n
    4. Joint Gas industry<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      The third reference in the above list are my comments. They addressed what has changed since DOE determined (in 2019) that additional efficiency mandates for gas cooking appliances is not justified. In short, Biden happened<\/em>. With that change, DOE resorted to a longstanding bias that any amount of net positive cash flow (greater than zero) on average was sufficient economic justification. I cited AHAM\u2019s press release \u201cGas Cooking Appliances Remain at Risk Despite New DOE Data<\/a>\u201d for this NODA that succinctly justified what that amount now is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      \u201cThe revised data reduces consumer savings to just 9 cents per month.<\/em><\/strong>\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      I contend no one would freely elect to invest in anything with that kind of return-on-investment (ROI). Additionally, 9 cents per month is far less than the uncertainty range within DOE\u2019s economic calculations.  Besides, DOE\u2019s economic calculations typically low-ball increased maintenance costs and over-inflate fuel costs (among many other biased input assumptions).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      What else has changed is that DOE cost-effectiveness now includes highly controversial benefits from reduced climate change allowed by grossly inflated social cost of carbon (SCC) avoidance and health benefits from improved indoor air quality (IAQ). As shown by the following table, the economic add-ons of \u201cclimate\u201d (SCC) and \u201chealth\u201d (improved IAQ) benefits greatly exceed the reduced energy consumption values (shown as \u201cconsumer operating cost savings\u201d) that the enabling legislation envisioned should be the leading criteria under the Energy Conservation and Policy Act (EPCA):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Further summarizing Table 1.2.2, for a 3% discount rate and the shown $259.2 million of DOE estimated net benefits, well over half ($160.8 million) are attributable to factors beyond the original intent of the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) to provide \u201csignificant\u201d consumer operating cost savings. [1]<\/a> A similar ratio exists for a 7% discount rate. Of course, \u201csignificant\u201d is defined by DOE.  And, at least for the present, \u201csignificant\u201d appears to mean any amount of net positive cash flow greater than zero.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      My comments also cited a recent paper that debunked assumed IAQ benefits.  The abstract of that paper follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n